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Reading Charles Beitz: twenty-five years of *Political Theory and International Relations*

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The last thirty years has seen the growth – or, as I should prefer to say, rebirth – of a field of inquiry that for much of the twentieth century was quiescent. That field would now routinely be called international political theory, in part to distinguish it from both political theory in general and International Relations (IR) theory in general, though of course, there are overlaps with both. Roughly speaking that field consists in ethical, historical and philosophical reflection on the manner and matter of international politics. There is a rich body of such inquiries in intellectual history (and not just in Europe)[1] but for a variety of historical and intellectual reasons such inquiries had fallen out of fashion by the late nineteenth century. This situation was reinforced by the simultaneous evolution of the individual disciplines of political science and IR, and in particular by the rise of methodological and epistemological claims in both largely inimical to those earlier sorts of inquiry[2]. Thus, as the story is widely told, 'political theory' and 'IR', as academic inquiries, followed largely independent paths for most of the twentieth century.

As we shall see later, I would qualify this claim to some extent, but be that as it may, certainly by the early 1970s, there was a growing sense from a variety of directions that this situation was increasingly untenable. The following group of essays all address a book that was one of the major catalysts for the emergence of a self-aware international political theory, Charles Beitz's *Political Theory and International Relations*.[3] That is reason enough, of course, to honour its twenty-fifth anniversary.

* I am grateful to Simon Caney, my co-conspirator in the preparation of this Forum section, to all of our contributors, to David Armstrong and Theo Farrell for supporting the idea, to the anonymous referees for the Review and, most of all, to Chuck Beitz for his agreement, example and collegiality.

[1] For excerpts from the work of some of these authors, see C. Brown, Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger (eds.), *International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[2] A development enhanced still further by developments in Anglophone philosophy at roughly the same time, which meant that for a generation or more 'political theory' (of almost any sort) disappeared from philosophy as well.

[3] Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979; 2nd edn., with new afterword, 2000. All references, unless specifically noted, will be to the first edition. There is one other book that was also hugely influential: Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). However, Walzer's book explicitly dealt with the one aspect of political thought that was – and had always been – avowedly concerned with international politics, that is, war, and about which, as he rightly says, there had been an enormous contemporary literature to boot. Beitz's book deliberately eschewed this literature in order to concentrate on the parts of international politics traditionally believed to be exempt from moral and political theorising. Therein lay much of its originality.

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However, Beitz's arguments in the book are of enduring value in their own right. Of course, in the ensuing twenty-five years Beitz himself has changed his view on some topics and modified others. However, as his afterword to the second edition has made clear, the general thrust of his argument he still thinks was right and the development of a 'cosmopolitan' view of international – indeed general – political arrangements is what he has continued to advocate and elaborate in his subsequent work.

It is worth perhaps commenting at the start on some of the features of the book that have contributed both to its longevity and its influence. In the first place there is the question of style. Beitz's book is avowedly a work in the tradition of analytical political philosophy, but it is written with a grace and a freedom from technicality which is not always observable in other examples of this genre. That not only allowed the argument of the book to emerge very clearly, it also facilitated the assimilation of Beitz's work outside political philosophy.

Secondly, there is the question of range. Beitz shows himself, during the course of the book, to be familiar not only with the apparatus of modern analytical political philosophy, but also with the literature of contemporary IR scholarship, and in addition, with much of the relevant intellectual history as well. Thus, in addition to the perhaps expected exploration of the post-Rawlsian terrain of analytical political philosophy, the book draws on various debates within IR theory (for example those over realism and interdependence theory) familiar to students of international relations in the 1970s and 80s, but also discusses, *inter alia*, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Vattel and Mill as well as, of course, Kant. This again facilitated the dialogue that Beitz intended to provoke between political philosophers and IR scholars.

A third point is simply to note that by discussing in detail both what he refers to as 'international scepticism' about the possibility of moral discourse in IR and the conventional way such scepticism has been rejected (the morality of states position discussed in the second section of his book), Beitz invited both major groups of theoretically inclined scholars of international relations onto his own terrain. To reject him, they would at least have to engage with him. Again, this helped to create the space for the kinds of discussions Beitz contended had been so absent in both political philosophy and IR, to the detriment of both.

In making this case, Beitz not only helped to create a particular space for the kind of dialogue he wanted, but in the process sought to revive a venerable way of thinking about ethics and politics in general that had been little discussed in previous twentieth-century political thought. He referred to this way of thinking as 'cosmopolitan' thinking, emphasising that he was using the term in the way that Kant had done, and suggesting that in the contemporary context of international relations, such a conception of international morality was 'increasingly plausible'. In the essays that follow, we seek to engage in the dialogue that Beitz sought to foster, focusing both on Beitz's own original contribution and the ideas it has helped to generate, but almost inevitably, all them are also, to a greater or lesser extent, concerned with Beitz's cosmopolitanism. Thus Chris Brown, while celebrating the influence and importance of the book, also points out that Beitz's arguments in all three sections of *Political Theory and International Relations* essentially stack the deck in favour of cosmopolitan arguments by ignoring more plausible versions of those arguments that he rejects. David Miller, in his contribution, concentrates his fire on the second section of the book, arguing that there is much more to be said in

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defence of the 'morality of states' than Beitz allowed in *Political Theory and International Relations,* although also adding that he thinks that Beitz's subsequent work has narrowed the differences between them. Simon Caney, meanwhile, confronts that aspect of the book that has perhaps been most influential in International Political Theory, the third section that advocated a conception of Rawlsian distributive justice for international relations. While he agrees with the thought that lies behind it, he is critical of the manner in which Beitz seeks to elaborate it in *Political Theory and International Relations*. And, finally, Cathy Lu offers a defence of Beitz's cosmopolitanism, but in terms very different from his own.

As for myself, in this first essay I want to explore two issues. First, I too want to say something about Beitz's cosmopolitanism and its relation to the wider revival of cosmopolitan thinking to which *Political Theory and International Relations* was such a powerful stimulus. Secondly, I want to qualify Beitz's claim that there had been little dialogue between political theory and IR prior to the 1970s, and add a question about his own conception of the relationship of philosophy to practice.

Cosmopolitanism revived?

Beitz's book was the first modern attempt to develop an explicitly elaborated cosmopolitanism in connection with international relations, but, of course, it was hardly the only one to do so. In addition to Beitz's book, path-breaking cosmopolitan studies which appeared at around the same time as his own would have to include Henry Shue's *Basic Rights*,[4] Onora O'Neill's *Faces of Hunger*,[5] Andrew Linklater's *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*[6] and the first edition of Peter Singer's widely read and influential *Practical Ethics*.[7] All these writers, as well as some others who wrote influential essays at the time – such as Brian Barry[8] – are of course still writing,[9] and they have been joined by many younger writers[10] in developing a rich and powerful set of arguments around universalistic and 'cosmopolitan' norms and principles, arguments which profoundly challenge the existing

[4] Henry Shue, *Basic Rights* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980. 2nd edn. 1996).

[5] Onora O'Neill, *Faces of Hunger* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986).

[6] Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1982. 2nd edition 1990).

[7] Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[8] See, for example, many of the essays contained in his *Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory*, vol. 2 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1991).

[9] I should add that a number of other writers, for example Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, were also developing distinctive positions that, somewhat later, became part of their own 'cosmopolitan' political and ethical theorising. See for example, Sen, *Poverty and Famines* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1981) and Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[10] From a large, and growing, list, good examples might be Simon Caney *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Cathy Lu, 'The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism' *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 8:2 (2000); Toni Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism*; David Rodin, *War and Self Defence* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2002); Charles Jones, *Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

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norms and structures of international relations and which argue for more or less – but usually more – radical change in the institutional structure of the international system. And, of course, the agenda of cosmopolitan thought is not exhausted by narrow conceptions of the subject matter of international political theory. Martha Nussbaum has developed her version of cosmopolitan thought so as to include, for example, questions concerning the proper approach to education, concerns shared in form, if not necessarily content, by cosmopolitans like Philip Allott and Ken Booth and Tim Dunne.[11]

In addition to its intrinsic merits – and amongst its advocates are some of the most interesting and thoughtful contemporary thinkers in a number of different fields – cosmopolitan international political thought has been helped by the growing sense that conventional accounts of international relations have failed to do justice to the changes being wrought in our political circumstances by technology, globalisation and a whole host of other contemporary developments. This has led to a not altogether unfair perception that cosmopolitan approaches to international political theory dominate the field.[12] Of course, it would be wrong to suggest that they meet no challenge at all; indeed, a wide range of critics has picked up the gauntlet cosmopolitan thought throws down. Those who see intrinsic, rather than merely derivative, value in existing forms of political community – for example Michael Walzer and David Miller[13] – have been very critical of cosmopolitan projects, though not always of moral universalism of some kind. Those influenced by post-Nietzschean and post-structural thought – William Connolly, Rob Walker, David Campbell, James Der Derian and Mick Dillon – have, by contrast, developed critiques of the universalism of the cosmopolitans, while sharing both their hostility to much of the conventional discourse of international relations, as well as aspects of their scepticism about existing political forms and allegiances.[14] Some scholars indebted to the so-called 'English School' of international relations – most notably perhaps Robert Jackson – have emphasised the centrality and *moral* power of pluralism for international relations, an argument made with equal force from a rather different direction by Terry Nardin.[15] Scholars such as Mervyn Frost, meanwhile, have developed a 'constitutive' approach that owes a good deal to Hegel and is equally critical of 'cosmopolitan' norms.[16] And in a sparkling series of essays

[11] See Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), and Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, 'Learning Beyond Frontiers', in Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler (eds.), *Human Rights in Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[12] See the elaboration of this point in Kim Hutching's excellent *International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in A Global Era* (London: Sage, 1999), p. 54.

[13] See Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame, Quebec: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

[14] See, for especially relevant criticisms of general positions in international political theory, William E Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995) and R.B.J.Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[15] See Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in A World of States* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2000) and Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).

[16] See Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

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over several years Chris Brown has assessed, on the whole sceptically, the assumptions of cosmopolitan thought across a wide range of its most important issue areas.[17]

Perhaps most seriously of all – from the standpoint of cosmopolitans at least – the philosopher whose *magnum opus* was unquestionably enormously influential on them all, John Rawls, has increasingly distanced himself from cosmopolitanism. By the time he published the *Law of Peoples*,[18] Rawls had set his face against the cosmopolitan version of his own ideas increasingly being emphasised by the likes of Brian Barry and Thomas Pogge and, as Beitz himself recognised, effectively set up his own arguments up as a rival version of liberal thought, 'social' as opposed to 'cosmopolitan' liberalism as Beitz has it.[19]

Yet the sense that there is a debate between 'cosmopolitans and their critics' – and, of course, there is – has often masked the extent to which cosmopolitans differ amongst themselves. By this I do not simply mean that there are number of different philosophical positions that can elicit cosmopolitan conclusions (deontological, Aristotelian, Utilitarian and so on[20]) but rather that understandings of what a cosmopolitan theory *is* and what follows from it, differ from one thinker to another. Beitz's view, expressed in the conclusion to *Political Theory and International Relations*, is that a cosmopolitan conception of international morality (which is what, he thinks, he has offered) is 'concerned with the moral relations of members of a universal community in which state boundaries have a merely derivative significance' (p. 182) but this does *not* imply what have now come to be termed 'institutional' cosmopolitan political arrangements. Moral structures, Beitz tells us, must be distinguished from political ones, and we must recognise that global normative principles can be implemented in a variety of ways, not necessarily by 'global institutions conceived on the analogy of the state' (p. 183).

In this 'cosmopolitan' conception Beitz is clearly and explicitly following Kant, citing Kant's description of the law of a universal community of nations in the *Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, and it is certainly true that Kant most emphatically did not envisage a world state; indeed he is explicitly critical of such an idea, thinking that it would, in all probability, be tyrannical. However, I think we might dwell on Kant's version of cosmopolitanism for a moment, because I think there is

[17] For a summary of Brown's ongoing, and not always unsympathetic, critiques, see especially his recent *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). Important articles that flesh out his critique of cosmopolitan thought (obviously in addition to his contribution to this Forum) would include 'International Political Theory and The Idea of World Community', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); 'Contractarian thought and the Constitution of International Society', in David Mapel and Terry Nardin (eds.), *International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), and 'John Rawls, "The Law of Peoples" and International Political Theory', in *Ethics and International Affairs*, 14 (2000), pp. 126–32.

[18] John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

[19] See his comments in Charles Beitz, 'Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism', in *International Affairs*, 75:3 (1999).

[20] I cannot forbear to add that one prickly pear for contemporary cosmopolitan thought is Natural Law theory. Unambiguously morally universalist, it is also – at least in certain respects – clearly very critical of much, even most, cosmopolitan theory. For examples, see for a traditional reading (of direct import for international relations), E. B. F Midgley, *The Natural Law Tradition and The Theory of International Relations* (London: Elek Press, 1975), and for a variant of the 'New Natural Law theory', John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980).

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an interesting *contrast* with Beitz, on which it is worthwhile to reflect. Kant's cosmopolitanism depended, I think, upon a very important assumption that he made in his later work and that becomes central to his mature political philosophy. We might call this assumption the Providentialist assumption, as it consists in the assumption that history, or rather providence as Kant prefers to call it, is working towards the establishment of the conditions that will enable humankind (as a species) to achieve its moral purpose – the successful realisation of the Kingdom of ends – even though individual human ends may work against it. As he puts it in his essay on *Theory and Practice*, 'I put my trust in the theory of what the relationships between men and states ought to be according to the principle of right . . . *I likewise rely . . . upon the very nature of things to force men to do what they do not willingly choose*.'[21]

This claim is made in various ways and to different degrees throughout the later writings,[22] and, so it seems to me, gives Kant's political philosophy part of its genuine moral power. Why might this matter? It might, I think, if we realise that Kant's providentialist assumption, however modest his expression of it, was meant to secure the possibility of moral progress, which is central to the claims that Kant wants to make in the political sphere. The question is whether a Kantian cosmopolitan framework can survive the *lack* of such security. Modern cosmopolitans, Beitz included, do not seem to have anything similar in mind, and thus they are vulnerable to the charge made by pessimists of various stripes, that human volition and the complex character of human institutions are simply too powerful to ensure that the moral claims made by cosmopolitans can be sustained (even if, from time to time, or in particular circumstances they can in some sense be realised). Two questions then remain, for Beitz and modern cosmopolitans to address; was Kant wrong to suppose that a cosmopolitan theory requires some such argument? and if not, what modern equivalent might there be? Beitz does not address either question in *Political Theory and International Relations*, and few others have seen fit to do so either but, or so it seems to me, some sort of an answer remains necessary for the basic plausibility of the cosmopolitan project.

Philosophy, practice and international relations

Let me turn now to a rather different point. It does not detract from the achievement of *Political Theory and International Relations*, I think, to recognise that in fact there was rather more work of relevance to political philosophy *and* international relations, than Beitz admits. The *failure* to recognise this is the result of a number of factors, I think. It is in part, no doubt, simply a matter of an angle of vision; in both fields, the dominant ways of thinking tended simply to ignore what work there was.

[21] See the 'Essay on Theory and Practice', quoted in C.Brown, T. Nardin and N.Rengger (eds.), *International Relations in Political Thought Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 431–2. I have expanded this reading of Kant's Political Philosophy in a paper, 'Freedom and Necessity in Kant and Mendelssohn', delivered to the Paton Symposium at St Andrews in September 2004 honouring the bicentenary of Kant's death.

[22] By which I generally mean the writings that follow the *Critique of Judgment* (usually termed the Third Critique) in 1790, to wit most of the political essays and his summation of these in the *Metaphysics of Morals*.

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IR scholarship, especially in the United States, tended to be concerned almost exclusively with twentieth century phenomena, even indeed post-Second World War phenomena, and thus missed much that was of relevance in historical and philosophical literatures that did not discuss these periods or share these concerns. At the same time, political philosophy (of the analytical sort, at least) missed or ignored much of the same literature on the grounds that it was not 'philosophy' or simply that it spoke in an idiom (perhaps derived from continental European modes of thinking) that analytical political philosophy found distasteful. But there were exceptions in both fields. Martin Wight, for example, picked up immediately the significance of Eric Voegelin's *New Science of Politics* for the thoughtful student of international affairs,[23] and from the other side, so to speak, Michael Oakeshott's appreciative review of Hans Morgenthau's *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* shows very clearly how the central concerns of both a 'political philosopher' and a 'scholar of International Relations' could mirror one another.[24]

Such work, however, has rather different ways of conceptualising the relationship between philosophical and practical activity than that found in Beitz, or indeed, in most contemporary Anglophone philosophy, and so it is worth, for a moment, exploring the differences. In the few remarks he makes about this topic in *Political Theory and International Relations*, Beitz argues that political theory in general 'arises from a perception of the possibility of choice in political affairs' and adds that 'this possibility is presupposed by criticism of the established order as well as by engagement in efforts to change it'.[25] His point is that despite a growing debate about 'the future structure of world order' political theorists have failed to offer 'the kinds of guidance one normally expects from theory in times of political change' and that this failure needs to be remedied, hence his book.

Now, of course, it is certainly the case that *one* reason for engaging in 'political theory' is indeed exactly the one Beitz gives. But, of course, that is hardly the *only* reason one might have for engaging in normative or historical reflection about politics (whether domestic or international). The question, surely, is what the possibilities and conditions of 'theorising' about politics (in any form) are and what we might expect from the various kinds of theorising we might engage in. Here, it seems to me, we need rather more than we are, in fact, given, about how our theoretical reflections might translate into 'the kind of guidance one normally expects from theory in times of political change'. To begin with we might ask whether, in fact, we – whoever the 'we' might be in this context – *do* expect guidance from 'theory' in times of political change. It might surely be suggested that most twentieth-century experiments where 'theory' has acted as a guide to practice in the fairly direct way implied by Beitz, are not wholly positive examples. James Scott, for example, has pointed out the extent to which some of the most disastrous policies of the twentieth century followed directly

[23] See, for example, his review of *The New Science of Politics* in *International Affairs* in 1952.

[24] See Oakeshott's very favourable review in the *Cambridge Journal*, reprinted in Tim Fuller's edited collection of Oakeshott's early essays *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). This review in fact led to a correspondence between Oakeshott and Morgenthau, focusing on Oakeshott's refusal to accept that political life could be understood as in any way tragic. I have discussed this exchange and the issues arising out of it, in a paper 'The Requirements of Autonomy: Hans Morgenthau, Michael Oakeshott and the Possibility of Tragedy', presented at the Morgenthau Centenary conference held at Gregynog Hall, Powys, in October 2004.

[25] *PTIR,* pp. 4–5.

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from this kind of assumption.[26] Scott's point, of course, is not to say that theoretical reflection can have no influence on practice; quite the contrary, it can, and usually does, have a *terrible* influence. The problem is the kind of knowledge that is assumed – universalistic, not particularistic; general, not local.

In other words, we might ask Beitz, to begin with, what *kind* of theory is most effective at 'offering guidance' and ask further, is it, in fact, a cosmopolitan one? But there is a yet more problematic point still. It is, I would say, absolutely the point of international political theory to consider a whole gamut of possible ways of understanding and interpreting the international – and perhaps the global – world in which we live, its history, the values (many and diverse) which constitute it and the possibilities of conflict and cooperation within it and how we should understand and interpret them. However, none of this has any necessary connection with what actually goes on *in* that world. The task of theory, one might say – if indeed it can be seen as a task at all – is simply to *be* theoretical; to follow the argument wherever it goes and to be as honest as one can be about one's assumptions, presuppositions and conclusions. That is what the university – not exclusively, but especially – exists to do. But this has no necessary carryover into the world of practice; in other words, theory understood in this way does not offer 'guidance' of any sort at all. It simply is what it is. If those in the practical world find some of the ideas expressed therein interesting and suggestive, well so be it; but that is contingent and wholly unrelated to what it is that is actually being done.

If one *were* to talk about political theory offering 'guidance' to practice, then one would be required, I think, also to talk about the rhetorical strategies that should be adopted by 'theorists' to get those in the world or practice to pay attention, to be convinced and thus to act of the basis of such conviction – since their interests might well dictate they should act otherwise. This is, of course, an old point – at least as old as Aristotle[27] – but, alas, rhetoric pays little role in the world of Anglophone philosophy and thus little role in the way that Beitz and other cosmopolitans seek to make their case.

And this, in a way, is perhaps the oddest point of all. For cosmopolitan theory most emphatically sees itself as being a contribution to the world of practice, and yet on all of the things on which at least the *political* world of practice most obviously relies – rhetoric, motivation and how to change it, the psychology and ethics of conversion – it is largely silent. It is its great realist opponents who talk of the manipulation of public opinion, of manufacturing support for this or that aspect of the world, and yet cosmopolitans seem curiously reluctant to embark on similar discussions in defence of their own ideas. Perhaps this is changing slightly,[28] but

[26] See James Scott, *Seeing Like A State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).

[27] Who, after all, saw his *Rhetoric* as a companion volume to his *Politics*.

[28] It is worth saying that there are some cosmopolitans who have at least touched on these topics. Martha Nussbaum – perhaps not incidentally the most classically minded of contemporary cosmopolitans – is the best example, in her discussions of education in general, the role of literature in moral education, the classical idea of philosophy as therapy and in her Gifford lectures on the emotions. See especially *Cultivating Humanity*, *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), and *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Another example would be Robert Goodin, who provides a rare example of an analytical political theorist discussing the question of political motivation at length in his *Motivating Political Morality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

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there is still not a great deal of direct engagement with the 'dark arts' of real world politics which will surely be necessary if cosmopolitan ideas are to have real impact. One can only speculate, of course, about the reason for this, but I suspect that, at least in Beitz's case, it might be found in some notion of the idea of public reason as being in important ways at least, non-rhetorical and that thus, all philosophy can do is to, so to say, lay out the argument. But in which case, say I, wherein lies the guidance?

Conclusion

The above two points, to say nothing of the remaining four articles, should be counted primarily as testimony to the enduring relevance and interest that *Political Theory and International Relations* has generated. In the work he has done subsequently, Beitz has developed the agenda laid out in that book in eloquent and subtle ways; he has modified some aspects of his argument while remaining constant about its central themes. And in the space that he helped to create, some of the most innovative and creative works of contemporary political theory and IR scholarship have found a comfortable and increasingly capacious home. Given this, and given also the increasing interpenetration of the domestic and the international and therefore the increasing topicality and importance of the subject matter of international political theory, there seems little doubt that, if I may adapt the title of Chris Brown's contribution, the 'House that Chuck Built' will continue to be expanded, adding floors, indeed possibly whole wings, for the foreseeable future. And that surely is worthy of real celebration.

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