proximate and the radical right party. Sometimes the mainstream proximate co-opts the platform of the extreme right, effectively "crowding out" any potential right-wing contender. In Hungary and Poland, for example, the mainstream conservative parties co-opted the positions of the far right, weakening the existing far-right party and preventing right-wing party entrants, respectively. In Hungary, the post-2010 ruling Fidesz Party adopted the ideological position of the Jobbik Party to such an extent that Jobbik engaged in ethnic *under*bidding in the 2018 and 2020 elections in order to remain electorally relevant —even cooperating with its liberal nemeses to try to push the ruling Fidesz Party out of its commanding positions in local and national elections. In doing so, the radical right party and its proximate mainstream "traded places" on many issues, including opposition to accepting refugees and the question of whether the George Soros-backed Central European University should be forced out of Hungary. Although Jobbik still adheres to many of its right-wing ideological positions, a focus on the fortunes of this party misses much of the picture of radical right-wing politics in Hungary.

That said, the core of Bustikova's account finds empirical support in Hungary. Survey research by Karácsony and Róna ("The Secret of Jobbik: Reasons behind the Rise of the Hungarian Radical Right," *Journal of East European and Asian Studies* 2(1), 2011) showed that the intensity of anti-Roma attitudes is indeed the principal factor separating Jobbik supporters from their more mainstream Fidesz counterparts. Moreover, Jobbik supporters are strongly opposed to government support for the Roma minority, also consistent with Bustikova's predictions. However, another reason for Jobbik's breakthrough in the 2009 European Parliamentary Election was certainly the significant uptick in intercommunal strife between the ethnic communities in the year leading up to the election and the accompanying increased focus in the media on "gypsy crime," which redounded to the benefit of a party that promised to solve the "Roma problem." Jobbik's anticapitalist, antiestablishment message also strengthened its appeal to voters opposed to western integration or dissatisfied with the benefits provided by the postcommunist system (András Kovács, "Antisemitic Prejudice and Political Antisemitism in Present-Day Hungary," *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism* 4, 2012). This suggests that a broader complex of factors comprised the reactionary dynamic that led to Jobbik's historic breakthrough.

In light of this, the question may be asked whether the real action is not between parties but in wider reactionary movements in society. Such movements are sometimes manifested in the radicalization of mainstream conservative parties, sometimes in increased support for marginal extremist parties, and sometimes in both. It may be true, as Bustikova observes, that it is rare for radical right parties to move from the margins to the mainstream, but both the German National Socialists and the Italian Fascists came out of the margins to become their countries' ruling parties —the first at the ballot box and the second through royal appointment. In other words, two of the most important right-wing dictatorships in history had their origins in broader reactionary movements that catapulted once-marginal parties into positions of total power. It cannot be ruled out that one or more of today's contemporary far-right parties could completely eclipse their mainstream conservative counterparts—as the National Socialists did to the German National People's Party in the 1930 federal election. In none of these cases was the boundary between mainstream and extreme right-wing parties clean.

If, in contrast, we accept that understanding the success of far-right parties is important in its own right (whether or not they remain marginal), then it is worth asking what *other* things make these particular parties distinct from their mainstream counterparts. To answer this question, the ideological characteristics of these parties deserve further investigation. Notably, anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, and antiestablishmentarianism are also hallmarks of Jobbik (Zsolt Enyedi, "Paternalist Populism and Illiberal Elitism in Central Europe," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 21(1), 2016), as they are of other far-right parties in the region and elsewhere. And whereas anti-Roma sentiment in Hungary has remained relatively constant over time, anti-Semitism increased substantially after 2006, sentiments that correlated strongly with support for Jobbik. Yet, it is not clear why this is the case or what role, if any, these additional hallmark features play in the story being told here.

None of these questions detract in any way from the quality of Bustikova's book, a shining example of problem-oriented research that convinces the reader, step by careful step, of a general theory of right-wing party success and failure in the region of Eastern Europe. It also offers future researchers a promising template to guide further investigation of the right-wing political dynamic in the region and beyond. *Extreme Reactions* is sure to become essential reading for any student of the radical right, as well as anyone seeking to understand the fortunes of right-wing parties in Eastern Europe and in PR systems around the world.

The Art of Political Control in China. By Daniel C. Mattingly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 244p. $105.00 cloth, $34.99 paper.
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Relatively few studies of local governance in authoritarian contexts seek to develop a theory with potential applications beyond the site of study, in part because of the prevailing belief that local politics are irrelevant to the

overall durability of authoritarian regimes. Challenging this view, Daniel C. Mattingly shows how the presence of strong civil society organizations in autocracies—and perhaps beyond—does not always indicate a broader shift toward democratic governance; on the contrary, his research explores the ways in which nonstate groups and their leaders are recruited by local officials to assist in the imposition of unpopular policies on citizens. This leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that communities with strong social institutions are more likely to suffer from the imposition of unpopular policies, whereas those with fragmented and disconnected social institutions may be better placed to resist them, because they are at lower risk of manipulation by the state. These findings raise a challenge to the seminal works on associational life from Tocqueville to Putnam, which argue that civic groups create forms of social capital that underpin the democratization process.

To demonstrate this conclusion, Mattingly lays out the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) "governance challenge" in rural areas: local officials must implement highly interventionist and generally unpopular policies while maintaining a stable and protest-free environment, yet citizens do not trust CCP representatives and are unlikely to vote for them in local elections. To overcome this challenge, officials engage in practices of "informal control," whereby they "exploit the social bonds created by strong civil society groups to collect information on individual behaviour and to apply social pressure on individuals to comply with the state" (p. 11). This exploitation occurs in three ways: by cultivating civil society groups that can advance the state's agenda on its behalf, by co-opting influential civil society leaders into local political institutions in order to use their moral authority to influence society, and by creating small cells of informants able to infiltrate civic groups and report back on instances of noncompliance. Although democrats and civil society promoters will undoubtedly find this a bleak picture of associational life in authoritarian conditions, Mattingly is careful to state that civil society organizations are not solely used for political control by the authoritarian state; rather, "they can strengthen social trust in ways that facilitate collective action *and* help autocratic regimes infiltrate and control society" (emphasis in original). However, of these two functions, "their more significant role in autocracies like China is top-down political control" (p. 19).

Mattingly demonstrates his theory of informal control through an exploration of two particularly interventionist policy areas: the requisitioning of land from village farmers and the enforcement of the One Child Policy. Land requisitioning has mushroomed since the turn of the millennium, as China's urbanization project has accelerated, with local officials acting as key brokers between poor farmers and developers while often providing low levels of compensation. Successful implementation of the One Child Policy, although varying in practice across provinces, has been deeply unpopular among citizens but is closely tied to the career paths of local officials. Taking a wide definition of civil society, Mattingly focuses on two groups commonly found in rural areas that form part of what Mary Gallagher has termed "unofficial civil society" (p. 7): lineage organizations and folk religious organizations. The former are extended kinship groups that trace family trees from a common ancestor and engage in ritualized ancestor worship, whereas the latter perpetuate local religious culture. The two groups do not have identical effects on policy implementation: whereas leaders of local lineage groups are often closely tied to local politics, this is less likely to be the case with folk religious leaders, given the proscription of religious activity during the Maoist period.

The book is accessibly written and carefully structured, with original empirical analysis spanning three chapters, each with a focus on one of the theoretical elements of informal control: cultivation, co-optation, and infiltration. Of particular merit is the skillful combination of qualitative and quantitative materials within each chapter. Sensitive, ethnographic fieldwork pairs two villages with contrasting levels of linkages between social organizations and the local authorities and, consequently, differing rates of land acquisitions and fulfillment of birth quotas. Quantitative data consisting of original field experiments and regression analyses of existing datasets then examine the extent to which the conclusions drawn from the qualitative material can be generalized across the rest of China.

The research presented here provides further ammunition with which to challenge the persistent view that the presence of civic organizations is a sign of democratization. Even the presence of local elections should not be taken as evidence of a functioning local democracy, because voters are more likely to select members of their chosen informal group than members of particular political parties; Mattingly states, "Elections are an effective way to determine which villagers have the most social authority and therefore help local officials project state power" (p. 67). These conclusions are not in themselves new—they were articulated by the early critics of the transition paradigm in the 1990s, who showed how institutions that appear "democratic" through a Western lens may take on very different meanings in different political and cultural contexts. The novelty of the present research lies in its lucid exposition of the specific ways in which these different meanings are forged and operationalized in the service of authoritarian governance. It explains why we see growing numbers of civic organizations while also seeing greater levels of authoritarian control.

Throughout the book, Mattingly raises the question of the generalizability of the theory of informal control beyond rural China. Two interesting avenues for further research stand out in this regard. First, given that lineage

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and folk religious organizations are far less prevalent in cities and that land appropriation is less relevant for the majority of city dwellers, a demonstration of the theory in urban China necessitates a follow-up study focusing on different organizations and policy spheres. One wonders whether other nonstate groups suffer from the same tripartite strategy of manipulation as they try to implement different types of policy. Second, Mattingly presents brief examples of similar practices in both democracies and nondemocracies, including the United States, Scotland, Venezuela, and India during the Middle Ages, raising the question of whether the theory can extend beyond authoritarian regimes. But there are qualitative differences in the way in which civic organizations interact with the state in democracies and nondemocracies; hence a deeper elaboration of informal control within types of authoritarian regimes would be required before exploring its iteration in democracies.

The wealth of new data presented in the book will be of great value to students of associational life and local politics in rural China. But the theory of informal control also raises an important question for promoters of civil society around the world: Should they pack up and go home, because their activities risk having the reverse effect to the one they intend? Clearly, this would be a win for authoritarian leaders, who have criticized Western support for nongovernmental groups since the Color Revolutions swept Eurasia during the early 2000s. We are left with the conclusion that authoritarian governance is far more robust and adaptable than previously thought and, perhaps, ultimately undefeatable.

Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine. By Dana El Kurd. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. 226p. $60.00 cloth.
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Rising authoritarianism, increased polarization, and the demobilization of a previously mobilized society are defining features of post-Oslo Palestine. Dana El Kurd's book *Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine* addresses these developments and asks, "What demobilizes a once-mobilized society; and how does international involvement amplify or suppress these dynamics?" (p. 4). The book provocatively posits that when Israel controlled the Palestinian territories directly, it did not succeed in creating the degree of polarization and demobilization that characterizes Palestinian society today.

El Kurd argues that international involvement, represented mainly by the involvement of the United States, has led the Palestinian governing body, the Palestinian Authority (PA), to become more authoritarian. US involvement has influenced how the PA functions, as well as its relationship to society, and in turn, this autocratizing involvement has polarized society and led to its demobilization. The book focuses on the United States' involvement because of the particularly important role it plays in Palestinian politics (p. 33).

Through a mixed-methods approach, El Kurd illustrates how the United States' involvement has created divergence or increased polarization in Palestinian society between those who are part of the PA elite and/or support the PA and do not support democracy, and the public more broadly, especially those segments who oppose the PA but support democracy and accountability. Because of the United States' support for Palestine's political elite, this elite has become insulated from the public it is supposed to represent, and therefore less constrained in its embrace of authoritarianism. The study defines political elites as those working in the PA bureaucracy with some level of decision-making power over policy and thus are directly influenced by different forms of international involvement (p. 46).

Because of this polarization, there is a decline in social cohesion that constrains effective mobilization in Palestinian society. The degree and form of polarization evidenced in Palestine today can be linked to the type of international involvement in the Palestinian case (p. 43). As the author explains, "This increased polarization is in fact linked to retrenched authoritarianism: authoritarian practices generate polarization, which in turn inhibits social cohesion" (p. 69). As a result, Palestinian society has become unable to mount successful opposition either to the unpopular PA or to the occupation (p. 68). El Kurd generalizes her findings beyond the Palestinian case to a broader discussion of authoritarian practices, illustrating how externally backed repression demobilizes societies by strengthening authoritarianism, and breeding polarization and a lack of social cohesion (p. 123). The book concludes with a discussion of these dynamics in Iraqi Kurdistan and in Bahrain.

One of the greatest strengths of this book is its superb, sophisticated methods and its novel empirical evidence. To analyze how international involvement generated polarized public opinion around preferences for democracy and accountability, El Kurd used experimental methods and original, two-level data on Palestinian elites and the Palestinian public. She conducted 35 open-ended interviews with members of the PA's political elite—individuals associated with the Ministry of Interior, the police force, and the PLO executive committee. At the public level, she conducted a nationally representative survey of 1,270 individuals across the Palestinian territories. She also included an experimental component pertaining to international involvement. To assess the impact of authoritarian practices on polarization and social cohesion, El Kurd used a lab-in-field experiment, case-study analysis, and interview analysis with 67 students at Birzeit