sophical positions. The authors are at their most perceptive when they offer enlightening discussions of fictional engagement with Christianity, underscoring Ulitskaia's conviction that Christianity must instill tolerance. Surveying Ulitskaia's corpus as an effort to achieve a more inclusive society, united by faith, tolerance, and togetherness, the critics show it to reveal an optimistic viewpoint about the potential for change and unity.

Of special interest is the Conclusion that examines Ulitskaia's memoirs and explores her public visibility. The authors applaud Ulitskaia for her charitable projects and her public support of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and other critics of authoritarianism.

The book is logically organized and includes extensive commentaries; the references alone are enough to keep readers and scholars scrambling to the interlibrary loan desk for years. With this admirable achievement, Skomp and Sutcliffe have performed a commendable service to all Ulitskaia fans, students and scholars of Russian literature, something for which we should be grateful.

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Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: The Other Europes. By Stephen White and Valentina Feklyunina. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. x, 368 pp. Notes. Index. Figures. Tables. $105.00, hard bound.

"What is Europe?" is a perennial question, often answered differently in the west and east of the continent. "What are the limits of European integration?" is a more concrete application of this question in the post-Cold War era. These questions are not just philosophical but have become acute political issues because of the Ukrainian crisis. These are the questions that Stephen White and Valentina Feklyunina address in their book.

The book has two outstanding strengths. First, methodologically it presents a comprehensive review of the identity discourses in the three Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The book relies not only on elite discourses in newspapers and other media, but also on public opinion surveys and ethnographic focus group interviews. Second, the tripartite conceptual framework of separating three—or in some visual presentations four—different kinds of discourses is clearly an advantage over too dichotomous approaches to identity questions. This allows to regard a mixed European and post-Soviet position as an identity construction in its own right.

With regard to Russia, White and Feklyunina differentiate three basic identity discourses: "Russia as Europe," "Russia as part of greater Europe," and "Russia as an alternative Europe." The first discourse sees Russia as part of Europe as defined by the west, the second sees Russia as an equal and constituent part of an EU-centric Europe, the third Russia's normative superiority vis-à-vis the EU-centric Europe. The first discourse dominated in the early 1990s, but the second became the mainstream way of constructing identity. The third discourse about Russia as an 'alternative Europe' has been more marginal but it has been in ascendancy recently as Russia is promoted as the protector of true European (Christian, conservative) values against western decadence.

In Ukraine, the discourse "Ukraine as Europe" took distance from Moscow and regarded Ukraine as part of Europe defined by the EU. "Ukraine as an alternative Europe" discourse stressed Ukraine's common identity with Russia and regarded the west as hostile. "Ukraine as part of greater Europe," in turn, constructed Ukraine

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as being close but still distinct from Russia. It also acknowledged shared European values but was critical towards the EU and regarded its policy towards Ukraine as being often based on double standards.

These three types of identity discourses can also be found in Belarus, where the development of elite discourse converged to "Belarus as part of greater Europe" under President Lukashenka, who first stressed the natural unity of Belarusian and Russian nations.

The strongest identity discourse on the popular level in all three cases was hence the "part of greater Europe" middle ground. Two thirds of the population in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus wanted to develop partnership relations with CIS countries and with western countries in a balanced manner. This also affected foreign policy choices, the authors concluded, due to the need to gain popular legitimacy. Dominant interpretations of identity did not determine individual decisions but defined the limits of conceivable courses of action.

This book has been long in the making and in the background there is a wider British-Russian studies community that has been conducting research on these issues from mid-1990s onwards. The preface is dated in August 2014: the book covers the sharpening of the Ukrainian crisis in spring 2014 but does not discuss the events in detail and it does not deal with the effects or consequences of it. Yet, the book gives important insights into understanding the background of the present crisis.

The evidence presented in the book clearly shows how the popular Ukrainian conception of their identity remained fairly stable since the 1990s despite changes in the official discourse and leadership rhetoric. Most Ukrainians were ambivalent about their deeper integration into either Russian or EU-led projects but they wanted to be part of both. There was no deep enthusiasm about EU membership based on a clear European identity in Ukraine, but also the idea of the "Russian world" was accepted only by representatives of the "Ukraine as an alternative Europe" discourse.

This work does a splendid job in mapping and analyzing identity constructions and their evolution in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as well as showing their political implications. Where we need still more research is to understand why one identity construction prevails over another.

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Building Hegemonic Order Russia's Way: Order, Stability, and Predictability in the Post-Soviet Space. By Michael O. Slobodchikoff. Lanham, NY: Lexington Books, 2014. xvi, 177 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Tables. $80.00, hard bound.

In *Building Hegemonic Order Russia's Way*, Michael O. Slobodchikoff examines that state's efforts to create a post-Soviet regional environment that would be both stable and to its liking. Not simply a coercive power, Russia, Slobodchikoff argues, "use[s] bilateral and multilateral cooperation to develop a security architecture that provides order, stability and predictability," benefiting itself *and* its neighbors (xiv). With the fall of the USSR, the author asserts that he has a unique opportunity both to investigate a regional hegemon's construction of order and engage the theoretical debates about the origins of regional and global hegemonic stability. In establishing the system, he contends the central tool is treaties, because they create "the rules of the order established by the regional hegemon" (35). Slobodchikoff engages in painstaking investigations of the agreements negotiated and their relationships to one another, arguing that when agreements are "nested" they create institutions that are reliant on

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