

century and after) surrounding the interpretation of E. At some point, the reader may get the impression that Aristotle scholarship is the focus of Berti's attention rather than the text itself, and that the rest of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* is exploited to the extent that others refer to it. The pages that present Berti's own analysis are often more engaging and contain many convincing arguments (e.g., about the universal understood as a cause rather than as a predicate (126-128)).

The emphasis on the history of the reception of E probably is the defining characteristic of Berti's approach in this work. The importance given to the scholarly tradition shapes the commentary and accounts for the orthodoxy of the translation. Therefore, the volume may not succeed in providing a renewed encounter with the Aristotelian text, but should prove very useful to a specialized readership.

References

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Intellectuals and Power: The Insurrection of the Victim

FRANÇOIS LARUELLE

in conversation with Philippe Petit. Translated by Anthony Paul Smith.

Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015; v + 155 pp. \$17.00 (paper)

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François Laruelle's work has recently found a North American audience, resulting in a bloom of English translations over the past five years. *Intellectuals and Power*, Laruelle's long interview with Philippe Petit, joins the list of Laruelle translations in 2015, which also includes his *General Theory of Victims* (Polity), *Introduction to Non-Marxism* (Univocal), and *Christo-Fiction: The Ruins of Athens and Jerusalem* (Columbia University Press).

The translator's preface by Anthony Paul Smith immediately situates the book in relation to the media frenzy that followed the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013. Smith highlights Laruelle's critique of public philosophers' ignorance of victims in favour of "media friendly concepts," thereby situating the book in relation to a contemporary event characterized by violence and injustice (vii). Laruelle's critique of what he calls the 'dominant intellectual' constitutes a critique of the self-styled experts and pundits who take refuge in abstraction while claiming to care about the victims and injustices of the world. Philippe Petit's interviewer's preface then summarizes Laruelle's recasting of the role of intellectuals in the context of his pursuit of 'non-philosophy.'

The Prologue of the book begins the interview, with Petit setting the stage for the exchange by placing Laruelle in the long line of French intellectual self-reflection (alongside Aron, Sartre, Lyotard, and Debray). While Laruelle joins this lineage he also

seeks to radicalize it, particularly by his distinction between the ‘dominant intellectual’ who prefers to act and separate, and the ‘determined intellectual’ who rejects the simple bifurcations of political discourse on victims and perpetrators. The Prologue sees Laruelle responding to Petit’s questions about the controversies surrounding French intellectuals from Michel Foucault to Bernard-Henri Lévy.

Chapter 1, “The Name-of-Man of the Identity of the Real,” begins with a lengthy definition of the Real, moving through explanations of Laruelle’s terminology such as the ‘Name-of-Man’ and ‘unilateral duality’ each of which is important to his larger system of non-philosophy, as presented in his *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy* (Univocal, 2013) and *Principles of Non-Philosophy* (Bloomsbury, 2013). A frustrating pattern that emerges early on in the Prologue and Chapter 1, and which continues throughout the book, is Laruelle’s evasion of Petit’s questions. When asked about responsibility for the Shoah, Laruelle critiques the intellectual refuge in slogans, but offers no constructive suggestion regarding ethical responsibility in return, and when asked about the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Laruelle only mentions his “critique of philosophical appearance” (24-25 and 34).

Chapter 2, “Portrait of the Dominant Intellectual,” seeks to critique dominant intellectuals for being too media-friendly, impatient, and reductive in their popular reflections on war and politics. Critiquing dominant intellectuals for either taking sides or searching for “some small mediation,” Laruelle advocates for a more critical treatment of “the relation between decision and the point of indecision” (60 and 63). While this relationship is indeed important, and the rush to decision in the wake of disastrous events on the part of dominant intellectuals is no doubt opportunistic and deplorable, Laruelle’s distance and hesitation in the face of present issues of justice risks the opposite violence. For example, Laruelle responds to Petit’s question about the war in Iraq by exempting himself from the conditions of the question and returning to his philosophy of “radical indecision” (64). It is very possible that Laruelle’s refusal of Petit’s questions regarding concrete issues of war, violence, and injustice is a consequence of his non-philosophical critique of the conditions of discourse about these issues. However, Laruelle’s refusal to engage with these questions risks complicity with exactly the sort of transcendent power that he associates with the dominant intellectual.

Chapter 3, “The Victim and the Understanding of Crime,” critiques Alain Badiou’s concept of the victim, implying that Badiou’s *Ethics* reduces victims to the assurance of their predicated identities as victims (82-83). Laruelle follows this with a critique of the victim as an essentialized singularity that can be represented politically, instead suggesting that victims must be the determiner of their own interplay between representation and non-representation (93). Chapter 4, “The Practice of the Determined Intellectual” then defines the determined intellectual as someone who executes the reflective discipline of “practice” over the reactivity of “action” (121). Searching for a way out of the knee-jerk reactions of the dominant intellectual, Laruelle suggests the possibility of an intervention strategy that could act without the reductive problems of “philosophical urgency” (126-127). Chapter 5, “Criminal History and the Demand for Justice,” then concludes with Laruelle’s critique of the popular emphasis on “judgment and punishment,” instead seeking to place justice beyond these courtroom decisions (135).

For claiming to be a book about justice and victimhood, Laruelle goes to great lengths to avoid Petit’s questions about current events and contemporary political situations, and so the risk is that Laruelle himself becomes that dominant intellectual who

detaches himself from the everyday reality of victims in an effort to detach himself from the violent methodology and vocabulary of dominant intellectuals. Because of the impenetrability of Laruelle's vocabulary (especially present in *Intellectuals and Power*), and because the discourse on Laruelle's work invites so much partisanship, the first-time reader of Laruelle would be better off to begin an acquaintance with his work by reading the essays collected in *From Decision to Heresy* (Urbanomic, 2013), or the secondary work of Katerina Kolozova in *Cut of the Real* (Columbia University Press, 2014) or Alexander Galloway in *Laruelle: Against the Digital* (Minnesota University Press, 2014). For a book that claims sensitivity to power imbalances, the epistemological power that Laruelle exerts is immense, running roughshod over the questions posed to him. However, a lesson that Laruelle provides, in the words of Smith, is that encouraging a turn towards the victim should not entail "some fetishization of victims that would turn them into a transcendent term that stops all conversation" (x-xi). So, let the conversation continue.

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Hegel's Introduction to the System: Encyclopedia Phenomenology and Psychology

ROBERT E. WOOD

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Hegel's Introduction to the System offers an accessible point of entry into the complexity constituting Hegel's mature thought. For this, it should be welcomed. Citing Hegel's own suggestion concerning the best way into his system, this text centres on the Phenomenology and Psychology sections of the *Encyclopaedia's Philosophy of Spirit* because, presumably, it is there that we find those features of experience that are "readily identifiable" and so most accessible and understandable to the initiate (3-4). Wood's introductory essays and extensive commentary illuminatingly contextualize these sections of Hegel's work not only in terms of their relation to one another but also in terms of the integrative holism crucial to his thought. The emphasis Wood places on the whole, and holism, is refreshing when considered against several strands of contemporary Hegel studies that proceed in a piecemeal fashion seemingly without regard for the holism inherent in his system. Overall, one is struck by the simplicity of Wood's introductory essays and commentary: they make the primary texts accessible for those approaching them for the first time but, frequently, at the cost of complexity and nuance. The risk here is that Wood presents his position as the only interpretation when this is simply untrue. For example, he reads Hegel's logic as a strict onto-logic (20) and makes no mention of alternatives (George Di Giovanni et al.). Nonetheless, this concern is tempered by the fact that the text is designed to offer an *introduction* to Hegel's thought and so must be permitted a tone of generality and restriction (in terms of reference to alternative interpretations) in order to clearly convey the central features of Hegel's thought. Nevertheless, peripheral reference to those concerns would not have undermined that design. The text, therefore, will appeal mainly to readers at the undergraduate and graduate