particularly cruel; indeed, all of these activists worked on a variety of animal issues. To them, the issues of raised by the live animal markets in Chinatown was just another battle to protect animals. Early on in their fight they had to decide if they were to include the restaurants on Fisherman's Wharf as a target—largely white owned restaurants that routinely killed lobsters and crab on site to serve to their well to do clientele. A strategic decision was made to drop Fisherman's Wharf as a target—both because public sympathy with crustaceans was not nearly as large as it was for many animals in Chinatown (turtles, chickens, geese frogs), but also because of the political power of the Fisherman's Wharf restaurants.

Excluding Fisherman's Wharf unsurprisingly led to charges of racism against the activists. The strength of Kim's book is that she shows both how these charges were both unfounded and completely understandable. The optic of cruelty is compelling: many animals in the live animal market lived under horrendous conditions. The optic of racism is compelling: from the point of view of many Chinatown merchants it seemed like they were singled out because of their ethnicity. While many of the activists were careful in how they framed their concerns, others who joined the campaign sometimes did use explicitly racist language.

Kim argues that both sides of this political campaign suffered from single-optic vision, and would do better to embrace what she calls multi-optic vision. The animal activists should have educated themselves better on the history of racism toward Chinese Americans and they have spent time "exploring their connection with it and at the same time understanding the ways that their own racial situatedness (more precisely, their whiteness) complicates their intervention" (p. 199). The Chinese American who defended the live animal markets, for their part, should "engage the issue of cruelty to animals . . . in good faith," without reducing everything to racism (p. 199).

This all sounds like a reasonable way to proceed, but given Kim's exhaustive and lengthy account of the political battles that ensued over the live animal markets for years, it is hard to see how it could have come about. While one organization of Chinatown merchants did seek a compromise with the activists, the other organization was led by Rose Pak, who was known for her "pugilistic and confrontational personality, her fight-to-the-death mindset" (127). It is hard to see how she could be convinced to see that the animal rights activists had a reasonable point: "Pak took an uncompromising stance of the live animal market conflict" (128), and called the concerns of the animal activists "ludicrous" (189).

Some of the animal activists did pursue an obvious compromise: that the animals in the live markets be treated humanely but that they allowed to be killed. Some of the activists opposed this compromise: they wanted the importation of frogs and turtles to be banned, since they claimed they harmed the ecological balance. (In a different chapter, Kim questions that idea of ecological harm in interesting ways.) In the end, the informal compromise between the SFSPCA and one of the Chinatown business organizations quickly collapsed. When part of that compromise actually became California law, it was a pyrrhic victory: with a near toothless enforcement mechanism, the law had no effect on live animal markets. Indeed, while animal activists won some political battles on the local levels, ultimately the political clout of the Chinese American community ensured these victories were short-lived.

A complication to this story is the passing of a law banning the sale of shark fins, a law that many Chinese Americans supported (and many opposed). But this begs a question: why did so many Chinese Americans support the shark fin, a key ingredient in a traditional Chinese soup, but not reformation of the live animal markets? Devoting considerable space to the debates about the live animal markets, Kim says little to answer this question.

The briefer chapters on whaling and Michael Vick have a similar structure to the one on Chinatown: animal rights activists ignoring the specter of racism, which is always present. And once again, Kim's call for multi-optic vision seems of limited help, particularly in the whaling case, where compromise is impossible. From the point of some Makah Indians, whaling activists are another set of white people trying to oppress them, and tell them what to do. From the point of view of the activists, whaling is always wrong, whether it is done by Norwegians, Japanese or Makah Indians. Sometimes when the battle is about life and death, it is hard to see the other side very sympathetically.

Public Trials: Burke, Zola, Arendt, and the Politics of Lost Causes. By Lida Maxwell. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 256p. $49.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592715003679

— Lena Zuckerwise, *Simmons College*

Until the release of Lida Maxwell's book, the term, "lost cause" called to my mind the Southern "Lost Cause Movement," a small but vocal cultural association intent on restoring antebellum white supremacy, and revizing Civil War history to cast the confederacy in a favorable light. Its proponents bemoan the supposed abuses of Unionists that contributed to the alleged economic exploitation of the South, the rise of Reconstruction, and the passage of the Voting Rights Act, which, they believe, is unforgivably punitive. Although the mission of this racist fringe group shares little in common with the undoubtedly progressive theory of lost causes outlined in *Public Trials*, it bespeaks the significance of narration in shaping not only retrospective understandings of history but also the politics of the present and future: It takes failure as a starting point from which to appeal to the public to imagine what might have been. These themes echo loudly in Maxwell's work.

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It is a rare gift to encounter a book as historically textured and politically provocative as *Public Trials*. Even more unusual is one that so effectively unsettles dominant binaries of success and failure for the purpose of advancing an argument with such political heft and import. Drawing from a wide range of historical and contemporary political phenomena—from the abuses of the East India Company in the eighteenth century to the recent case of the alleged terrorist mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and from Hannah Arendt's review of the comedic writing of Nathalie Sarraute to an original and persuasive reading of Kathryn Bigelow's 2012 film, *Zero Dark Thirty*—Maxwell puts these disparate subjects into conversation with one another in exciting, unorthodox ways. Performing some of the same practices of narration that are the objects of her analysis, Maxwell treats her readers to a rich, productively paradoxical, nonlinear story of democratic promise and downfall, the realization and impossibility of justice, and the indispensability and limitations of law.

Contrary to what Maxwell calls "fatalistic" claims of the political theory jeremiad that democracy is dead or dying, she argues that narratives of democratic failure, as seen in a variety of writings on public trials, animate democratic politics. Specifically, these accounts of democratic failure that authors put to use, not to bemoan the end of democracy but to reinvigorate it for the present and future, are what Maxwell calls "lost cause narratives." Like failure, the term "lost" is, for the author, not a permanent state but temporary misplacement, resulting from a set of conditions that reveals alternative possibilities. In Maxwell's words, "where fatalistic narratives portray democratic failure as revealing the (possible) failure of democracy as such and call for civic deference to elites and rules, lost cause narratives portray democratic failure as a contingent event that could have been otherwise. By emphasizing how things could have been in past democratic failures, lost cause narratives suggest that the future is similarly contingent, and they appeal to a belated public that could seek justice for the past and in the present" (pp. 161–62). Through exclusive focus on public trials, Maxwell interprets the writing of Edmund Burke, Emile Zola, and Hannah Arendt not only as diagnostic accounts of political shortcomings but also as arguments for unique political possibilities inherent in democratic failures. Echoing the claim of Judith Halberstam in *Queer Art of Failure* (2011), she sees that awakening to the creative potential of failure does not undermine the critical perspectives of the authors in question but deepens them.

Focusing on three public trials exemplifying the lost cause narrative, which ended with the unsuccessful impeachment of Warren Hastings, the false indictment of Alfred Dreyfus, and the rightful execution of Adolph Eichmann, Maxwell is concerned with neither the dubious legitimacy of the outcomes nor empirical facts of these events, but rather the ways they are captured in writing by Burke, Zola, and Arendt. Throughout the book, Maxwell questions what kind of democratic politics is reflected in and generated by their accounts. The ambiguous status of "the public" is consistent among the trials mentioned. Zola's view of it is particularly riddled with (unavoidable) contradictions: it is simultaneously trustworthy and easily deceived; it is guilty of anti-Semitic bias and desires truth. In all cases, the authors both appeal to the existing public and attempt to solicit a new one for the purpose of realizing an authentic justice, which the legal system is, on its own, incapable of fulfilling.

The status of democracy in the eyes of the authors remains an open question, and possible tension, in the book. Throughout the discussion, Maxwell claims that lost causes are uniquely suited to open up new democratic possibilities. Is this a move that can be abstracted from the authors' political life and work, regardless of their attitudes toward democracy, or are they actively, deliberately participating in this democratic practice? To put this differently, is Maxwell suggesting that readers might repurpose their lost cause narratives for democratic ends, regardless of the authors' positions on democracy, or that the authors themselves possess democratic commitments, though tacit and inconsistent? This is not addressed in the text, though it is consequential. If the latter is true for Maxwell, then the burden is on her to establish the presence of democratic inclinations on the part of the authors, for these are not self-evident. For example, the prevailing view of some recent political theorists is that Arendt's views of democracy are questionable. Her glorification of the individual actor, rather than the demos; her reliance on the pre-Socratic separation of the public and private spheres; and her relegation of matters such as housing, education, and health to the realm of the prepolitical and even the antipolitical social surface in the arguments of theorists such as Sheldon Wolin and Alan Keenan, who read her as a largely antidemocratic figure. Whether Maxwell is suggesting, as has Bonnie Honig, that Arendt's work can be put to use for democratic aims, despite her ambivalence, or, as Jeffrey Isaac claimed, her political theory is itself radically democratic, explicitly confronting this question would likely enrich the discussion in *Public Trials*.

Maxwell concludes *Public Trials* with a reference to the closing line of *Zero Dark Thirty*, uttered by a pilot tasked with returning the protagonist to the United States following the successful killing of Osama bin Laden, to which she was integral: "Where do you want to go?" The character responds with a single tear and silence. Among other things, Maxwell interprets this as a possible invitation to the public to offer its own answer. I suspect that the author herself might be doing the same in her book. Throughout the discussion, she neither issues normative answers to the question of what attunement to democratic failure should do, nor instructs her readers as to where lost

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causes can be found. Instead, because of Maxwell's firm political commitments to justice, her unequivocal belief in the tensions and promises of failure, and her critical confrontations with the limitations of public trials, as well as the possibilities they reveal, the readers of *Public Trials*, who, I submit, are far more fortunate than the viewers of *Zero Dark Thirty*, are well positioned to ask a revised version of the film's concluding question, one far more democratic and imaginative: Where might we go from here?

Michael Oakeshott's Cold War Liberalism. Edited by Terry Nardin. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. 197p. $90.00 cloth.
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— Steven A. Gerencser, *Indiana University South Bend*

Michael Oakeshott's career as a writer spanned over sixty years, yet his work in the three decades following the Second World War until the mid-1970s earned him a reputation as a political philosopher and essayist of the first order. "Rationalism in Politics" (1948), along with other essays in the eponymous collection where it was later published (1962), established Oakeshott's standing as an iconoclastic conservative to audiences beyond England; his *On Human Conduct* (1975) broadened this view, as Oakeshott uniquely explores the theoretical and historical foundations of something like a liberal constitutional state. Of course this period also covers the bulk of the Cold War, and the essays collected in *Michael Oakeshott's Cold War Liberalism* attempt to situate his work in light of that period of significant ideological and political conflict. The difficulty is that Oakeshott was notoriously elusive regarding contemporary political matters. He neither made many dramatic or explicit statements about, say, Soviet communism, nor did he engage in ideological battles with the like-minded over who better protected, or more threatened, freedom. Thus, in *Michael Oakeshott's Cold War Liberalism* the various writers reinterpret Oakeshott's work by positioning it in relation not just to the Cold War, but into conversation with Cold War liberals such as Isaiah Berlin, Raymond Aron, Karl Popper, and Friedrich Hayek. The authors also consider how capable his work is in addressing post–Cold War theoretical and political issues.

The collection is organized into three parts. The first takes up the question of the possibility of understanding Oakeshott in the liberal/conservative framework so significant in Cold War politics. The second examines Oakeshott's contributions to the great debates about the character and threats of totalitarianism, particularly important to Cold War liberals. The third part considers the applicability of Oakeshott's ideas in the context of contemporary East Asian politics. This third section is potentially the most original, yet also the most problematic, and it fits least well within the context of the volume. It may be the most original because, as several of the authors acknowledge, few in East Asia are familiar with Oakeshott or have tried to view Asian politics through his works. It is problematic at least because several of the authors find Oakeshott's ideas not very useful and the section fits less well because it is difficult to see early 21st Century Asian politics through the mid-20th Century lens of the Cold War.

To try to position Oakeshott ideologically, the contributors recognize, is a mug's game; they do a better job illustrating the limitation of the liberal/conservative dichotomy for understanding Oakeshott, than attempting to use it. Here, the essay by Terry Nardin (who is also the editor of the volume) stands out as a clear introduction to Oakeshott, especially his post-war work, as well as to the complications of any ideological pegging of Oakeshott in the preeminently ideological Cold War period. There is some irony, however, that Part I—titled "Oakeshott on Modern Politics: Liberal or Conservative?"—is led by Nardin's chapter "Oakeshott: Neither Liberal nor Conservative." Nardin recognizes that many are interested in this question; yet, he demonstrates that for Oakeshott the very contrast of liberalism and conservatism falls short of his own insight in the distinction between enterprise and civil association, which can differentiate between the purposive state, and a state guided and restrained by the rule of law.

Going a step further, Nardin argues persuasively that "if Oakeshott is important today, it is as a philosopher, not as a participant in the political debates of the twentieth century" (p. 24). Paradoxically, this claim somewhat undermines the premise of the volume. Yet, his chapter, as well as Edmund Neill's essay on Oakeshott's understanding of modernity, Erika Kiss's on Oakeshott's idea of the university, Andrew Gamble's chapter on "Oakeshott and Totalitarianism," Chor-yung Cheung's on the modern state, and Jan-Werner Müller's essay on "Oakeshott's Peculiar Constitutionalism," successfully demonstrate that Oakeshott's work speaks beyond the horizon of the Cold War. While these essays put Oakeshott into conversation with other Cold War thinkers, they also reveal how Oakeshott was out of step with the theorists like Berlin, Aron, Popper, and Hayek. Of course, Oakeshott's work can speak to totalitarianism and the advantages of a liberal constitutional order to collectivism. But these writers suggest that Oakeshott approaches these topics in ways quite distinct from those Cold War liberals.

Still, while these essays do lift Oakeshott beyond the Cold War context, they suggest another complication. While not wanting to tie him to a particular time and place, many of the essays reveal how Oakeshott's interest was primarily the history of Western, and often specifically English, political traditions, illustrating how he explicitly cautioned against wrenching ideas and practices from one tradition and grafting them onto another. As Gamble writes: "While Oakeshott believed in English liberty, he did not think it could be exported. Countries that did not

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