European Integration from Nation-States to Member States
Christopher J. Bickerton
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The European Union (EU) is an "unidentified political object" in the words of Jacques Delors, "less than a federation, more than a regime," in those of William Wallace (1983). How to conceptualize this persistent puzzle? For some, the EU is a "regulatory state" (Majone, 1994), an "intergovernmental regime" (Moravcsik, 1998), for others, a "multi-level governance" (Hooghe and Marks, 2001), a "neo-medieval empire" (Zielonka, 2006) and a "system of differentiated integration" (Leuffen et al., 2012). Christopher J. Bickerton defines the EU as a "union of member states" (vi) that is the result of the transformation of the state in Europe. The member states are at the centre of the Union and the decisions are made by national representatives, not European agents, as we might think. With the end of the "Golden Age," in the 1970s to1980s, and the redesign of the social contract, Europe saw the transition of nation-state to the member state.

According to Bickerton, member state is not a legal category but a concept created by social scientists. It is an ideal type of the state that is structured by horizontal bureaucratic expertise and consensus relations among different governments. It aims to address technical problems and is structured around two trends, populism and technocracy. Bickerton also qualifies the member state as a "populist technocracy" (188). This model differs from the nation-state in that it is characterized by vertical political ideological and conflict ties between government and society. The nation-state is to manage political disagreements over the nation (47) and is organized around the left/right divide. To sum up, the member state is less a political community than an administrative machine or, to paraphrase Engels, the "administration of things" (69).

Bickerton contributes to our knowledge on European integration by defining a clear thesis and a concise argument. He successfully avoids falling in the euro-jargon to reconcile the politician and the scientist. The shift in focus from Brussels to the state and its transformations is innovative and useful in explaining the European integration process. Indeed, few studies (Schmidt, 2010) in European studies focus on elites (national or European) and societies (national and transnational). In addition, identifying the change from the nation-state to the member state in the 1970s and 1980s, rather than after the Second World War, is an original and compelling historical argument. Finally, Bickerton expresses his concern about the trend to research specialization in the social sciences in general (Lahire, 2012) and particularly in the European studies. To understand the EU as a whole, to qualify the *polity-building* rather than to complete the "series of postcards" (Hall, 2007: 126) on the *policy-making,* is useful.

While acknowledging the premises of the argument, I have a few reservations. First, the European integration is thought as a unified process and as a static system. On the one hand, the units (member states) seem interchangeable because the structure of power relations is not specified. Some EU states correspond to the member state model, others less so. There is an assumption that the smaller the state and its relative "dependence" (Estonia, Malta and Romania, for example), the more emphatic the confirmation of the thesis of the member state. The greater the state and the more "independent" (Germany, France, Poland and the United Kingdom, for example), the more likely the thesis will be less persuasive. In addition, the starting point (the nation-state) is suitable for the states of Western Europe but, for historical reasons, not so appropriate for the states of Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, variations between sectors seem to have been lost. The empirical analysis of *high politics* only (foreign policy,

macroeconomic policy, justice, internal and external security policies) does not invalidate the idea that political sectors matter. In the absence of hard evidence, the idea that *all* states of the EU (Germany and Greece as well as Denmark) hold, in *all* policy areas (defense and justice as well as agriculture and competition), the same central position seems more essentialist than realistic.

Second, the union of member states offers an approach intergovernmental of the EU. The institutionalization of Europe (Stone Sweet et al., 2001) is considered marginal since the emergence of a "Eurocracy field" (Georgagakis, 2012), that is to say, Bickerton rejects the empowering of European institutions over the member states. The idea that the EU is limited to 28 member states seems restrictive, even in the *high politics* such as security, justice (Bigo, 1996; Guiraudon, 2000) or defence (Mérand, 2008). Even if the significance of national identity can hardly be disputed, studies such as Lewis (2006) on the functional and institutional socializations process of political representatives in the EU show their plural identity.

Third, the shift from the nation-state to the member state appears linear because governments make "conscious policy choices" (Bickerton, 2012: 149). This analysis leaves no room for the "unintended consequences" (Pierson, 1996) and hysteresis phenomenon (Neumann and Pouliot, 2011), the "chaotic way" that characterizes the formation of European foreign policy (Buchet de Neuilly, 2005), the constrained decisions or non-decisions leading to the creation of a European defense policy (Mérand, 2008) or the "unlikely strategy" of the policy makers who formed the single market (Jabko, 2009). This linearity of the process gives a teleological impression which excludes the possibility of a reversal or a disintegration of Europe. In other words, after a radical change (the genesis of the member states paradigm), there is a strong "path dependency" (Pierson, 2000) toward the European integration process.

The cover of the book, the great black-and-white photo of Chris Killip's "True Love" shows a man, alone, facing a wall. On the sidewalk, newspapers are tossed and scattered by the wind. A world is disintegrating without another taking its place. This is the pessimistic and complex reality that Christopher J. Bickerton presents.

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Peuples et populisme.
Catherine Colliot-Thélène et Florant Guénard (dir.)
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Dans cet ouvrage collectif, les auteurs essaient de décortiquer la relation entre la démocratie et le populisme, en particulier la difficulté de démêler le phénomène du populisme de celui du peuple. Cinq analyses y sont présentées. D'abord, Catherine Colliot-Thélène offre un texte de survol qui s'interroge sur *« Quel est le peuple du populisme? »*. Ensuite, Pierre Rosanvallon apporte son analyse dans *« Penser le populisme »*. En troisième lieu, Florent Guénard approfondit la question du peuple avec: *« Existe-t-il encore un peuple? Démocratie et vie moderne »*. Dans un quatrième texte, Chloé Gaboriaux poursuit cette réflexion avec : « *L'autre peuple. La gauche et les paysans au XIXe siècle »*. Enfin, Juliette Roussin partage ses réflexions autour de: *« La sagesse du peuple »*.

Pour Colliot-Thélène, il existe une distance entre le *demos* de la démocratie et le supposé *peuple* du populisme. Ledit écart se révèle par un constat : pour gouverner, il faut déléguer et donc distinguer entre gouvernés et gouvernants. Ainsi, il existe une tension entre ces deux groupes. Pour l'auteure, transformer cette tension est la seule façon de protéger la démocratie et d'affaiblir le populisme.