of vernacular western narrative sources for these relationships is broadly similar to the Old Rus′ terminology, while the Latin narrative texts have a different set of terms.

Students of Slavic languages may find her distinction between Old Slavic and Old Rus′ to be excessively sharp, but the observation certainly deserves further examination. In addition to the problems of language and terminology, Mikhailova also tries to work out the relations of princes/lords and their "vassals," their armed retainers and lesser lords. Here she seems on firm ground, as the differences in words cover realities that are remarkably similar in the west and in Rus′ in the instances that she adduces. The same is true for relations among princes. Since most of the "lords" in Rus′ had princely titles, the lesser princes functioned more like western "vassals" than like equals. Of course this phenomenon was in large part due to the absence of primogeniture in the Rus′ principalities. In the west the oldest son usually was the only one to inherit a title, whereas in Rus′ all the children of a prince inherited a princely title. Clearly some of them would not remain at the pinnacle of the princely hierarchy of power.

The author's argument is clear if occasionally repetitive, but the need to argue the case makes the text rather dense. Mikhailova tries to give examples that are as vivid as possible, but the pages of discussion make for slow going. Most of these examples come from the twelfth century, in spite of the title. The author's focus is actually on the years after the death of Iaroslav in 1054, but mainly on the years after the 1130s. These years provide the best examples for her thesis, but the result is to leave the origins of the system she describes rather vague.

Mikhailova's account of her predecessor historians is brief and concentrates on western scholars. The reader needs to remember that Russian medievalists first looked for Russian uniqueness, in contrast to the western Middle Ages. N. P. Pavlov-Sil′vanskii and A. E. Presniakov instead looked for parallels and she sees the former as a pioneer. To be fair, the Marxist-universalist scheme of human development, including "feudalism," also required similarities to the medieval west. The notion of political "disintegration" (*razdroblennost′*) that she decries came when Soviet historians compared Rus′ with the textbook Middle Ages of the early twentieth century, then seen as the story of the formation of centralized ("national") states. Rus′, in this scheme, was just backward. Mikhailova is not the first to look for parallels in the west, but she tries to escape from these dilemmas by concentrating on specific structures and political values in her sources, and has found many similarities. Hers is an innovative and potentially productive approach that may very well be successful with further research and discussion.

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Tsardom of Sufficiency, Empire of Norms: Statistics, Land Allotments, and Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1700–1921. By David W. Darrow. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018. xiv, 361 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $44.95, hard bound.
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This new study by David Darrow returns to "the peasant question" in Russia, reminding us that there is still much to be learned, despite the attention historians have devoted to this subject over the years. Darrow's is an intellectual history; his focus here is not on the peasantry itself, but on the history of ideas about the Russian peasant economy and the significance of these for rural policy from the eighteenth

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to the early twentieth centuries. He focuses in particular on the peasant land allotment or *nadel*: the debates surrounding its significance, the numerous attempts to measure it and standardize it, and the policies designed to ensure peasants had sufficient access to it.

This study reveals an intriguing interplay between the prevailing discourse about the tsarist state's moral obligations to the peasantry and statisticians' vigorous efforts to gather data on which to base reforms (and with which to evaluate their effectiveness). What eventually emerged was the notion that it was the state's obligation to provide peasants with land "sufficient" for maintaining their households and paying their taxes, and that this obligation could be quantified with some degree of precision.

But what constituted a "sufficient" holding? Sufficient for what or for whom in which circumstances? Darrow's account shows persuasively that neither state technocrats nor statisticians in the field had a very well-articulated sense of what they ought to be measuring, thus limiting the effectiveness of the data gathered for the policy initiatives that were subsequently based on them. These educated, urban elites were hardly well-versed in the ways of peasant life (never mind its many variations across the empire).

This does not mean, however, that statistics was itself the problem, as Darrow sometimes implies. He points out, reasonably enough, that contemporaries were obsessed with numbers and often quite gullible regarding their "scientific" nature. Furthermore, he notes that the measures generated—the "average" nadel, the "middling" peasant, the "median" household—were often inadequate to capture the economic reality of most Russian peasants. These are entirely valid points, but have no bearing on the value of counting and measuring as tools for appraising peasant standards of living. The culprit, it seems, was not blind faith in numbers, but the ignorance of political elites and statisticians about the rural economy. They were too ill-informed to frame suitable questions for quantitative research. As a result, they overlooked geographical variation, the importance of the wage economy, the presence of rural industry, the possibility of stratification within the commune, and the role of communal politics (to name just a few omissions). They focused instead on assigning concrete values to vague concepts like "sufficient," using whatever numbers they could find. The result was a growing mountain of statistical data and an array of dubious measures, which "informed" policy decisions from Alexander II to Lenin and became embedded in the historical literature on the Russian peasantry.

Darrow's study suggests that the real problem, more than statisticians, was the role of the tsarist state in perpetuating enduring misconceptions of Russian rural society. When it went about abolishing serfdom, the state cloaked its own self-interest in moral terms—insisting it would provide peasants with sufficient land because this was the right thing to do and not because it wished to guarantee a viable tax base. If state officials had been clearer and more explicit about their goals, and had done a better job of measuring and defining quantitative parameters in advance of the reform, the question of "sufficiency" and peasant well-being might have been framed very differently. The corners cut by the state (for political and economic reasons) in preparing for emancipation—proceeding without a cadaster, putting landlords in charge of allocating land for peasants and of providing the data used to determine "sufficiency," and retaining the commune—practically guaranteed that conflicts and confusions would arise later. The statisticians themselves appear to have followed the state's lead in their data-gathering zeal: counting and measuring whatever they could in a vain attempt to make vague notions precise. In the end, everyone brought their own questions to the numbers generated, and interpreted them as they wished.

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The dialectical relationship between data and reforms took on a life of its own: numbers generated without clear questions to frame them (or a clear sense of context) ultimately undermined the reforms that were based on them. This compelling story about the origins of elite attitudes regarding rural "norms" in the tsarist period thus simultaneously, if not explicitly, sheds interesting light on the origins of today's skeptical attitudes toward quantitative history.

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Law and the Russian State: Russia's Legal Evolution from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin. By William E. Pomeranz. Bloomsbury Academic: New York, 2019. x, 228 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $115.00, hard back.
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William Pomeranz, the Deputy Director of the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, both a historian and an attorney, has produced an ambitious book on the developing of law in Russia from Peter the Great to the present. He offers an erudite and balanced view of the role of law in Russia, nicely combining political and legal history. This is what all Russia scholars need to know about Russian law.

Pomeranz's view is that "the chronology of Russian law is best understood through the actions of individual rulers" (2), and he has structured his book in nine chronological chapters. The first is devoted to Peter the Great, while a few emperors share the second chapter. The third chapter deals with the important judicial reforms of 1864 under Alexander II and its aftermath. Chapter 4 discusses the revolutions and Chapter 5 the creation of socialist law, which is followed by Chapter 6 on socialist legality and illegality. Chapter 7 analyzes the long constitutional crisis from 1985–93; Chapter 8 Boris Yeltsin's 1993 constitution as a framework for reform; and Chapter 9 Vladimir Putin's restoration of state and law. A brief conclusion sums up the book.

The author offers several succinct theses that go through the different chapters. The main purpose of Russian law is to reinforce the power of the ruler. Therefore, the main theme is state and law, and the dominant judicial organ is not the court, as in a western country but the procuracy, which has also been responsible for state supervision since it was founded in 1722 by Peter the Great. Pomeranz contends that "in the absence of a single overarching ideology that covers over 300 years of Russian history, the theory of state and law represents Russia's most enduring government philosophy" (3).

Pomeranz emphasizes the importance of law in Russia, though it was less so and different from in the west. He underlines continuity. Russia's first law code was adopted in 1649, not very different from many European countries. The greatest step forward was the judicial reforms of 1864 under Tsar Alexander II. The division between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government were never clear in Russia, and the ruler always dominated over both legislature and judiciary. Conversely, Russia's dilemma is that decrees dominate over laws, and the sources of law have been multiple.

Similarly, the "distribution of power among the three main legal institutions—the judiciary, procuracy, and the bar—is also heavily biased in favor of the state, with the procuracy serving as the "eyes" of the sovereign" (168). The procuracy has dominated over both courts and defense attorneys all along. Another consequence is that

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