with the general argument and the findings with respect to trade salience, and it is left unexplained.

In chapter 4, Avdan examines the determinants of border walls. Using a simple frequency table, she demonstrates that whereas global attacks are very weakly related to border fortification, targeted attacks against a country's territory and citizens exhibit strong positive association with border walls. This is indeed one of the novel findings of her book. Regression analysis, however, only partially supports this finding. Results suggest that, although targeted and fatal attacks may appear to be positively correlated with border wall construction, this association is due to some dyad-level underlying factors (fixed effects). Interestingly, high-impact (spectacular) attacks are not associated with a particularly high likelihood of border fortification. The results also suggest that trade relations between countries are not a good predictor of border fortification. Instead, wealthy countries are more likely to erect border fences, especially against populous neighbors, which is similar to findings in previous studies.

Chapter 5 focuses on the Turkish case. Avdan explores how economic liberalization and change in the conflict environment affected Turkey's visa and border control policies. Her analysis here suggests that Turkey retained liberal visa policies with respect to Western European countries—largely for economic reasons and because it wanted to join the EU—and did not retaliate despite occasional restrictions on Turkish nationals in those countries. In contrast, Turkey's policies toward the Middle East were more affected by security concerns, especially following ISIS attacks in major Turkish cities. Although the general trends in the Turkish case are consistent with the hypotheses of this book, Avdan could have considered more thoroughly alternative explanations, such as the influx of Syrian refugees that has somewhat coincided with changes in border control policies (Anna Getmansky, Tolga Sinmazdemir, and Thomas Zeitzoff, "The Allure of Distant War Drums: Refugees, Geography, and Foreign Policy Preferences in Turkey," *Political Geography* 74, 2019).

In the concluding chapter, Avdan highlights the relevance of her findings for broader themes such as globalization, migration, populism, territoriality, and crime. Overall, she makes several important contributions. First, she highlights that border control is a multifaceted policy area. Most of the scholarship so far has focused on visible policies, such as border walls. By analyzing visas and connecting them with the threat of terrorism, Avdan suggests that some of the border controls can be implemented in subtler, less visible, and more nuanced ways. More importantly, although terrorism may not have a robust impact on the establishment of border walls, she shows that it affects migration and mobility through visa requirements and rejections. One of the key implications of her analysis is that terrorism can have indirect negative effects on the compatriots of the perpetrators, who face a higher likelihood of access denial from countries targeted by these attacks. Another innovative finding relates to visa denials to citizens of majority-Muslim countries. Although most of the recent attention has focused on President Trump's travel ban against citizens of several Muslim countries, Avdan convincingly shows that similar policies are also prevalent in the EU: applicants from Muslim countries are significantly more likely to be denied a visa, controlling for many factors that may affect visa policies.

This book also paves many avenues for future research. One is further exploration of the connection between economics and security. Avdan assumes that there is a trade-off between security measures and economic cooperation. However, in reality, conflict also imposes economic costs. Thus, a more complete analysis of how economics shapes border controls should incorporate the economic costs of addressing and not addressing security concerns.

The Wealth Effect: How the Great Expectations of the Middle Class Have Changed the Politics of Banking Crises. By Jeffrey M. Chwieroth and Andrew Walter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 572p. $120.00 cloth, $39.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592720000808

— Thomas Oatley, *Tulane University*
toatley@tulane.edu

The global financial crisis of 2008–9 reinvigorated scholarly work on the political causes and consequences of financial instability and banking crises. *The Wealth Effect* offers a distinctive and important contribution to this already large literature. Most existing scholarship examines financial crises through the lens of a regulatory capture perspective in which financial institutions induce regulators to relax rules and then exploit the laxity to become too big to fail and to take on too much risk. The state then bails them out when the inevitable crisis occurs. In contrast, Jeffrey Chwieroth and Andrew Walter locate the cause of financial instability in the logic of electoral politics. They argue that rising middle-class wealth has caused voters to expect the government to enact policies that protect the value of their assets in the face of financial crises. In their words, "emergent middle-class expectations…have prompted modern democratic governments…to opt for increasingly extensive bailouts and other policies aimed at wealth protection…Put differently, we argue that modern governments implement bailouts because their electoral prospects depend heavily on doing so" (p. 67). And because elected officials have such incentives, financial institutions recognize they will be bailed out and thus engage in reckless behavior.

Three elements differentiate this book from existing work and, in combination, produce a very important contribution that deepens our understanding of the politics of finance. First, *The Wealth Effect* develops a macro and a longitudinal political economy account of banking crises in democratic societies. The work focuses on socioeconomic structure and the political system in the broadest of terms. It focuses our attention on electoral institutions, the interests of the middle class, and the interaction between them. *The Wealth Effect* effectively describes the emergence and development of a middle-class interest in financial stability over time as a function of their accumulated wealth and of broader institutional change, such as the shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension plans. The work thus offers an important counterpoint to the actor-centered and largely cross-sectional analysis that characterizes most of the existing research on banking crises. Moreover, and more broadly, by focusing on middle-class wealth the work brings the "financialization of everyday life" into the center of our understanding of financial system performance. This constitutes a valuable synthesis that should have an important impact on how we think about the politics of finance.

Second, the underlying theoretical dynamics that the authors develop focus on the unintended consequences of the broader structural and institutional changes that their macro perspective highlights. Indeed, one might even suggest that the authors assume that the political economy of finance approximates a complex adaptive system (though they never use this term) in which multiple agents interact and that this interaction changes the system over time. Private actors gain new interests, public actors attempt to accommodate these interests in an effort to retain power, and these interactions generate outcomes in the form of financial instability and banking crises that no one causes, intends, or desires. This adaptive and evolutionary logic of politics contrasts sharply with the more standard instrumental and consequentialist explanations that dominate political economy of finance research, in general, and the regulatory capture argument, in particular. The work thus stands as a model for an important and distinctive broader theoretical approach to political economy.

Third, *The Wealth Effect* presents an abundance of evidence analyzed with a variety of methods. The authors assemble fairly comprehensive data describing the accumulation of wealth by the middle class and the resulting increased participation in financial markets (chapter 3). They provide a large-*N* statistical analysis of the political causes and consequences of government intervention in banking crises in democratic societies that extends back into the late nineteenth century (chapters 5 and 6). The work provides detailed comparative case studies that trace the development of middle-class wealth and expectations during the last 150 years in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Brazil (chapters 7–12). The book thus offers plentiful evidence drawn from multiple sources and analyzed with a variety of methods to strengthen our confidence in its principal findings.

I had two primary concerns about the work. First, *The Wealth Effect* largely neglects the global dimension of finance. This omission is surprising generally, given the extent of contemporary global financial interdependence. And this omission is surprising more specifically because contemporary research concludes that financial instability within countries typically is driven by global market forces —the so-called capital inflow bonanzas. These large and sustained net capital inflows generate real estate and equity market bubbles, and banking crises often occur when these bubbles pop. A real puzzle, then, which the authors chose not to explore, is why governments have not implemented capital controls and other measures to prevent capital inflow bonanzas and thereby protect middle-class wealth. *The Wealth Effect's* theoretical framework might offer a solution to this puzzle: the middle class expects to hold an internationally diversified portfolio, and as a result, governments have no electoral incentive to limit cross-border flows. Another possibility, however, is that, in an age of global financial interdependence, domestic financial institutions earn an increasing share of their revenues through cross-border transactions and thus pressure governments to keep borders open to these flows. Elected officials thus find themselves squeezed between pressures to safeguard middle-class wealth, in part by renationalizing finance, and pressures to retain financial sector revenues by embracing deeper financial interdependence. Bailouts to rescue banks thus become the only politically feasible policy option that governments have.

My second concern is that the book is less clear than it could be about how exactly bailouts of the banking system protect middle-class wealth. As the authors describe, the middle class does not hold its wealth in bank deposits, but instead buys real estate and equities. And bank bailouts may save banks and the banking system, but they do very little to shore up real estate values and equity prices. In the 2008 crisis, for instance, the US government's effort to rescue banks did not prevent sharp declines in home values and the major stock market indices. The same outcome is evident in the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. Nor need a stock market correction that erodes middle-class wealth necessarily cause a banking system crisis that would prompt a government rescue. The collapse of the dot.com bubble in 2001–2, for instance, certainly eroded middle-class wealth but did not provoke a significant government policy intervention in the financial system. Thus, the book could do a more thorough job of explaining exactly how and the conditions under which bank bailouts provide an effective response to middle-class concerns about their accumulated wealth.

On balance, however, these two concerns do little to detract from the significance of *The Wealth Effect's*

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720000808 Published online by Cambridge University Press

contribution to our understanding of the politics of finance. The book constitutes essential reading for every scholar with an interest in the politics of financial crises and will be of great value to anyone whose research touches on the political economy of modern democratic capitalism.

Making the World Global: U.S. Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary. By Isaac A. Kamola. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019. 304p. $99.95 cloth, $26.95 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592720000328

— Rafael Khachaturian, *University of Pennsylvania*
rafkhach@sas.upenn.edu

Making the World Global is a rich and intriguing exploration of academic knowledge production and its effects on the material conditions of the world. Isaac Kamola's account traces the origin and history of "globalization" and global thinking as an object of knowledge in the second half of the twentieth century. Its key claim is that the discourse of globalization—the "global imaginary"—was not an empirical given that was first observed and then formalized by scholars into a set of concepts and theories. Instead, the global imaginary was actively created and disseminated by knowledge-producing institutions like universities, foundations, international financial organizations, and the American state in response to the changing material conditions of the post-1970s world. In this way, the paradigm of the global captured a new set of political and economic relationships that were asymmetrically forged, molded, and reproduced on the terrain of higher education, resulting in lasting political and policy changes.

Kamola grounds his analysis in the standpoint of reproduction, as initially theorized by Louis Althusser. Central to this account is the principle of overdetermination, where a society, with all of its different apparatuses and (re)productive relationships, exists as a complex, internally contradictory, and multicausal social whole. Within this framework, globalization was not merely an ideology necessitated by the interests of a ruling class. Instead, it came about by individuals and their institutions engaging in "material practices that reproduce an imagined relationship to the world as global" (pp. 24–25). Global imaginaries are "not the spontaneous products of human minds but rather [are] always produced, reproduced, and circulated within unique, heterogeneous, and contradictory worlds" (p. 191). *Making the World Global* thus emphasizes how academic knowledge production can be prefigurative and reproductive, rather than descriptive.

Because of its position as the dedicated site of knowledge production about society, US higher education and the institutions that intersected it became the node where the global imaginary took on a material existence. The phenomenon of "globalization" emerged as the product of many contested and contradictory relationships between academic disciplines, university departments, students, faculty, administrations, donors, professional organizations, and other interests. This overarching point is captured in six chapter vignettes, selected from within a "vast, complex, and overdetermined set of social relations" (p. 18) and illustrating how the global imaginary came to colonize US higher education. The book is largely organized around specific individuals—modernization theorist and Cold War mandarin W. W. Rostow, World Bank presidents Robert McNamara and A. W. Clausen, economist Theodore Levitt, Social Science Research Council (SSRC) president Kenneth Prewitt, and New York University (NYU) president John Sexton—who leveraged their institutional influence to present the global imaginary as a social fact. Together, this network of social actors produced and disseminated specialized knowledge presenting the world as either already interconnected or increasingly becoming so and—in the process—bringing this very world into being.

Kamola traces the initial production of the global imaginary as a response to the structural crises of the 1970s. During the Cold War, expanded funding from the federal government and foundations had turned higher education, and especially the US social sciences, into sites for the reproduction of modernization as a "distinct national imaginary" (p. 32). Material apparatuses like universities, journals, and professional organizations served American national ends by producing new knowledge about parts of the world relevant to US strategic interests. From the vantage point of the American state, the flourishing of area studies and realism in international relations contributed to this process of knowledge production by helping it "manage a strategically contested world" (p. 40). However, the convergence of radical decolonization movements challenging the postwar order, while the US defeat in Vietnam and the economic stagnation of the 1970s displaced the national development imaginary of both Rostow and McNamara, created a window of opportunity for the advancement of a new global imaginary.

This shift became evident in the 1980s, with Levitt's popularizing of the idea of globalization at the Harvard Business School and Clausen's introduction of punitive structural adjustment policies during his tenure at the World Bank. In presenting the global economy as a structural reality to be heeded, the World Bank decimated universities in the Global South, and especially Africa. These had previously served as alternative sites of decolonial knowledge production, and their economic decline further perpetuated the "reality" of a global convergence on a single paradigm. The end of the Cold War exacerbated this process. Funding for interdisciplinary area studies programs dried up, prompting Prewitt's SSRC to decisively shift its focus toward global studies in the 1990s, ostensibly on the grounds of moving from

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720000808 Published online by Cambridge University Press