Between Empire and Nation-State: Comments on the Pathology of State Formation in Eastern Europe during the 'Short Twentieth Century'

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The present essay is meant strictly as a think-piece: its propositions are preliminary and hypothetical and are presented here because the author believes they might provoke further discussion and, perhaps, encourage more systematic work along the lines to which they allude.[1]

The last decade in European history has brought with it developments humbling for contemporary historians and social scientists alike. Who could predict the collapse of communism, today a historical fact, only ten years ago? And who could tell only eight or nine years ago that problems related to nationalism and inter-ethnic conflict would absorb more political and academic attention than questions pertinent to systemic change?

In his *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780*, published in 1990, Eric Hobsbawm, inspired by his Marxist *Weltanschauung* as well as by the multinational structures in capitalist business and the apparently 'supranational' developments within the European Community, went as far as to claim:

> The world history of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries . . . will see 'nation-states' and 'nations' or ethnic/linguistic groups primarily as retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by the new supranational restructuring of the globe . . . The very fact that historians are at least beginning to make some progress in the study and analysis of nations and nationalism suggests that, as so often, the phenomenon is past its peak. The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good thing that it is now circling round nations and nationalism.[2]

[1] The first version of this essay was written during summer and autumn 1994, for a lecture delivered at the University of Trondheim, Norway, in November the same year. A second version was presented in Bressanone/Brixen, at the Summer School of the European Academy Bolzano, in September 1998. The present version was written for and presented to the conference 'Reflections on the Twentieth Century' of the journal *Contemporary European History*, at the Remarque Institute of New York University, 8–11 April 1999.

[2] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality*, Wiles Lectures series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 182–3.

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This assertion is rightly described as resonating with modernism's tragic *hubris*,[3] not only in the light of the upsurge of inter-ethnic violence and conflict from 1991 onwards in eastern Europe, especially in south-eastern Europe, but also with a view to west European developments.[4] Indeed, the revised second edition of Professor Hobsbawm's book of 1992 reflects considerably humbler pretensions when it comes to predicting the near future of nationalism and the nation state.

> It is not impossible that nationalism will decline with the decline of the nation-state . . . It would be absurd to claim that this day is already near. However, I hope it can at least be envisaged. After all, the very fact that historians are at least beginning to make some progress in the study and analysis of nations and nationalism suggests that, as so often, the phenomenon is past its peak. The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism.[5]

I do not wish to follow Professor Hobsbawm's example and need to duck from my own boomeranging words when a few years have gone by. What I propose to do instead is to present a few ideas that, at best, might enable us to further develop the view of Hugh Seton-Watson, according to which the east–central parts of our continent constitute 'the sick heart of modern Europe'.[6] If, after careful consideration and research, which still remain to be done, they prove to be sustainable, they may provide the foundations of an argument for how crucial it is, even ignoring all the economic necessities and advantages, for the countries of east–central Europe to join and to be admitted into the European Union. Less importantly, they will explain why the author of the present essay is a desperate Euro-optimist.

Which transition?

If this paper had been written a mere decade ago, I would have given my readers a cautiously optimistic report on the improving status of the heart of Europe. I would have emphasised the profound changes in Polish and Hungarian politics and society and the hopes held out by the modest and yet, within the Soviet context, very promising *perestroika* of Mikhail Gorbachev. On the debit side, I would have listed the national–communist dictatorship in Romania, and the leftist reactionary conservatism still holding sway in Prague and East Berlin; but even in this regard I would have exhibited a certain amount of optimism on account of Moscow's changing attitude towards its satellites and, especially, on account of the cancellation in July 1989 of the Brezhnev Doctrine. On the whole, my text would have been

[3] See Glen Bowman, 'Xenophobia, Fantasy, and the Nation: the Logic of Ethnic Violence in Former Yugoslavia', in Victoria A. Goddard, Josep R. Llobera, and Gris Shore, eds., *The Anthropology of Europe. Identity and Boundaries in Conflict* (Providence: Berg Publishers, 1994), 143.

[4] On the strength and persistence of the nation-state in western Europe, see David P. Calleo's powerful argument, 'Reflections on the Idea of the Nation-State', in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 15–37.

[5] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality*, revised edn, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 192.

[6] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The 'Sick Heart' of Modern Europe. The Problem of the Danubian Lands* (Seattle, WA, and London: University of Washington press, 1975).

dominated by the theme of *systemic change*, by those facts of and tendencies towards the undermining and/or transcending of the economic, societal and political order of state socialism.

A bit less than a decade ago, I could have given a *cautiously optimistic* report. Today, however, only a *cautious pessimism* is permissible with regard to the state of affairs in the region as a whole. A great deal of our attention has had to shift from predominantly systemic aspects to problems pertinent to nationalism and the ethno-politics of state formation. This distinction should not, however, lead anyone to believe that the main issues of the post-communist transformation, such as the development of pluralist democracy and the ways in which post-communist states take care of ethnopolitical relations, do not affect one another. Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century it seems quite plausible to claim that ethno-nationalism is the mightiest single challenge to the chances of pluralist democracy in a large part of eastern and south-eastern Europe.

Most of what is being said in this paper applies to the whole region between the western boundaries of the Russian Federation and the eastern borders of Germany, Austria and Italy – a region stretching from the Baltic down to the Adriatic. While under Communist rule, the region was by and large co-extensive with the Cold-War concept of Eastern Europe, or the Soviet bloc.

Which Europe? Which nation-state?

Eastern Europe in my usage is a historical region of the modern era that has been lagging behind and/or has deviated from the path of western development not only in economic terms but also in terms of the twin processes of nation building – defining who 'we the people' are – and state building – defining state boundaries and creating political institutions which are accepted by all major political actors and which enjoy and inspire the loyalty of the people.[7]

The foundations and frames of modern western nation-building were provided by the absolutist state which worked as a melting pot, tending to produce French, British, German and other nations out of peasants and nobles, priests and artisans, merchants and labourers, who used to live in geographic, social, cultural and often even strong linguistic (dialect) isolation from one another. The historical logic of modern western nation-building started out from the state, went through the constitution of a political nation inclusive of all citizens and thus tended to yield cultural homogeneity and cohesion.[8] The western European nation-state has tended

[7] For an interesting essay on the problems inherent in this twin process of nation and state formation in post-communist Russia, see Vera Tolz, 'Conflicting "Homeland-Myths" and Nation-State Building in Postcommunist Russia', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 57, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 267–94.

[8] Roger Brubaker has rightly observed that this peculiar, north-western European and north American model of nation building tended to be seen by modernist political science and historical sociology as a universally valid pattern where variation occurs in timing only (see R. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 80–83.

to relate to its citizens as the 'civic state', to use Roger Brubaker's typology: 'the state of and for all of its citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity'.[9] By the time the region was hit, from the 1970s on, by the renaissance of ethnic, regional and/or religious consciousness and by a lmassive influx of migrants from other countries and continents, the European Community and then the European Union could provide some effective cushions to absorb a great deal of the conflict potential inherent in the region's changing demography and the dynamic processes of identity politics.

Surely one of the most conspicuous discrepancies between political development in the western and eastern parts of Europe from the early modern era was a contrast 'between peoples with a state and those without'. This contrast, according to Tony Judt,

> is *the* great misfortune of the eastern half of Europe: that its division into states came late and all at once. It is what gives to these lands their common history and their common weakness – and it is what in the end makes them crucially different from the luckier peoples to their west.[10]

I would prefer to define this contrast as one between peoples with a (civic) nation-state and those developing their national communities within the frameworks of imperial states. However, there is another even more important contrast between the west and east European experiences: the nation state in east–central Europe was not only a development emerging considerably belatedly out of the ruins of empires, but when it came, it came also to work (and it still tends to work) as a powder keg rather than as a melting pot. This is due, to a large extent, to the fact that the historical logic of the east–central European nation and nation-state building from the early nineteenth century onwards has followed a path starting out from the ethno-culturally (and not territorially) grounded *Kulturnation*, through empire-breaking, secessionist nationalist movements to the ethnically defined nation-state.[11] When modern influences, among them industrialism and nationalism, started reaching the shores of the region, its people were still living within the boundaries of multinational empires. Their nationalisms developed by necessity as ethno-culturally (and not territorially) grounded, competitive, state-seeking nationalisms. The states they have managed to establish during the nineteenth century and especially after 1918, have by and large followed the patterns of nationalising states – that is, states '*of* and *for* a particular ethno-cultural ''core nation'', whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be protected by the state'.[12] They are polities, in which the political class promotes what is conceived as the interests of the 'core nation' by squeezing out other ethno-

[9] Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 105.

[10] Tony Judt, *A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe* (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 55–56.

[11] The origin of the useful distinction between political nation (*Staatsnation*) and cultural nation (*Kulturnation*) is Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the national state* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970 [translation of *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates*, originally published in 1907]).

[12] Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 103.

cultural groups from social and political spaces and, at worst, even from their homes and country.

The results were not much different in the special case of Hungary, which, at the end of the nineteenth century, could rightly be described as 'the solitary survivor in central Europe of the medieval nation states of the type of England and France'. The Turkish and Habsburg domination in the region, however, led to centuries of delay in the homogenising assimilation processes that in western Europe were achieved by the absolutist states. The delay proved fatal. By the time (1867) the Hungarians regained genuine control over their state and Hungary regained genuine autonomy within the Dual Monarchy,

> Her unassimilated peoples were [..] caught up in the cultural nationalist movement of the nineteenth century. In place of the slow but successful assimilation that had gone on in previous centuries, a desperate policy of compulsory Magyarisation was now adopted, which only accelerated the onset of disaster. [. . .] At a time when the other peoples of Central Europe were struggling to convert their cultural nationalities into politically independent states, Hungary was still attempting to force her way in the opposite direction, from political to cultural unity.[13]

Truncated by the Trianon peace treaty, interwar Hungary became one of the region's ethno-culturally grounded, nationalising successor states, as was evident in its discriminatory policies directed against the Jews as early as the 1920s.[14] On the other hand, the policies pursued in relation to such ethno-national minorities as the Germans, Slovaks or Romanians were closer to those of a civic state,[15] which certainly had much to do with the fact that its political elite never gave up the objective of a restoration of the unitary 'historical Hungary of St Stephen' which had failed to work and had never completed its role as a melting pot creating a culturally homogeneous political nation of Slovaks, Ruthens, Romanians, Croats, Magyars and other ethnic groups cohabiting in the kingdom of the Magyars.[16]

The contrast in Europe between the western and eastern historical patterns of state development, resulting in a profound variation in the concepts of 'nation' and

[13] Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969), 36.

[14] See Katalin N. Szegvári, *Numerus Clausus rendelkezések az ellenforradalmi Magyarországon* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1988). The Roma minority of interwar Hungary, around 200,000 in number, was ignored rather than programmatically discriminated against by the authorities. There was no 'gipsy question' and if any political or (rather) administrative attention was paid to the Roma at all, its objective was to discipline the migrating groups of the Roma people and to make them settle down and integrate into the 'normal working society'. Cf. László Karsai, *A cigánykérdés Magyarországon 1919–1945. Út a cigány Holocausthoz* (Budapest: Cserépfalvi Könyvkiadó, 1992).

[15] Cf. Loránt Tilkovszky, *Nemzetiségi politika Magyarországon a 20. században*, Történelmi Kézikönyvtár series ed. Irén Simándi and János Barta (Debrecen: Csokonai Kiadó, 1998), which does not cover the policies vis-à-vis the country's Roma and Jewish minorities.

[16] For a new excellent review of post-Trianon Hungarian (ethno-)political thought, see Ignác Romsics, ed., *Trianon és a magyar politikai gondolkodás 1920–1953* (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 1998), especially the essays of Balázs Ablonczy, Lóránt Péteri, Miklós Zeidler, Attila Lengyel, and Krisztián Ungváry.

'nation-state' within the two contexts, is all too seldom spelled out and is often even neglected by social scientists and even historians.[17]

It has to do with their specific nature and the historical circumstances of their birth, and not simply with their great-power neighbours to the east and west, that eastern Europe's nation-states have been at regular intervals threatened by projects of imperial integration. Indeed, in a longer-term macro-historical perspective it seems that the modern, nineteenth- and twentieth- century development of the region's state-system is characterised by an oscillating movement between the unfortunate extremes of empire and ethnic nation-state. Thus the post-1989 triumph of the ethnic nation-state idea in the region may again prove but a phase in this oscillating movement.

Between empire and nation-state

To view the era of the ending of the Cold War as one of the defeat of the imperial and the triumph of nationalist ideas is not at all new, nor is it very original.[18] But it readily provides the opportunity and, indeed, the need to question the connection between the *annus mirabilis*, 1989, and what I would prefer to call the *annus miraculus*, 1991 (the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia). This is the genuine scholarly task, a real alternative to the obligatory and intellectually sterile condemnation of nationalism.[19]

It seems to me to be a conceptual mistake to believe that the poles of the dichotomy are empire and nationalism. Rather, they are empire and ethnic nation-state. Of course, the revival of the project of ethnic nation-state has come both as a consequence and as the very agenda of triumphant nationalism. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet empire and the collapse of the state-socialist societal order has brought with it the advent of an era of fragmentation and division in eastern Europe – an era to which there is no end in sight for the time being.

Excluding the Russian Federation, thirteen new states have been established in the region since 1989. These new states exercise sovereignty over and affect the

[17] To name but one relatively recent example: few of the contributors to Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson, eds., *The Question of Europe* (London: Verso, 1997) exhibit any hesitation in discussing the problems of the 'European nation-state' without explicitly trying to distinguish between the experience of western and eastern Europe.

[18] The end of the Soviet Empire has brought with it a veritable upsurge of new studies focusing on the antagonism between nationalism and empire and yielding books like the following: Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good, eds., *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, in association with the Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota, 1992); Geir Lundestad, ed., *The Fall of Great Powers. Peace, Stability and Legitimacy* (Oslo, Oxford, and other places: Scandinavian University Press and Oxford University Press, 1994); Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Raymond Pearson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

[19] In general, I find myself much in sympathy with David P. Calleo's call that we should try 'to understand and accept the enduring strength of the nation-state, in order to work more imaginatively and efficaciously to control the consequences'. P. Calleo, *Reflections*, 15.

everyday life of about 120 million people. However, the new political map of eastern Europe emerging from these changes falls, in almost all of its constituent units, far short of the ethno-nationalist ideal of 'national self-determination', the ideal of an ethnically pure nation state.[20] So did the political map of the post-First World War 'new Europe'. With very few exceptions, the nation-states of eastern Europe today are organizing the political life of multi-ethnic societies. On the other hand, core nations, whose states are characterized by a relatively high ethnic homogeneity, have sizeable ethnically related 'diaspora' communities in neighbouring countries; that is, they exhibit a low territorial concentration. According to data from the period 1985–1992,[21] 88 per cent of Serbia's population were Serbs, but the level of concentration of Serbs in Serbia was only 67 per cent. Almost 94 per cent of all Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but they constituted only 44 per cent of the population of that same country. Hungary exhibits a homogeneity index (93 per cent) which should rightly be regarded as very high within the region. However, the territorial concentration of Hungarians is pretty low, only three-quarters of them living within Hungary. In the case of Croatia, we find 76 per cent ethnic homogeneity and 75 per cent territorial concentration. Albania's case is rather similar to that of Hungary – with a homogeneity index at 96 per cent, but with an outstandingly low territorial concentration of 63 per cent, which is due mainly to the large Albanian communities in Kosovo and Macedonia.

In our region, the presence in a state of any sizeable ethno-religious or ethno-national minority tends to be understood as a challenge to the legitimacy of the nation-state project, in the promotion of which important components of the post-communist political class (similar to the political elites of the interwar years) have vested interests. The challenge is at least twofold. On the one hand, it originates from the fact that most of the minorities belong to the dominant nation, or *Herrenvolk*, of the area's former, defunct, often imperial state (like the Russian minorities which constitute a population of 25 million people in various former Soviet republics regaining independence after 1991; the Germans in Poland and Czechoslovakia after the First World War; or the Hungarian minorities in post-1918

[20] This ideal had very little to do with Wilson's principle of national self-determination. In fact, I do not think it was Wilson who 'tended to confuse' the issues of popular sovereignty and the ethno-national control of the state as Alan Sharp seems to suggest ('The genie that would not go back into the bottle. National self-determination and the legacy of the First World War and the Peace Settlement', in Seamus Dunn and T. G. Fraser, eds., *Europe and Ethnicity. World War I and Contemporary Ethnic Conflict* (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 12–13). The 'confusion' arose in the east–central European context where the very concepts of nation, nationalism, and nation-state acquired a new and regionally–historically specific content during the nineteenth century. As Alan Sharp himself shows in his essay quoted above, western peacemakers and Wilson himself were not quite at ease about the appropriation of the principle of national self-determination by the ethno-nationalist discourses of central and eastern Europe during and after the First World War.

[21] The data quoted hereafter are from Hieronim Kubiak, 'International consequences of ethnic conflict', in Judit Balázs, et al., *International Stability: Eastern European Perspectives* (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Veröffentlichungen der Forschungsgruppe Internationale Beziehungen, P 93–305 /July 1993/), 14–15.

Slovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia or in the sub-Carpathian region). On the other hand, and even more importantly, the challenge stems from the fact that in many cases these minorities have their 'mother nations' (or 'mother nation-states') right next door. Besides the cases already listed, the most conspicuous example of this latter category today is Albania. Thus, within the framework of the eastern European ethnic nation-state project, minorities tend to be regarded as treacherous fifth columns which deserve no mercy: their social space and their cultural and political rights are restricted and they are driven away from their homes and countries in more or less violent campaigns of ethnic cleansing. It is within this context that one can fully realise the appalling irresponsibility of the claim aired in front of an international audience in 1990 by József Antall, that he considered himself the prime minister of all the 15 million Magyars within and outside of the boundaries of the Hungarian Republic.

Against the background of the more or less explicit contests over territory and the equally divisive national and minority issues emerging or re-emerging from the post-communist dissolution of federal and imperial structures, what we are actually experiencing in the post-1989 era is the third major upsurge of the ethnic nation-state project since the first wave of Balkanisation in the wake of the retreat of the Ottoman Empire from south-eastern Europe in the latter half of the long nineteenth century.

Identity politics and the ethnic nation-state project

As Alfred Stepan has emphasised,

> empirically, there are very few polities in the world that are simultaneously a state, a nation, and a democracy. Indeed, if one employs systematically the three concepts it is impossible that most polities could be all three simultaneously. This is so because throughout most of the globe there is such an overlapping and inter-mixing of different cultural nations that the possibility of clear territorial boundaries that are congruent with even a very small nation-state cannot be obtained, short of 'ethnic cleansing' and mass migrations. In other words, the effort to combine all these will often lead to the erosion of the conditions needed for consensual democracy or even territorial integrity. There are almost two hundred states in the world. But, according to a standard homogeneity index, less than 20 of these approximate the ideal of a homogeneous nation-state. Since democracy implies rights of minorities, some reconciliation is necessary.[22]

An obvious measure of the explosive potential present in the region is the size of national minorities who are the first to be victimised by the revival of the ethnic nation-state idea in post-communist eastern Europe.[23] In terms of the extent and background of the presence of national minorities, we can distinguish between at least three groups of states. (i) states with homogenous populations, where national

[22] Alfred Stepan, 'When democracy and the Nation-state are competing logics: reflections on Estonia', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, Vol. 35, no. 1 (1994), p. 127.

[23] A very useful and systematic catalogue of the post-1989 ethnopolitical conditions in the region is Janusz Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe. A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties* (Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

minorities constitute fewer than 3 per cent of the country's inhabitants, such as Albania, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; (ii) where the multi-ethnic character of the societies organised under the dominance of a core or state-nation is strongly emphasised by the presence of national minorities of 9–14 per cent: Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia; and, finally, (iii) states where the presence of nationalities other than the state-nation is of such a magnitude, from 20 per cent upwards, that one wonders whether describing them as 'minorities' would really do justice to the actual numerical, cultural and social weight they may carry within their respective host societies (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia). Bosnia-Herzegovina's is a special case, reminiscent, even after Dayton, not so much of a genuine multinational state as of a geographical area, the ethno-national division of which has not yet been completed (Muslims – 44.7 per cent, Serbs – 32.0 per cent, Croats – 17.6 per cent, and 'Yugoslavs' – 5.6 per cent).

To the nations of former Yugoslavia, the revival of the ethnic nation-state project has brought war and massive killing of innocent civilians, as well as the uprooting up to the present day of about 6 million people. In the rest of the Balkans it has created and sustained a whole series of tensions with a high potential to set the whole peninsula ablaze.

Slovakia until quite recently had a parliament and a government under Vladimír Meciar with an aggressively nationalist anti-Magyar programme, resulting in increased tensions between the Slovakian state-nation and the country's sizeable Hungarian minority, as well as officially between Slovakia and Hungary.

The series of pogroms arranged by extremists of the local Vatra Romaneasca group against Hungarians and Hungarian organizations in the Transylvanian city of Tirgu-Mares (Marosvásárhely), in the second half of March 1990, was an early reflection and signal warning of the animosities and conflicts prevailing between the Romanian state-nation and a Hungarian minority of close to two million people in Transylvania.

In Estonia[24] in 1989, more than 30 per cent of the non-military population were Russians. A pre-independence survey, conducted during summer of 1990, showed that more than 37.3 per cent of the ethnic Russians living in Estonia had been ready to define themselves as 'members of the Republic of Estonia', and only 21.5 per cent would have identified themselves as 'members of the USSR', the rest being distributed between such categories as 'member of a town' (32.5 per cent), 'member of the whole world' (6.6 per cent), and 'member of Europe' (2.1 per cent). Of those surveyed 76.6 per cent declared themselves proud or very proud of being a resident of the republic (in a comparable group of ethnic Estonians polled the proportion was 88.5 per cent). Of all the Russians polled, 43.4 per cent were born in Estonia and more than 80 per cent of them had lived there more than ten years. Another survey, conducted in April 1992, allowing multiple answers and offering multiple identities, such as 'Russian Balt', produced the following results: 'Russian Balt'

[24] The data on Estonian ethnopolitical conditions are all from Stepan, 'Democracy'.

proved to be the most popular category, with 65.8 per cent; 'member of a town' came next (54.2 per cent); in the middle of the field were three categories – 'member of a work collective', 'citizen of Estonia' and 'member of the Russian community' with 51.6 per cent, 50.2 per cent and 49.1 per cent respectively. Even more telling were the responses given to the questions concerning citizenship preferences: 49.1 per cent preferred Estonian citizenship, 12.1 per cent Russian, 26.3 per cent Russian citizenship with an Estonian work permit, while the 'other' category stood at a low 10.4 per cent. The two surveys have shown unequivocally, as Stepan has rightly emphasised, 'that Estonia had the political and cultural possibility of having ethnic Russians as loyal members of the state of Estonia as well as participating in a multi-ethnic democracy. As long as institutional guarantees were given to all citizens for their common political participation and cultural expression, the strong possibility of multiple complementary political identities existed.' However, as the chances of establishing independence from the Soviet Union grew, the Estonian political leaders tended to emphasise more and more the requirements of an Estonian nation-state and to be less concerned with independence and democracy in themselves. As time passed, Estonian legislation on citizenship moved from broad and inclusive definitions to narrow and exclusive ones. While the struggle for independence went on, it was proposed that everybody participating in the movement and wishing to have Estonian citizenship should obtain it, and that citizenship should be granted to anyone born in Estonia. In the end, however, the norms and rules which have actually been established and enforced grant outright citizenship only to those persons (and their descendants) who were born in Estonia before the 1940 annexation by the Soviet Union. With regard to the 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections, this citizenship law disenfranchised almost 40 per cent of the population of Estonia. Restrictions put on the use of the Russian language in official contexts and the expansion of the nation-state discourse, which tends to exclude ethnic Russians from the Estonian polity altogether by describing them as 'colonists' (even though a sizeable portion of them had been residents of Estonia before 1940), by crushing multiple political identities and replacing them with polar ones, undermine the moral, cultural and psychological foundations of a workable multi-ethnic democracy. However aggrieved and oppressed the Estonian nation had been under the Soviet empire, the policies of an 'ethnically pure' Estonian nation-state inflict the same kind of injustices on the ethnic Russians of the country, and thus endanger democracy at home and peace and stability internationally.

The most important point to be made concerning the historical dynamics of identity politics and the recurring post-imperial attempts to establish and consolidate ethnically homogeneous nation-states is the futility of the latter in the light of the wisdom that can be learned from the experience of the former. When all the necessary efforts have been made, with apparently good results, to produce a reassuring ethno-cultural homogeneity in the population of a state, when all the organised population exchanges, violent ethnic cleansing, *Vertreibungen*, genocides and ethnocides have been effectively executed – who will and who can guarantee

the stability of the ethno-demographic make-up of a state attained at the costs of immeasurable human misery? We have plenty of cases from Europe's twentieth-century history showing the uncontrollable interactive dynamics of ethno-cultural identity construction. Integration by acculturation and assimilation can indeed make important contributions towards increased homogeneity. These processes, however, can never yield irreversible results. Communist Poland, with good reason, on many occasions declared itself to have become an ethnically homogenous nation-state. Yet, after the collapse of communist rule, it became apparent that there were still (or, rather, again) sizeable ethnic (German, Ukrainian, and so on) minorities in Polish society.[25] Resurfacing anti-Semitism and the renaissance of ethno-cultural and ethno-religious consciousness in the early post-communist years produced an environment prompting increasing numbers of secularised Magyar–Jewish individuals to identify themselves primarily as Jews.[26] Many other examples could be added. In general, the ethno-demography of twentieth-century Europe has been increasingly characterised by profound processes of change rather than by some rigid stability. These processes of change have been fed by both the often unexpected and uncontrollable results of identity construction and, ever more importantly and especially after the Second World War, international migration.

It may very well be good advice to accept and respect the sustained strength of the modern nation-state in terms of its power to command the allegiance of its citizens, as David Calleo suggests. However, it is ill-advised, fundamentally wrong and irresponsible to accept the policies and basic principles of nationalising ethnic nation-states, as has been done so many times during the present century in the vain hope that one could thus 'definitively' achieve ethno-cultural homogeneity and thereby sustained stability and peace. Paul Latawski seems firmly to believe that

> The most effective solution to intractable nationality conflict is the separation of hostile groups into homogeneous states or regions. While the expulsion of the Germans from east central Europe and the creation of an ethnographically homogeneous Poland were extreme measures, they nevertheless offered a definitive solution to dangerous national conflict.[27]

I profoundly disagree with Professor Latawski and believe that in our modern world, the ethno-demography of which has been and will to an increasing extent be in a state of constant flux, there is *nothing* that can recommend policies of homogenisation/nationalisation. While we can safely claim that such policies have

[25] Cf. Ch. 12 in Janusz Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe. A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

[26] For a well-balanced and illuminating orientation concerning Jewish identity formation in post-communist Hungary, see the following works: András Kovács, 'Anti-Semitism and Jewish Identity in Postcommunist Hungary', in Randolph L. Braham, ed., *Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Eastern Europe* (New York and Boulder, CO: The Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies & Social Sciences Monographs, 1994), 125–142; several essays in Mária M. Kovács, Yitzhak M. Lashti, and Ferenc Erös, eds., *Zsidóság, identitás, történelem* (Budapest: T-Twins Kiadói és Tipográfiai Kft., 1992); and András Kovács, *A különbség köztünk van. Az antiszemitizmus és a fiatal elit* (Budapest: Cserépfalvi Kiadó, 1997).

[27] Paul Latawski, 'What To Do About Nationalism?' in Paul Latawski, ed., *Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1995), 180.

always implied some of the worst violations of elementary human rights and brought with them immense suffering for millions of people, they can never be expected to deliver 'a definitive (even less, final) solution' to ethno-political conflict. On the contrary, historical experience shows that their international acceptance and pursuance have led to spatial proliferation, further intensification, and temporal reproduction of ethno-political conflicts, thanks to the legitimacy they lend to a pattern of 'solution' that tends to reinforce the nationalising practices of the ethnic nation state. In the regions where radical solutions of 'separation' were applied, the never-ceasing *Angst* over possible revenge and the actual political articulation and mobilisation around the expatriates' demands saw to it that the wounds inflicted would never heal. Such 'most effective' and 'definitive solutions' can be seen as skeletons, however long and well hidden in cupboards, haunting the post-communist governments and forcing themselves again, in various forms, upon the political agenda of the countries of eastern Europe: problems arising around the nullification of measures confiscating and nationalising private property from 1945 on constitute a good illustration of this.

The great powers and state formation in east–central Europe

There can be hardly any doubt about that the malfunctions of the state-system of the region, its captivity between the unfortunate alternatives of empire and ethnic nation state, have their origins in the peculiar historical circumstances under which modernity, and the processes of modern nation-building, entered the region during the nineteenth century. These malfunctions were certainly reinforced by the peace arrangements at the end of the First World War. Before the war, the political life of eastern Europe was organised by four empires in all: the German, the Russian, the dual Austro-Hungarian, and the Ottoman Empire. Of these four, the Ottoman Empire, after a long period of waning, ceased altogether to be a factor in the region's state system and political life as a consequence of the Balkan wars of 1912–1913. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was destroyed by the Entente Powers in 1918 at the end of the First World War. In the vacuum created by the contraction and/or postwar collapse and destruction of empires there arose a whole series of mutually competitive and hostile ethnic nation-states. This development proved detrimental not only to the possibility and, indeed, necessity of intra-regional economic and political co-operation, but even to the chances of democratic development within the individual polities concerned. Within two to three decades, the ethnic nation-state project also proved to be one of the issues exposing the very existence of the region's successor states to the mightiest challenge in this century: the thrusts of German and Russian expansionism from 1938 onwards. The Munich agreement of 1938 and the so-called Vienna awards of 1938 and 1940 made manifest Hitler's intention maximally to exploit the division and fragmentation in the region in order to implement his own *Grossraum* objectives.

In 1848 the Czech nationalist historian, Frantísek Palacký, claimed that the Habsburg Empire was a necessity which, if it had not existed, would have to be

invented. As Palacký is often paraphrased or quoted inaccurately, let me quote his own words here.

> In the south-east of Europe, along the frontiers of the Russian Empire, there live many nations widely differing in origin, in language, in history and morals – Slavs, Wallachians, Magyars and Germans, not to speak of Turks and Albanians – none of which is sufficiently powerful itself to bid successful defiance to the superior neighbour on the east for all time. They could only do so if a close and firm tie bound them all together as one. The vital artery of this necessary union of nations is the Danube. The focus of power of such a union must never be diverted far from this river, if the union is to be effective and to remain so. Assuredly, if the Austrian state had not existed for ages, it would have been a behest for us in the interest of Europe and indeed of humanity to endeavor to create it as soon as possible. . . . Think of the Austrian Empire divided up into sundry republics, some considerable in size and other small – what a delightful basis for a universal Russian monarchy![28]

This 'Austria', a voluntary confederation of equal and free nations under the Habsburg crown, Palacký conceived as the only chance for survival for the small nations between the Turkish, Russian and emerging German empires. It secured the balance of power between Russia and Germany on the Continent and it provided for a supra-national mechanism of arbitration and conflict-resolution for the frictions arising among the many national, ethnic and religious groups of the region itself. It was conceived as a powerful means to prevent inter-ethnic conflict from turning the region from a consolidated power centre into Europe's major power vacuum where, instead of cohesion and internal peace, fragmentation, warfare and aggressive ethno-national rivalry prevailed.

Since the First World War, the region of east–central and south-eastern Europe has been unable to deliver the goods in the way Palacký expected. The Austrian Empire was replaced by a series of nation-states imposed on multi-ethnic or multi-national societies: in 1930, only 72 per cent of the population living within Romania's boundaries belonged to the Romanian nation, Serbs, Croats and Slovens combined made up not more than 80 per cent of the people living in Yugoslavia, while Czechs and Slovaks constituted as little as 66 per cent of the inhabitants of the newly established Czechoslovakia. The ethnically Polish component of interwar Poland's population constituted only around 69 per cent.[29] Under such conditions, the supremacy of the ethnic nation-state project would of necessity compromise the requirements of democracy or/and intra-regional stability.[30] As if the countries of east–central and south-eastern Europe were begging, during the interwar decades,

[28] Frantísek Palacký's letter 'To the Committee of Fifty, c/o President Soiron, in Frankfurt', dated Prague, 11 April 1848, published by *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 26, no. 67 (April 1948), 305–8.

[29] For the ethnic composition of interwar east–central Europe's societies, consult Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Seattle, WA, and London: University of Washington Press, 1974).

[30] For an excellent illustration of the variation of political responses to an ethno-culturally and ethno-religiously complex society on the part of an ethnically controlled nation-state, see Brubaker's essay on the 'nationalizing' policies in interwar Poland in Brubaker, *Nationalism*, 84–103.

for a new era of empire-building at the cost of their own territorial integrity and independence.

Western powers too played a less than glorious part in this twentieth-century drama, where imperial and ethnic nation-state projects have alternately tormented the region's society. As historical research has shown, in their planning for peace after the First as well as the Second World War, the Western powers (Britain and the United States) appeared to be considering seriously various federal solutions for the region.[31] Yet, at the end of the day, they have always given way either to imperial integration or to ethnic nation-state projects, either as an acknowledgment of their Soviet–Russian ally's security interests in the region, or as a concession to Polish, Czech, Rumanian and south-Slav nationalism.

Indeed, one of the most shameful episodes of the history of the attempts at creating ethnically clean nation-states in the region took place under the auspices of the victorious anti-Axis alliance. According to certain estimates 12.3 million people, all members of east–central Europe's German minorities, were forcibly moved out of their homes and countries during the final phase of and immediately after the Second World War.[32] The background follows the well-known pattern of minorities allegedly having acted as fifth columns on behalf of a hostile neighbouring nation-state. No doubt Nazi Germany did exploit the post-First World-War system of protection of minorities as a way of achieving its aggressive objectives and managed to turn large sections of the region's ethnically German citizens against their own states, thus paving the way for German expansionism.[33] But accepting

[31] See, among others, Ignác Romsics, ed., *Integrációs törekvések Közép és Kelet-Európában a 19–20. században* (Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 1997); Ignác Romsics, ed., *Twentieth-Century Hungary and the Great Powers* (Boulder, CO, and Highland Lakes, NJ: Social Science Monographs & Atlantic Research and Publications, 1995); András D. Bán, *Pax Britannica: Wartime Foreign Office Documents Regarding Plans for a Postbellum East Central Europe* (Boulder, CO, and Highland Lakes, NJ: Social Science Monographs & Atlantic Research and Publications, 1997).

[32] The most important work on the post-Second World War expulsion of the German population from eastern Europe is Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, *A Terrible Revenge. The Ethnic Cleansing of the East European Germans, 1944–1950* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). The original German book was published in 1986 and was entitled *Anmerkungen zur Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten*. The first English translation, with revisions and additions, was published in 1993 under the title *The German Expellees: Victims in War and Peace*. The use of the concept of 'ethnic cleansing' was obviously meant to suggest certain commonalities between the book's topic and the ongoing war in Yugoslavia. Another relevant and important work of de Zayas is *Nemesis at Potsdam. The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans. Background, Execution, Consequences* (London: Routledge & Kegan, Paul, 1979). For a statistically very solid and rather well balanced discussion of Europe's prewar and postwar experience with population transfers, see the important books of Joseph B. Schechtman: *European Population Transfers, 1939–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) and *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945–1955* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962).

[33] On this side of the issue in Czechoslovakia, a well documented work is Radomír Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans. A Study of Czech–German Relations, 1933–1962* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964). For the political use by Hitler of Hungary's German minority, see Loránt Tilkovszky, *Ez volt a Volksbund: a német népcsoportpolitika és Magyarország 1938–1945* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1978). An excellent historical survey of Hitlerite Germany's policies vis-à-vis Europe's German minorities is Valdis O. Lumans, *Himmler's Auxiliaries. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933–1945* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993).

this as a basis for legitimising the collective punishment of the German minorities was hardly less criminal.

Exiled Czech politicians were the first to articulate policy proposals aimed at 'radically solving' the problem of national minorities.[34] They claimed that the case of German minorities was a proof of the failure of interwar policies of assimilation and that, *therefore*, the policy after the war should be the forced expatriation of the German and Hungarian minorities from what they envisaged to be the postwar unified Slav Czechoslovakia. At the time – December 1943 – when Eduard Benes first contacted the Allied powers to air this idea, he got only partial support. The Allies consented, in principle, to the expatriation of the Sudeten Germans, while the suggestion that this act of ethnic cleansing should also embrace the Hungarian minority of Slovakia was, to begin with, only supported by Stalin.

The Moscow-based Polish communist journal, *Nowe Widnokragi*, made it clear as early as in 1943 that 'the renewed Polish state will be a nation-state'. In the second half of 1944, the London Polish government in exile and the Lublin Polish committee of national liberation petitioned to the Allied powers asking for their consent to the expatriation of Germans after the war. The petition applied not only to Germans living within the 1937 Polish boundaries, but even to the German population of such territories as were to be annexed to Poland after the war. The Allied powers gave their consent and connected the expatriation of Germans from Poland with the resettlement of those Poles who lived in the western areas of the Soviet Union which, before the war, had belonged to Poland.

The politicians of postwar Czechoslovakia and Poland were so eager to embark on their programme of forced resettlement right after the war, that the Potsdam conference had to discuss the matter and to issue a communiqué which emphasised that expatriation from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary should take place in an organised and humane manner. The Potsdam communiqué was a surprise because Hungary had not been previously considered as part of the expatriation campaign. The inclusion of Hungary in the plans was apparently due to an appeal by the Hungarian temporary government to the Soviet Union (26 May 1945), in which it asked for the removal of fascist German traitors. More often than not, however, such formal requests were sent to Moscow only after the Soviet leadership had informally contacted the Hungarian politicians (as a first step, the Communists) and told them to take the 'initiative'. In this particular case the Soviets may have wanted to include Hungary's Germans too in order to make place for minority Hungarians whose forced expatriation from Czechoslovakia they had already promised the Czechoslovaks they would support.

The Allied Council of Control was responsible for the planning and supervision of the forced resettlements. According to a resolution of November 1945, the

[34] In addition to the works of de Zayas and Schechtman already referred to, in the section below I have been drawing on Andrea R. Süle, 'A közép- és kelet-európai német kisebbségek kitelepítése a második világháború után', *Medvetánc* (Budapest), 1988/4–1989/1, 107–30.

council estimated an expatriation of altogether 6.65 million Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria.

The forced expatriation from Czechoslovakia had started well before the Potsdam conference, and it went hand in hand with the confiscation of German property legalised by the presidential decrees of 19 May, 21 June and 24 and 25 October 1945. On 2 August 1945 a presidential decree deprived all Germans and Hungarians in the country of their Czechoslovakian citizenship. Another presidential decree, of 18 October, closed down all schools for the minority nationalities. Realistic estimates put the number of expatriated Germans at 3.2 million (the Czech official figure, 2,256,000, includes only those who were resettled in an organised manner, not those who had been forced to leave before August 1945). According to the statistics made public by the Czech historian, Jirí Sláma, the relative size of the German minority was 29.3 per cent in 1937, 26.3 per cent in 1945, 2 per cent in 1947, and 1.8 per cent in 1950. The reduction was slightly over three million from 1937 to 1950.[35] The fact that the expatriation was executed as a collective punishment was underlined by the inclusion of a great number of former anti-fascist resistance fighters and prisoners of German concentration camps. About 80,000 persons were granted permission to stay by the Czechoslovak authorities on account of their 'democratic record', but 43,000 of them chose to resettle in East Germany. Those who stayed had to bear deprivation and humiliation: some of them were forced to move from the border areas to the central parts of the country, where they were compelled to carry special distinguishing marks, a white stripe on their sleeve or a badge. Even their food ration coupons were marked 'German'. Until 1948 they were outlawed, and only then it was made possible for them, upon application and the fulfilment of a number of criteria, to (re-)gain Czechoslovak citizenship. Considering the fact that the expatriation measures concerned a quarter of the population, whose political complexion had always been more moderate than that of the rest, the pursuance of the objectives of the ethnic nation-state made a major contribution towards the successful Communist takeover in 1948.

The story of Poland's German minority ended in a very similar fashion to that of Czechoslovakia's. Forced resettlements went on until the end of the 1940s, and those few who were allowed to stay had to suffer a number of restrictions on their civil and political rights: their freedom of movement within the country was restricted, all education in the German language was stopped and all German cultural and social institutions were dissolved. Polish official statistics admitted the expulsion of 3.3 million Germans. Molotov, Stalin's Minister of Foreign Affairs, claimed on 9 April 1947 that, disregarding those who left 'illegally', 5,678,936 Germans had been made to leave Poland up to 1 January 1947. Communist Party leader Boleslaw Bierut apparently did not wish to conceal his pride, reporting to his people in his 1954 new year address that 'the Polish nation . . . is transforming itself

[35] Jirí Sláma, 'Die Folgen der Zwangsaussiedlung der Deutschen für die Tschechoslowakei', paper presented at the international conference 'Internal Factors Facilitating the Sovietization of the Central and East European States, 1944–1948', arranged by the Institute for Contemporary History, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Opocno, 9–11 September 1993.

from a multi-national state into a single-nation state'. And the Allied powers, among them all the major Western democracies, could congratulate themselves on having supported and supervised the most massive ethnic cleansing in Europe's history.

Concluding remarks

David P. Calleo put forward a number of convincing arguments suggesting that the nation-state is here to stay. I am ready to accept and resigned to the idea that this applies also to the east European region. But I think it would be tragically wrong for the future of the region also to become resigned to and to accept the unfortunate alternatives of empire and *ethnic* nation state. What lies, then, beyond them? Well, to use the language of political sociology, there is the deliberate cultivation of complementary multiple identities promoting an ethnoculturally inclusive notion of citizenship: if in Catalonia 73 per cent of the population are 'proud to be Spanish', 82 per cent are 'proud to be Catalan', and 83 per cent are in favour of the unification of Europe via the European Union, then why on earth should it not be possible and permissible for Serbs and Croats to identify themselves in Croatia and Serbia as Croatian Serbs and Serbian Croats respectively? Why could not a bilingual (Romanian and Hungarian) inscription on a pharmacy in Transylvania be tolerated and even accepted as normal? Having been born in Hungary, in a secularised Magyar–Jewish family, but having also spent fourteen years in Sweden and another five in Norway, I feel I have good reasons to call myself a *Skandinavien-ungrare*, and there can be no 'primordial' reasons preventing a Hungarian born in Slovakia into a family that has always lived in Slovakia genuinely identifying himself/herself as a loyal Slovak citizen without having to deny being a Slovakian Magyar.

The emergence and consolidation of multiple, complementary identities and loyalties need time and are conditional upon such political and legal structures as provide guarantees to the different nationalities sharing one and the same state. Such institutional arrangements are needed as make both majority and minorities feel safe and at home in the state, of which they are all citizens.

However, the development and cultivation of multiple identities and the political and other institutional structures supporting them are certainly necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the peoples of eastern Europe to free themselves from the trap of the evil alternatives of empire and ethnic nation-state. Multiple identities and genuinely democratic political structures and cultural institutions are easy prey to the ethnic nation-state project, especially when the latter legitimises itself by reference to external threat. Indeed, the only hope for durable peace and stability in the region lies in developing its state-system towards confederal structures. Such structures would work in a fashion similar to the reformed version of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as envisioned by the Austroslavist Frantísek Palacký in the late 1840s. It could at the same time turn the bulk of the region's dangerous inter-state and inter-ethnic disputes into manageable internal affairs and assert and defend the interests of eastern Europe's small nations vis-à-vis possible new waves of great-power expansionism from east or west.

As in all pendulum movements, the oscillation between empire and the ethnic nation-state derives a great deal of its energy from its own swings. The fragmentation and division brought by the post-imperial upsurges of nation-state projects have tended to redefine the region as an area of power vacuum in European politics. Restricted intra-regional wars, civil wars, grievances suffered by minority populations (sometimes of the same ethnicity as that of the dominant group in a neighbouring great power) and major waves of migration resulting from these conflicts can all produce a multitude of more or less legitimate avenues for great power involvement in the region. Whether such involvement will prove a first move of the new swing towards imperial integration is of course a matter depending first of all on the internal politics and external aspirations of the great power in question. A new, successful imperial integration, on the other hand, will by default provoke a resistance of national self-defence, the germ, that is, from which the break-up of empire and a new era of ethnic nation-state building might develop. We should be very careful not to base our hopes on the belief that history never repeats itself. If history were teaching lessons to us, it would certainly teach us to go against it.

Hitherto two major historical chances have been missed to direct the development of the region's state system towards non-imperial integration into confederal frameworks. A third has now presented itself with the collapse of state socialism and the contraction of the Soviet–Russian empire. A great many of the opportunities have already been wasted and a series of upsetting blunders have been made by the western powers. Integration by joining the confederal structures of the European Union appears to be the last realistic hope, for the time being. Will the EU have the political courage, wisdom and internal strength necessary to open itself, within a relatively short period of time, to the states of eastern Europe? The answer to this question will decide whether the post-communist march of the peoples of the region 'back to Europe' will, in fact, bring them to yet another phase of imperial integration. Indeed, the present orgy of nationalisms and the ethnic nation-state project produces not only a great deal of human suffering but also a power vacuum in the region which Imanuel Geiss has rightly described in the following words.

> The New World Order after the Cold War seems to be plunging into the chaos of more post-imperial successor states. They are the stuff that dreams of empire are made of.[36]

[36] Imanuel Geiss, 'Great Powers and Empires: Historical Mechanisms of their Making and Breaking', in Geir Lundestad, ed., *The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy* (Oslo and Oxford: Scandinavian University Press & Oxford University Press, 1994), 42.