

universality reveal the futility of increasing access to politics as a statist dispensation from above. It takes a rich fabric of associational life to make universal access to politics real. For Tomba, these two aspects are linked: when experiments in self-government are insurgent, they expand access to politics, because when the entire social order is under challenge “anyone can be on the side of the insurgents” (p. 19).

Insurgent universality can sound abstract. The major strength of Tomba’s book is to win this concept from the rough ground of history. The book’s chapters span the French Revolution and Paris Commune to the Russian Revolution and the Zapatistas. Each chapter clarifies “insurgent universality” by studying a neglected experiment in self-government that transcended borders. In the French Revolution, for example, we look away from the Jacobins and Girondins toward the actions of the *enragés*, insurrectionary women, and their enslaved counterparts in Saint-Domingue. In the 1871 Paris Commune, we read the Parisians’ insurrection together with their Arab and Berber counterparts in Algeria. After 1917, we turn away from the Bolsheviks, the better to dwell with the agrarian socialist possibilities contained in the soviets and the 1920 Congress of the Peoples of the East. In the case of the Zapatistas, their defense of the *mandar obedeciendo* is not exoticized as foreign to Western modernity, but is recontextualized as a continuation of the imperative mandate tradition connecting 1793, 1871, and the Soviet Constitution of 1918.

For Tomba, these episodes of self-government can appear as insurgent universality if we forsake a vision of history populated by “progressive” protagonists and “reactionary” antagonists. Indeed, by eschewing teleological history we can rediscover these experiments as something other than anachronisms, namely as “trailmarker[s] of possible futures” (p. 26). Tomba’s method pays off when it uncovers hidden ligaments connecting liberation movements across time and space. In the end, writing a history of insurgent universality is a trustbusting enterprise. Forget nationalist historiographies. Forget monopolies, whether the state’s monopoly on sovereignty, capitalism’s monopoly on time, liberalism’s monopoly on freedom and association, and Western Europe’s monopoly on universality. Moments of insurgent universality could connect everyone, because they belonged to everyone.

Tomba devotes little space to historical exposition. The result is that the book will be of greatest appeal to readers already familiar with events like the Paris Commune or the Russian Revolution. Other readers may have a harder time recognizing the work of theoretical excavation that forms each chapter’s contribution. At times, too, Tomba’s ambition can generate frustrating binary characterizations of complex historical affairs. The Paris Commune is staged as a war between individual and collective rights (p. 107), even though newspapers like the *Cri du peuple* acclaimed individual rights for the “communal revolution.” Variations of the phrase, “There are two conceptions at stake...” or

“There are two traditions...” score the text. This binarism empowers Tomba’s critique of a “dominant modernity” but risks overstating its uniformity. Andrew Sartori’s *Liberalism in Empire* (2014) has recently challenged us to consider why Bengali peasants could invoke Lockean property to demand the British Empire’s expulsion from their land. These peasants weaponized “dominant modernity” against itself. One wonders what Tomba would make of such experiences.

Even so, there is good reason to accept Tomba’s dramatic staging, even if it sometimes exaggerates, because the book’s goal is not historical documentation. It is the construction of a vantage point to appreciate past experiments in insurgent universality as “something incomplete,” as a legacy for us to resume today (pp. 5, 14, 28). And herein resides the book’s great value: it demonstrates how to use history to do political theory. So much history of political thought unfolds in an expository mode, routinely executed as monographs or chapters contextualizing a single author. Tomba’s book is proof of concept that the history of political thought can be so much more. “When the people are really the protagonists and they act politically,” Tomba claims, “the people don’t need big personalities.” That is why “insurgent universality is mainly anonymous” (pp. 2, 79). Tomba is out to remind us that democratic theory is not the achievement of individual authors; it is the conquest of groups trying to win a more equal form of life. His book models how to do historical political theory that lives up to that conviction.

Mary Shelley and the Rights of the Child: Political Philosophy in *Frankenstein*. By Eileen Hunt Botting. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. 232p. \$42.50 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

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Two hundred years after its publication, Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein; or, the Modern Prometheus* more than retains its place in modern culture. The 20-year old author’s novel has made its mark on what one might call the global imagination, and its relevance is likely to endure. Begun when she was 18, Shelley’s work has been adapted for the stage as well as the screen, and it has shaped art and literature worldwide: translated into French shortly after its publication, it can be read now in nearly every language. The novel’s story first appeared on film in 1910 in J. Searle Dawley’s *Frankenstein* and has inspired the work of many other cinematographers throughout the world, including Ishirō Honda’s 1965 Japanese-American coproduction *Frankenstein Conquers the World*, the Spanish director Victor Erice’s 1973 *The Spirit of the Beehive*, and Mel Brooks’s 1974 *Young Frankenstein*.

In the preface, Eileen Hunt Botting tells us how she first came to *Frankenstein* as a child in the 1970s by watching the *Creature Double Feature* on a local television station, then reading the novel once in high school, and finally appreciating its “philosophical richness” at university when Victor Frankenstein’s murderous creation, the Creature, ceased to be merely a horrendous fictive miscreation in her eyes. Instead, she saw “the Creature’s double identity as a superman avenger and a hideous monster to be a dangerous psychological fiction, foisted upon his self-image by his father’s and society’s horrified reaction to his features.” Behind this façade, she discerned “the Creature for who he really was: a stateless orphan, abandoned by family, abused by society, and ignored by the law” (p. xi). For all his hideous crimes, the Creature deserved sympathy for having been made as repugnant as he was and then neglected for it. This is the sentiment that sets the tone of Hunt Botting’s book on Shelley’s masterpiece, which she wishes to consider not through the lens of science but through that of politics.

Reading *Frankenstein* in this light has a long pedigree, Hunt Botting acknowledges; indeed, the book was said by Mary’s husband Percy Shelley to show how injustice was not only inflicted on but also increased by its victims. “Treat a person ill,” Hunt Botting quotes Percy Shelley, “and he will become wicked . . . by neglect and solitude of heart, into a scourge and a curse” (p. 2). What distinguishes her account from others who have similarly placed the text within its early nineteenth-century political context—namely, the social and political unrest of the post-Napoleonic Wars period—is that Hunt Botting takes the novel to be a “profound work of speculative fiction designed to engage philosophical questions concerning children’s rights to the means for their healthy development and well-being – fundamentally, rights to warmth, food, water, clothing, shelter, care education, family, community, and, most crucially, love” (p. 3). Although she insists that her interpretation does not exclude others and is not intended to brush them aside, for Hunt Botting, the entire structure of *Frankenstein* forces on its readers a moral consideration of the question of the rights of children. It is constructed, in her view, through a series of thought experiments that ask such questions as the following: What if the scientific creator of a child were repelled by his or her creation? What if a neglected child claimed a fundamental right to a female companion from its nonbiological creator? What if this creator refused? Thus Hunt Botting is not only offering a particular interpretation of *Frankenstein* but is also using her reading of the work as a platform for some moral philosophical probing.

The four chapters that make up her book take us from the 17-year-old Mary Shelley’s discovery of the dead body of her infant daughter Clara; the nightmares that followed; through to the status of children in the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant; then an

examination of Shelley’s own mother Mary Wollstonecraft’s views on children, followed by reflections on the various aspects of the thought experiments that Hunt Botting sees in *Frankenstein*. It ends in a form of plea that we think through the rights of post/human children engendered by the exponential developments in fertilization and genetic modification being made now or in the future. As Hunt Botting sees it, “*Frankenstein* leads readers to see that the justification of a fundamental right to love is the same for a post/human child as it is for a child deemed human.” The issue is pressing, given the “immanent possibility of making post/human children en masse through gene editing and other biotechnologies” (p. 179).

This is a provocative work. Although one may question aspects of its account of the Hobbesian state of nature; Kant’s views on illegitimate children, duties, friendship and more; or Wollstonecraft’s pronouncements on rights or attempts to qualify them in some way or other, there is no doubt that it raises interesting questions about the nature of rights; parent–child, society–child, and state–child relationships; and, most importantly, the nature of love. It is a book for the philosophically inclined, but the issues it raises are of general concern: even if a world of genetically modified or entirely artificially created children were not to come into existence, we need to think and rethink what may be deemed to be owed to children by their parents, families, society, and the state. Expectations of these rights vary between cultures and change with time, just as what children may be deemed to owe their parents, families, society, and the state changes.

That children should be granted rights, indeed have rights, is not a novel claim. In book I, chapter 16 of his *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1765–69), Sir William Blackstone stated that the duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law; he called on the authority of Samuel Pufendorf to support his view that this obligation did not just emanate from nature but also from parents’ own agency in bringing their children into the world. This obligation gave children a perfect right to maintenance from their parents. One can take it from this that neither Blackstone nor his seventeenth-century predecessor, Pufendorf, would be unwilling to grant that Shelley’s Creature or any post/human child created by twenty-first-century science might produce a similar right. The difficulty would reside in the extensiveness of this right of maintenance. They might well accept the *Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child* (1924), which specifies that children must be given the means for physical and spiritual development, nursed when ill, helped when in distress or need, protected from exploitation, and put in a position to earn a living—as well as the UN’s subsequent conventions on children’s rights. The right to be loved may be another matter. Actions can be

commanded, but not so feelings. They are moreover unlikely to develop in response to entitlements to them by others. In any event, who would or could determine whether being tucked into bed and read a story was done out of duty or love?

Frankenstein provides a warning of the fatal consequences of the failure to attend to a scientific creation's affective needs. The lesson is an important one, more generally speaking. But is fear of consequences a basis for love? And is love necessarily allied to good nurturing and care? The medical profession is trained to perfect a kind of emotional detachment from patients partly so as to ensure their best possible care. Among the merits of Hunt Botting's book is that it makes us ponder the complexity of the phenomenon of love and reminds us of its centrality to Western philosophical inquiry since at least Plato.

Cities and Immigration: Political and Moral Dilemmas in the New Era of Migration. By Avner de-Shalit. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 192p. \$80.00 cloth.
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What an ambitious book! *Cities and Immigration: Political and Moral Dilemmas in the New Era of Migration* by Professor Avner de-Shalit sets out to recalibrate debates in the political theory of migration from states to cities and then to address the myriad controversies, confusions, and potentials that follow. In doing so, de-Shalit opens up endless questions, presents new theoretical perspectives, and makes the case for the poverty of state-centric migration theorization. The book is also methodologically ambitious. It is grounded on hundreds of interviews (with mayors and administrators, but more often locals, artists, retailers, or passing pedestrians) that bridge traditional political theoretical considerations with de-Shalit's own personal musings. To that, he adds intermittent empirical and historical considerations. Although the book asks far more questions than it ultimately resolves, for the most part that is its strength.

The book consists of three substantive chapters and an "appendix." Chapter 1 addresses the normative questions of if and how cities should control their borders. De-Shalit's answer is a soft and interesting "yes." He reviews many arguments by both state- and city-focused theorists—none of which I survey here—and finds that there are few good arguments for closing the city gates. However, although de-Shalit does not defend closed *territorial* borders, he does maintain that some *cultural* borders are sometimes worth protecting. For de-Shalit, *civicism* or urban communitarianism (I return to this idea) usually means openness and inclusivity, and that ethos needs protection. As a rule, however, protecting it by closing borders would scuttle its underlying principles. Hence, de-

Shalit argues that protecting urban communitarianism requires opening the city to all, but there are exceptions that generate communitarian arguments for exclusion. For example, some immigrants could threaten the communitarian spirit due to what we could call preexisting conditions. So, cities can close the gates to criminals because, by their very criminality, they have indicated that they are misanthropes of one sort or another. The logic here is not the logic of protecting the culture (it is not David Miller's liberal nationalism argument writ small), but almost one of self-ostracism by deed. The same logic allows de-Shalit to argue that certain "political criminals" (pp. 48–51)—by which he seems to mean people who are not convicted of a crime but are simply "illiberal," such as sexists, racists, and Nazis—could also be excluded. A more slippery slope is hard to imagine. Nobody wants a Nazi to move in next door. But can this really suffice as a theory of immigration/integration politics? Maybe, but to find out, the endless puzzles portended by the argument need to be confronted head-on. Who would decide what constitutes a "political crime"? Where will the said Nazi live? Who investigates political criminality? Is anybody willing to endorse the creation of the city-police apparatus required for surveilling the political leaning of migrants?

The "appendix" follows the first chapter and should not pass without comment. It is cowritten by Dr. Despoina Glarou and is more aptly described as an essay. This essay is fascinating for two reasons. First, it does an admirable job of excavating the idea of "philoxenia," the virtue ethic manifest as a practice of radical inclusiveness in Thessaloniki. Second, it embodies a way of addressing foreigners that appears to be totally distinct from the modern liberal theoretical hegemony. There are no discussions (this section is based primarily on interviews with locals) of rights or duties, just a virtuous disposition to the alien at your door. It is a breath of fresh air in a field often stifled by lifeless Rawlsian disquisitions. The quibble here, like elsewhere, is that one is left wishing that de-Shalit (and Glarou) developed these ideas further. In particular, the contrast between liberal migration ethics (including de-Shalit's *civicism*) and "philoxenia" is unexplored.

Chapter 2 considers the grounds and conditions of city-naturalization and the political rights of the immigrant. De-Shalit argues that new immigrants should have the opportunity to become "genuine member[s] of the urban community" (p. 98), but (unlike Walzer) membership should not precede formal political rights. The reason, de-Shalit persuasively argues, is that political rights should be treated not as prizes for passing tests, but as means through which "genuine" membership could be realized. That is, rights then duties, not duties then rights, because rights foster civic communitarianism and civic communitarianism gives substance to duties.

Chapter 3 addresses the question of "city-zenship" and integration, comparing and contrasting three cases: