Book Reviews

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Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker (eds.), *Well-being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. x + 316.

James Griffin is one of the most thoughtful and thought-provoking of contemporary moral philosophers. He is best known for two books. *Well-being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance* (1986) helped reintroduce the ancient question of the nature of human good, and its relation to morality, into moral philosophy. *Value Judgement: Improving our Ethical Beliefs* (1996) constructively questions many of the distinctions and ambitions of contemporary moral philosophy. This book of new essays was published to mark Griffin's appointment to the White's Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford.

This is an excellent book. The fourteen previously unpublished articles are all of a very high standard, and will all repay careful study. Nine of the articles deal directly with Griffin's own work, while the rest contribute to central debates in moral theory which have been transformed by his work. The volume ends with Griffin's replies to the first nine articles. While the five other articles are all well worth reading, the greatest interest in this volume lies in Griffin's exchange with his critics. By carefully clarifying, correcting or extending his previously published views, Griffin significantly advances discussion of his central themes. This dialogue between the philosopher and his critics will be the focus of this review.

Two broad themes dominate Griffin's dialogue with his critics. The first is his desire to blur or transcend a cluster of related distinctions which dominate the contemporary philosophical agenda. The second is his consistent questioning of the ambitions of contemporary moral philosophy, in particular utilitarianism.

Contemporary discussion of well-being centres on three general approaches: the mental state view, the desire view, and the objective list theory. In *Well-being*, Griffin rejects the mental state view and concentrates on the differences between desire-based and objective list theories. He seeks to blur this distinction, offering an informed desire account. The mere fact that I desire something does not make it good for me, unless my desire is of an appropriate sort.

Wayne Sumner attacks Griffin's desire-based account of well-being. He first rejects Griffin's appeal to the possibility of post-mortem benefits or harms in support of a desire-based account against theories requiring that all prudential goods must be experienced by the agent. Sumner regards this move as illegitimate. There is too much disagreement over posthumous harms for the fact that it countenances them to be counted unequivocally in favour of a particular theory. Sumner's second complaint is that when Griffin replaces

the experience requirement with a requirement that a desire must 'enter our lives' (*Well-being*, p. 22), he leaves this last crucial phrase 'pretty vague and undeveloped' (p. 9).

In Sumner's view, however, the main problem for any desire-based theory is posed by desires whose satisfaction is insufficient to make us better off. He concludes that desire is the wrong place to start, and offers instead an account of well-being based on happiness, construed as 'a response by a subject to her life conditions as she sees them' (p. 15).

In response to Sumner, Griffin admits that he was unwise to use the term 'desire' in describing his theory. This is because he built so much into the notion of an informed desire that his account is effectively transformed into an objective list theory. A desire is only properly informed if it aims at one of the items on Griffin's list: accomplishment, understanding, enjoyment, deep personal relations. Once this is recognized, Griffin argues, Sumner's objections dissolve. The satisfaction of certain desires does not make us better off because the objects of those desires are not on the appropriate objective list, while the elaboration of items on the list explains in detail the various ways desire can enter our lives. Griffin also defends himself on the question of posthumous harms, suggesting that Sumner begs the question by asking whether the posthumous satisfaction of a desire leaves the person 'better off', rather than phrasing the matter more neutrally in terms of the value of the person's life. This leads Griffin to conclude that perhaps his account and Sumner's are not really competitors, as they answer different questions. Sumner asks what makes a person's life better from her own perspective; Griffin asks what makes it more valuable.

The second distinction Griffin seeks to blur is between two alternative models of prudential value. According to the taste model, a prudential good, such as accomplishment, is valuable because we desire it. According to the perception model, we come to desire accomplishment because we recognize it to be valuable. In *Value Judgement*, Griffin rejects both models. Jonathan Dancy and Peter Railton both attack this move, from opposite directions.

Dancy objects that Griffin does not go far enough. His attempts to blur the distinction are unsuccessful, and a more radical option is required. Dancy suggests a complete change of focus, replacing the causal account of reasons for action with one which construes agents as acting 'in light of reasons' (p. 48).

Dancy helpfully characterizes the distinction Griffin tries to blur in terms of recognition and reaction. When we make a value judgement, are we recognizing the fact that something is valuable, or recording our own reaction to it? Dancy isolates three lines of argument Griffin uses to blur this distinction: the claim that recognition is not entirely free from desire; the claim that desires can be rationally evaluated; and the rejection of the distinction between active reaction and passive recognition. Dancy argues forcefully that, while each of these arguments brings out an important connection between recognition and reaction, none of them shows that the two are not distinct. What is needed is not an account of the complex interrelationships between belief and desire, but some way of transcending the whole belief/desire asymmetry.

In reply, Griffin suggests that his main argument in *Value Judgement* was that the relevant sort of desire incorporates 'the recognition of a value, not just some sort or other of value judgement' (p. 290). He objects that this chief argument 'nowhere appears in Dancy's account of my views' (p. 291). Griffin does not directly address Dancy's own positive suggestion. This raises an interesting question: Even if Dancy has overlooked Griffin's main argument, how does Griffin's real position relate to Dancy's radical alternative? Are they two distinct ways of radically avoiding the recognition/reaction distinction, or merely two ways of saying much the same thing?

Peter Railton takes issue with Griffin's rejection of the taste model. To emphasize the significance of this move, he notes Griffin's claim that 'the taste model is now widespread in philosophy, and dominates the social sciences' (*Value Judgement*, p. 21). Railton argues that Hume's model of taste has far more resources than Griffin and other critics credit it with. He uses Griffin's much-discussed example of the person who desires to spend his whole life counting blades of grass. Griffin's reason for not regarding such a life as valuable is that the concept of value requires one to see the object of desire as valuable for humans in general. Railton argues that, far from disagreeing with this conclusion, Hume's account of taste can lend support to an even broader claim of generality of value judgement.

Railton takes issue with Griffin's emphasis on what is valuable for humans. He discusses several examples of 'constitutionally different normalcy' (p. 65): a Martian music critic with sensitivities that are radically different from our own; a Venusian prudential theorist whose people are completely self-sufficient and have no need of social interactions; and the lives of more familiar non-human animals. When discussing such cases, Railton argues, we apply our ordinary concept of prudential value. This shows that that concept is not conceptually linked to normal human interests. Prudential value for humans is merely a special case of a more general notion.

Griffin agrees that the Humean picture provides much of what he wants. However, all Humean accounts have one fatal flaw, as they cannot accommodate the fact that 'a person's understanding can be without defect, and his logic flawless too, yet what he wants be without value' (p. 292). In rejecting the taste model, Griffin draws on his earlier rejection of the distinction between recognition and reaction. When we bring our critical resources to bear on our beliefs about the quality of life, 'what seems to be going on here has more the character of a *recognition* of a human interest than merely a refined motivational *reaction* to something factually delineated' (p. 293). Another way of putting the difference between the two positions is that Griffin insists that valuing requires the recognition that there is something desirable in normal human interests, whereas his Humean opponent appears merely to react favourably to those interests.

The chapter by Andrew Moore brings us back to Griffin's substantive account of well-being. Griffin is sceptical about the traditional distinction between objective and subjective accounts of well-being. On a subjective account, something is good for someone because he or she desires it. On an objective account, certain things are good for people whether they want them or not.

Moore seeks to rehabilitate this distinction. His primary tool is an interesting distinction between goods and good-makers. Moore defines objectivity in terms of the latter. An objective theory of well-being is one in which 'what makes things good is independent of whether they are or would be objects of desire' (p. 81). Moore traces Griffin's scepticism about the subjective/objective distinction to the claim that our prudential understanding has a desire-dependent nature, as the belief that something is valuable is intrinsically linked to a desire for it. Yet, as Moore points out, this claim is not sufficient for Griffin's purposes, as one cannot infer immediately that the objects of our prudential understanding have desire-dependent good-makers. Even if we necessarily desire what we value, what makes it valuable may have nothing to do with anyone's desires. Moore concludes that Griffin needs an additional premiss before he can legitimately reject objectivity regarding prudential value.

In reply, Griffin acknowledges that his main interest in *Value Judgement* was in good-makers. He also agrees that an extra premiss is required. However, he claims to have already provided one in *Value Judgement*. Griffin's reply to Moore mirrors his reply to Dancy. Our reaction to something is a constituent part of our recognition that it is valuable. Griffin uses the example of 'pain'. Our use of this term is based in part on characteristic human desires. We recognize pain by recognizing that it is the sort of thing that normal humans seek to avoid. There is no desire-independent way to cash out the crucial features or properties characterizing our use of 'pain'. An objective account of the disvalue of pain is thus impossible. One is left wondering whether Griffin has chosen an unreasonably easy target. Even if we grant what he says about pain, other values may be more resistant to this treatment. Consider the value of achievement, a key value for both Griffin and Moore. It is certainly not obvious that our use of 'achievement' connects with what human beings typically desire. After all, many of the achievements cited by middle-class philosophers are things many people do not desire at all.

The final distinction Griffin seeks to blur is between the natural and the evaluative. The issue here is whether the evaluative supervenes on the natural. Can two actions or events be exactly alike in their natural properties yet differ in their evaluative ones? As Michael Smith notes, almost all contemporary moral philosophers answer this question in the negative. Supervenience is generally taken for granted. Griffin challenges this dogma, expressing misgivings about the supervenience thesis. Smith attempts to rehabilitate supervenience. He begins by defining it. Following G. E. Moore, Smith defines 'natural' in terms of the natural sciences. A natural property is one that is 'such as to figure in an empirical regularity' (p. 95). Smith reads supervenience as applying between possible worlds rather than within them. If two objects in two possible worlds have exactly the same natural properties, then they must have exactly the same evaluative properties. To say that something is good is to say that anything with those natural properties would also be good. Smith regards the supervenience thesis, thus formulated, as a conceptual truth. To illustrate this, he borrows an example from Griffin. The fool, living a life of idle dissipation, encounters Socrates, striving after knowledge and

accomplishment. The fool sees something in Socrates' life that his own lacks. Reflecting on this, he comes to see that his own life would indeed be better for him if he too abandoned hedonism for weightier goals. Smith acknowledges that, when asked to explain what he has recognized, the fool may well reply in terms of evaluative properties. He has noticed that Socrates' life is more worthy or meaningful than his own. He may also explain these broader evaluative notions in terms of more specific properties which are also evaluative, such as accomplishment, fulfilment, or deep personal relations. If we push the fool far enough, however, Smith argues, surely he will eventually have to point to some natural properties which Socrates has and he lacks, and which explain the different value of their lives.

Griffin agrees with Smith's summary of his position, and admits that his account of supervenience requires modification in light of Smith's attack. However, he continues to resist the claim that the supervenience thesis is a conceptual truth. Returning to Socrates and the fool, Griffin asks '[w]hy can one not eventually reach a point with the iterative question where one just recognizes the presence of a value, rather as one recognizes a colour?' (p. 301). Griffin points out that Smith assumes an answer to this question, rather than demonstrating one. This also brings out a difference in emphasis between Smith and Griffin, which Smith himself notes. Griffin's primary interest is in the role of the evaluative and the natural in our use of our critical powers to answer questions of prudential value. Smith's interest is in the more abstract question of whether two naturalistically indistinguishable possible worlds might have different evaluative properties. Griffin asks whether the supervenience thesis is epistemologically helpful; Smith asks whether it is metaphysically true.

The second theme of the book is Griffin's scepticism regarding the systematizing ambitions of contemporary moral philosophy. Griffin comes under attack from both directions. He is accused of being too pessimistic, and too optimistic.

Roger Crisp defends utilitarianism against Griffin's recent attacks, arguing that it can provide a useful criterion of action. Crisp's utilitarian accepts 'most if not all of Griffin's illuminating discussion of the limits of the will' (p. 123), and follows Griffin and Sidgwick in believing that 'much of philosophical ethics develops out of reflection within commonsense morality' (p. 116). The principle of utility is then used to test possible improvements on commonsense morality. Contra Griffin, Crisp argues that the principle can play this role. He cites the example of the supposed moral distinction between killing and letting die. 'Non-utilitarian moral philosophers have made little if any progress in grounding any fundamental moral distinction between killing and letting die' (p. 128), and the contrary implications of the utilitarian principle are clear enough. Here is a case in which our practice would be altered, and improved, if we became utilitarians.

Brad Hooker accepts Griffin's critique of direct utilitarianism, but seeks to rehabilitate indirect utilitarianism. For Hooker, the right action is the one prescribed by the code of rules whose acceptance by everyone would produce the best consequences. Given our inability accurately to predict such consequences, Hooker accepts that there will often be several codes whose expected value is equal. In such cases, we choose the code closest to commonsense morality. Like

Crisp, Hooker's indirect utilitarian thus seeks improvements on commonsense morality. Hooker notes that Griffin clearly does believe that we can revise and improve our existing moral beliefs and practices. He challenges Griffin to find a legitimate source for such revisions which is not consistent with a suitably modest indirect consequentialism.

In reply, Griffin argues that he is not as pessimistic as Crisp suggests, and endorses many of the reforms Crisp proposes. However, his main reaction to Crisp and Hooker remains sceptical. Griffin doubts that utilitarianism can provide useful answers even to the modest questions posed by Crisp and Hooker.

John Broome and Amelie Rorty accuse Griffin of being too optimistic. Broome discusses Griffin's account of incommensurability. He begins with a useful technical overview of the issues. Broome characterizes incommensurability in terms of an 'intermediate zone' (p. 25). Some option outside the zone is neither better nor worse than any option within the zone, but different options within the zone may be better or worse than each other. The significance of incommensurability is a function of the size of the intermediate zone. Griffin assumes that the zone must be narrow. If A and B are both neither better nor worse than C, then the difference in value between A and B cannot be very great. Broome denies this, citing the example of a choice between two very different kinds of career. A successful army career is much better than a mediocre one, yet neither is better or worse than a moderately successful career in the church.

Griffin admits that he has provided no argument to show that the zone must be narrow. His position was based on intuition. Yet he responds that Broome's position is similarly reliant on intuition, and that intuitions are notoriously unreliable in such cases. Griffin then sketches a new argument in favour of a narrow intermediate zone, beginning with a single value such as enjoyment. Griffin argues that we cannot make intuitive sense of the claim that A is much more enjoyable than B, even though neither is more or less enjoyable than C.

Amelie Rorty criticizes Griffin for ignoring the social, cultural and historical influences on ethical thought and decision-making. She notes that the critical evaluation of ethical standards takes place, not in the isolation of the philosopher's study, but in the context of a field of action. She is surprised that 'someone so alert to the interdependence of normative ethics and meta-ethics should attempt a philosophical study that moves towards – and then shies away from – an account of politically formed, culturally based psychology' (p. 151). She also accuses Griffin of implicitly assuming a controversial, and 'Olympian', view of what it is that we want from an ethical theory.

Griffin responds that he seems 'to be locked in a dramatic dialogue with [Rorty], in which she gets to write both parts' (p. 311). His aim was never to ignore or downplay the significance of historical and cultural factors, or the limits they place on our critical powers. Rather, he asks whether the powers we happen to have can provide some guidance in the situation we find ourselves in. To deny that they can, Griffin suggests, is to succumb to Olympian pretensions of a different kind.

TIM MULGAN

University of Auckland

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Peter Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 256.

Thirty years after his first pioneering attempt to deal with the issue of global poverty, Peter Singer has finally offered a more comprehensive and long-awaited account of his view on international ethics, in which a robust defence of global ethics and a number of supranational political proposals are presented. Singer's declared intention to urge Western citizens to adopt a 'post-Westphalian cosmopolitical way of life' is engendered through the use of a highly developed rationale in an accessible form. Scintillating polemics, striking examples and provocative comparisons characterize the cool but plain style of this text, in which quotations from such a wide political spectrum as to include several US presidents, Marx, the Bible, Kofi Annan, the SS leader Himmler, and Aquinas form the material for the moral assessment of current political rhetoric.

From the 1970s, Singer vigorously stimulated the discussion on global justice, while inevitably attracting a number of fierce criticisms from almost every political angle, so that he has appeared both as a radical egalitarian ready to divulgate a revolutionary word and as a self-deceived conservative concerned with neo-liberal charity rather than political justice. As a rebuttal to such accusations, reiterated just months ago by Andrew Kuper (2002), *One World* offers a strengthened restatement of Singer's original proposal, although with a substantial enlargement in scope and a further refinement of the argument.

The change in world social circumstances constitutes the initial assumption of Singer's argument. The time of a world of isolated villages has ended, for technology and economic globalization have generated an increasingly integrated global community, of which terrorism is only further evidence. Although Singer's case is organized around the recognition of such a global society, this remains an unnecessary element in his ethical argument, in so far as it would still be wrong to assume the absence of obligation beyond borders even where different nations led more independent lives (p. 197). The moral principle of universal impartiality, as in Hare's formulation, represents, instead, the normative bulk of Singer's reasoning, producing a global ethical framework which recognizes, against communitarians and political realists, national obligations only as prima facie duties.

From this, Singer develops an ethical assessment of the political reality. Through the prism of the fundamental question of the moral requirements for governmental legitimacy, four relevant cases of global interaction are studied (atmosphere, economy, law, and community). The conventional creed, accepted also by international institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, according to which the sole test of legal validity for governments is the effective control over a territory, is contested in favour of a more democratic, although pluralistic, reading based on freely expressed popular support. Hence the traditional state-centric stance, represented by the doctrine of the 'first things first are the people who live in America' (p. 2), is disputed in line with the enhancement of political institutions of

global governance. A world allocation of responsibility is recommended, and the progressive creation of a world federal community (with the European Union as a model), with its own elected legislature and a scheme of division of political labour according to the principle of subsidiarity, is thus encouraged. Finally, but crucially, the principal responsibility for the weakness and the delay in the institution-building process of such supranational organizations clearly lies with the US government.

The apparent and yet effective simplicity characterizing Singer's arguments can be attributed to a pair of reasons. On the one hand, since his public intentions are explicitly political, it is clear why he renounces his straightforward traditional utilitarian argument in favour of a more ecumenical and less sophisticated one. On the other hand, in doing applied ethics, he is constrained to focus on specific case studies and to attempt to create a normative overlap of distinct abstract principles with concrete policy prescriptions. In addition, his political appeal is strengthened through the integration of his rationale with a number of different arguments, including prudential reflections (the national threat of an unjust world), evolutionary explanations (competition of genes as formation of mutually beneficial co-operative relationships), and empirical considerations (the interdependency of social reality as a basis for global ethics).

Despite all this, some chapters contain minor inconsistencies and a serious lacuna (significantly emerging from the more political final chapters) remains, which demands reconsideration. Singer's defence of the distinction between legal and ethical justification concerning the duty of intervention is not fully convincing (p. 137), while his retreat from a full treatment of the issue of sovereignty and religious regimes is unsatisfying (p. 144). In addition, his proposal for a UN World Assembly with representatives from each country, irrespective of either their form of government or their observance of human rights, and yet elected through democratic elections, is self-contradictory (p. 148), whereas his answer to the argument of the 'community of reciprocity' seems to miss the point, in so far as it is based on the possibility for refugees to co-operate in a collective enterprise rather than on the moral illegitimacy of their exclusion from social benefits (p. 169). Finally, a further problem lies in the lack of a clear terminological distinction between state and nation, both terms being used interchangeably, often in the conventional confusing formula of the nation-state.

The most detrimental gap, however, consists in the incomplete development of the concept of cosmopolitical citizenship. Of the two components of global citizenship, in fact, only the more conventional aspect of multilevel responsibility has attracted some attention in this study, although its articulation is insufficient to convince sceptics of its political viability. The other, much less discussed but politically crucial, issue of migration and citizenship is, instead, not examined at all, leaving the decisive element of consequentialist international ethics, political agency, only partially identified. In failing to provide a full and innovative characterization of the central political concept of the institution of citizenship, *One World* suffers from a serious deficiency, which does not allow its oscillation between work of academic research and political pamphlet to come to a less exposed rest.

In conclusion, praise is due to the courage of a committed thinker, who has produced a qualified moral critique of the current international situation and an overt accusation of the entity that is principally responsible, together with a number of plausible political counter-proposals. *One World* adds an important component to Singer's alternative narrative to the dominant Rawlsian school, rebalancing, on the international level at least, the theoretical dispute with contractarianism, and fostering that spirit of social criticism which has characterized the tradition of political utilitarianism, from Mill via Russell to Singer himself.

RAFFAELE MARCHETTI

London School of Economics

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Brian Hutchinson, *G. E. Moore's Ethical Theory: Resistance and Reconciliation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. viii + 219.

G. E. Moore had an enduring impact on twentieth-century ethics. His *Principia Ethica* (1903) restructured the field, and for seventy years – until Rawls's *Theory of Justice*, to be precise – no single work in ethics had repercussions as profound. Yet nowadays hardly anyone studies *Principia*. Specialists have long since advanced the metaethical debates it initiated beyond its limited frame of reference, and in any case in ethics these days metaethics no longer holds centre stage, with many philosophers focusing their attention instead on normative theory and concrete moral issues. Small wonder, then, that Moore is out of fashion.

Brian Hutchinson deserves credit, therefore, for attempting to renew interest in Moore's ethical theory. Although the cover of his book proclaims it to be 'the first comprehensive study' of Moore's ethics, in fact it concentrates almost entirely on *Principia Ethica*. Earlier or later texts are discussed only in so far as they shed light on that book, and although Moore lived until 1958, Hutchinson says little about the further development of his ideas. In particular, he refers only four times to Moore's *Ethics* (1912), which Moore later said he considered the better book. Hutchinson, however, does not try to provide a detailed guide to, or a systematic exposition of, *Principia*. Rather, he takes as his theme *Principia*'s effort to persuade its readers of the objectivity of good and thus to preserve common moral insight from scepticism.

Moore was both a revolutionary ready to sweep away all earlier ethical philosophy as erroneous and a conservative who believed that in some sense we already know the truths that other philosophers have obscured. Hutchinson describes Moore as innocent and utterly lacking in irony. Yet this lack of irony is 'the key to *Principia*'s greatness' as Moore 'tell[s] a simple and moving story about how human beings constantly jeopardize the plain awareness of objective value that is their birthright'. Hutchinson writes clear, intelligible prose, but he has a literary style and sensibility that often make his points elusive and his position difficult to summarize. And his sentences too frequently strive for

cleverness or profundity. Thus, to pick examples from page 2, he writes: 'it may be that the greatest of iconoclastic acts is to renounce iconoclasm', 'Moore is not afraid to be a lonely philosopher and stand with the crowd', or 'we all have moments when the profoundest truths appear to be the ones right on the surface, when the idea of *depth* seems illusory. *Principia* captures this thought as beautifully as any that has the depth to defend it'.

Hutchinson's first two chapters treat of Moore's view that good is a simple, indefinable and non-natural property. This is familiar terrain, but Hutchinson usefully brings some of Moore's other essays to bear on the question of non-naturalism. Like most contemporary philosophers he does not think much of Moore's open-question argument. Although Hutchinson makes some suggestive and pertinent points, remarking, for example, that our knowledge of good and the things that are good must grow together, he does not undertake to persuade the reader that Moore's metaethical views are important or insightful. He does not situate them with respect to alternative positions, and he ignores the various objections that contemporary philosophers would raise to Moore's view of good.

Chapter 3 addresses the problem of how to reconcile Moore's optimistic notion that by clearing up a few simple philosophical mistakes he can pave the way for great ethical progress with his pessimistic belief that all earlier philosophers botched the job. Chapter 4 tries to find the resources in Moore for a more sympathetic attitude to previous ethical theorists than is apparent in *Principia*. Chapter 5 continues this endeavour to 'separate Moore's theory from the limited and fallible statement and application of it in *Principia*' (p. 111) by showing that our common-sense awareness of good is more provisional than Moore sometimes implies. The following two chapters then take up *Principia*'s argument that egoism is contradictory and irrational. This argument is rather obscure, but, however one unpacks it, it remains implausible, and, indeed, Moore quietly abandoned it in *Ethics* nine years later. Hutchinson points out that Moore's argument not only desiccates goodness by making it too impersonal but also threatens to dissolve the self altogether.

In chapter 8 Hutchinson moves on to Moore's practical moral philosophy. He rightly criticizes Tom Regan's view that Moore was a moral liberator, concerned to free the individual from traditional ethical constraints. Regan's view is hard to square with Moore's explicit thesis that one should always conform to rules that 'are both generally useful and generally practiced'. On the other hand, Hutchinson may overemphasize the conservative and rule-oriented character of Moore's thought, for Moore also held that in the realm beyond these rules one must guide oneself by a direct consideration of the good and bad effects of one's actions. Moore thus straddles act and rule consequentialism, and contemporary moral theorists will certainly find his thinking about rules and individual moral choice pertinent and intriguing. Hutchinson rightly spends time on this topic, but he probably spends too little time probing Moore's unequivocal commitment to consequentialism, his account of virtue and motives, or what he says about the limits to our knowledge of right and wrong.

Instead, in his final two chapters Hutchinson turns from Moore's normative theory to what he calls Moore's 'cosmic conservatism'. Although loosely

concerned with *Principia*'s final chapter, in which Moore contends that personal affection and aesthetic enjoyment are by far the greatest of goods, these chapters revisit the earlier theme that Moore sees philosophy as having, hitherto, obscured our pre-philosophical awareness of value. But this reviewer found Hutchinson's ruminations on this theme difficult to follow, and like much of the book itself they did little to enhance his understanding and appreciation of *Principia Ethica*.

WILLIAM H. SHAW

San Jose State University

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Andrew Vincent, *Nationalism and Particularity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. vii + 292.

Andrew Vincent examines the challenge of particularism – by which he means the special associations, ties, loyalties and commitments typical of any ordinary human life – for political theory. In light of the increasing recognition of the importance and relevance of particularism, the traditional aspiration of political theories to 'seek out universal foundations for our social and political judgements is partly in abeyance' (p. 1). Vincent's central aim in this work is to engage critically with what he calls this 'drift to particularity', as expressed in the widely affirmed ideas of nationalism, sovereignty, patriotism, among other forms of special associations. His goal is not to endorse such group particularities, but to understand how political theory can and should respond to this anti-universalistic drift in contemporary social and political life. One of the central motivations for Vincent's work is to correct the tendency, as he sees it, of 'liberal-minded theorists' hastily to 'dismiss groups as irrelevant or incoherent' (p. 2).

The book is organized around two interrelated themes. The first concerns the relationship between nationalism and other kinds of particularist ideas that have political resonance, such as the principle of sovereignty, the idea of the nation-state, citizenship, liberal nationalism, patriotism, communitarianism, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism (the latter, Vincent explains, is regarded by some of its critics as a form of particularism at bottom). A thorough philosophical and historical examination of these different kinds of particularism, and their complex relationship to nationalism, constitutes the individual chapters of this book.

The second theme of the book concerns the general move towards particularism in political life, and its implications for normative political theory. Through a close study of the different forms of particularisms mentioned above, Vincent exposes the historical roots of these ideals and evaluates their normative status. Ultimately, Vincent recommends 'treating all forms of particularism, specifically nationalism, with extreme caution and scepticism' (p. 240). But he also worries that contemporary political theories, especially those within the liberal perspective, cannot adequately accommodate and

account for the claims of particularism. He proposes that political theory moves 'beyond the contrast between universality and particularity' (p. 241), though he concedes that it is highly unclear at this point what such a theory might be. This conclusion is representative of the despair among some theorists regarding the irreconcilability of the universal and particular in contemporary theory.

Vincent starts by showing that the concept of state sovereignty provides the language of 'indivisibility, unified purpose, common interest and unified action' (p. 34) upon which the nationalist discourse is parasitic. On Vincent's view, it is sovereignty that lends force and meaning to the nationalism. To the extent, then, that sovereignty as a normative ideal can be called into doubt, as Vincent argues it can, nationalism as a normative ideal can also be doubted (chapter 1).

Moving on to discuss the compound idea of the nation-state, Vincent concludes that the relationship between nation and state is redundant (chapter 2). This is because nationality is not the only available unifying element for statehood, contra the claims of many nationalist theorists like David Miller; other forms of available particularistic commitments, such as political ideology, religion, moral ideals, and so on can provide the commonality among individuals that 'generates belonging' (p. 60). The fact of 'internal pluralism' shows that to 'focus specifically on nationality as the sole source of morality is thus profoundly contestable and narrow' (p. 52).

Given the difficulties with the idea of nationality, many liberal theorists, Vincent points out, prefer to speak in terms of citizenship instead of shared nationality. Citizenship is supposedly superior because it is seen as a form of particularism that can accommodate universalist ideals. For example, the liberal idea of citizenship includes a commitment to universalistic liberal principles. But according to Vincent, the tension between universalism and particularism is not resolved but is indeed much accentuated by the language of citizenship (chapter 3). As a liberal ideal, citizenship carries with it a universalizing impulse; but in practice, citizenship is inescapably associated with the state. Citizenship is in fact 'an empirical technique of exclusion' (p. 79), as is reflected in the restrictive immigration policies of all states, including liberal ones. The attempt to transcend particularism by replacing the idea of national identity with the concept of liberal citizenship does not, therefore, succeed.

The remaining chapters go on to discuss the normative significance of liberal nationalism (chapter 4), patriotism (chapter 5), communitarianism (chapter 6), multiculturalism (chapter 7) and cosmopolitanism (chapter 8), and their complex historical relationship to nationalism.

There is much to be discussed in this wide-ranging book, and the analytical depth and historical richness of the chapter-by-chapter survey of the different forms of particularism will be of special interest to scholars working in the relevant areas. Here, I can only briefly reflect on Vincent's general conclusion that the universalism of contemporary (liberal) theory cannot be reconciled to the particularism so common in political life.

One might suggest that a way of reconciling the universalism of theory and the particularism of the real world is to treat the universalist normative

aspirations of theory as concerned with the background conditions of justice. That is, the universalism of political theory speaks to the principles or norms of institutions within whose rules particularist expressions and pursuits have to be situated. What these background constraints are will depend on the specifics of the particularist claims at issue. For example, if the question is whether nationalism can permit people to favour their co-nationals over foreigners with regard to resource allocation, we need first to know what rightly belongs to whom as a matter of justice, and the answer to this question has to be determined by reference to some conception of distributive justice that is independent of the particularities of nationality and national membership. While particularist commitments may give content to political life, universalist principles set the limits to these commitments.

So understood, particularism as such need not worry the universalist so long as particularist goals and expressions are kept within the demands of justice impartially conceived; and universalism need not undermine particularism if group attachments and commitments can still retain their richness and meaning even as they are subordinated to the demands of justice.

Now Vincent's analysis suggests that particularisms are often claims about the demands of justice, and not just claims about loyalties or attachments as such. Special concern for one's fellow nationals, for instance, is often invoked by real-world nationalists as one reason why the demands of global justice must be limited. But must nationalism entail such a claim about justice in order to retain its moral significance? Can we think of a form of nationalism that can respect the priority of universal justice while retaining much of what is morally significant about nationalism? Nationality may provide people with their identities, but the issue of national identity and that of justice can perhaps be disentangled. More debate is, of course, needed; in this regard, Vincent's book will be an important resource for students seeking to understand the significance of nationalism and particularity for political theory and practice.

KOK-CHOR TAN

University of Pennsylvania

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Linda C. Raeder, *John Stuart Mill and the Religion of Humanity* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2002), pp. xi + 402.

It is hardly controversial that Mill advanced a secular ethics and political philosophy, or that he often had religion and religious institutions in his sights. Raeder, however, aims to show that 'Mill's commitment to the replacement of Christianity with a Religion of Humanity was one of the chief purposes governing his philosophical endeavours throughout his life' (p. 1). To this end she argues that Mill's youthful sympathy with Saint-Simon and Comte was no passing fancy, and that like them he viewed his times as a transitional stage on the way to a new age to be brought about by a social transformation

grounded in positivist philosophy. By examining a number of Mill's key works in the light of his correspondence and diary entries Raeder seeks to show that his early sympathy with the social-revolutionary and anti-theological thrust of the Philosophical Radicals and French Positivists never left him. The first two chapters deal with early influences. Then there is a chapter devoted to 'Nature' and 'Utility of Religion', the first two of the posthumously published *Three Essays on Religion*. This is followed by a chapter on Mill's polemic against Mansel, and a chapter on 'Theism', the third of the *Three Essays*. *On Liberty* and *Utilitarianism* each have a chapter. The conclusion draws out some consequences and implications. Raeder is not content to trace influences. She is out to expose Mill as an arrogant and even sinister figure with deeply illiberal tendencies.

In a neglected passage in chapter III of *Utilitarianism* Mill by implication suggested that the feeling of unity with our fellow human beings should 'be taught as a religion, and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, directed . . . to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and by the practice of it'. It can reasonably be wondered how this is supposed to square with liberalism, but Raeder's attempts to detect sinister motives in Mill sometimes seem strained. She argues, for instance, that the defence of freedom of discussion in *On Liberty* 'is entirely in keeping with the Saint-Simonian conception of a "transitional" period in human thought and society' (p. 236). On this conception freedom of discussion is meant to assist 'the transition from the unsettled critical state to the stable organic state' (pp. 236–7). By Raeder's lights the worry seems to be that Mill's approval of freedom of discussion is severely qualified because it applies only to the transitional period. As evidence for this she cites passages in chapter II of *On Liberty* in which Mill denies that absence of unanimity is an indispensable condition of knowledge and envisages that as understanding progresses there will inevitably be a 'gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion'. If this talk of narrowing is read to imply that freedom of discussion is to pass away the passage might look sinister. But what on earth could sanction such a reading? The idea surely is that where there is truth to be found, the application of appropriate methods is liable to uncover it. When it does, then disagreements on the matter in hand, among those with the relevant understanding, would cease, not for want of freedom of discussion, but simply because agreement has been reached. Of course, some may wrongly think that they have discovered a truth by methods they wrongly think adequate to the purpose, but then it would be up to others to show them to be mistaken. There is nothing in this suggesting that Mill thinks that in the fullness of time freedom of discussion will no longer be an important value.

In a section headed 'Mill's Experience of Disorder', Raeder suggests that when Mill composed 'Nature' he 'seems to have experienced the cosmos . . . as a vast chaos' (p. 97). In support she observes that Mill speaks of the perfect and absolute recklessness of cosmic forces. Why should the recklessness spoken of here be conceived as chaos? The idea surely is not that nature is chaotic but that it lacks the kind of order one should expect to find if there were benign and just powers guiding it. Raeder then turns to a passage in which Mill

represents nature to have 'the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice' and vividly describes 'her' harsh dealings with life. As if stunned by the vehemence of this 'outburst', Raeder simply adds that 'Mill never suggests that he is speaking metaphorically' (p. 98). Are we supposed to gather that the passage is a demented moral critique of nature, showing that Mill – going through a bad patch, perhaps – fails to appreciate that nature is not an agent? If that, or something like that, is not the suggestion, then what is the point of the comment?

When she turns to the design argument Raeder is wayward. She rightly takes Mill to hold that the argument relies not just on mere analogies, but on induction. But she misrepresents how far Mill thinks that induction can take us. In 'Theism' Mill writes:

> We are therefore warranted by the canons of induction in concluding that what brought all these elements [of the eye] together was some cause common to them all; and inasmuch as the elements agree in the single circumstance of conspiring to produce sight, there must be some connection by way of causation between the cause which brought these elements together, and the fact of sight.

He then comments that this is 'the sum and substance of what Induction can do for Theism'. Note that there is no mention of design or of intelligent will. He then adds what he describes as 'the natural sequel of the argument':

> Sight, being a fact not precedent but subsequent to the putting together of the organic structure of the eye, can only be connected with the production of that structure in the character of a final, not an efficient cause; that is, it is not Sight itself but an antecedent Idea of it, that must be the efficient cause. But this at once marks the origin as proceeding from an intelligent will.

Raeder runs the two passages together, omitting the remarks that separate them about the sum and substance of what induction can do and about the natural sequel. Then, adding insult to injury, she claims that 'what Mill gives he immediately takes away' (p. 191). She is prompted to do so by the fact that Mill takes seriously the possibility that evolutionary theory is true and can account for the connection between sight and the structure of the eye, without the hypothesis of design by an intelligent will. If the conclusion of the inductive argument proper were as Raeder reports, then Mill's procedure would be puzzling. But Mill is explicit that the inductive argument falls short of establishing design and that the 'natural sequel' of the inductive argument, which does concern design, is 'not so inexpugnable' as the inductive part of the argument. In other words, a portion of text in which Mill makes it clear that the conclusion about intelligent design goes beyond what induction can do for theism is presented as one in which Mill goes soft on a conclusion he has just presented as being well supported by induction.

This is the only book-length study providing a comprehensive examination of Mill on religion. It brings together a great deal of evidence showing the importance of the Religion of Humanity for Mill's reforming project. It usefully highlights aspects of Mill's thinking, and parts of his corpus, which have

undoubtedly been neglected by philosophers. But the critical discussion of Mill's ideas and arguments needs to be handled with care.

ALAN MILLAR

University of Stirling

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Mariangela Ripoli, *Itinerari della felicità: La filosofia giuspolitica di Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill* (Turin: Giappichelli, 2001), pp. 346.

This book on the political thought of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill is a scholarly and well-reasoned work. It makes an accurate use of printed and unpublished sources and of the most recent literature on these authors. Reference to the Italian high-level tradition of legal and political philosophy – generally unfamiliar with the utilitarian tradition – proves fruitful in highlighting some controversial aspects concerning the interpretation of Bentham's and the two Mills' work. It is however a matter of opinion whether Ripoli's analysis would have been enriched by some explorations outside the field of political and legal philosophy. For example, her interesting discussion of codification contained in chapter 3 does not consider Richard Posner's (1981) arguments on the intrinsic economic character of common law and on the utopian nature of Bentham's legislative proposals. Analogously, chapter 4 on punishment does not encompass the point of view of the economics of crime, despite Gary Becker's (1968) reference to Bentham as a forerunner.

The book includes a chapter on the foundations of Bentham's and the two Mills' utilitarianism; another chapter on their different conceptions of sovereignty and representative democracy; a third chapter discussing their conceptions of liberty and the instrumental function of law; and finally a chapter on punishment, focusing on the issue of capital punishment and ending with an analysis of Bentham's 'Panopticon'. It is rare to find a work in which the three above-mentioned authors (plus William Paley) are studied with equal authority and competence. Indeed, the thrust of Ripoli's analysis lies in comparison. One of its more interesting results is the light shed on James Mill's role as a forerunner of his son's arguments, as for example on the nature of happiness, on the value of individual autonomy, and on the comparative hedonistic weight of capital punishment and life imprisonment.

Chapters 2 and 3 are central in Ripoli's analysis. Getting rid of some deep-rooted prejudices about classical utilitarianism, the author definitely claims *both* Bentham's and John Stuart Mill's affiliation to the liberal tradition. As mentioned above, another interesting contribution made by this book is the comparative analysis of Bentham's and John Stuart Mill's ideas on common law and codification. While Bentham associates the confusion and lack of symbolic strength of 'judge-made' law with the arbitrariness and corruption of the courts, Mill distinguishes between the positive role of the courts, which

is responsible for the freedom enjoyed by British citizens, and the stratification of contradictory legal regulations that results from their activity.

Chapter 1 revolves around the traditional distinction between Bentham's quantitative assessment of pleasures and pains and Mill's qualitative approach. Nevertheless, Ripoli admits that Bentham himself made important distinctions between pleasures of different qualities, arguing however that he, unlike Mill, gave priority to pleasures 'of a very humble kind', which in fact correspond to the absence of 'these pains that were inevitably associated with the life of the majority of people at that time: hunger, diseases, poverty, uncertainty of subsistence' (p. 36). Now, this interpretation implies that (i) in Bentham's utilitarian theory there is a primacy of pain over pleasure, and (ii) Bentham's approach is historically dated and adapted to less developed societies, in which satisfaction of 'basic needs' is an absolute priority. In my opinion, this interpretation is attractive but misleading. First and foremost, Bentham intended to offer a general theory of pleasure and pain. The classification of pleasures and pains presented in chapter V of IPML provided a broad framework that was essentially open to new types of pleasure that might emerge from the evolution of technology and customs. Second, in Bentham's classification, the structure of human sensibility appears to be more composite with regard to 'mental pleasures' than 'physical pleasures'. The former range from pleasures of possession, to pleasures of hope, sympathetic and benevolent attitudes. Third, Bentham explicitly rejected the arguments of Locke and Maupertuis, who stressed the supremacy of pain and the limited availability of pleasure. For him, the expectation of pleasure was as strong a motive for action as pain.

Nor is Bentham's hedonistic conception of the individual entirely 'behaviouristic', as Ripoli states (p. 36). Although Bentham never explicitly mentions the role of conscience and of the internal sense of duty, as Mill did, in his theoretical framework room is made both for external sanctions and for internal ones. Being a legal theorist, he obviously emphasized the role of the former, but his writings on indirect legislation, education, poor management, and prison aim at interiorizing social attitudes, and *Deontology* develops a strategy of moral instruction based on the expansion of spontaneous benevolent feelings. His theory of fictions probably made him suspicious of such vague notions as 'conscience' and 'sense of duty'; his line of attack centred instead on the development of a higher *sensibility* to sympathetic sentiments.

Lastly, Ripoli deduces Bentham's egalitarianism from his quantitative conception of pleasures and pains (pp. 36, 38). I think that the path from Bentham's hedonistic conception to his egalitarian assumptions is not so straightforward. An important distinction is that between 'sentience' and 'sensibility'. Sentience justifies the mere inclusion of every animate being in the calculation of general happiness. But what happens if it is proved that an individual is twice as sensitive to pleasures and pains as other individuals? Would she be entitled to receive more than others in social distribution? Bentham's answer to this question is that, since interpersonal comparison is complicated by the variability of human sensibility to different qualities of pleasures and pains, equal 'average' sensibility should be *postulated* in social

choice. Equal sentience being the only 'sure thing', it may only serve to justify such a postulation.

MARCO E. L. GUIDI

Università di Pisa

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Bennett Helm, *Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. x + 261.

Bennett Helm's book is an impressive, systematic treatment of important questions in metaethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of action. Among other things, it is a sustained attempt to argue against an exclusive and exhaustive division of contentful mental states into cognitive and conative states, or states with one or the other of two familiar 'directions of fit' with the world. The book defends a theory of value and valuation that makes a central place for emotions, bodily pains and pleasures, and other 'felt evaluations'. This theory is broadly in the tradition of recent sensibility theories espoused by authors such as John McDowell and David Wiggins. It attempts to steer a course between non-cognitive theories of evaluative judgement (which understand evaluation by appeal to desires, sentiments and other non-cognitive states) and various kinds of cognitivist realism that treat value as something entirely independent of human concerns, and evaluative thought as a matter of trying to secure cognitive contact with these independent values. Yet this work goes well beyond previous sensibility theories in offering a detailed moral psychology of evaluation, and by arguing for a conception of rationality better suited to the emotions and other felt evaluations than are traditional epistemic or instrumental conceptions.

The book is both ambitious in breadth and rich in detail, suggesting novel accounts of a number of topics along the way. Space constraints prohibit me from cataloguing (much less exploring) all of these here, so I focus on the account of emotions and of value and valuing that is at the heart of the book. Emotions are essentially evaluative feelings: feelings of things going well or poorly. They involve an evaluative construal of their *target* (the object the emotion is 'directed at') as having some kind of *import* (roughly, non-moral value), and the particular kind of import determines the emotion's *formal object*. So, for instance, fear that the flying ball will smash my prized vase involves construing the ball as dangerous, and dangerousness is fear's formal object. The evaluation involved in an emotion is crucially a felt evaluation – and various cognitivist accounts of emotion are criticized for their failure to appreciate the significance of this point. Helm argues that it is because these evaluations are felt as painful or pleasant that they figure in the best account of how we are motivated by value, and why we ought (rationally) to be so motivated. But non-cognitive theories of emotion are, if anything, worse, since they cannot make sense of the fact that emotions are evaluations,

nor of the way in which emotions involve *assenting* to these evaluations. They therefore conflict with the commonsensical thought that some of our emotions and other felt evaluations are unwarranted. One can be afraid of things that are not really dangerous, and long for things that are not good (for one).

Import is held to be independent of any particular emotional episodes, so it can be a standard against which to appraise them as warranted or not. But import is not independent of emotions more generally. Helm's interesting proposal is that what constitutes import is a special kind of pattern among one's attitudes (especially feelings, emotions, and desires), in virtue of which one has reasons to respond and be moved in various ways so as properly to respect the import of things that matter to one. A crucial stepping-stone is the intuitively plausible idea that individual emotional episodes impose rational pressure on one to feel various other emotions. Thus if you fear the smashing of the vase, then, other things being equal, you ought to be relieved when it is not smashed, sad when it is, angry at the smasher, hopeful that it will have survived the earthquake this afternoon, and so on. Helm urges that this pressure arises because emotions involve a kind of commitment to the import of the emotion's *focus* (the background object whose import to the subject makes the evaluation implicit in the emotional episode intelligible). Fearing that the vase will be broken is a kind of commitment to the import of the vase, and that import explains why one ought to have the various other kinds of responses constitutive of the pattern. Import is then used to make sense of warranted and unwarranted responses, as well. A given emotional episode may be unwarranted if the focus does not really matter (to you) in the way the emotion suggests.

This view must walk a fine line between perils on two sides. If import is really to be constituted out of patterns in our responses, then the question of whether something really has import for a person must be allowed to depend upon whether in fact she has the attitudes that make it plausible to count this thing as mattering to her. Helm is explicit that what has import for one person may not have import for another; and differences in what we actually fear, hope for, etc. will presumably loom large in explaining these differences in import. On the other hand, if import is really to constitute a rational norm or standard, it must be possible to fail to meet that standard – to be afraid of outcomes that would not really be bad (for one), or to fail to be afraid of things that would. Yet when one does find oneself strangely unafraid at the prospect of losing something one had thought important to one, this is sometimes evidence that it does not really matter to one after all – or not as much as one thought. Furthermore, more generally, any actual pattern of responses underdetermines answers to newly arising questions about import. The question is when emotions should be understood to lie outside the rational pattern that constitutes import for a given person, and when instead they should be treated as new evidence about the true contours of that pattern. Helm takes up a version of this problem in chapter 7. He urges that attempts to articulate and refine our conceptions of import can support some such conceptions and leave others plainly wanting. One measure of success or failure here is the degree to which one's felt evaluations end

up supporting or conflicting with one's considered judgements. But it is at least questionable whether the open-ended process of reflective articulation in combination with the vagaries of actual felt responses will supply anything sufficiently determinate to settle which possible outcomes count as mistakes and which do not.

I have only been able to sketch one theme out of many. This is especially unfortunate since Helm's argumentative approach is avowedly holistic. While he argues for some individual theses, and against rivals, much of the justification for the view is said to come from an overall appraisal of its ability to solve various persistent problems which I have not been able to explore here. This holism, and the proliferation of terminology throughout, make the book difficult to digest without careful study. But the reader is rewarded with a remarkably comprehensive treatment of important philosophical questions.

JUSTIN D'ARMS

Ohio State University

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David Schmidtz (ed.), *Robert Nozick* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. x + 230.

This book is a kind of festschrift. It collects ten new essays on the philosophical thought of Robert Nozick. Such a volume is in a way very timely, having been published in the year of Robert Nozick's death. At the same time it was, like Nozick's passing, premature, as it does not address Nozick's final book, *Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World*. Nonetheless, the essays cover his surprisingly wide-ranging thought in a way that Nozick would endorse. Admiring without flattering, critical and yet appreciative, this set of papers contains some illuminating, challenging and non-coercive philosophy.

As might be expected, the volume is weighted towards the discussion of Nozick's most famous book, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Philosophers sometimes forget how important a work this is, among both philosophers (who generally regard it as unsuccessful) and popular audiences. For a work of philosophy to have such a wide audience is a truly remarkable thing. (Far more students have read substantial amounts of it than, for example, Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* – a fact attributable to the former's readable style and captivating examples.) It is still used as the most thoroughly defended and plausible representation of libertarianism in political philosophy courses everywhere. Nozick famously (and cryptically) repudiated the particular libertarianism defended in that book, but just how much of it he rejected is hard to say. In a remark in *The Examined Life*, he calls his former view 'seriously inadequate', mysteriously pointing to the 'symbolic importance of an official political concern with issues or problems, as a way of marking their importance or urgency' (pp. 286–7). Several of the essays in this volume pick up on Nozick's remark and try to make something of it. Loren Lomasky, for example, tries to explain in what sense libertarianism is compatible with the

quasi-communitarian sympathy expressed in the aforementioned remark. A libertarian world, he argues, is fully consistent with 'joint expressive activity' that might be a component of any utopia. Lomasky argues persuasively that there is no reason to think that the workings of the 'invisible hand' would preclude communitarian outcomes. Gerald Gaus takes the challenge of the symbolic even more seriously, trying to tease out what Nozick might have meant by 'symbolic reasons', or reasons provided by the symbolic utility of an action (as distinct from evidential and causal reasons). Connecting this remark to Nozick's other writings on rationality, Gaus concludes both that Nozick is indeed committed to such reasons, and that such reasons are hopeless. Gaus does as much as anyone could with such an implausible and strange hypothesis. However, most people who reject the philosophy of *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* do so for completely other reasons than the one to which Nozick mysteriously alludes.

Overall, only two of the five essays on Nozick's political thought could be described as defences of Nozick's libertarianism – the Lomasky piece and another by John Sanders defending a kind of non-contractualist, quasi-natural right to property. On the whole they are quite critical. David Miller argues that Nozick's defence of political authority (against anarchy) as presented in the often-neglected Part I of *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* is not entirely successful. Philip Pettit has written a piece that is useful and compelling, focusing on the question of whether there is a defensible way to view rights as constraints (as opposed to goals). He concludes that there is not, and that a 'utilitarianism of rights' or some other kind of consequentialism is unavoidable. Pettit's critique is probably much more serious for Nozick's view than is his notoriously scanty defence of natural property rights, which is the focus of redistributive welfarists.

The contributions of *Philosophical Explanations* are not neglected. An excellent piece by Michael Williams addresses Nozick's efforts in epistemology. Nozick sought to avoid the quagmire of post-Cartesian epistemology by abandoning the task of the justification of our beliefs, focusing instead on an explication of what knowledge is. Writing in a way that is both a nice introduction to Nozick's reliabilism as well as a critique of it, this essay might be used as part of an undergraduate introduction to scepticism and modern responses to it. Michael Bratman ponders the role of free will in Nozick's incompatibilism, touching on Nozick's account of personal identity. In a gesture that Nozick would probably endorse, Bratman refrains from taking the last word for himself.

There is something here for everyone. Although most articles emphasize the doctrinal commitments of Nozick, Elijah Millgram focuses on the performative aspect of Nozick's philosophizing. He defends the ill-received *The Examined Life* against the charge that it lacks argumentation by painting a different picture of Nozick: Nozick the self-creating, non-coercive philosopher who was not interested in having disciples. Nozick argued against the incongruous background of his argument-filled corpus of writing that persuasion was not his aim; Millgram attempts to flesh out what Nozick might have been doing instead. This is not mere portraiture; Millgram is trying to show that Nozick (or

at least part of him) should be located in a different genre of philosophy – the one to which Kierkegaard belonged. I am not sure that this portrait is one that would be welcomed by Nozick, but it certainly adds a new (perhaps schizoid) dimension to his persona. The final essay is a reflection on the meaning of life by David Schmidtz. Schmidtz highlights some of the more lively examples and anecdotes that make Nozick a pleasure to read, but his essay is not a critique or analysis of Nozick's approach.

The brief introduction is respectful and even deferential (it begins with the words 'Robert Nozick's brilliance', just to give you an idea), and takes Nozick's self-understanding at face value. It emphasizes his rejection of the style of philosophy that focuses on winning debates. It is probably too soon to say whether this is the upshot of Nozick's legacy. The articles themselves showcase the many compelling arguments and examples that Nozick bequeathed to us. This may be attributable in part to the fact that it is easier to analyse and respond to a philosophical commitment than it is to analyse and respond to a philosophical persona.

It would have been nice had this volume been delayed to include something addressing Nozick's final book, which was published in 2001. In addition, it did strike me as odd that in the twenty-first century such a festschrift would contain no essays written by women. Nonetheless, those who have followed Nozick's philosophical career with interest and enjoyed his writings will welcome this worthwhile homage.

RUTH SAMPLE

University of New Hampshire

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Julia Stapleton, *Political Intellectuals and Public Identities in Britain since 1850* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. x + 220.

The first thing that must be said about this book is that the title is misleading. This is not an examination of a representative sample of British political intellectuals during the period under study. Neither J. S. Mill nor Bloomsbury receives more than passing attention. A more accurate label would have started with something like 'Nationalist Intellectuals' or 'Conservative Intellectuals with Particular Emphasis on Christian Ones'. There are occasional brief discussions of intellectuals beyond the right and right-centre, such as E. P. Thompson or John Strachey, but the bulk of the book is devoted to thinkers who emphasized English 'national identity' (p. 1), and often Christianity, and positioned themselves on the right of the political spectrum. This position evidently has Julia Stapleton's sympathy, which embraces even such figures as Enoch Powell.

The focus on a relatively narrow selection of intellectuals enables Stapleton to devote attention to a number of less-known writers, such as A. D. Lindsay, Alfred Zimmern and Sir Arthur Bryant. Not that those discussed

did not have significant careers, but they were, as Rodney Barker notes on the jacket, 'frequently eminent rather than important'. There are a few more 'important' individuals discussed, e.g. Collingwood and Eliot. However, Stapleton's treatment of them is not extensive, perhaps so as not to overshadow the less prominent personalities she highlights.

The work's organization is largely biographical. Nevertheless, it emphasizes themes rather than individuals, above all the themes of attachment to national identity and religion, as opposed to godless cosmopolitanism. The godless lose the battle in this book: 'it was liberalism's association with agnosticism that proved not the least important source of its travails' (p. 79). Stapleton sometimes attributes attachment to God and country to British intellectuals as a group: 'The intellectual elite of Victorian Britain' is thus made to oppose 'Radical national denial' (p. 32). Her ability to make this claim is an indication of her focus on a certain sort of intellectual – which evidently did not include Mill or the Radicals themselves.

Stapleton's work is stronger in discussing the inter-war period in British intellectual life, especially the 1930s. Her discussion of the inter-war period brings out the association of pastoral themes with concerns about national identity and spirituality, which persisted after the Second World War. G. M. Trevelyan, Ernest Barker, and others are cited in this vein – this is one occasion on which Stapleton does not restrict her discussion to the right wing. A chapter is devoted to 'Communism and the Religious Impulse: John Strachey and the Search for Political Faith'. The pastoral theme also leads Stapleton to an extended discussion of Sir Arthur Bryant. Bryant was an equivocal figure, willing to join with a socialist like R. H. Tawney when he could find an ally against the industrialization of the countryside. More importantly, Bryant was a noted appeaser who frequently expressed broad sympathy for the Nazi regime, if no desire to import it into England. Stapleton is content to excuse Bryant with faint blame: 'It has to be said that Bryant's editorial note to *Mein Kampf* stopped short of unconditional praise' (p. 141). She is more comfortable stressing Bryant's post-Second World War relationship to Lord Lawson and their common fight against the uprooted, irreligious, technological age that it inaugurated.

In her more contemporary chapters, Stapleton makes some odd choices, even within her chosen boundaries. Why devote more space to Powell than to F. W. Hayek? What does it mean to say that Powell, famed for his vitriolic opposition to the European Union and immigration by people of colour, showed 'an unparalleled depth of concern for the fortunes of the English people in a period of imperial and industrial decline' (p. 180)? And then, as if in an attempt at balance, to close the last substantive chapter of the book with a brief discussion of E. P. Thompson? Did Thompson and Powell really belong to the same family of political discourse? Actually, the word 'discourse' does not appear in this book, nor does 'language' in any other than a descriptive sense. Stapleton's methodological conservatism is in conformity with her politics. This is unfortunate, because Stapleton could have made good use of a Skinnerian approach in discussing what might be called the 'language of national identity', as used by the British right over the course of the period discussed.

Putting Thompson and Powell together, however, is as much an example of the book's strength as it is of its weaknesses. There is a parallel to be drawn between Thompson's insistence on the *Englishness* of his preferred form of socialism and Powell's insistence on English national identity, narrowly construed. Most observers would not choose to make this parallel. Stapleton thrusts it into prominence and insists that we look at it, even if we do not choose to celebrate it as she does. The book's merit lies in this willingness to explore a less charted sea, even if, ultimately, the island it reveals is narrow and cramped.

ALAN KAHAN

Florida International University

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Ishtiyaque Haji, *Deontic Morality and Control* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. xiv + 288.

Determinism threatens our view of the future as having alternative possibilities and, therefore, appears to threaten our view of ourselves as morally responsible agents. Compatibilists argue that this threat is mistaken. They say we can be morally responsible even if the future is determined. Haji accepts this claim, but argues that in giving up alternative possibilities we do give up something of importance: deontic morality. 'Deontic morality' is Haji's term for judgements that actions are right, wrong, or obligatory. He explores how deontic morality differs from judgements of moral responsibility and how this difference complicates the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. This exploration is accomplished in three parts. Part I details the argument that determinism is incompatible with deontic morality; Part II argues that some versions of indeterminism allow deontic morality but, nevertheless, fail to allow for moral responsibility; and Part III argues for the significance of deontic morality by arguing, for instance, that deontic morality cannot be satisfactorily replaced by virtue ethics. As Haji freely admits, these results are disturbing. So far as we know, either determinism or indeterminism is true. If determinism is true, then we can be morally responsible for our actions, but none of them are right, wrong, or obligatory. Alternatively, if indeterminism is true, then our actions can be right, wrong, or obligatory, but we are never morally responsible for performing them. So it appears that, regardless of the truth of determinism, we lack the sort of control that we desire.

Haji is thus a compatibilist with respect to moral responsibility, but an incompatibilist with respect to deontic morality. Here are three general concerns about Haji's stance: (1) pure compatibilists can argue that deontic morality is *not* incompatible with determinism; or if they grant that it is, then they (2) can argue that we can do without deontic morality; and finally, (3) pure incompatibilists will want to know why it is that we can be morally responsible for performing actions that are neither right nor wrong. Since

Part III of Haji's book thoroughly responds to the second concern mentioned, I will briefly examine his responses to the first and third concerns.

The argument for the incompatibility of deontic morality and determinism depends upon two fairly standard deontic principles, plus a new principle that Haji proposes. The standard principles are the familiar **K**: *S* ought to *x* only if *S* can *x*; and **OW**: *S* ought to *x* iff it is wrong for *S* to refrain from *x*-ing. From these two principles alone it follows that no action that I perform is wrong if it is determined. For suppose my shooting you is both wrong and determined. If it is determined, then I cannot refrain from shooting you. But if it is wrong for me to shoot you, **OW** implies that I ought not to shoot you. But then, by **K**, if I ought not to shoot, then I can refrain from shooting, which contradicts the original assumption. However, this shows only that if determinism is true, then nothing I do is wrong. It does not also imply that nothing I do is right. For suppose it would be best for me to shoot you (you are threatening to kill several innocents) and my shooting you is determined. Since I am determined I can shoot you, and as that is the best result I do the right thing even though I could not have done anything else. In fact, in order to achieve this incompatibility Haji needs another principle, the 'complement' to **K**, **CK**: *S* ought to *x* implies *S* can *refrain* from *x*-ing. Now, while **K** and **OW** are defended at length against recent attacks in the literature, **CK** is merely defended by the claim that the above asymmetry between right and wrong actions is implausible. But it is one thing to note that if determinism is true, then deontic morality operates rather differently from how we might expect, and quite another to accept that determinism *disallows* deontic morality. Given the circumstances, the compatibilist might well choose the first option rather than the second. **CK** needs more support.

Now consider Haji's claim that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. Suppose determinism is true. Then, says Haji, people may be morally responsible though they never do any actions that are right, wrong, or obligatory. But he claims that blameworthiness requires a belief on the agent's part that her action is morally wrong (p. 118). Thus, although we could hold people morally responsible, we could only do so as long as they falsely believe that their actions are right or wrong. But this would seem to violate an epistemic requirement for moral responsibility. It seems that we would be lacking relevant information when making our decisions. Another objection is this. According to Haji, agent evaluations appraise people on how their beliefs and resultant actions 'disclose' who they really are. But if determinism is true, it turns out that the kinds of persons we are, as well as our disclosures of ourselves, are determined by our genetics and upbringing. So it is not clear why Haji holds that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. However, even if I am correct in this criticism, Haji's arguments that indeterminism cannot sanction judgements of moral responsibility remain strong. Thus, if indeterminism is true, it at most rescues only deontic morality.

Such minor criticisms aside, this is a good book. It is a carefully argued, fairly technical work that thoroughly responds to important recent work in the area, especially that of Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Alfred Mele, Randolph Clarke, Michael Slote, and Derk Pereboom. It has a good-sized bibliography, a useful index, and a helpful glossary of most of the technical terms and principles

used. Although the flow of argument is intricate in its structure, Haji provides an overall prospectus at the beginning and a synopsis for each Part. Overall it is a valuable contribution to the contemporary debates surrounding freedom and determinism.

ERIC MOORE

Longwood University

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