Regional Political Cultures in Canada

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Research on political attitudes and behaviour in Canada tells us that Canadian political culture is not what it used to be. Canadians are becoming less deferential than they once were. Depending on which research you read Canadians are either becoming more like Americans (Nesbitt-Larking, 1998; Nevitte, 1996) or less like Americans (Adams, 1998; 2003; Lipset, 1990; Peacock, 1998). Voter turnout is down, cynicism is up, confidence in leaders is down, distrust is up. The fundamental tenets of Canadian political culture, to the extent that we believe what they had to say about Canadian political attitudes, appear to be shifting. If these attitudes are changing, we have reason to believe that other tenets, such as regionalism, are also not static. This article argues first that interprovincial differences in political attitudes are either stable or declining, depending on the indicator. Second, it demonstrates that on measures of trust and efficacy, regional rather than provincial affiliations account for variations among Canadians.

Regionalism is one of the accepted facts of Canadian political life. The distinct fragments in eastern Canada and present-day Quebec are credited with tempering Canadian liberalism with a Tory or feudal touch (Horowitz, 1966; McRae, 1964; Lipset, 1968). Our understanding of the brokerage system of political life in Canada hinges on the existence of regional demands. Literature on different political approaches in various provinces has received considerable attention and has linked social practices and demography to the development of party politics.[1] For the most part these works were neither comparative nor quantitative, but rather efforts to account for the tenor of political life in a particular region or province.[2]

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Systematic attention to quantitative data on regional political cultures owes much to Richard Simeon and David Elkins, who examined results of the Canadian Election Studies in the 1960s and 1970s (Simeon and Elkins, 1974; Elkins and Simeon, 1980). The authors concluded that there are variations in efficacy and trust across Canada, producing four distinct citizen types: critic, supporter, deferential and disaffected. Respondents in the eastern provinces and French Canadians displayed much lower levels of political efficacy than their counterparts in British Columbia and Ontario. This pattern also holds true for political trust, although French Canadians appear more trusting that their Atlantic counterparts. The Atlantic provinces, which displayed low trust and efficacy, were deemed disaffected. Voters in Ontario and British Columbia were characterized as, respectively, critics and supporters, French Canadians as deferentials. The authors noted that each of the four categories would be present in any provincial population, but that the overall classification of the province flows from the existence of cultural boundaries that are meaningful to voters. In short, Canadian provinces possessed distinct political cultures as a result of distinct provincial institutions. Variations in demographic characteristics that might otherwise account for deviations in political attitudes are thus not solely responsible for these differences. Provincial differences remained even when community size, social class, education, age and sex are controlled for.

Elkins and Simeon subsequently updated their analysis to incorporate later data and to clarify their argument (Elkins and Simeon 1980). *Small Worlds* contains a broader range of attitudes on which to examine provincial political cultures and shows significant differences according to national identity, role of government, social policy preferences and spending and partisan identification. Throughout, the collected papers argue that the province presents an enduring boundary, although often acting in concert with socio-demographic factors such as class, employment and immigrant status. On some measures such as national identity, constitutional renewal, support for a multicultural Canada and patterns of public expenditure, provinces present diverging political attitudes and behaviours. On most areas of public policy, however, provinces appear to have converging preferences.

These findings are consistent with research on provincial political cultures in Canada (Nevitte, 1995; Wilson, 1974). Among such works there is a belief that provincial sub-cultures reflect very real variations in political practice. In his analysis of regional political cultures in Canada, for example, John Wilson made reference to past practices such as the absence of Hansard in British Columbia, the underdeveloped role for the opposition in Ontario, the absence of nominating conventions for the Liberal party in Newfoundland and differing approaches to patronage, some more enthusiastic than others (Wilson, 1974). Such variations,

Abstract. This paper examines the existence of sub-State political cultures in Canada. In so doing it revisits research conducted by Richard Simeon and David Elkins into the existence of provincial political cultures in Canada. It reviews the evidence for provincial political cultures and examines recent data from the Canadian Election Study in an effort to determine whether attitudes towards government have changed. Second, it revisits the process by which sub-cultures are identified. Using data from the federal election profiles and the CES the paper identifies nine distinct regional variant cultures within Canada. These regional cultures possess different political attitudes and behaviours that cannot be explained by the existence of provincial boundaries.

Résumé. Cet article examine l'existence de cultures politiques sous-étatiques au Canada. Il reprend, ce faisant, les recherches de Richard Simeon et David Elkins qui démontrent la réalité des cultures politiques provinciales au Canada. L'article reconsidère l'authenticité de l'existence des cultures provinciales et étudie les données récentes de l'Étude électorale canadienne pour tenter de déterminer si les attitudes politiques ont changé. Ensuite, il réexamine le processus d'identification des sous cultures . En utilisant les profils des circonscriptions fédérales et l'ÉÉC, l'article identifie neuf variantes régionales distinctes au Canada. Ces cultures régionales manifestent des attitudes et comportement distincts qui ne peuvent pas s'expliquer par l'existence des frontières provinciales.

according to Wilson, were symptomatic of different stages of political development, which in turn could account for variations in political values. Researchers on political cleavages also notes that there are variations in attitudes and behaviour between women and men, French and English speakers, among different religious groups and rural and urban voters (Burt, 1986; Everitt, 1998; Mendelsohn and Nadeau, 1997; Nevitte, 1996; O'Neill, 2001; Wearing and Wearing, 1991; Gidengil, 1989; 1990; Ornstein, 1986). Some of these characteristics cluster in different regions, compounding the potential existence of regional political preferences.

Regionalism and the existence of provincial political cultures has been an enduring element in attitude research since Simeon and Elkins first published their research. This analysis should be revised, however, for two main reasons. First, the original analysis draws on data that are almost forty years old. But, the questions on which the original work rests its conclusions have been replicated in many of the subsequent election studies. Thus, an investigation of more recent data would allow us to determine whether there are still significant variations in political attitudes. Updating the analysis does not allow much for its advancement but tests its continued applicability. As a result this would be more of a mechanical manipulation than a conceptual advancement of the work. The second reason for revisiting this work is the fit between theory and data. Simeon and Elkins argue that provincial political cultures exist first, because provincial political institutions create meaningful cultural boundaries around citizens, and second, because of the varied relationship between the federal government and voters across the country. Although the updated analysis in 1980 incorporated perceptions of different levels of government, thus far analyses of provincial political cultures have con-

flated the notions of provincial culture and regional reaction. With the exception of 1984, the Canadian Election Study has never asked respondents about their views of provincial politics, the supposed motor behind pan-Canadian variations. Thus, when survey respondents identify their perceptions of the federal government, they are responding to indicators that tap into the regionalized aspect of Canadian political culture rather than the existence of provincial sub-cultures. Responses for these individuals are then aggregated at the provincial level, forcing a provincial analysis on to regional data.

The following analysis revisits Simeon and Elkins' original data and then addresses the conceptual relationship between provincial sub-cultures and regional variant cultures. It examines the existence of regions within Canada by analyzing the social, demographic and economic characteristics of federal election districts. In his assessment of the renaissance of political culture William Reisinger claimed that future research must seek to explain how sub-cultures relate conceptually to the overall societal culture (Reisinger, 1995). Elkins and Simeon, in a methodological piece on political culture, also suggest that the "culture-bearing unit" must be identified (Elkins and Simeon, 1979). For both these works, sub-cultures require bounded communities, as would be the case with provincial political culture. In contrast, regional variations in political attitudes that do not conform to provincial boundaries reflect the different experiences that voters have with the federal government. There is a conceptual difference between asking individuals how they feel about politics during a federal election—an exercise that would heighten awareness of regional divisions—and arguing for the existence of provincial political cultures as created by provincial institutions. Simeon and Elkins argued, for example, that voters in Atlantic Canada possess low efficacy and low trust. It is worth determining if variations in attitudes can better be explained by province or by region. At present, asking about Ottawa and dividing by province does not allow us to determine whether both, one or neither is relevant. This article, then, determines whether regional clusters can substitute for provinces as the constituent units of political culture, without loss of explanatory power.

Data and Analysis

The analysis relies primarily on two datasets. The first dataset is the 2000 Canadian Election Survey (CES), which contains a rolling cross-section sample of respondents who completed two waves of interviews (before and after the election) and a self-completion questionnaire. The questions have a considerable amount of continuity from the first election study in 1965. Where applicable, data have been compared with earlier years that relied on similar coding. In most cases this facilitates a com-

parison between 1974, when 5-point Likert scales were used, rather than earlier years. The second dataset consists of Federal Election Profiles (FEP) for all federal constituencies, data for which are drawn from the 2001 census. The profiles offer counts for a variety of ethnic, linguistic, racial, economic and demographic measures. These data were recoded to represent percentages or rates rather than raw counts for each constituency. Further manipulation, explained later in this section, facilitated the sorting of constituencies into coherent clusters for analysis. Each constituency in the FEB dataset was then assigned to a cluster. To determine the relationship between a regional cluster and political attitudes, each respondent in the 2000 CES was assigned the cluster that corresponded to the federal constituency in which he/she resided. Differences in political attitudes could then be tracked according to province and to region. The use of both datasets allows for an analysis of the differential impact of province or region on the political attitudes of respondents.

Contemporary Data

Simeon and Elkins argued that significant differences among provincial respondents pointed to the existence of provincial political cultures. Central to this conclusion was an analysis of efficacy, trust and political involvement data from the 1965, 1968 and 1974 election studies. Table 1 compares the responses of provincial respondents for the efficacy measures in 1974 and 2000. Data from 1974 are used, as this year employed a Likert scale similar to the one currently used in the CES. Before this year, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with a particular statement, rather than if they agreed, or agreed strongly, disagreed or disagreed strongly. Furthermore, Table 1 only contains responses for the efficacy questions, as trust variables in the earlier studies have not been replicated in recent versions of the CES. With this in mind, Table 1 reports the percentage of individuals who indicated that they agreed or agreed strongly with three measures of political efficacy. Architects of institutional reform argue that change is needed because voters are becoming increasingly frustrated with politicians, and possess declining confidence and satisfaction, efficacy and trust. As Table 1 shows, however, the widespread decrease in efficacy that politicians have feared has not materialized. Over the last thirty years the proportion of people who feel that they have no say in politics has decreased in Canada, as has the proportion of individuals who feel that politics is too complicated. The proportion of respondents who indicate that it is not worth voting remains unchanged in Canada. We know, of course, that one of the best predictors of efficacy, formal education, has increased in the last thirty years. While not the focus of this paper, changes such as these could account

TABLE 1
Efficacy Scores in Provinces over Time

	C	NF	PEI	NS	NB	QEng	QFr	O	MB	SK	AB	BC
Efficacy												
People like me have no say												
1974	53	67	65	44	51	51	70	45	66	58	51	37
2000	37	43	26	56	54	58	14	39	40	59	54	53
Politics too complicated												
1974	65	86	63	57	80	66	63	62	85	71	75	56
2000	52	63	46	53	55	41	58	46	55	57	53	48
So many voters, no point voting												
1974	14	18	20	20	27	18	22	10	19	10	14	6
2000	14	15	9	10	13	15	15	12	16	32	10	15

Source: CES 1974, CES 2000. Results are per cent who agree or agree strongly with the statement. Complete question wording is included in the appendix.

for improved efficacy. These are, of course, not the only measures of political dissatisfaction. In addition, the perception that voting is not a worthwhile activity, stable since 1974, cannot account for the decline in turnout from 1974 to the present. What we do know, however, is that by these limited measures the proportion of 'low-efficacy' respondents in Canada has decreased over time. This in itself is interesting, but for our purposes the differences among provinces prove more revealing.

In 1974, provincial respondents offered widely varying responses. As Simeon and Elkins noted, far more Atlantic residents expressed low efficacy, while voters in British Columbia expressed more positive responses. In the following thirty years, however, there appears to have been dramatic changes within provinces and a levelling off among respondents. In 1974, Quebec francophones, Newfoundlanders and New Brunswickers respectively had the largest proportion of low-efficacy voters according to the three questions listed here. Today, almost thirty years later, Saskatchewan voters record the largest proportion expressing low efficacy on two of the three questions, while a large proportion of Newfoundlanders remain convinced that politics is too complicated for them. At the same time, while British Columbians once had the lowest proportion of low-efficacy respondents, this mantle has now passed to anglophone and francophone voters in Quebec, and residents of PEI. In fact, of francophone voters in Quebec, only 14 per cent believe they have no say in politics. By contrast, the proportion of Canadians who feel this way is 37 per cent. Provinces with previously large proportions of respondents indicating minimal efficacy have seen a drop in their numbers. Efficacy appears to have improved in most of the Atlantic provinces. At the same time, provinces on the opposite end of the scale in 1974 also appear to have had a change in attitudinal patterns. Ontario, once home to a relatively small number of respondents expressing a lack of effi-

cacy, has seen a small rise in the number of voters who feel there is little point in voting. Although the ranges in proportions appear similar across time, the patterns of change are interesting. Within the Atlantic provinces, some have seen a marked drop in the proportion of respondents with low efficacy, while others have seen a dramatic rise. If culture has an enduring influence on politics, and can explain the presence of critics, supporters, disaffecteds or deferentials in any province, and if Atlantic provinces possessed similar 'deferential' cultures in 1974, how can we account for opposing trends within categories? An analysis of regional political cultures addresses this point.

Province or Region?

Students of political culture in the United Kingdom have long attempted to prove the existence of national political cultures. In part, the argument for devolution was based on the existence of different approaches to policy and government in Scotland and Wales. Quantitative research on the subject, however, has had very limited success in proving the existence of constituent cultures in the United Kingdom (Henderson, 2001; Miller, Timpson et al., 1996). In most cases, proof of difference is found only upon stretching political culture as a concept to include voting preferences for nationalist parties or national identity (Dickson, 1996; Brown, McCrone et al., 1998). More often, research on political culture in the United Kingdom indicates that the boundaries around the historic nations are less relevant than the social and demographic characteristics of various regions (Curtice, 1988; 1992; 1996). John Curtice argues that there is neither a distinct Scottish political culture, nor a Welsh or English political culture, but northern and southern variations of political attitudes fostered mainly by the different economic experiences of voters. For Curtice, region feeds nationalism, a fact not disputed in most literature on nationalism in Scotland (Brown, McCrone et al., 1998; Mitchell, 1996).

Simeon and Elkins acknowledged the impact of socio-economic characteristics and indicated that many of these characteristics were distributed unequally across the country. Pointing to the diversity of political attitudes within such provinces as Alberta and Saskatchewan, however, they warned that "it is dangerous to assume citizens of geographically proximate areas share the same attitudes" (Simeon and Elkins, 1974: 401). For them, not all Albertans think alike, nor do all Westerners. This view does not preclude the existence of regions that occur within and across jurisdictional boundaries, a topic of research much more developed in American political science.

In his analysis of American federalism, Daniel J. Elazar identified three main political cultures in America: an individualistic culture, a tra-

ditional culture and a moralistic culture (Elazar, 1972). For those in the individualistic type, politics and government operate as a marketplace, while for the moralistic type, the responsibility of government is to build a commonwealth in which all benefit. The traditionalistic view falls between these two poles and tends to advocate elitist or deferential approaches to politics. The different groups were created, Elazar argued, by patterns of early migration. The arrival of ethnic and religious blocks of voters, coupled with the pattern of Western migration, led to pockets of homogeneity in which pre-existing views of politics could influence American political life. Once cemented in institutions, these pre-existing approaches continually reinforce political attitudes. In this, Elazar's analysis fits well with fragment theories of Canadian political culture. The analysis is based on an intuitive understanding of the way American politics has developed. Subsequent research has sought to improve upon Elazar's model, subjecting it to a more rigorous statistical analysis (Clynch, 1972; Schlitz and Rainey, 1978; Savage, 1981; Sharkansky, 1969). One approach in particular is useful for our purposes.

In his 1993 article Joel Lieske sought to determine whether there was a more systematic way to identify regional political cultures in the United States. To accomplish this goal he created a database that contained aggregated data for counties in the United States. The racial, ethnic, religious and linguistic profiles of the counties were recorded alongside information on urban population, population mobility, presence of certain age cohorts, employment in various economic sectors, university education and income. The author then employed cluster analysis to identify the existence of coherent groups of counties and identified seven distinct clusters of counties in the United States. In an effort to determine whether his method provided a better explanation of variations in political attitudes in the US, the author assigned respondents in the national election study to each of the clusters based on their county of residence. He then ran a series of analyses of variance tables to determine whether the clusters demonstrated statistically significant differences in political attitudes. One of the advantages of Lieske's approach is that it does not identify the clusters based on responses to political attitudes, but rather it relies on what he refers to as the constituent units of culture, namely ethnicity, race, language, religion and social structure. As much of the literature on political culture argues, voter attitudes are proxy measures of culture. Individuals themselves do not possess political cultures (Simeon and Elkins, 1979), nor regional variants nor sub-cultures, but have attitudes and behaviours that allow us to examine what the dominant political culture might look like. Relying on the sources of political culture rather than its products allows for an investigation that is conceptually cleaner. This method has been employed in a Canadian context once before. In his 1990 article Robert MacDermid sought to identify different regional clusters within

Ontario. His research points to seven distinct clusters within Ontario, which vary according to two axes: urban-rural and economic activity. This reflects the indicators selected by MacDermid, which include measures of income and employment, and single indicators for language, ethnicity, religion and education (MacDermid, 1990).

In an effort to determine whether there are regional variants of Canadian political culture, this article draws on a similar methodology. In particular, the analysis relies on a dataset of all federal constituencies and relevant demographic information from Statistics Canada. The data draw on the profiles of federal election districts that contain information on ethnicity, race, income, education, mobility, population and employment. Rather than mimic exactly Lieske's categories, which are better suited to the American migration patterns and the particular racial profile of the United States, the following analysis employs a list of indicators that better reflect variation among Canadian constituencies. The cluster analysis relies on four main variables, with a number of constituent indicators.

Ethnicity/Race/Religion: % Québécois/Acadian, % British, % Scandinavian, % Protestant Europe, % Catholic Europe, % Asian, % Black/African, % Slavic, % Aboriginal origins, % Jewish

Language: % English mother tongue, % French mother tongue, % bilingual, % Native languages, % Asian, % Scandinavian, % Western European language, % Slavic, % sub-continent, % Gaelic

Immigration: % immigrants, % old immigrants, % new immigrants, % 3rd generation Canadians or older

Social structure: % over 65, % internal migrants, % non-movers, % common law, % university degree, % managerial, % professional, % natural resources, % women in labour force

These four variables are intended to capture the ethnic and linguistic migration patterns that were considered to have an impact on Canada's initial fragment cultures, in addition to social-demographic information that currently influences political attitude variations. Ethnicity has been coded so that it identifies those reporting Jewish ethnicity or an ethnic background of a Protestant or Catholic European country.[3] Federal election districts were then classified on the basis of common cultural characteristics, using cluster analysis. The number of clusters was set at nine, in the expectation that districts would be grouped according to the following categories: eastern Canada, Prairies, western provincial north, southwestern Ontario, northern Ontario, homogeneous Quebec, metropolitan Toronto, metropolitan Vancouver, metropolitan Montreal. Such an arrangement reflects the vision of Canada as a country of five regions, while recognizing the multicultural nature of its larger urban centres.

Results of the cluster analysis support grouping the constituencies into nine relatively homogeneous clusters.[4] The characteristics of the clusters suggest the following descriptive labels based on their geographic location:

(1) Cosmopolitan Quebec
(2) Suburban Toronto and Vancouver
(3) Urban Canada
(4) Rural and mid-northern
(5) Manufacturing belt
(6) New France
(7) British North America
(8) Far north
(9) Metropolitan Toronto

Some of these clusters exist entirely within a province while others cross provincial and territorial boundaries.[5] As expected, the analysis produced separate clusters for metropolitan Toronto and homogeneous Quebec (labelled here as New France). Atlantic Canada is not a coherent region, although many of the Atlantic constituencies appear in a cluster characterized by large proportions of respondents with British ancestry. This cluster has been labelled British North America as it contains areas to which United Empire Loyalists emigrated both in the Atlantic provinces and in Ontario. Other constituencies in Atlantic Canada are incorporated into the manufacturing belt cluster, which also contains constituencies in Ontario such as Sudbury and the 'nickel belt.' Metropolitan Vancouver did not receive its own cluster although much of metropolitan Montreal is contained within the cosmopolitan Quebec cluster. Instead, many of the Vancouver constituencies appear along with other urban centres in the urban cluster. This cluster contains urban constituencies, mostly from the richer 'have' provinces, and unlike the others, it is not geographically concentrated in one region. Suburban Toronto and Vancouver include constituencies from the 905 area and Vancouver area constituencies such as Burnaby. There are two clusters for the north. The rural and mid-north cluster contains respondents from across the western portion of the provincial north, including Ontario, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Alberta, British Columbia and the Yukon. The far north includes the NWT and Nunavut, in addition to two larger northern constituencies in the western provinces.

The typical vision of regional variations in Canadian political culture is that they operate on an east-west basis. The cluster analysis suggests that we must acknowledge the north-south dimension of Canadian politics, not only as it relates to the territorial north but to the provincial north as well (Coates and Morrison, 1992). This analysis also highlights the heterogeneous nature of western Canada, which is often lumped together as a distinct entity. At its most nuanced, the west often is treated

as three distinct groups: British Columbia, Alberta and the prairie provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Here, however, the west contains elements of an urban cluster, which includes cities such as Edmonton and Winnipeg, and a rural cluster, which includes the elements of provinces across the west. In addition, these are distinguished from suburban Vancouver, which has more in common with suburban Toronto than with more proximate constituencies in rural British Columbia. The characteristics of each cluster reinforce this point.

The far north cluster contains a large proportion of native residents and the British North America cluster contains a larger proportion of English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh residents. Metropolitan Toronto has a high mean score for immigrants from 'old Europe,' while suburban Toronto and Vancouver contain more Asian and sub-continent residents. The rural and mid-northern constituencies have larger mean scores for Slavic residents, a fact that reflects the ethnic characteristics of early migrants to the prairies. The New France cluster contains far fewer constituencies of British stock. The size of each cluster ranges from four, for the far north cluster, to the sixty constituencies that comprise the New France cluster. To be useful, however, the division of constituencies into regions must be accompanied by an analysis of their impact on political attitudes.

In light of the comparison of efficacy indicators earlier, Table 2 contains the proportion of respondents who agreed or agreed strongly, sorted by regional cluster. The regional clusters possess varying efficacy responses that reflect, in many cases, the answers in relevant provinces. The New France cluster, for example, has a small proportion of respondents who feel they have no say. Interesting differences appear in clusters that are geographically close to each other. Suburban Toronto and Vancouver have a larger proportion of low-efficacy respondents than metropolitan Toronto. Rural and mid-northern constituencies have a larger

TABLE 2
Efficacy Scores in Clusters

	Clusters							
	Cosmo Q (1)	Sub TO&V (2)	Urban (3)	Rural (4)	Manuf (5)	NFr (6)	BNA (7)	Met TO (9)
People like me have no say % agree, agree strongly	21.5	56.7	38.9	53.1	45.7	16.8	43.3	35.1
Politics too complicated % agree, agree strongly	51.3	51.7	45.6	54.7	60	58.3	49.6	39.8
So many voters, no point voting % agree, agree strongly	14.1	25.9	10.0	18.8	8.7	14.5	11.7	12.0
N	246	94	588	609	108	1055	709	222

Cluster 8 has been excluded because of insufficient respondents.

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proportion of low-efficacy respondents than urban constituencies in 'have' provinces. The constituent attitudes of any political culture include more than measures of efficacy. The following analysis employs seven main variables. Attitudes to basic responses to efficacy questions are included alongside groups of questions probing perceptions on voting and views of political parties. Further explanations of these variables are contained within the appendix.

The analysis also includes an additive index of political activity, counting respondents who have performed any of five protest behaviours. Individuals who would consider acting in a similar manner were not included in the index counts. An additional index tracks confidence in public institutions such as the government and police. Last, the analysis contains two measures of political ideology, one old, one of more recent origin. Placement on a left-right spectrum is included, as is a test for post-materialism. In sum, these seven variables were used to compare the differences among respondents according to province of residence of regional cluster.

Table 3 summarizes the analysis of variance for province and regional cluster. There is a significant difference among provincial respondents according to measures of efficacy, which confirms the earlier findings of Simeon and Elkins, and significant differences according to left-right ideology. There is also a significant difference among the respondents when clustered by region. These differences are summarized in the ANOVA F scores, which examine the variation between groups, and the variation within groups. A significant F score indicates that there are clear divisions among the categories of the variables. Here, efficacy, left-right placement and political activity produce significant deviations

TABLE 3
Comparison of Province and Regional Clusters

	F	
	Province	Regional cluster
Efficacy	3.006**	2.048*
Voting	.657	.555
Parties	.594	.967
Political activity	1.627	2.249*
Confidence	1.844	1.140
Left-right	3.137**	3.957**
Post-materialism	.379	.538
Wilks' Lambda	.837	.856
	F = 1.648**	F = 1.845**

*p < .05, **p < .05

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in results among clustered respondents. Results of the multinomial logistic model further illustrate this point.

Tables 4 and 5 contain the predicted probabilities of membership in the province or regional cluster based on the seven political variables. The results demonstrate first that political attitudes are able to predict membership in regional clusters as well as they are able to predict province of residence. The pseudo-R^2s for both models are similar. We are hoping for a McFadden's score greater than .2, which does not occur in either model.[6] Second, the tables show that some variables produce statistically significant estimates of membership. The betas in multinomial logistic regression report the maximum probability of observing the values of the dependent variable that were observed, given the values of the independent variables. These predicted probabilities are recorded as the natural logs of the odds ratio. In other words, as efficacy increases by one unit the probability of correctly predicting residence in Quebec increases by a multiplicative factor of .62. Within the regional model, as left-wing beliefs increase by one unit a respondent is four times more likely to be classified as residing in cosmopolitan Quebec. The tables also indicate the percentage of cases in any grouping that were correctly predicted by the model. The proportion of cases correctly predicted for both models appears similar, at 37 per cent for the provincial model and 30 per cent for the regional model. The preceding analysis suggests that further research should more fully explore the existence and influence of regions in generating variations of political attitudes and behaviour across Canada.

Existing research on political culture highlights the importance of regionalism in Canada, something that this article confirms. From earlier works exploring the relevance of migrant groups in New France and British North America, to more recent evidence on varying levels of efficacy across the country, such research emphasizes both the existence of east-west variations, and provincial political cultures. The first significant finding, then, is that regionalism in Canada is not an exclusively east-west phenomenon, nor does the role of provinces appear to be of unparalleled influence, as previously thought. By noting that regional clusters can equally account for variations in political attitudes and behaviour across Canada, this article clearly notes that regionalism in Canada does not conform to provincial boundaries. The existence of multiple cultures within the west, and the identification of two distinct northern clusters suggest that the west is much less homogenous than once assumed, and that the long-ignored north is not only relevant, but diverse. The analysis notes also the existence of not one but three distinct urban clusters, something suggested in MacDermid's 1990 research on Ontario. This in itself suggests that the rural-urban dichotomy should in future distinguish among those living in large metropolitan centres, suburban areas, mid-sized urban towns and more rural areas.

TABLE 4
Predicted Probabilities of Provincial Membership

	Model	NF	PEI	NS	NB	Q	ON	MB	SK	AB
Efficacy		.255	−.510	−.764	−.252	−.478**	.032	−.162	−.228	−.787***
Voting		−.073	−.212	−.328	.314	.219	.002	.004	−.045	.092
Parties		.094	−.066	.300	.258	.298	.264	−.184	−.007	.368
Postmat		.599	1.551	.549	1.272	.029	.159	.506	.320	.600
Political activity		−.208	−.947	2.715	−1.075	.375	.041	−1.849	−1.920	−.096
Confidence		4.935*	5.126	5.399	4.316*	3.801***	1.101	5.286**	2.806	2.512
Left		.125	.679	−.974	−.102	1.004**	.083	.112	−.441	−1.420**
% correctly predicted	36.7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	20.9%	71.8%	0%	0%	7%
Cox and	.163									
Snell	.047									
McFadden's	104.82***									
chi-square	.163									

Prediction sare based on the estimated coefficients of the multinomial logistic model.
Reference category is British Columbia.
*p < 0.1, **p < .05, ***p < .01

TABLE 5
Predicted Probabilities of Cluster Membership

	Model	Cosmo Q (1)	Sub TO &V (2)	Urban (3)	Rural (4)	Manuf (5)	NFr (6)	BNA (7)
Efficacy		.323	−.338	.040	−.312	−.305	−.583**	.093
Voting		.113	.179	−.088	.025	.015	.190	−.004
Parties		−.287	−.090	−.217	−.547**	−.899**	−.173	−.423*
Postmat		−.730	−.745	−.726	−.326	.499	−.739	−.383
Political activity		−1.357	−.065	.097	−.833	−.094	1.058	1.041
Confidence		−.630	−.828	−.133	2.433	6.417**	3.583**	1.249
Left		1.395*	−.763	−.695	−1.183**	−.884	.301	−.378
% correctly predicted	30%	0%	0%	29.3%	51.9%	0%	21.1%	19.4%
Cox and	.143							
Snell	.042							
McFadden's chi-square	90.73***							

Respondents from cluster 8 are excluded from the analysis because of small numbers.
Predictions are based on the estimated coefficients of the multinomial logistic model.
Reference category is cluster 9 (Metropolitan Toronto).
*p < 0.1, **p < .05, ***p < .01

Perhaps most significant, the research questions the importance of political institutions in the generation of assessments of their performance. Previously, regional political cultures in Canada have been seen as the products of institutions. Provincial legislatures and the policy they generate could account for much of the variation in attitudes to politics, the remainder of which was attributed to the different ways in which the Canadian Parliament and its legislation affected citizens in different portions of the country. If regional clusters perform as effectively as provincial boundaries in accounting for variations in political attitudes and behaviour, then there is reason to doubt, at the very least, the impact of provincial institutions. We should be cautious, though, in our assessments of provincial impact, if only because indicators directly probing efficacy and trust in provincial politics have long been excluded from the Canadian Election Study. Clearly, though, provincial boundaries are not the only way to account for variations in political culture across Canada. That these clusters exist within and across provincial boundaries points to the greater need for research into the interaction among socio-demographic variables, provincial boundaries and attitudes to the federal government.

Conclusion

This article performed two tasks. First, it examined variations in provincial attitudes to federal politics in light of recent data in the CES, and demonstrated that the number of low-efficacy respondents is falling and that inter-provincial differences appear stable over time. Second, it demonstrated the existence of regional clusters that could account for variations in attitudes to federal politics. Regionalism in Canada, usually seen as an east-west phenomenon, also contains an important north-south dimension. In addition, indicators of political culture, including perceptions of parties, voting, efficacy, left-right beliefs and post-materialism, can predict membership in regional clusters as successfully as they can residence in provinces.

In its exploratory investigation of the current state of provincial political cultures in Canada, this paper sought to clarify whether provincial political institutions or regional clusters could better account for variations in federal political attitudes. Additional research would help to further clarify the relationship between province and region. Such research could examine the predictors of provincial political attitudes, re-examine the measures of political culture at the provincial level and determine the role of regional clusters in driving attitudes to provincial politics. The data explored here do not disprove the existence of significant provincial variations, but suggest that greater attention should be paid to the role of regions in the generation of political attitudes. It would appear that what we have been measuring thus far in political culture research is not the

existence of provincial sub-cultures, but that of regional variations. The structure of any existing sub-cultures remains an under-explored area of research.

Appendix

VARIABLES

Variable	Explanation	Coded
	CLUSTER ANALYSIS FOR FEPS	
Ethnicity		
Québécois/Acadian	Québécois, Acadian, French	%
British	Scottish, English, Irish, Welsh, British	%
Scandinavian	Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, Icelandic	%
Protestant Europe	German, Dutch, Danish	%
Catholic Europe	Italian, Portuguese, Spanish	%
Asian	Chinese, Filipino, Vietnamese, Korean, Japanese, South Asian	%
Black/African	Jamaican, African/black, Haitian, West Indian, Black, Guyanese, Trinidadian	%
Slavic	Ukrainian, Polish, Russian	%
Aboriginal origins	First Nations, Métis, Inuit	%
Jewish	Jewish	%
Language		
English	English mother tongue	%
French	French mother tongue	%
Bilingual	Bilingual English + French	%
Native	Cree, Ojibway, Inuktitut, Montagnais, Micmac, Blackfoot, Dakota, South slave, Nishga'a, Chipewyan, Gwichin, Tlingit, Dogrib	%
Asian	Cantonese, Mandarin, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, Khmer, Malay, Thai, Malayalam	%
Scandinavian	Swedish, Norwegian, Icelandic, Finnish	%
Western European	Italian, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Flemish	%
Slavic	Ukrainian, Polish, Russian	%
Sub-continent	Punjabi, Hindi, Gujarati, Urdu, Tamil, Bengali, Sinhalese	%
Gaelic	Gaelic languages	%
Immigration		%
Immigrants	Emigrated to Canada	%
Old immigrants	Arrived before 1961	%
New immigrants	Arrived in last 10 years	%
3rd generation	3rd generation Canadian	%
Social structure		%
Over 65	Male and female population 65 years and older	%
Internal migrants	Intra-provincial and inter-provincial migrants in the last 5 years	%
Non-movers	Individuals residing in same census enumeration district	%
Common law	Individuals living in common-law relationship	%

continued

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Continued

Variable	Explanation	Coded
University	Completed university degree	%
Women in labour force	Female participation in labour force	%
Manufacturing	Employed in manufacturing and construction sectors (1997 North American classification)	%
Natural resources	Employed in natural resources sector (1997 N Am classification)	%
Professional	Employed in professional job (1997 N Am classification)	%
Managerial	Employed in managerial job (1997 N Am classification)	%

Variable	Explanation	Coding
	CES	
Efficacy	Measured by an efficacy scale developed from factor analysis (Cronbach's Alpha .72). The scale is formed from the following seven questions: 1. Parties in Canada care what ordinary people think. 2. MPs soon lose touch with the people (changed direction). 3. Political parties do more to divide the country than to unit it (changed direction). 4. Elections are conducted fairly. 5. Satisfied with democracy. 6. System needs parties. 7. Political parties look after the best interests of everybody.	Continuous
Voting	Measured by a voting scale developed from factor analysis (Cronbach's Alpha .62). The scale is formed from the following four questions: 1. It is important to vote. 2. It is the duty of every citizen to vote. 3. If I did not vote, I would feel guilty. 4. My vote hardly counts for anything (changed direction).	Continuous
Parties	Measured by a parties' scale developed from factor analysis (Conbach's Alpha .72). The scale is formed from the following three questions: 1. Parties are good at finding solutions. 2. Parties present clear choices. 3. Parties express concerns of ordinary people.	Continuous
Confidence	Cumulative Index of 11 confidence items (Cronbach's Alpha .75).	Continuous, recoded 0–1
Political activity	Measured by an additive scale (Cronbach's Alpha .55) formed from the following five items (1 = have done):	Continuous, recoded 0-1

continued

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Continued

Variable	Explanation	Coding
	1. Signing a petition 2. Joining in boycotts 3. Attending unlawful demonstrations 4. Joining unofficial strikes 5. Occupying buildings or factories	
Left	And finally, you personally. Would you say you are on the left, on the right, in the centre, or are you not sure?	1 = left, .5 = centre, 0 = right
Post-materialism	Measured by the 3-point Inglehart scale (Inglehart 1990).	1 = post-materialist, .5 = mixed, 0 = materialist

Notes

1 See, for example, Trudeau, 1959; Macpherson, 1962.
2 Exceptions include Lipset, 1968.
3 A more explicit test of religion produced similar results. Income has not been included in large part because it does not provide an accurate measure of wealth or poverty. The variable cost of living in Canada could mean that someone earning $35,000 could have widely varying levels of relative wealth in, for example, Iqaluit, Toronto and Halifax.
4 The analysis was repeated by setting the number of clusters both higher and lower than nine. The nature of the analysis remained similar. When forced to select a smaller number of clusters, the urban, suburban and metropolitan clusters merged. When forced to select a smaller number of clusters, the far north cluster fractured to distinguish Nunavut from the rest of the territorial north.
5 A full list of the constituencies within each cluster may be obtained from the author.
6 A McFadden's R^2 below .2 would suggest that less than 20 per cent of the variation of the dependent variable can be attributed to the variation in the independent variable.

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