

Tony Blair's Vietnam: The Iraq War and the 'special relationship' in historical perspective

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Abstract. This article examines Tony Blair's policy and posture on Iraq through the prism of the special relationship in which he was reared. At the same time, it examines his policy and posture on the special relationship through the prism of Iraq. In this context it proposes a Vietnam analogy of a kind, with reference to Blair's white-hot predecessor Harold Wilson: a curious affinity of fate – disenchantment, disgrace, and moral ruination.

Utility is an impermanent thing: it changes according to circumstances. So with the disappearance of the ground for friendship, the friendship also breaks up, because that was what kept it alive. Friendships of this kind seem to occur most frequently between the elderly . . . and those in middle or early life who are pursuing their own advantage. Such persons do not spend much time together, because they sometimes do not even like one another, and therefore feel no need of such an association unless they are mutually useful. For they take pleasure in each other's company only in so far as they have hopes of advantage from it. Friendships with foreigners are generally included in this class.¹

There are three kinds of friendship, Aristotle tells us, friendship based on utility, friendship based on pleasure, and friendship based on goodness. Of these three, only the last is perfect, as he says, for 'it is those who desire the good of their friends for the friends' sake that are most truly friends, because each loves the other for what he is, and not for any incidental quality'. In other words the friendship is essential rather than circumstantial, dedicated rather than calculated, persistent rather than evanescent. It does not wait on time and tide, terror and tyranny, suicide attack or simmering stockpile. It rests on character, and specifically on goodness, a scarce commodity. Friendships of this kind are rare, adds Aristotle, because men of this kind are few. 'And in addition they need time and intimacy; for as the saying goes, you cannot get to know each other until you have eaten the proverbial quantity of salt together. Nor can one man accept another, or the two become friends, until each has proved to the other that he is worthy of love, and so won his trust. Those who are quick to make friendly advances to each other have the desire to be friends, but they are not unless they are worthy of love and know it.' To demonstrate worthiness of this sort is no easy task, individually or internationally. To maintain the conviction is even harder. 'The wish for friendship develops rapidly', Aristotle concludes appositely, 'but friendship does not'.²

¹ Aristotle, in *Ethics*, trans. J. A. K. Thomson (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 262 [1156a16–b2].

² *Ibid.*, pp. 263–4 [1156b2–1157a9].

The 'special relationship' between Britain and America is a subtle case of friendship between foreigners posited on perfection. International relations in general are not known for their goodness, nor even their disinterestedness, as Aristotle himself underlined; yet the claims made for this particular relationship are founded on virtue. Anglo-American apologetics echo Aristotelian ethics. The special relationship is an unusually self-conscious one. It creates its own myths and propagates its own legends. What is special about it is its capacity to do this – to invent and reinvent itself, to exploit its mythical potential – which may be as close as we get to its occult essence. The special relationship is a shimmering illusion lost in never-never land, marooned somewhere between a monumentalised past and a mythical fiction, to borrow Nietzsche's terms; and it continues to cast its spell.³ More conventionally, it is a community of belief, whose celebrants dwell in high places. The stories they tell each other to sustain that belief are of consuming interest.

One such story was told by Tony Blair to Bill Clinton, his first best friend, at a White House dinner in February 1998. It was framed by Blair as a story of 'those great days of America and Britain standing together' in the Second World War. It turns on a fact-finding visit to Britain by Harry Hopkins, FDR's eyes and ears, in January 1941. The outcome of this visit would be critical in determining the President's assessment of Britain's chances of survival and the attitude he would take towards its buccaneer Prime Minister, as Winston Churchill well understood. The climax is reached at a farewell dinner – taking salt together is a rich seam of the tradition. As Blair recounted it:

On the last evening before he left to take home a message to America he gave a speech to the dinner and sitting next to Churchill he said: 'I suppose you wish to know what I am going to say to President Roosevelt on my return.' And then Harry Hopkins said he would be quoting a verse from the Bible: 'Whither thou goest, I will go, and whither thou lodgest, I will lodge. Thy people shall be my people and thy God my God.' And Hopkins paused and then he said: 'Even to the end'. And Churchill wept.⁴

And Clinton in his turn wept, as Blair surely intended. (The tear-jerker is also part of the tradition. Milking emotion is one of the prerequisites of the special relationship.) Their weeping was incommensurable – if Churchill had nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat, Clinton had merely the toil of the Monica Lewinsky scandal – but the point was made. For the British, standing together is a kind of shibboleth. It is a proof of loyalty, and of dependability. Fifty years ago Oliver Franks observed wisely: 'In the Anglo-American relationship British policy has to pass the test: can the British deliver?'⁵ The obligations of alliance are acutely felt by the weak.

In the beginning was the anti-fascist annunciation. The tale of Harry Hopkins is a moral tale. It tells of a good war, a war of indubitable legitimacy, that is the fount

³ On Nietzsche and the storied past, see Alex Danchev, 'The Cold War "Special Relationship" Revisited', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17 (2006), pp. 579–95; and more generally, *On Specialness* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

⁴ Toast at the White House, 5 February 1998, (www.number-10.gov.uk). The story was originally recorded by Churchill's doctor, who was there. Moran diary, January 1941, in Lord Moran, *Churchill: The Struggle for Survival* (London: Constable, 1966), p. 6. Blair came across it, he said, in Martin Gilbert's authorised biography. For Clinton's reaction, and the scandal-soaked atmosphere in Washington, see John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars* (London: Free Press, 2004), p. 89; Anthony Seldon, *Blair* (London: Free Press, 2005), pp. 372–3.

⁵ Oliver Franks, *Britain and the Tide of World Affairs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 35.

and origin of Anglo-American self-regard and *raison d'être*. It is told, and retold, for a purpose. Rigorous analysis of the grounds for a special relationship has always been too difficult. Adepts have opted instead to testify, like evangelicals. Ever since 1941 the relationship has led a double life: on the one hand, a hole-and-corner affair, secret and taboo, regularly disavowed; on the other, back-slapping bonhomie, brazen self-promotion, razzamatazz, showtime! In brief, private observance and public performance. For prime ministers and presidents, public performance would not be complete without the evangelical set-piece – the speech – a cocktail of primitive faith and popular history, emotionally charged, full of solemn incantation, shameless glorification, and ritual invocation of the household god Winston.

'There is a union of mind and purpose between our peoples which is remarkable and which makes our relationship truly a special one. I am often asked if it is special, and why, and I say: "It is special. It just is and that is that!"' Thus Margaret Thatcher, in characteristic vein, addressing the rubicund Ronald Reagan at the British Embassy in Washington in 1985. In all this testifying, a sort of rhetorical equi-probability has been smuggled in. Specialness is goodness. Goodness is specialness. Good men (and good women) make good wars. Being good is doing good, together. 'As Winston once said', Thatcher went on, proprietorially, as if they were personally acquainted, "'The experience of a long life and the promptings of my blood have wrought in me the conviction that there is nothing more important for the future of the world than the fraternal association of our two peoples in righteous work, both in war and peace!'" No one could put it better than that.⁶

Tony Blair is a devil for righteous work. 'We are the ally of the US not because they are powerful, but because we share their values', he admonished a gathering of British ambassadors in January 2003. 'I am not surprised by anti-Americanism', he continued snappishly, 'but it is a foolish indulgence. For all their faults, and all nations have them, the US are a force for good; they have liberal and democratic traditions of which any nation can be proud.' On this argument, utility is subsumed in goodness. 'Quite apart from that, it is massively in our self-interest to remain close allies'. Pleasure is off, apparently, unless it is a certain uppishness. 'Bluntly there are not many countries who wouldn't wish for the same relationship as we have with the US, and that includes most of the ones critical of it in public'.⁷ Stephen Potter, the original satirist of Hands-Across-The-Seamanship, should be living at this hour. 'It is not our policy continuously to try to be one-up, as a nation, on other nations; but it is our aim to rub in the fact that we are not trying to do this, otherwise what is the point of not trying to do this?'⁸

No European leader of his generation speaks so unblushingly of good and evil. *A force for good* is quintessential Blair, and something of a Blairite mantra. If the US

⁶ Speech at British Residence, Washington, 20 February 1985, (www.margaretthatcher.org). There is a telling imbalance. Such speeches are more often delivered by prime ministers than presidents. Compare the irrepressible Bill Clinton, reminded of his obligation to mention the special relationship on the occasion of his first meeting with John Major, in 1993. 'Oh yes,' said Clinton. 'How could I forget. The "special relationship"!' And he threw back his head and laughed. Raymond Seitz, *Over Here* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), p. 322. On the other hand, that was in private. In public, many gave as good as they got. See, for example, Ronald Reagan's response to Thatcher, above.

⁷ Speech at Foreign Office Conference, London, 7 January 2003, (www.number-10.gov.uk).

⁸ Stephen Potter, 'Hands-Across-The-Seamanship', in *One Upmanship* (1952), reprinted in *The Complete Upmanship* (London: Hart-Davis, 1970), p. 263.

is a force for good, Washington is worthy of love. For the Prime Minister, this means making a conquest of the tenant of the White House, whoever that may be. In love and Anglo-American relations, reciprocity is the key.⁹ Britain too is a force for good, naturally, and also the British Army.¹⁰ This is goodness militant. Tony is a true believer in the mission of the moment. Blazing sincerity is integral to his self-image, or self-construction. Like his folksy friend George (his next best friend), with whom he often looks so uncomfortable, he advertises himself as ‘a pretty straight sort of guy’. He speaks with seeming frankness: *frank-seeming* is his *métier*, as the writer Alan Bennett has remarked. ‘That Tony Blair . . . will often say “I honestly believe” rather than just “I believe” says all that needs to be said.’ *Time* magazine’s correspondent at the Hutton Inquiry made a similar observation: ‘In two and a half hours of apparently frank testimony – always thoughtful and reasoned, passionate when passion was called for – Blair gave a masterful performance.’¹¹

Articulacy he can do – ‘his brilliantly articulate impersonation of earnest inarticulacy’. Authenticity is another matter.¹² A dash of missionary zeal, meanwhile, is all part of the service. ‘I feel a most urgent sense of mission about today’s world’, he told Congress in July 2003. ‘September 11th was not an isolated event, but a tragic prologue. Iraq, another act; and many further struggles will be set upon this stage before it’s over.’¹³

Doing good in the world is for Blair an ethical imperative and a practical necessity. At the Bush Presidential Library in April 2002 – when Iraq was still only a gleam in the eye – he set out his stall in front of ‘41’ for the benefit of ‘43’, in a language the latter could understand:

The only purpose of being in politics is to strive for the values and ideals we believe in: freedom, justice, what we Europeans call solidarity but you might call respect for and help for others. These are the decent democratic values we all avow. But alongside the values we know we need a hard-headed pragmatism – a *realpolitik* – required to give us any chance of translating those values into the practical world we live in. The same tension exists in the two views of international affairs. One is utilitarian: each nation maximises its own self-interest. The other is utopian: we try to create a better world. Today I want to suggest that more than ever before those two views are merging.

I advocate an enlightened self-interest that puts fighting for our values right at the heart of the politics necessary to protect our nations. Engagement in the world on the basis of these values, not isolation from it, is the hard-headed pragmatism for the 21st century . . .

If necessary the action should be military, and again, if necessary and justified, it should involve regime change. I have been involved as British Prime Minister in three conflicts involving regime change. Milosevic. The Taliban. And Sierra Leone, where a country of six million people was saved from a murderous group of gangsters who had hijacked the democratically elected government.¹⁴

⁹ Specifying specialness has proved extremely difficult. Reciprocity is one of ten criteria proposed in Danchev, *On Specialness*, pp. 7f. Needless to say, the criteria (and the very idea of criteria) remain essentially contested.

¹⁰ See the Defence White Paper, *Delivering Security in a Changing World* (London: TSO, 2003). ‘The Defence Vision’ in this document is a three-pronged affair: ‘defending the UK and its interests; strengthening international peace and security; a force for good in the world’.

¹¹ Bennett diary, 29 May 2003, in Alan Bennett, *Untold Stories* (London: Faber, 2005), p. 331; Jeff Chu, ‘Winning the Battle, Losing the War’, *Time*, 8 September 2003.

¹² John Lanchester, ‘Unbelievable Blair’, *London Review of Books*, 10 July 2003. On the authenticity project see Alex Danchev, ‘Provenance’, *Journal for Cultural Research*, 10 (2006), pp. 23–33.

¹³ Speech to Congress, 18 July 2003, (www.number-10.gov.uk).

¹⁴ Speech at Bush Presidential Library, 7 April 2002, (www.number-10.gov.uk).

The emphasis is interesting. One of Blair's deepest concerns is said to be untutored unilateralism, to coin a phrase, and its baleful consequences. He told the journalist Peter Stothard, who shadowed his every move for the fateful month of March 2003, that if he was not there side-by-side with the President he feared America would rush in, topple Saddam, and rush out again, careless of the stability of the country it left behind. The same theme is threaded through his speeches. 'Prevention is better than cure', he argued, beforehand. 'The reason it would be crazy for us to clear out of Afghanistan once we had finished militarily is that if it drifts back into instability, the same old problems will re-emerge. Stick at it and we can show, eventually, as in the Balkans, the unstable starts to become stable.' In sub-Churchillian mode, after the fact: 'Finishing the fighting is not finishing the job'. Most succinctly, six months on: 'We who started the war must finish the peace'.¹⁵

But there would be no more loose talk of regime change, not from this quarter. That was ruled out of order by the Attorney-General (Lord Goldsmith). The infamous Downing Street memorandum of a meeting of the Prime Minister's inner circle in July 2002 reveals among other things the Attorney-General's pithy advice, 'that the desire for regime change was not a legal basis for military action'.¹⁶ Oratorically, the Prime Minister fell into line. Clandestinely, he continued on his chosen course. Iraq, too, was sold as a good war, but it was precisely the selling – or the mis-selling – that gave it a bad name. It was in fact a war of the worst kind, a war of false pretences; manufactured, as one might say, and of doubtful legality.¹⁷ Tony Blair was a party to the intrigue that brought it about. This was a war made in Washington, to be sure, and yet to all intents and purposes it was an Anglo-American intrigue – a sniff of the old exclusivity. Blair fulfilled the time-honoured role of accomplice-in-chief.

In essence, he connived at a deception. The issue of the Prime Minister's deceptiveness, and the deliberateness of the deceptiveness, is an essentially contested question, prey to the prejudiced and the *parti pris*, and clouded further, perhaps, by an element of wishfulness (or self-deception) on Blair's part.¹⁸ The documentary evidence is still thin (as thin as the credible intelligence). But the nature of the deception emerges with chilling clarity in the Downing Street memorandum, ironically, in a contribution from 'C', the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service

¹⁵ Ibid., speech to Congress, 18 July 2003; speech to Labour Party Conference, 30 September 2003, (www.number-10.gov.uk). See Seldon, *Blair*, p. 616, drawing on an interview with Sir Peter Stothard, 2 April 2004. Stothard's fly-on-the-wall diary is *30 Days* (London: HarperCollins, 2003). He records as axiomatic in Blair's circle by September 2002 that 'it would be more damaging to long-term peace and security if the Americans alone defeated Saddam Hussein than if they had international support to do so' (p. 87).

¹⁶ 'Iraq: Prime Minister's Meeting', 23 July 2002, in Mark Danner, *The Secret Way to War* (New York: NYRB, 2006), p. 91. The memo was first published in the *Sunday Times*, 1 May 2005. At the meeting the AG listed three possible legal grounds for military action: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, and UNSC authorisation. He discounted the first two, and considered the third 'difficult' on the basis of pre-existing resolutions. Blair's subsequent public pronouncements take their cue from this. 'Regime change alone could not be and was not our justification for war. Our primary purpose was to enforce UN resolutions over Iraq and WMD.' Speech in Sedgfield Constituency, 5 March 2004, (www.number-10.gov.uk).

¹⁷ An argument explored in greater detail in Alex Danchev, 'The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the Iraq War', *Intelligence and National Security*, 19 (2004), pp. 436–66.

¹⁸ Among the more convincing analyses: Danner, *Secret Way to War*; Andrew O'Hagan, 'King Tony', *New York Review of Books*, 16 November 2006; and especially David Runciman, 'Liars, Hypocrites and Crybabies', *London Review of Books*, 2 November 2006. Cf. John Lloyd, 'Lies, Spin and Deceit', *Prospect* (October 2006).

(Sir Richard Dearlove), recently returned from talks with the cousins: 'Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But *the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy*.'¹⁹ This last formulation (a neat one) was subsequently corroborated by the President himself in another leaked memorandum, of a *tête-à-tête* at the White House in January 2003, when he coolly informed the Prime Minister that 'the diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning'.²⁰

At both of these meetings, the internal British one in July 2002 and the Anglo-American one in January 2003, the explicit assumption was that the UK would take part in any military action. British spear-carriers were not strictly necessary, as the US Secretary of Defense made unpalatably plain at the time ('there are workarounds'), but Washington needed a fig-leaf of legitimacy for this fight.²¹ London supplied it. That was its function. Churchill once said that all he expected was compliance with his wishes after reasonable discussion. Much the same is true of Washington and the special relationship. Compliance is expected; enthusiasm is supererogatory. The British Prime Minister, 'that simpering little whore' in the immortal words of Hunter S. Thompson, is not exactly a harlot; British troops are not exactly mercenaries.²² But the Hessian option was more nearly a reality in Iraq than in Vietnam. Whether or not the British Army is a force for good, it is a stake in the game. The stake bought a say, of a sort. It bought access – face time – and kudos, at least in some circles. These are the traditional marks of favour in the relationship. Under the present imperium they are in short supply. Twice blessed, Tony Blair strutted on the world stage in the role of cheerleader and whipper-in. The memorandum of the second meeting records his fealty: he declared himself 'solidly with the President and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam'.²³

When it came to military action, Blair had form. He was proud of that, as his speechifying indicated.²⁴ He had also learned some lessons – he thought – on how to manage Anglo-American relations, in particular, the delicate business of being best friend. Tony Blair is now firmly ensconced in the public mind as the President's poodle. (In the British public mind, that is, and more weakly in the international one; in the US he has not yet lost his sheen. In this as in other respects, there is a parallel with Margaret Thatcher.) He himself has been conscious of 'the poodle factor' from

¹⁹ Meeting of 23 July 2002, in Danner, *Secret Way*, p. 89 (emphasis added).

²⁰ This memorandum, of a meeting on 31 January 2003, was disclosed in Philippe Sands, *Lawless World* (London: Penguin, 2006). Its contents are summarised in *The Guardian*, 3 February 2006, and the *New York Times*, 27 March 2006.

²¹ Donald Rumsfeld was asked at a press conference on 11 March 2003 whether the US would go to war without Britain. His answer is printed and discussed in Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, pp. 290–1.

²² Hunter S. Thompson interviewed by Robert Chalmers, *Independent on Sunday*, 31 October 2004. 'I almost felt sorry for Bush, until I heard someone call him "Mr President", and then I felt ashamed. Every nation in the world despises us, except for a handful of corrupt Brits, like that simpering little whore, Tony Blair.'

²³ Meeting of 31 January 2003. At this meeting Blair was still talking about a second UN resolution, though in purely instrumental (and somewhat debased) terms: as 'insurance policy', providing 'international cover', in case anything went wrong with the military campaign, or Saddam raised the stakes (burning oil wells, killing children). Whether these were the terms he thought best calculated to appeal to the President is a matter for speculation, but they do not sit well with the public presentation of 'offering Saddam the prospect of voluntary disarmament through the UN'.

²⁴ He is still proud of it, or at least determined to defend it. See his speech to the Foreign Policy Centre in London, 21 March 2006, at (www.number-10.gov.uk).

the outset. 'If [terrorism] is the threat of the 21st century, Britain should be in there helping to confront it', ran one apology, 'not because we are America's poodle, but because dealing with it will make Britain safer'. He put a somewhat more sophisticated argument to the assemblage of ambassadors:

The price of British influence is not, as some would have it, that we have, obediently, to do what the US asks. I would never commit British troops to a war I thought was wrong or unnecessary. Where we disagree, as over Kyoto, we disagree. But the price of influence is that we do not leave the US to face the tricky issues alone. By tricky, I mean the ones which people wish weren't there, don't want to deal with, and, if I can put it pejoratively, know the US should confront, but want the luxury of criticizing them for it. So if the US act alone, they are unilateralist; but if they want allies, people shuffle to the back.²⁵

Disobedience, however, is not his forte. ('We keep waiting for his *Love Actually* moment,' bemoaned one of his ministerial colleagues, 'and it never comes.') Even before 9/11, perceptive observers noted his chronic lack of leverage, together with his promiscuous warmth, his serial devotion, his eager demeanour, his reluctance to challenge, even in private, and drew the inevitable conclusion about a relationship less special than spaniel. 'In Washington today', wrote the distinguished commentator Hugo Young in February 2001, 'Tony Blair will do what history tells him. It isn't possible to imagine him doing anything else. He will shake George Bush by the hand, and set about getting as close to him as a weekend in Camp David permits.' 'Some day soon', he added, a year later, 'Washington will eat him for breakfast, along with the morality it then spits out'. By September 2003, in his last, coruscating column, he was measuring the tragedy of Tony Blair – trust evaporated, credibility vanished – and pondering bleakly 'our country and what becomes of it in abject thrall to Bush and his gang'.²⁷ Others, equally perceptive, and if anything even more vituperative on the subject of Bush and his gang, conceive of Blair as a minstrel for the American cause, in John le Carré's sardonic phrase: not so much a poodle, more a seeing-eye dog. 'Your little Prime Minister is not the American President's *poodle*, he is his *blind dog*, I hear', jeers one of the characters in le Carré's tract for the times, *Absolute Friends*.²⁸ Lap dog or guide dog, the canine analogy may be more complex than at first appears, but the power relationship it proposes is as apt as it is unambiguous.

The guide dog barked in 1999. Blair boldly went to the Economic Club of Chicago, the citadel of isolationism, to deliver a speech entitled 'Doctrine of the International Community'. It was an important speech on an important subject. At the heart of it was the conundrum of humanitarian intervention. 'The most pressing

²⁵ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (London: Pocket, 2003), p. 107, quoting an unnamed British official, apropos Blair's visit to Washington in September 2001; Speech to Labour Party Conference, 30 September 2003; Speech at Foreign Office Conference, 7 January 2003.

²⁶ James Naughtie, *The Accidental American* (London: Pan, 2005), quoting an unnamed British minister. In the 2003 film, the make-believe Prime Minister (the winsome Hugh Grant) finally repudiates the terms of the relationship. 'A friend who bullies us is no longer a friend'.

²⁷ 'Blair might be a poodle, but at least he should bark', 'Blair the intervener', and 'Under Blair, Britain has ceased to be a sovereign state', *The Guardian*, 22 February 2001, 30 April 2002 and 16 September 2003. The latter two are collected in Hugo Young, *Supping with the Devils* (London: Atlantic, 2004), pp. 141–4 and 319–22. Young died a few days after the final column appeared. Blair paid him fulsome tribute.

²⁸ John le Carré, *Absolute Friends* (London: Hodder, 2003), p. 257 (emphases in original). See also the interview with le Carré in Naughtie, *Accidental American*, p. 122.

foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts.' He offered five considerations:

First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators.

Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should always give peace every chance, as we have in the case of Kosovo.

Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake?

Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? In the past we talked too much of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate numbers of troops than return for a repeat performance with large numbers.

And finally, do we have national interests involved? The mass expulsions of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded the notice of the rest of the world. But it does make a difference that this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe.²⁹

The bones of Blair's argument had been provided on request by Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, one of a small coterie invited to covert coffee mornings on international affairs to help Blair prepare for government.³⁰ Given two days to work it out, Freedman turned for inspiration to a previous effort to codify the conditions under which the use of military force might be warranted: the so-called Weinberger Doctrine (1984):

The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . . .

If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. . . .

If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. . . .

The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed – their size, composition, and disposition – must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. . . .

Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. . . .

The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.³¹

The Weinberger Doctrine was precipitated by a disastrous US peacekeeping mission in the Lebanon, a bloody failure capped by a humiliating retreat. More fundamentally, it embodied the consolidated lessons of the Vietnam War. As a template for decision-makers, it was designed to avert either fate – *débâcle* or quagmire. The sub-text of the Weinberger Doctrine was Never Again.

²⁹ Speech at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999, <www.number-10.gov.uk>. The speech identified two dictators directly: 'Many of our problems have been caused by two dangerous and ruthless men – Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic.'

³⁰ Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, pp. 50–3; Seldon, *Blair*, p. 398. The invitees included the former diplomats Sir Rodric Braithwaite, Sir Michael Butler, Sir David Hannay, Sir Nicholas Henderson, Sir Robin Renwick, and Raymond Seitz, a transplanted American; together with Timothy Garton Ash, of St Antony's College, Oxford, and Freedman.

³¹ Caspar Weinberger, 'The Uses of Military Power', *Defense '85* (January 1985), p. 10. The author was then Secretary of Defense. The Weinberger Doctrine was later supplemented by Colin Powell, as Chairman of the JCS, whose criteria centred on the clarity of the military objective, and the ability to gauge when it has been achieved. For a recapitulation of US doctrine see Edwin J. Arnold, 'The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests', *Parameters*, XXIV (1994), pp. 4–12.

Given the course of events in Iraq since 2003, it is richly ironic that Tony Blair's guidance on the good intervention owed something to American determination on no more Vietnams. Not the least of the ironies concerns the vexed question of exit strategy. Blair's public pronouncements tended to give the impression that he considered talk of exit strategy so much hot air – prevarication or (worse) pusillanimity on Washington's part. Another portion of the Chicago speech, addressed specifically to Anglo-American resolve over Kosovo, contained the grandiloquent soundbite: 'Success is the only exit strategy I am prepared to consider'. This might possibly find an echo in Bushite absolutism on winning the war on terror, but Clinton and his people were not amused. Official Washington is impatient with exhortation. An undercurrent of mockery crept in. The President's henchmen began to refer to Blair as 'Winston'. The Deputy Secretary of State (Strobe Talbott) was heard to say privately that Winston was 'ready to fight to the last American'.³²

Blair told one intimate that Kosovo could be his Suez. The ghost of Suez (1956) haunts British decision-makers, even those too young to remember it.³³ (Tony Blair was three.) Suez was traumatic: the special relationship was unhallowed, the Prime Minister (Anthony Eden) undone, the job unfinished. The lesson drawn by military men savoured of the inquest on Vietnam. 'What Suez lacked was coherent ministerial resolve,' reflected the Chief of the Defence Staff at the time of the Falklands War (1982). 'There were too many changes of mind, and changes of course, whereas I think the background to the success of the Falklands was that we set our objective, and we stuck to it, absolutely, throughout'.³⁴ As for the politicians, the lesson drawn by Margaret Thatcher is a representative one. 'We should never again find ourselves on the opposite side to the United States in a major international crisis affecting Britain's interests'.³⁵ In plain language, never go to war without the Americans, an injunction very nearly flouted by Thatcher herself over the Falklands. In that little war the US Secretary of State (Alexander Haig) tried rather desperately to mediate; but even as he shuttled vainly between London and Buenos Aires he was clear that, whatever attitude the Americans took towards British belligerence, they would not repeat Suez, as they put it. 'By which they meant they would not pillory us, even if they did not agree with us,' Sir Nicholas Henderson has explained. 'They would not put us in the dock, as they had done in 1956 over Suez, and bring us to our knees'. In other words, they would not let their ally down. They might be equivocal, but they could not be impartial. They would do their bit. Notwithstanding the nay-sayers, they did.³⁶ The obligations of alliance are occasionally felt by the strong.

³² Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, p. 48; John Rentoul, *Tony Blair* (London: Time Warner, 2001), extracted at (www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blair/prime/better.html). Did Blair's advisors also come across Gideon Rose, 'The Exit Strategy Delusion', *Foreign Affairs*, 77 (January/February 1998), conveniently available on the internet?

³³ Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, p. 49; Seldon, *Blair*, p. 395. See, for example, the interview with Jack Straw in *The Times*, 1 January 2002, quoted in Peter Riddell, *Hug Them Close* (London: Politico's, 2004), p. 141.

³⁴ Admiral Lord Lewin interviewed in Michael Charlton, *The Little Platoon* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 203.

³⁵ See Margaret Thatcher, *The Path to Power* (London: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 87–91.

³⁶ Nicholas Henderson interviewed in Charlton, *Little Platoon*, p. 195; *Mandarin* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), p. 444. Henderson was British Ambassador in Washington at the time. *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign* (London: Routledge, 2005) reveals an interesting strain of calculation and lack of whole-heartedness in Washington, mirrored by irritation and sense of

Blair came of age, politically, in the Falklands War. He was first selected as a candidate in a Parliamentary by-election in 1982, at the very moment of decision. He supported the dispatch of the Task Force, with reservations. 'At the same time I want a negotiated settlement and I believe that given the starkness of the military option we need to compromise on certain things. I don't think that ultimately the wishes of the Falkland Islanders must determine our position.'³⁷ For all the idealism, the moralism and the evangelism, there has always been a strong dose of pragmatism in Tony Blair. As Prime Minister he often seemed to combine a Gladstonian impulse with a Palmerstonian itch – saviour of a fallen world, with a gunboat. Ideologically, he travels light. What matters is what works, as he is fond of saying. *What works* is another Blairite mantra. On the Falklands, he was by no means alone in fearing that the military option might not work. On Iraq, twenty years later, a similar consideration applied. At the Downing Street meeting in July 2002, with his trusted advisors around him, he was most insistent. 'If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.'³⁸

Evidently the idea was to develop the political strategy in concert with Washington. The special relationship is a cardinal belief, in Blair's words, but it is also a political project, a feature of pragmatism for the twenty-first century. Utility rears its ugly head. The ardent pursuit of specialness had a party-political rationale. For Tony Blair, the messiah of New Labour, tightness with a Republican President and a Republican Administration would effectively neutralise the Conservative opposition. Labour, adept and ambidextrous, could work with Democrats and Republicans alike; even the Neo-Cons had no need of the Cons. The nub of the work was national security. New Labour, unlike old Labour, could be trusted with the defence of the realm. Another plank of the opposition platform had collapsed. The Conservatives supported the Iraq War – they could find no way to oppose it – but their support was redundant. In fact their redundancy was all but complete. They had been outflanked, or blindsided, and they knew it. They were reduced to internecine impotence. The project of specialness through adhesiveness had done its worst. As formulated by the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Advisor, David Manning, 'At the best of times, Britain's influence on the US is limited. But the only way we exercise that influence is by attaching ourselves firmly to them and avoiding public criticism wherever possible.'³⁹ At home, the limpet strategy was a calculating powerplay.⁴⁰ In electoral terms it was a consummate

grievance in London. See Alex Danchev, 'England Your England', *International Relations*, 20 (2006), pp. 364–9.

³⁷ Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, p. 6.

³⁸ Meeting of 23 July 2002. Typically, this was an informal gathering, not a calendared meeting of the Cabinet or a Cabinet committee. Those present were the Defence Secretary (Geoff Hoon), the Foreign Secretary (Jack Straw), the Attorney-General (Lord Goldsmith), the Cabinet Secretary (Sir Richard Wilson), the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (John Scarlett), the Director of GCHQ (Francis Richards), the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (Sir Richard Dearlove), the Chief of the Defence Staff (Admiral Sir Michael Boyce), the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff (Jonathan Powell) and Foreign Policy Advisor (David Manning), the Director of Policy and Government Relations (Sally Morgan), the Director of Government Communications and Strategy (Alastair Campbell), and an aide to David Manning (Matthew Rycroft). These last were truly the Prime Minister's people.

³⁹ Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, p. 117.

⁴⁰ See Robin Cook, *The Point of Departure* (London: Pocket, 2004), p. 104; Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, p. 161.

success. Blair or Bliar, new or shop-soiled, Labour won three straight general election victories, in 1997, 2001, and 2005, an unprecedented feat.

Home and abroad are intertwined. In Anglo-American relations a friend in need is a friend in political difficulty. Asking for help in these circumstances is allowed and understood. So is an element of gamesmanship. Playing on domestic political difficulties is part of the repertoire. According to the well-informed Bob Woodward, Blair asked Bush for help during their *tête-à-tête* in January 2003. The pitch was that a second UN resolution was for him an absolute political necessity. 'Blair said he needed the favor. Please.' Bush heard, in his fashion. He called it 'the famous second resolution meeting'.⁴¹ He tried, up to a point. It did not happen. Politically, however, *extra-specially*, as one might say, it was perhaps the conspicuous effort that was needed, as much as the resolution itself.

For it is also a question of pragmatism in the world. Blair recapped for the documentary film-maker Michael Cockerell: 'The reason why we are with America in so many of these issues is because it is in our interests. We do think the same, we do feel the same, and we have the same – I think – sense of belief that if there is a problem you've got to act on it.'⁴² Anglo-America is the sphere of clarity and action; Europe, turgidity and vexation. The White House has the capacity and the will – and latterly the faith. 'We're history's actors', one of Bush's senior advisors memorably said to the journalist Ron Suskind, 'and you, all of you, will be left just to study what we do.'⁴³ But not Tony Blair. Blair the renegade from the reality-based community, Blair the interloper with the patter and the air-portable brigades, Blair the biddable best friend, would be in on the act. Tony was 'our guy'. He talked the talk and walked the walk. He had *cojones*, the President announced; he was someone 'who does not need a focus group to convince him of the difference between right and wrong'.⁴⁴ The others – Jacques, Gerhard, even Vladimir – they had their own issues to deal with. Tiger shooting was not their cup of tea.⁴⁵

Blair was committed. Commitment, he argues, is the crux of the matter. Michael Cockerell asked him if the special relationship depends in part on whether the British are prepared to send troops, 'to commit themselves, to pay the blood price'. He replied, unhesitatingly, 'Yes. What is important though is that at moments of crisis they [the Americans] don't need to know simply that you are giving general expressions of support and sympathy. That is easy, frankly. They need to know, are you prepared to commit, to be there when the shooting starts?'⁴⁶ On this analysis the special relationship is a sanguinary affair. The price of influence, as Tony Blair would have it, must be paid in blood. The influence gained is wholly imponderable – under Blair, minimal – but an acceptable contribution is something akin to a promise of consideration. The corollary is simple. No contribution: no consideration.

⁴¹ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, p. 297, apparently on the evidence of Bush himself.

⁴² Blair interviewed by Michael Cockerell in *Hotline to the President*, BBC2, 8 September 2002. The interview was conducted on 31 July 2002. Parts of it are in Naughtie, *Accidental American*, pp. 135–6.

⁴³ Ron Suskind, 'Without a Doubt', *New York Times*, 17 October 2004.

⁴⁴ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, p. 178; Riddell, *Hug Them Close*, p. 199.

⁴⁵ For the tiger shooting test in Anglo-American relations see Alex Danchev, 'Tiger Shooting Together', *Reviews in American History*, 18 (1990), pp. 112–17.

⁴⁶ Cockerell, *Hotline*, extracted in BBC News, 'Britain will pay "blood price" – Blair', 6 September 2002 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/uk_politics/2239887.stm).

This is an old lesson in Anglo-American relations. It was pressed on Tony Blair's Labour predecessor Clement Attlee (his polar opposite in stance and style) by the magisterial Oliver Franks, British Ambassador in Washington, on the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The question arose of a British military contribution, in particular, a token ground force. Franks took it upon himself to write a personal letter to the Prime Minister. The burden of his argument was twofold. First, 'the initial British reaction to any major question is the most important from the American point of view'. If the initial reaction appeared negative, or merely consultative, 'then we are "against it" no matter what happens afterwards. The reverse applies.' Secondly, 'the Americans will to some extent – I know this to be true of the Defense Department – test the quality of the partnership by our attitude to the notion of a token ground force'. This token, therefore, was a token of commitment, and also a token of friendship. Franks disclaimed any attempt to suggest what the outcome should be: the implication was clear enough. That course of action did not commend itself to London. But Attlee himself was convinced. He put it to his colleagues that they could not expect to maintain a special relationship purely on the strength of wise counsel. Disinterested advice was inappropriate. Sympathy was not enough. The Chiefs of Staff swallowed their scruples and decided to send a brigade group of British troops to fight alongside the Americans. Nothing less would do. The Cabinet endorsed the decision as 'a valuable contribution to Anglo-American solidarity'. The argument advanced by Oliver Franks carried the day.⁴⁷

It was a lesson well learned.⁴⁸ And yet, the next Labour Prime Minister appeared quite deliberately to unlearn it. Throughout the Vietnam War, Harold Wilson steadfastly (or serpentine) refused to make any contribution of that sort, resisting all blandishment and intimidation – resisting even the formidable, almost physical, persuasive power of President Lyndon Johnson. Wilson was not short of suggestions for a token ground force. When he offered to fly to Washington for talks in 1965, fearing further escalation, Johnson told him to mind his own business. 'I won't tell you how to run Malaysia and you don't tell us how to run Vietnam', adding that Britain should 'send us some folks to deal with these guerrillas'. When Wilson brought up Attlee's talks with Truman on Korea (in 1950), Johnson pointed out that Britain had troops in Korea but not in Vietnam.⁴⁹ 'A platoon of bagpipers would be sufficient', the President informed him when they met the following year, 'it was the British flag that was needed'. As the Secretary of State (Dean Rusk) put it to the British journalist Louis Heren, in 1968, 'All we needed was one regiment. The Black Watch would have done. Just one regiment, but you wouldn't. Well, don't expect us to save you again. They [the Russians] can invade Sussex, and we wouldn't do a damned thing about it.'⁵⁰

Johnson did not like to be denied. He was resentful. Wilson started low in his estimation and sank lower. The US Ambassador to London (David Bruce) confided to

⁴⁷ See Alex Danchev, *Oliver Franks* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp. 124ff.

⁴⁸ By Margaret Thatcher and John Major during the Gulf Conflict of 1990–91, for example, as Tony Blair must have known.

⁴⁹ Wilson-Johnson telephone conversation, 11 February 1965, PREM 13/692, National Archives (UK); Harold Wilson, *The Labour Government* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), pp. 80, 116. For Britain's miscellaneous contributions, overt and covert, and a judicious overall assessment see John W. Young, 'Britain and "LBJ's War", 1964–68', *Cold War History*, 2 (2002), pp. 63–92.

⁵⁰ Wilson, *Labour Government*, p. 264; Louis Heren, *No Hail, No Farewell* (London: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 231.

his diary the President's 'antipathy' for the Prime Minister.⁵¹ Barely concealed contempt might be nearer the mark. There was something of the weasel about Wilson, he thought, weasel words, weasel gestures. On another occasion when London asked for a meeting, the President's response was well-nigh unprintable. 'We got enough pollution around here already without Harold coming over with his fly open and his pecker hanging out, peeing all over me'. When they talked, the obligations of alliance hung heavy between them. Without soldiers in the field, Britain was 'willing to share advice but not responsibility', Johnson reminded him, as if to anticipate Tony Blair.⁵² Nevertheless, LBJ forbore from trying to take advantage of the chronic weakness of sterling to strong-arm Wilson into a deal – dollars for troops – less crudely, loans to support the pound in exchange for a token ground force, a move advocated by his National Security Advisor (McGeorge Bundy), who considered that 'it makes no sense for us to rescue the pound in a situation in which there is no British flag in Vietnam', and advised the President to indicate directly that 'a British brigade in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars at the moment of truth for sterling'.⁵³

Johnson's patience was sorely tried. Wilson had the irritating habit of presenting himself as a restraining influence on the US, another traditional Anglo-aspiration. In June 1966 the British Government publicly dissociated itself from the bombing of petrol, oil and lubricant installations in Hanoi and Haiphong. Tricked out in Parliamentary language, 'dissociation' looked uncommonly like posturing (and propitiating the Labour left-wing). To Washington this was nothing other than a craven case of shuffling to the back. It rankled. McGeorge Bundy's successor, Walt Rostow, inveighed against 'an attitude of mind which, in effect, prefers that we take losses in the free world rather than the risks of sharp confrontation'.⁵⁴

The Prime Minister almost had to beg for an audience with the President, but he was permitted to indulge his penchant for peace-making. Over the winter of 1966–67 he was given a long enough leash to involve himself in a series of diplomatic initiatives with Moscow, in the person of the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, only to find the rug pulled from under him by a combination of inattention, exasperation and suspicion on the part of the White House. Harold Wilson was apt to claim a privileged position and a special insight into both superpowers – the dream of Britain as moderator exercises a continuing fascination – but one of the many difficulties of his situation was that, if anything, the claim had more justification with Moscow than with Washington. When he floated the idea of a mission to Hanoi, an idea that emerged during his talks with Kosygin, it was time to call a halt to Harold's incontinent freelancing. The draft reply prepared for the Secretary of State ran as follows: 'Thank you, we are grateful for your steadfastness, persistence, skills, etc., etc., in talks thus far. Believe, in light of our various private ongoing efforts such a trip would be counter-productive at this time. Will keep in close touch. Thanks again, etc., blah blah blah.'⁵⁵

⁵¹ Bruce diary, 22 March 1965, quoted in John Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis, 'British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives, 1966–67', *Diplomatic History*, 27 (2003), p. 117.

⁵² Jonathan Coleman, 'Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, 1964–68', *American Studies Today Online*, p. 3 (www.americansc.org.uk); Wilson-Johnson telephone conversation, loc. cit.

⁵³ Bundy to Johnson, 28 July 1965, in Coleman, 'Harold Wilson', p. 3.

⁵⁴ Coleman, 'Harold Wilson', p. 4.

⁵⁵ Bruce and Cooper to Rusk, 11 February 1967, in Dumbrell and Ellis, 'Peace Initiatives', p. 140.

On the face of it there is a stark contrast between the limpet strategy adopted by Tony Blair and the jellyfish strategy adopted by Harold Wilson. In November 1967 the Foreign Secretary (George Brown) recommended to Cabinet the continuation of 'our present policy of committed detachment'. He concluded: 'Uncritical alignment behind the Americans would be an act of folly'.⁵⁶ Under the Blair regime such a sentiment would have been unthinkable, or at any rate unspeakable, for any holder of high office. 'Committed detachment' was for Blair and his cohorts not merely oxymoronic but obviously moronic. Cabinet ministers were powerless to object. Cabinet as a collectivity was supine. In March 2002 the Prime Minister gave them their instructions: 'I tell you that we must steer close to America. If we don't we will lose our influence to shape what they do.'⁵⁷

Wilson certainly demonstrated the impossibility of a relationship at the same time close and arms-length.⁵⁸ His only commitment was detachment. Exactly when and how Blair committed himself to Bush is unknown, and perhaps unknowable in terms of time and date and precise wording, but the most striking thing about his *modus operandi* is the care he took to reassure the President of his good intentions.⁵⁹ The dominant motif of his most private protestations in the long lead-in to the Iraq War is the reiterated pledge 'I'm with you'. He so averred in a personal letter to the President in July 2002; at 'the *cojones* meeting' in September 2002; and, repeatedly, during a decisive telephone conversation in March 2003, in which Bush gave him a chance to opt out – if that would avert the fall of his government – and Blair declined, with a little touch of Harry in the night. 'Thank you. I appreciate that. It's good of you to say that. But I'm there to the very end.'⁶⁰ Wilson offered Johnson no such reassurance. The reverse applies, as Oliver Franks might have said. Johnson must have felt that he could well do without him. But he would surely have appreciated that brigade group.

Beyond the protestations of faithfulness, however, there is a curious affinity of fate. Both Blair and Wilson ran their own show. Both focused their attention on the President. The relationship between Prime Minister and President is a combustible one. It is as high-maintenance as it is high-risk. Closed doors and personal diplomacy are prone to arouse suspicion. George Brown suspected Wilson of doing a deal with Johnson behind his back. Did Tony Blair's senior colleagues feel similarly? They have been careful to cover their tracks, but among the Defence Secretary's contributions to the Downing Street cabal of July 2002 is the remark that, 'if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement [in Iraq], he would need to decide this early'. The decision was Blair's, certainly, but they were all in it together. In the circumstances, one might have expected a more plural construction (we rather than he), and even a degree of encouragement. Was there perhaps an element of distancing here?⁶¹

⁵⁶ Cabinet meeting of 15 November 1967, in John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship* (London: Macmillan, 2001), p. 150.

⁵⁷ Cabinet meeting of 7 March 2002, in Cook, *Point of Departure*, p. 116.

⁵⁸ Wilson preferred 'close' to 'special', and made some rhetorical play of the difference. See, for example, his speech to the University of Texas, 30 April 1971, in Ian S. McDonald, *Anglo-American Relations since the Second World War* (London: David & Charles, 1974), pp. 219–22.

⁵⁹ Cf. David Runciman, *The Politics of Good Intentions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

⁶⁰ Seldon, *Blair*, p. 76; Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, pp. 178, 338.

⁶¹ Meeting of 23 July 2002, in Danner, *Secret Way*, p. 92. The Foreign Secretary for his part had ample cause for suspicion: he was removed from his post in May 2006. Allegedly the White

Covering his tracks never held much appeal for George Brown. Barbara Castle recorded his tirade in her diary:

God knows what he has said to him. Back in 1964 he stopped me going to Washington. He went himself. What did he pledge? I don't know: that we wouldn't devalue, and full support in the Far East. Both those have got to go. We've got to turn down their money and pull out the troops: all of them. I don't want them out of Germany. I want them out of East of Suez. This is the decision we have got to make: break the commitment to America. You are left-wing and I am supposed to be right-wing, but I've been sickened by what we have had to do to defend America – what I've had to say at the dispatch box. Vietnam? Yes, Vietnam, too. And I know what he'll say this time: let's get over this again, then he'll go to Washington and cook up some screwy little deal.⁶²

Wilson did no deal, yet he was deeply compromised by Vietnam. He acquired a reputation for deviousness unparalleled in British politics. He stood accused of an unsavoury mix of duplicity, complicity, and mendacity. He had been cast as an apologist for a calamitous American war; he appeared now to have become an apologist for himself. There was a strong sense of hopes betrayed. Disenchantment set in, and even a certain distaste.⁶³ So much had been expected of Harold Wilson. It was a shame, according to some. Others felt differently. From their perspective it was worse than a shame. It was a disgrace.

If such an accounting exaggerates the wickedness of Harold Wilson, it describes no political career so well as that of Tony Blair. In an almost poetic sense, Iraq is Blair's Vietnam. Scheherazade-like, the folly continues to unfold. For Iraq the end is not yet in sight. For Tony Blair it has already arrived.

House had conveyed its displeasure over his expressed views on 'the military option' in the case of Iran.

⁶² Castle diary, 18 July 1966, in Barbara Castle, *The Castle Diaries 1964–70* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974), p. 148.

⁶³ Noted (and contested) by Tony Blair himself, in an obituary appreciation, 'Lessons of the Wilson Years', *Independent*, 25 May 1995. Cf. R. W. Johnson, 'So Much was Expected', *London Review of Books*, 3 December 1992; Hugo Young, 'Architect of Labour's Ruined Inheritance', *Guardian*, 25 May 1995.