

In sum, in the recent flood of linguistic handbooks, some of which partly duplicate each other, *The Cambridge handbook of linguistic code-switching* is a particularly welcome addition, meeting a long-felt need. The volume surveys a wealth of CS research from the past few decades, scrutinizes insightfully major issues and many proposed principles, and opens up new paths in the investigation and understanding of CS. Being the first handbook of its kind and unique in its depth and breadth of coverage, *LCS* will not only serve as a useful reference work, but is also likely to stimulate new CS research in the next few years.

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Ileana Comorovski & Klaus von Heusinger (eds.), *Existence: Semantics and syntax* (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 84). Dordrecht: Springer, 2007. Pp. vii + 332.

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This volume brings together research presented at the workshop Existence: Semantics and Syntax, held at the University of Nancy 2 in 2002, along with

some invited contributions. The papers are organized into three thematic sections, preceded by a brief introductory chapter.

Ronnie Cann ('Towards a dynamic account of BE in English') seeks to capture the flexible distribution of *be* under a unified analysis. Instead of assuming homophony for *be*, or deriving a family of meanings from a basic one, Cann analyzes *be* as an underspecified monadic predicate, the content of which is determined by linguistic and extralinguistic context. In Dynamic Syntax, the incremental construction of utterances restricts the pragmatic and linguistic resources available for determining content. Cann exemplifies how such restrictions can be used to derive standard copular constructions, constructions in which a postcopular predicate is elided, existential sentences, and so-called existential focus constructions (*Neuroses just ARE*). The analysis raises various interesting issues, such as a potential derivation of some of the well-known properties of existentials from architectural properties. The idea that *be* is radically underspecified intriguingly invites comparison with *have*, for which underspecification has also been claimed, and the formulation of a general theory of underspecification within the principled account of the interaction between form, meaning and context outlined.

Ileana Comorovski ('Constituent questions and the copula of specification') analyzes French constituent questions of the form [*quel* cop DP] as specificational clauses. The postcopular D(eterminer)P(hrase) is argued to be a specificational subject denoting an individual concept; *quel*-questions function to inquire about the extension of this concept relative to a context. Comorovski argues for a lexically specified copula of specification, and, consequently, against analyses of specification as inverse predication. The proposed semantics explains some of the characteristics Comorovski identifies for specificational subjects, for example, the fact that they cannot be referential or quantificational. An open question Comorovski points to is the apparent requirement that specificational subjects contain a discourse-familiar referent ('indirect discourse anchoring'). This is not explained by type-theoretical choices. An answer to this question would presumably also explain other interesting observations made in the paper, such as the fact that incomplete definite descriptions cannot be specificational subjects. Beyond analyzing a class of French interrogatives, the paper demonstrates that individual concepts are relevant to understanding 'specification', converging with evidence from other areas of research, such as the semantics of concealed questions (e.g. Romero 2007).

Ljudmila Geist ('Predication and equation in copular sentences: Russian vs. English') offers an analysis of Russian predicational, specificational, and equative copular sentences which maintains a unified basic interpretation for the copula as an identity function on predicates. She thus argues against positing a separate copula of identity, contra, for example, Higgins (1973), instead correlating the distinction between the predication and identity

readings in part with a property- vs. entity-type denotation (respectively) for the postcopular nominal. She then makes novel use of type-shifting to achieve semantic composition when the copula – which unambiguously needs a property-type complement – has to combine with an entity-type complement to yield an identity reading: rather than adopting the standard move of type-shifting the nominal, Geist combines the relevant nominal type-shifting function with the copula via function composition, combining that result with the nominal. This seemingly innocuous change, combined with the assumption that type-shifting must apply to explicit linguistic expressions, cleverly accounts for a variety of facts in both English and Russian.

Claudia Maienborn ('On Davidsonian and Kimian states') discusses what she calls statives, a class of predicates including those expressed by postcopular constituents. In previous work, Maienborn has argued that statives do not involve a Davidsonian event variable but instead express K(imian)-states. Unlike eventualities, K-states are realized only in time, not space, and hence are not perceptible. Here, Maienborn defends this thesis from two potential counterarguments. One is that if statives lack a Davidsonian variable, they should not permit manner modification, yet they sometimes do. Maienborn explains away such cases as involving non-compositional interpretation. The second counterargument, based on Parson's 'time travel' argument, also involves manner modification. Since statives do not allow manner modification, she claims that this argument does not carry over to them. The success of this response therefore depends directly on the strength of her reply to the first counterargument. Another issue is whether Maienborn's distinction requires abandoning Davidsonian logical forms, rather than just the recognition of non-spatial, abstract truth makers. For example, could the distinction be incorporated into a Davidsonian analysis as a sortal distinction in the domain of eventualities, on which the relevant ontological distinctions are pinned? Assuming that manner modifiers are sort sensitive, the adverbial modification facts might then be derived.

Jianhua Hu & Haihua Pan ('Focus and the basic function of Chinese existential *you*-sentences') analyze the discourse function of existentials in Mandarin Chinese. The main aim of the paper is to account for existentials in which a discourse-old, formally definite noun phrase occurs in an existential with a focus marker. Hu & Pan's claim is that in such cases, the existential sentence functions not to introduce a new discourse referent but rather to introduce the new information that a given entity is an element of a given set (on the assumption that the given set is not given by an enumeration of its members but by a description). As Hu & Pan point out, this is a more precise characterization of so-called 'list' readings of existentials with definite NPs. The main intuition of the paper seems correct; unfortunately, however, the paper stops short of an explicit analysis. The formalization

given (see, e.g., 25) is not coherent, one of several places where more careful copy-editing would have helped.

Barbara H. Partee & Vladimir Borschev ('Existential sentences, BE, and the genitive of negation in Russian') consider whether there are necessary or sufficient conditions for identifying existential sentences in Russian. The prototypical Russian existential looks like a copular sentence containing a locative predicate, only with the constituent order reversed so that the locative expression is sentence-initial rather than postcopular. However, Partee & Borschev point out that there are other contrasts between typical existentials and locatives, including the absence of both definite subjects and null present tense copulas in existentials, and the presence of genitive of negation marking on the subjects of negated existentials but not on the subjects of negated locatives. They present a useful overview of the genitive of negation and Russian existentials literature, including their own analysis in terms of what they call *Perspectival Structure*. They then show how the distributional correlates of existentials vs. locatives fail to align as predicted. Partee & Borschev outline several different approaches to this problem, tentatively suggesting that, for Russian, 'existential sentence' is a cluster concept associated with a set of independent but frequently coinciding characteristics.

In 'Negative quantification and existential sentences', Lucia Tovena discusses two nonverbal constructions in Italian involving the negative elements (*n*-words) *niente* 'nothing' and *nessuno* 'no/nobody', which correspond roughly to negative existentials:

- (1) (a) Nessun testimone intorno a lei.
 no witnesses around to her
 '(There were) no witnesses around her.'
 (b) Niente processo per la truppa.
 nothing trial for the troops
 '(There will be) no trial for the troops.'

Tovena suggests that these constructions are interpreted as tripartite quantificational structures, the *n*-word contributing the quantifier, the adjacent noun the restriction, and the rest of the clause the scope (essentially as in Keenan's 1987 analysis of English existentials, where the expletive and copula are semantically inert). The paper provides a rich and intriguing discussion of various semantic and pragmatic properties differentiating the two constructions. For example, *niente* constructions assert that the intersection of the restriction and scope is empty, whereas the *nessuno* construction allows that it is not. Tovena speculates that this reflects an information-structural distinction related to conservativity. Since *niente* is second-argument conservative, its first argument is NOT topical, but rather part of the assertion, and nothing is assumed in the common ground about its extension. This is appealing, but as Tovena herself notes, the link with conservativity is weak. *Niente* and

nessuno are both conservative on both arguments, and conservativity can therefore not determine their information structural differences.

Francis Corblin ('Existence, maximality, and the semantics of numeral modifiers') presents a novel analysis of nominals containing the modified numerals *at least n*, *at most n*, and *exactly n*, on which these expressions introduce a comparison between two sets: one having the cardinality *n*; the other, the maximal set of individuals satisfying the conditions expressed by the sentence. For example, the satisfaction conditions for *At least two girls sang* require that the set of girls who sang is at least as large as a set of two girls. Corblin then argues that an utterance of a nominal containing a modified numeral introduces two discourse referents: one for each of the compared sets. He supports this analysis with data involving discourse anaphora and appositive modification, which show that the cardinality conditions relevant for truth are distinct from those relevant for discourse dynamics. Finally, Corblin points out a problem his analysis encounters with existential sentences lacking coda phrases. Interestingly, this problem would not arise if Corblin assumed a relational semantics for existentials such as that proposed by Partee & Borschev, pointing to the relevance of modified numeral data for debates over the semantic analysis of existentials.

Klaus von Heusinger ('Referentially anchored indefinites') discusses the notion of specificity pertaining to specific indefinites. He argues that the relevant notion for the analysis of all specific indefinites is what he calls 'relative specificity', which involves anchoring to an entity familiar in the context. Familiarity is modeled as in File Change Semantics (Heim 1982). Specific indefinites and definites differ in that the latter are directly anchored to a familiar entity, whereas the former introduce a new discourse referent which is 'linked' or identifiable relative to a familiar referent. According to von Heusinger, unlike the case of definites, the anchoring referents for specific indefinites must be introduced within the same clause as the indefinite. This assumption predicts that specificity is dependent on configurational facts, a prediction argued to be borne out in languages like Turkish. However, he also shows that anchoring can be to entities which are not syntactically represented in the sentence, such as the speaker. It thus seems that specificity is not so much clause-bound as utterance-bound. This unified analysis of specificity is intuitively very appealing; however, the formalization is slightly confusing, as it is unclear whether index variables stand for sets of indices (as indicated by notations such as $\{i\} \subseteq j$) or sets of individuals (as indicated by notations such as $i \subseteq j$). This is another instance where better copy-editing would have helped.

Bart Geurts ('Existential import') examines an asymmetry between strong quantifiers such as *every* and weak quantifiers such as *some*: the former, but not the latter, carry what Geurts calls existential import, i.e., the implication that their domain of quantification is not empty. Geurts considers, and rejects, two previous explanations for why some quantifiers

have existential import and others do not. He then defends the view that strong quantifiers presuppose a nonempty domain, while weak ones do not. He reviews the evidence for this view and replies to the criticism that strong universal quantifiers cannot presuppose their domain because universal quantifications can be true when their domain is empty. The discussion leads to a more general reflection on the nature of presupposition in which Geurts argues that the existential import facts support Strawson's pragmatic conception of the phenomenon. In addition to serving as an argument for the binding theory of presupposition (van der Sandt 1992), which Geurts shows is one way to formalize a Strawsonian view of presupposition, the paper provides thoughtful commentary on the relation between definedness, accommodation, givenness and existential import.

Finally, Roberto Zamparelli ('On singular existential quantifiers in Italian') examines the system of singular indefinites in Italian, with emphasis on *qualche* 'some' and *un qualche*, literally 'a some'. The puzzle is that while *un qualche* is always interpreted as singular and with a free choice implication, *qualche* can be interpreted as strictly singular or as entailing more than one. The latter interpretation is the default; the former, restricted to contexts which Zamparelli loosely describes as intensional. Another difference is that singular *qualche* and *un qualche* imply indetermination of identity, while plural *qualche* implies indeterminacy of quantity. Zamparelli accounts for these facts under a uniform semantics for *qualche* by appealing to a 'layered' DP structure, which affords two distinct landing sites for *qualche*, and by interpreting indefinites with respect to Horn scales which yield different implicatures depending on which position *qualche* occupies. In a very interesting move, he attributes the free choice interpretation of *un qualche* not to domain widening, as is standard, but to a blocking of domain restriction.

We close with a few comments on the formal aspects of the volume. There is a useful subject index that includes reference to the different languages discussed in the contributions. Although each section is reasonably cohesive, the papers vary considerably in length, resulting in a certain unevenness. As mentioned above, the volume would have benefitted from more thorough editing and proofreading: there are inconsistencies in the presentational details of the contributions and typographical errors in all of the chapters, and in some cases the papers have stylistic elements that are more characteristic of an expanded handout than a published article. Nonetheless, the volume presents a number of novel, thought-provoking proposals and makes for worthwhile reading.

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Louise Cummings, *Clinical pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. xi + 305.

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Louise Cummings's *Clinical pragmatics* is a valuable resource. The book has two main aims: to survey pragmatic disorders and existing treatments of them, and to evaluate the field. It meets the first aim very effectively. With regard to the second aim, the book has some noteworthy flaws, but is nonetheless a useful contribution to an important emerging discipline.

Cummings considers a host of pragmatic deficits, describing both developmental disorders and deficits acquired in adulthood. Chapter 2, 'A survey of developmental pragmatic disorders', is devoted to the former. She explains in detail the symptomatology of Specific Language Impairment (SLI), Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), emotional and behavioral disorders, including especially Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and numerous varieties of mental retardation (e.g., Down's, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, Williams' Syndrome). As for acquired deficits, in Chapter 3, 'A survey of acquired pragmatic disorders', Cummings provides a detailed overview of the pragmatic effects of, among other things, left and right hemisphere damage (whether due to stroke, other lesions or trauma), and the pragmatic deficits characteristic of schizophrenia and Alzheimer's.

Beyond presenting the symptoms, Cummings provides an overview of the various suggested causes. In particular, in the fourth and fifth chapters ('The contribution of pragmatics to cognitive theories of autism' and 'The cognitive substrates of acquired pragmatic disorders') she explains at length the posited roles of Theory of Mind, Weak Central Coherence, and Executive Function. Building on this, she catalogues in Chapter 6, 'The assessment and treatment of pragmatic disorders', a host of existing assessment tools and treatment regimes.