of terrorism. Furthermore, Chapters 4 and 5 note that because American primacy "has animated both the terrorists' purposes and their choice of tactics" (p. 110), "the best way to keep people from believing that we are responsible for their problems is to stay out of their faces" (p. 101). Chapter 6 makes a persuasive case that preventive war is almost never an appropriate policy choice. Chapter 7 argues that America's "Big Small Wars" in places like Iraq and Afghanistan are increasingly unnecessary, ineffective, and inefficient. Chapter 8 points out the logical inconsistencies of a policy that says that the United States will fight for Taiwan only as long as it remains a rebellious province rather than an independent nation. Instead, Betts suggests that the most prudent policy for dealing with rising Chinese power may be to find a way to back away from America's commitment to fight for Taiwan. A more restrained foreign policy should allow for a more restrained defense budget, according to Chapter 11.

Betts completed his book at a more opportune time than did Nincic. A self-described Cold War hawk (*American Force,* p. xi), Betts has been calling for a more restrained policy for the United States for most of the post–Cold War era at a time when the country has instead pursued increasingly more expensive, ambitious, and militarized policies. In the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the trillion dollar annual deficits that the government has faced in recent years, his prescriptions may face a more receptive audience among policymakers today.

Both authors understand, however, that old habits die hard. Nincic adopts a path-dependency argument. Starting from general insights of social psychology about the power of black-and-white views of the world and of the perceived legitimacy of punishing evildoers, he argues that after politicians had successfully punished one another for being soft on communism in the late 1940s, the domestic political constraints faced by political leaders throughout the Cold War were reshaped. In the wake of 9/11, the domestic politics of antiterrorism has been reminiscent of the domestic politics of the Cold War, making it prohibitively costly for any American policymaker to pursue policies of positive engagement with foreign leaders who could be labeled as friends of terrorists and implacable enemies of the United States (*Logic,* pp. 32–44).

Betts identifies specific barriers to the adoption of each of the initiatives he supports. In broad terms, however, he notes how difficult it will be to break the habits of liberal hegemony: "The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity unbound the United States and opened the road to moral ambitions" (*American Force,* p. 49). There is a deep consensus among American elites that active and assertive American leadership of the world is both necessary and appropriate: "Across the political spectrum, American elites do tend to conflate U.S. national security with international security. For liberals this means that what is good for the world is good for the United States, and for con-

servatives it means that what is good for the United States is good for the world" (ibid., p. 24).

In essence, a principal threat to US national security is the consensus among American elites that the exercise of liberal hegemony over the world should continue, as should the domestic political dynamics that punish any leader who might try to challenge that consensus by advocating for a more restrained foreign and defense policy. Can policy advocacy by academic scholars of international relations and American foreign policy help make the present era a critical juncture that will shift the United States to a new path? As Nincic notes, constraints within academic disciplines make it difficult for scholars to attempt to do so (*Logic,* pp. 44–57): "[P]olicy relevance has not . . . been much of a priority within the academic community, whose analytical efforts often appear self-referential and disconnected from the concrete world" (ibid., p. 182).

To the extent that scholars try to influence policy, they are often more successful at pointing out the failures of existing policies and making strong cases for their alternative policy prescriptions than they are at spelling out how these new policies could be adopted. A strength of Nincic's work is his effort to systematically identify opportunities for dismantling the mechanisms of reproduction that sustain a foreign policy focused on negative sanctions and the use of force. Betts is also sensitive to this issue throughout his book, but never quite pulls together a sustained argument for the way in which the United States could move from liberal hegemony to soft primacy. His Chapter 10, which looks at whether it is even possible to pursue strategy given the complexity of psychological and domestic political processes that impede strategic decision making, could have provided an opportunity to examine this question in detail, but was instead focused on a more general examination of the possibility of strategic decision making. Although neither book compellingly argues how America can or will move to a more restrained foreign policy, both books present strong cases for the benefits of such a shift in American foreign policy at a time when significant change seems possible.

Reflexive Governance for Global Public Goods. Edited by Eric Brousseau, Tom Dedeurwaerdere, and Bernd Siebenhüner. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012. 376p. $54.00 cloth, $27.00 paper.

— David L. Feldman, *University of California, Irvine*

The major premise of this edited collection based on a series of presentations given at three European workshops held in 2006 and 2007 is that traditional approaches to understanding the provision of global public goods rest on two antiquated assumptions. The first is that these goods, including policy remedies to abate climate change, protect biodiversity, equitably manage natural resources, and prevent pollution, are largely defined by

protagonists in accordance with public choice criteria such as perceived material benefit and avoidance of burdensome costs. The second deficiency is that these goods are principally managed through formal, multi-lateral agreements negotiated by nation-states and implemented by national bureaucracies.

Reflexive governance refers to the processes by which actors frame and define public goods in a new, much changed global environment that has witnessed a veritable explosion of participation in decisions regarding how to more broadly define, as well as manage, global public goods by non-governmental actors and sub-national governments. The authors demonstrate how a participatory revolution has occurred largely due to changing values regarding what constitutes a public good as articulated by networks of local, regional, and national leaders, and by NGOs that adhere to a wide array of ideological and ethical views. As a consequence, the disposition of public goods is now subject to decisions formulated through interactions among diverse coalitions of civil society groups, and implemented through a series of complex, interwoven partnerships among various levels of governance. Most importantly, the contributors to this collection contend that these partnerships manifest a far more de-centralized foundation of policy-related knowledge than was formerly the case when nation-states alone governed these goods. This is because co-production of knowledge regarding the sources and solutions to transboundary problems is now commonly performed by citizen groups, scientific associations, and others.

The twenty contributors are an eclectic mix of economists, urban planners, political scientists, and philosophers. To achieve coherence around the central theme of reflexive governance, the editors sought to engage in what they describe as a "highly interactive and quite demanding (process) for the authors" (p. xi) that required considerable interaction during and after the three above-noted conferences. The result is that the fifteen chapters are arranged around a handful of critical topics, ranging from how to define public goods (with contributors concluding they may be any ubiquitous commodity, amenity, or technology that is in high demand and subject to dispute over management, control, availability, or allocation), to how to design incentive schemes, evaluate compliance tools, and co-generate knowledge.

On the whole, the contributors effectively explore how many trans-boundary environmental, resource, and science and technology problems have evolved from being state-centered objects of high politics to subjects of highly iterative, deliberative, and often decentralized collaborations involving citizen-activists, local knowledge purveyors, and practitioners of translational science. In all of these collaborative activities, however, the various cases reveal that national governments' authority in these issues has not waned—but has, instead, become transformed.

Nation-states now occupy a decisional domain which requires mediating public goods controversies. Essentially, they occupy the policy space between sub-national governments—which, for instance, often independently act to try to mitigate climate change, or regulate biotechnology—and international intergovernmental organizations that vigorously espouse globally-equitable solutions. The latter may also co-generate information regarding problems as varied as agriculture and biodiversity protection.

Three chapters devoted to multi-stakeholder coordination in environmental decision making, and which focus on collaboration among heterogeneous NGOs, offer the book's most intellectually ambitious and innovative contribution. Cases on forest management, watershed management, and ecosystem sustainability feature a series of novel meta-analyses that compare and evaluate decisional outcomes along several process and outcomes-related criteria. The cases themselves—mostly set in European and Latin American contexts unfamiliar to many political scientists in the US—are trenchant and illuminating.

Most of all, these chapters illuminate the reasons why infusion of more participatory methods into decisions, while helping to broaden the legitimacy of policies agreed to by protagonists, assures neither that adopted policies are effective in solving problems nor useful in improving the quality of useable policy knowledge. In all cases, it seems, meeting the interests and aspirations of the various protagonists remains the ultimate litmus test for policy acceptability. This suggests that even reflexive governance cannot overcome strongly held stakeholder expectations.

In knitting together the voices of diverse disciplinary adherents, such an ambitious collection is bound to suffer some unevenness. This is apparent in the topics and literatures omitted. For example, the discussion of cross-national regulatory reform of environmental public goods excludes discussion of ISO 14000—an EU innovation that has been widely cited as a common framework for ensuring voluntary compliance and information sharing (e.g., Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski, *The Voluntary Environmentalists—Green Clubs, ISO 14000, and Voluntary Environmental Regulations,* 2006). Meanwhile, the chapter on the evolution of biotechnology research-and-development governance focuses mostly on industrial collaboration but, surprisingly, ignores the considerable literature on international networking for converging nano-, bio-information, and cognitive science technologies and the unique reflexive experiences that have been emerging in this area.

Likewise, chapters on the co-production of knowledge and managing global risks are so case-focused as to ignore theoretical contributions offered in the political science literature on path dependency and resistance to incorporating new information in decisions, as well as the comparative uses of the precautionary principle in risk

regulation. The first omission is surprising given the widely-recognized importance of knowledge co-production in global environmental policy debates and demands for better two-way communication between scientists and local policy makers—for instance, on how to use information distilled from climate change models for meeting local community needs for long-term resource planning (e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, *States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order,* 2004*).* Regarding the precautionary principle, the omission of recent comparative politics investigations of its use in diverse environmental and health policy contexts (e.g., David Vogel, *The Politics of Precaution,* 2012) is also surprising.

Finally, while the book's contributors acknowledge the importance of ensuring policy acceptability by adapting adopted policy measures to the moral norms and collective preferences of society, the editors' abbreviated conclusions fail to discuss lessons from these intriguing cases regarding how to do this more effectively. In particular, how do co-production of knowledge and collaborative processes that seek to articulate a consensus around policy reform change the preferences of protagonists over time? Political scientists who have examined the evolving agendas of local and regional governments relative to global environmental issues (e.g., Henrik Selin and Stacy VanDeveer, *Changing Climates in North American Politics,* 2009) have, for instance, noted the importance of value change, community capacity, and shifting agendas in explaining the emergence of multi-level governance of these issues.

These are probably unavoidable shortcomings in an ambitious, multidisciplinary collection such as this. Nevertheless, given the enormous effort the contributors invested in the volume's production, its usefulness to political scientists who study the governance of global public goods could have been strengthened by better linking contributors' findings to other recent work, as well as by connecting these findings to cases studied by scholars outside of this volume's network of contributors.

Barriers to Peace in Civil War. By David E. Cunningham. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 296p. $90.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592713000820

— Erin K. Jenne, *Central European University*

Answering the question as to why some civil wars end in a matter of months, while others persist for decades (Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, and Colombia), is both theoretically interesting and critical to the design of more effective methods for ending intractable civil wars. David E. Cunningham's *Barriers to Peace in Civil War* stands as a lively addition to a growing scholarship on this important topic. The author begins by pointing out the huge variation in the duration of wars, with the vast majority ending in a matter of months or years but a significant minority carried on for many years, if not decades. He explains why

we should care about these seemingly endless civil wars, as they are responsible for far more casualties, are more likely to involve genocide, and are also more likely to recur.

To address this question, Cunningham first reviews explanations in the literature for the duration of civil wars. For instance, some conflicts may last longer because they are fought over things that cannot be divided, such as when the conflict is waged over control of national territory (Monica D. Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory,* 2003) or sacred spaces (Stacie E. Goddard, "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy," *International Organization* 60 [2006]: 35–68; Ron E. Hassner, "'To Halve and to Hold': Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility," *Security Studies* 12 [2003]: 1–33). Alternatively, informational asymmetries may cause one or both sides to overestimate their chances of prevailing in battle, inducing them to fight on (Branislav L. Slantchev, "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," *American Political Science Review* 97 [2003]: 123–33). It may also be that the winning side (usually the government) cannot credibly commit to protecting the losers once they disarm, making the losing side unwilling to lay down their weapons (Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51 [1997]: 335–64; Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars,* 2002; James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41 [2004]: 275–301). Finally, civil wars may involve wartime looting, creating pecuniary disincentives for the combatants to reach a settlement (see Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 4 [2004]: 253–73).

Cunningham discusses each of these factors in turn, concluding that "they cannot, however, come close to explaining the extreme variation in civil war" (p. 12). This is because many wars end quickly despite incentives for war profiteering, the apparent indivisibility of the stakes of conflict, and informational asymmetries, while other wars last for decades despite the relative *absence* of such barriers to peace.

The author then advances an alternative explanation that the number of "veto players" ("a set of actors that have separate preferences over the outcome of the conflict and separate abilities to block an end to the war"; p. 15) largely determines how long a conflict will last. Prolonging the war is, according to the author, something veto players do deliberately "because, in the end, it gets them a better deal" (p. 4). Cunningham argues that the more veto players there are in a given conflict, the more difficult it is to collectively agree on a division of state resources that all participants prefer to the continuation of war. This is the major reason why some conflicts are easier to end than others—because "spoilers," or veto players, emerge