

the riot. When the state supreme court upheld Johnson's conviction on a 3–2 vote, the dissenters noted that two white witnesses placed him far from the scene of the crime working at a construction site, corroborated by a timecard. The mobs and the white community demanded a scapegoat, and the sheriff conveniently reported that at the execution Johnson privately confessed.

By the time the race riot exploded in Atlanta, mobbing, assault, lynching and other such racial violence had become commonplace. In 1906, to add a note of legal approbation to the violence, the Supreme Court decided that black laborers who contracted to work for a lumber manufacturer and were forced by armed white men to leave their jobs without being paid had no federally protected right to enforce their contracts. In deciding the case the Court in *Hodges v. United States* made clear that the workers reliance on the plain language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was misplaced. The court affirmed what the Justice Department routinely wrote to African Americans. They should not seek prosecution for those who assaulted and murdered blacks from the Justice Department. These were not federal crimes and, in the interest of federalism, they should enlist local police, who by the way, often helped to perpetrate the complained about abuse.

Godshalk persuasively explains how the riot cast a long shadow. Biracial cooperation squelched any rising black militancy in the immediate aftermath. Also, elite fears of social disorder reinforced segregation and undermined attempts at integration after WW II. Atlanta's biracial traditions covered over the white racist hatreds graphically displayed during the riot, "but only at the cost of veiling promising black visions of America's future" (290). Atlanta became the city too busy to hate and a model of racial cooperation, while problems went unaddressed.

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Robert M. Fogelson, *Bourgeois Nightmares: Suburbia, 1870–1930*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. Pp. 264. \$30.00 (ISBN 0-300-10876-1).

As we travel through this country's urban and suburban spaces, we rarely think about how the landscape came to be. We simply accept what we see for what it is. We do not see the landscape as contingent, accidental, or the product of a thousand choices. It is simply there, seemingly preordained, a visual fixture in our lives.

In this fascinating book, urban historian Robert Fogelson peels back those layers of unconscious acceptance and exposes how the utopian ideals of planners, the greed of developers, and the fears of citizens combined to create the older suburbs that surround our cities. Detailed restrictive covenants, we find, are not new phenomena, invented for today's upscale suburban subdivisions. Rather, they have been used by developers for years to cater to the hopes and dreams of the suburban buyer. By the end of the nineteenth century, aesthetic controls on building placement, types, and materials ensured that subdivisions reflected the proper taste and style (86–95). Use controls governing density, commercial establishments, and other nuisances preserved the "healthfulness" of surroundings, and

their value (61–66, 84–86). From a canny assessment of buyers' wants, and the use of restrictive covenants, developers aimed to create a place (in the words of an early sales brochure) "of natural beauty, restful in its quiet peace, and warm in its spirit of easy friendliness and charm" (12).

The friendliness of turn-of-the-century suburbs was, of course, a selective friendliness—persons as well as buildings were the subject of desirability guarantees. Covenants outlawed not only groceries, livestock, privies, and squirrels (61, 168–81); they also outlawed Africans (also called "Negroes" and "Ethiopians"), Asians (also called "Mongolians," "Chinese," and "Japanese"), Jews (also called "Hebrews," "Persians," and "Syrians"), and a myriad of other people (102–3). Indeed, the sheer range of exclusions that Fogelson has unearthed is astounding; only Caucasians, on the whole, were acceptable—with the exception, of course, of Hungarians, Greeks, Armenians, Austrians, Italians, Russians, Poles, Romanians, and Slavs (103).

This study of the first sixty years of residential covenants presents a compelling commentary on the values, aspirations, and fears of early twentieth-century suburbanites. It also explains what might otherwise seem to be a puzzling contradiction. Property rights, at that time, were considered to be natural rights that protected a cherished sense of individual autonomy. Why, then, would residents—particularly well-to-do residents—choose to live in subdivisions that limited their rights in property so severely? The answer, Fogelson suggests, lies in those residents' fears—fears of change, fears of the market, fears of "the dangerous classes," and fears of people like themselves (24). Although restrictions on the size of one's lot, the style of one's home, and the development of one's land were annoying, they were preferable to fear. Just as these residents knew that they might harbor secret desires to subdivide their lots, create a commercial use, or sell (for a profit) to Africans or Asians, so (they thought) might their most immediate neighbors. Faced with such prospects, the desire for freedom in property ownership yielded to the desire for protection from undesirable decisions of others (198–199).

This book's illumination of the physical and social engineering that drove the creation of the early American suburbs is compelling reading. In addition, and on a deeper level, this book meditates upon the fundamental role that land plays in the realization of individual aspirations and desires. It also brings home their ubiquitous nature, and their costs. For instance, although today we reject out of hand the blatant racism and xenophobia of early suburban residents, in many ways our goals and the effects of our actions have not changed. For instance, the idea of "exclusiveness" in residential living is certainly as popular now as it was then—and the restriction of desirable places to "desirable" people is not something that can only be achieved through the most obvious of covenants. As Fogelson suggests, covenants of an apparently "benign" kind can just as effectively realize the ideals of some citizens, and destroy the opportunities of others.

More sympathetic is the early suburban residents' desire for permanence—in the physical spaces, neighborhoods, and places they called home. However, in this there is also a contemporary lesson. In some ways—for instance, in the preservation of the physical beauty of Philadelphia's Main Line, or New York's Scarsdale—these

covenants succeeded in the achievement of their goals. In countless other ways, they failed. Ultimately, in many cases, elegant houses fell to decay, commercial uses encroached, and change came whether it was wanted or not. Indeed, it is in the very datedness of many of the old covenants that their failure is most clear. Yet, faced with this evidence, we persist in this desire. We still attempt to guard our homes, our lots, our communities, and our lives from the danger of change that lurks outside our doors. Now as then, we refuse to accept the evidence—indeed, the living proof—that the human desire for permanence and protection through property is, in the end, simply a mirage that we all seek.

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Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. 377. \$49.95 cloth (ISBN 0-691-07471-2); \$19.95 paper (ISBN 0-691-12429-9).

Mae Ngai's thoroughly researched and beautifully written book, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*, shows how the restrictions on immigration dating from 1924 created the category of the "illegal alien," someone whose inclusion within the nation was "simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility." Using a variety of sources, including census reports, INS reports and internal memoranda, case law, legal briefs, and legislative history, Ngai reconstructs the legal history of United States immigration from 1924, when the Johnson-Reed Act first enacted national origins quotas, to 1965, when the quota system was abolished by the Hart-Cellar Act. Ngai's book fills a gap in immigration history scholarship, which has been more commonly concerned with early immigration, especially the era of Chinese Exclusion, and immigration since 1965. More importantly, Ngai's book does the work of showing how the quota system worked and how it has shaped a racialized image of illegal immigrants in ways that remain with us today.

Ngai's book covers a broad sweep of immigration policy by focusing on the way in which immigration policy constructed and attempted to contain groups of racial "outsiders," through policies such as the repatriation of Filipinos during the 1930s, the internment of the Japanese during World War II, and INS raids on Chinatowns in the 1950s. Each chapter is meticulously researched and lucidly written and could stand on its own as an analysis of the effect of immigration law on a particular group of immigrants. But the book works as a whole because it is uniquely focused, unlike most immigration history, not on the effect of immigration on legal immigrants but instead on how the legal regulation of immigration creates the category of "illegal alien."

Perhaps most interesting from the standpoint of the current national debate over undocumented migration is Ngai's explanation of how a quota system that exempted Mexicans from quotas could result in Mexicans being seen as the pro-