

From Middle Powers to Entrepreneurial Powers in World Politics: Brazil's Successes and Failures in International Crises

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ABSTRACT

This article uses the concept of entrepreneurial powers to discuss how and under what circumstances Brazil successfully accomplishes its goals in international crises. The concept of entrepreneurial power focuses on systematic evidence of middle-power behavior and its relation to foreign policy tools. Brazil resorts to three agency-based foreign policy tools that are the substance of its entrepreneurial power. These instruments are always mediated by a structural condition, the dominant power pivotal position in the crisis. This study applies qualitative comparative analysis methodology to 32 international crises since the early 1990s in which Brazil played a role. It finds that for regional crises, the use of only one agency-based tool is sufficient for success, regardless of the dominant power position; and for global crises, the use of only one agency-based tool is a necessary and sufficient condition for Brazil to accomplish its goals, despite the dominant power position on the issue.

In the last decades, Brazil has strived to increase its influence in global affairs. Brazilian foreign policy has become more affirmative and more active in regional and global forums, and many analysts have come to consider Brazil a rising middle power. However, important controversies persist regarding what makes a country a middle power and how to explain middle powers' behavior in international arenas. Which countries should be considered middle powers, and why? More important, what do middle powers really do, and what explains their international behavior?

This article tries to answer the last question using the notion of entrepreneurial power to systematically analyze Brazil's behavior in international crises. By focusing on Brazil's foreign action, we aim to better understand what middle powers actually do to assert their importance in the international arena, which resources they use to influence international crisis outcomes, and under what circumstances they succeed. In doing so, we aim to specify the concept of middle power, emphasizing its behav-

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ioral dimension and proposing a way to operationalize it for empirical research purposes. More specifically, we try to assess Brazil's capacity and ability to successfully accomplish its goals in regional and global crises. We consider Brazil successful when its revealed preference for solving a crisis matches the actual final solution to that crisis.

This study applies qualitative comparative analysis to the universe of 32 international crises from 1990 to 2017—both regional and global—in which Brazil has tried to exert influence or aspired to change the course of events. Through QCA we identify variables shared by cases that have reached the same outcome—success and failure—in order to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for Brazil's entrepreneurial power.

This article is divided into four parts. The first section discusses the middle powers literature and introduces the concept of entrepreneurial power and its analytical benefits. The following section discusses the propositions resulting from the theoretical approach and presents the cases to be analyzed. Then the QCA analysis is developed and the results presented.

MIDDLE POWERS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL POWERS IN WORLD POLITICS

A bulk of literature exists about the middle powers in world affairs. Different authors have stressed what are supposed to be common features of middle powers: they generally are regional leaders, coalition builders, conflict managers, and mediators; they favor multilateralism; and they participate intensively in multilateral organizations in order to promote their goals.

Nevertheless, the concept of middle power is elusive. On the one hand, it is structural and situational, pointing out the relative position of some countries in the state system, and the consequences of that position in terms of capabilities and power resources. On the other hand, it is ideational and behavioral, describing a set of values, conduct, and political styles typical of those states placed in an intermediate position in the international system. In this sense, middle powers have been defined by their position in the global distribution of military and economic power as much as by their typical behavior (Sennes 2003; Black 1997; Carr 2014; Patience 2014; Cox 1996; Mares 1988; Spektor 2006; Chapnik 1999; Wood 1990; Pratt 1990; Cooper et al. 1993; Cooper 1997; Cooper and Flemes 2013, 2015; Higgott and Cooper 1990; Keohane 1969; Jordaan 2003; Flemes 2007; Burges 2008, 2013, 2015; Gardini 2016; Ravenhill 1998; Cotton and Ravenhill 2011; Lima and Hirst 2006; Macdonald and Paltiel 2016; Van der Westhuizen 1998, 2013; Behringer 2012; Ungerer 2007; Nolte 2010; Ping 2005).

In sum, the literature on middle powers raises three intertwined questions. The first is about intentions, the second about how intentions can be translated into behavior, and the third discusses the concrete consequences of those countries'

actions for the prevailing global power distribution, international negotiations, and international institutions (Jordaan 2003; Ungerer 2007; Behringer 2012; Patience 2014; Cooper et al. 1993).

Some authors, like Hurrell et al. (2000, 1), consider middle and regional powers to be contested concepts and believe that attempts at rigorous theorization have led to a dead end. On the other hand, Cox (1996, 825) argues that scholars should not discard the concept of middle powers altogether. We agree with Cox when he suggests that the concept should be dealt with not as fixed or universal but as something that must be continually rethought or reframed. In the same vein, we believe that reframing the concept of middle powers requires an effort to capture more accurately those countries' actual international behavior and their foreign policy instruments while avoiding the convoluted debate on middle power definitions.

We believe that the existing analytical toolbox provided by the middle powers literature does not offer suitable concepts of foreign policy instruments. The literature approaches them only laterally; few authors develop one or two specific tools separately. For some, material capacity is important, even if limited (Holbraad 1984). Other studies focus on middle powers' normative capacity (Cooper and Flesmes 2013; Hurrell and Narlikar 2006; Stuenkel 2014; Stuenkel and Taylor 2015; Malamud 2011; Carr 2014). Some focus on their coalition-building skills (Narlikar 2003; Cooper 1997; Higgott and Cooper 1990; Flesmes 2007). In sum, there is no systematic conceptualization of middle powers' repertoire of foreign policy instruments. How can we determine middle powers' most common foreign policy instruments and how to account for them consistently? What is their relation to foreign policy results? These are questions the traditional literature on middle powers does not try to answer precisely.

In addition, some authors argue that Brazil should not be considered a middle power, since the country does not properly fit the most common behavioral and materialistic features associated with the concept (Jordaan 2003; Burges 2013; Ping 2005). Lima and Hirst (2006) also try to get past the middle power debate by considering the country an "intermediate power." Malamud (2011) argues that Brazil's increasing difficulties in establishing regional leadership show how classifying Brazil as a rising middle power can be misleading, due to Brazil's limitations. Malamud's paper has been an inspiration because it shows how bitter contestation in the region affects foreign policy success. In this sense, a successful Brazil might lead to even more regional opposition, favoring Malamud's argument. Nolte (2006) argues that a regional power is a middle power that commands support within its region and recognition beyond it. Therefore, if we combine Nolte's and Malamud's arguments, our study will show that Brazil is indeed a successful regional power but with no regional leadership.

However, the purpose of this article is not to evaluate regional leadership or how to classify Brazil as a middle power, but to analyze middle powers' systematic behavior. Therefore, we propose a notion that allows us to tackle more systematically empirical evidence of a middle power behavior: entrepreneurial power.¹ We argue that a country's entrepreneurial power consists of three performative tools—

norms creation, coalition building, and material power—mediated by a structural condition—the dominant power position. According to the literature on middle powers, the three performative tools are the most common agency-based foreign policy instruments used by middle powers to seek their goals abroad. Correspondingly, they express a country's ability to create norms, build coalitions with different partners—including the dominant power—and spend its modest material resources to reach its revealed goals and preferences. The environmental condition is the dominant power pivotal position that often constrains middle powers behavior in international crises.

We understand normative entrepreneurship as a country's ability to craft norms and rules followed by others. Norms are defined as “a broad class of prescriptive statements—principles and standards—both procedural and substantive” that are “prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a sense that they ought to be followed” (Chayes and Chayes 1994, 65). Thus, a country shows normative entrepreneurship when it is capable of creating norms or rules that carry a sense of obligation to others. Normative capacity is considered one of the most common foreign policy instruments of middle powers behavior (Narlikar 2003 and Cooper 1997).

The second agency-based instrument of entrepreneurial power is a country's capacity to build coalitions around specific international issues. Coalitions are an important and decisive instrument for middle powers to accomplish their goals. Several authors show that coalition building is one of the main, if not the most important, middle powers foreign policy instruments (Narlikar 2003; Cooper 1997; Flemes 2007; Wood 1990; Mares 1988; Higgott and Cooper 1990). Coalition-building efforts may assure reliable allies and increased strength to push for a winning agenda. But coalition building is possible only if a country presents itself as a reliable partner, capable of standing up for its commitments (Guisinger and Smith 2002).

The third agency-based instrument is material entrepreneurship. Middle powers are known for their limited but reasonable material resources (Holbraad 1984; Black 1997). Material entrepreneurship means a country's readiness and willingness to spend—or to threaten to use—its scant material resources to convince others of its intention either to solve a problem or to accomplish its own goals.² Other countries involved in the crisis must recognize a country's willingness to spend material resources.³ Material entrepreneurship encompasses tangible resources, such as military deployments, military equipment provision, economic sanctions, establishment of diplomatic missions in foreign countries, and initiatives to propose trade panels or to promote trade agreements.

However, success will not be accomplished solely by shrewd agency. There are always environmental conditions, very often related to the dominant power's behavior, that constrain middle powers, despite their intentions and initiatives. This is especially important when the middle power has an ambiguous relation to great powers and power distribution in the international arena. According to the literature, there are behavioral differences between traditional and emerging middle powers in relation to dominant powers. Whereas traditional middle powers—

Canada or Australia—tend to support U.S. visions and interests, seeking the role of stabilizers and legitimizers of the current world order, emerging middle powers, such as Brazil, South Africa, or Nigeria, are reformists and ambivalent toward dominant powers. Whereas traditional middle powers seek to increase their influence within an international structure where the United States remains the dominant power, emerging middle powers seek to create situations in which they can change their international status (Jordaan 2003; Burges 2013; Cooper and Flesmes 2013; Nolte 2010; Van der Westhuizen 1998, 2013; Cooper et al. 1993).

In this context, we argue that a favorable or neutral position of the dominant power plays an important role for the middle power to succeed in international crises. An unfriendly dominant power can make performative tools less efficient, decreasing the chances of success, although not eliminating it altogether. It represents an environmental intervening variable, lying beyond the middle power's direct control, that certainly constrains its strategic options.⁴

In addition, the literature is also divided as to the importance of regional and global arenas to middle powers. While traditional middle powers are known for their preference for multilateralism and low regional influence; emerging middle powers are usually recognized as regional powers (Jordaan 2003; Malamud 2011; Nolte 2006, 2010). Since some middle powers (like Brazil) are known for having regional supremacy; their behavior should be analyzed separately from global arenas, where such supremacy should disappear when facing multiple great powers and other regional powers. In this sense, Brazil's performance in Latin America should differ from Brazil's performance in Southeast Asia (Indonesian crisis) or the Middle East (Israeli crisis). Lustig (2016), while analyzing the Brazilian foreign policy rhetoric regarding South American neighbors, found that Brazil's discursive behavior has been predominantly firmer and harsher in the region than outside the region. This is an indication that regional crises should be analyzed separately from crises located in places where Brazil has traditionally less influence. Thus, these two arenas are treated separately in the middle power theorization, although Brazil exerts influence in both arenas simultaneously and using the same foreign policy tools.

In brief, entrepreneurial power is defined by a middle power's ability to promote new rules, build coalitions, and spend moderate material resources, given certain environmental conditions, with the purpose of accomplishing positive foreign policy results.⁵ Entrepreneurial power includes normative, reputational, and materialistic types of middle power entrepreneurship, representing agency-based abilities moderated by structural conditions.⁶

In this vein, it is important to remember that entrepreneurial power is not an alternative concept to middle powers but a specification of middle powers based on systematic behavioral evidence and its relation to foreign policy instruments. This idea follows Cox's suggestion (1996) to treat middle powers not as a fixed concept but as a notion that can and should be specified in terms of actual behavior. Bringing in more systematic evidence through innovative conceptual and methodological approaches can improve the operationalization of the concept for empirical and theoretical purposes.

Estimating foreign policy success is not an easy task. We are aware that policy effectiveness relies on several different criteria and that goal attainment is only one of them, although an important one. Some scholars analyze goal attainment as a matter of degree, others as a binary option between success and failure, whereas others argue that countries usually pursue multiple goals at the same time (Baldwin 2000). This article uses a dichotomous classification in terms of success or failure.

On the other hand, we do not propose to find out whether crises have been actually solved, but only if results are in accordance with Brazil's revealed preferences for a certain solution. In each crisis, many conflict preferences emerge within the administration. We decided to choose the preference revealed either by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) or by the Brazilian Presidency. In addition, it is always possible to argue that Brazil's revealed preference has coincided with the final solution to the crisis or that Brazil has adjusted its preference according to the given conditions, which would indicate that Brazil's influence was not necessarily relevant.⁷

However, we think that adjusting preferences to a given structural condition might be an important diplomatic skill for middle powers, something that is not necessary for great powers. Spending unnecessary resources is a luxury middle powers cannot afford, so they might adjust their preferences over time, or worse, they might publicize only preferences they find feasible and not their true preference for a specific issue. The protocol in this study is that unless there is mounting evidence to the contrary from other sources (documents, interviews, etc.), the dominant revealed preference issued either by the Presidency or Itamaraty is the baseline for analysis.

Our definition of crisis is inspired by the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). For the ICB, a foreign policy crisis is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions, deriving from a change in a state's internal or external environment: a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a probability of involvement in military hostilities. We accept the definition but do not consider the last element—the likelihood of military involvement—mandatory. Considering Brazil's—and several other middle powers'—low military involvement in global affairs, we suggest a more encompassing understanding of crises, in which threat to basic values and finite time to respond are sufficient to characterize an international dispute, regardless of the probability of war.

This study analyzes several different types of crises, such as conflicts, military intervention, peacekeeping missions, regime change, disputes over energy resources, border disputes, territorial partition, international espionage, international agency inspections, and disputes over international agency boards. Despite their obvious differences, we believe that a middle power uses roughly the same tools for influencing results and faces the same structural challenges in all types of crises.

CRISES AND QCA ANALYSIS

This study employs the qualitative comparative analysis methodology. The QCA is useful technique when working with a small number of cases, when theory implies a combinatorial logic between conditions, when it is possible to find different causal paths to the same outcome (equifinality), and when it is possible to find necessary and sufficient conditions for specific results. The analytic strategy is to identify causal conditions shared by cases with the same outcome (Ragin 2008, 20–28; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 1–20).⁸

More specifically, QCA methodology is useful in answering two basic questions. First, what are the specific causes or combinations of causes that constitute a necessary condition for the outcome? These combinations must always be present for the outcome. Second, what are the specific causes or combinations of causes that constitute sufficient conditions for the outcome? These combinations represent one of several possible paths that always, or almost always, lead to the result. Therefore, a common finding is that a given outcome may result from several different combinations of conditions. These combinations are generally understood as alternative paths or recipes for the result, and they are treated as logically equivalent (i.e., as substitutable) (Ragin 2006, 299).

Two measures, consistency and coverage, are used to evaluate whether the data produce potential answers to these questions. In searching for necessary conditions, consistency assesses the degree to which instances of an outcome also display the causal condition thought to be necessary. In looking for sufficient conditions, coverage assesses the degree to which the cases sharing a given causal factor or combination of causal factors all display the outcome in question. In this context, consistency assesses the degree to which instances of an outcome display the causal condition thought to be necessary, whereas coverage tells the degree to which instances of the causal combination are paired with instances of the outcome (Ragin 2006, 292).

The analysis used both “crisp set” QCA, which requires dichotomous variables, and MvQCA (Multivariable QCA), which also requires dichotomous variables but allows for using ordinal coding (0, 1, and 2). Crisp set and MvQCA use Boolean algebra to examine each cluster of causal and outcome conditions. These clusters, or groups, can then be compared across cases to determine which set(s) of conditions are driving the outcomes. In sum, QCA method uses Boolean logic to reduce all observed causal combinations of variables into the simplest possible logical combination for a specific result or outcome (Ragin 2008, 17–26).

It is possible to argue that there is some degree of endogeneity in the use of the agency-based conditions. For example, endogeneity would mean that Brazil could resort to all three agency-based entrepreneurship to accomplish its goals, especially in more difficult crises, making it impossible to determine whether each condition was important to success or failure. The concomitant use of agency-based entrepreneurship would create opportunities for one condition to affect or pull the other in one direction or another. We were aware of the endogeneity problem, and we aimed to

Table 1. Regional Crises

Crisis	Code	Brazil's Role	Government
1. Lubbers Plan Suriname 1990	Sur01	Third party	Collor
2. Operation Traíra Colombia 1991	Col01	Party	Collor
3. Chávez coup Venezuela 1992	Ven02	Third party	Collor
4. President Fujimori's coup Peru 1992	Per01	Third party	Collor
5. Cenepa War Peru-Ecuador 1995	Cenepa	Third party	FHC
6. Paraguay coup against President Wasmosy 1996	Par02	Third party	FHC
7. Ecuador coup against President Mahuad 2000	Ecu01	Third party	FHC
8. Venezuela coup against President Chávez 2002	Ven01	Third party	FHC
9. Haitian crisis 2004–2015	Haiti	Third party	Lula
10. Pulp mill dispute Uruguay-Argentina 2005–2010	Uru01	Third party	Lula
11. Gas crises Bolivia 2006	Bol02	Party	Lula
12. Operation Fenix Colombia-Ecuador 2008	Col02	Third party	Lula
13. Santa Cruz unrest Bolivia 2008	Bol01	Third party	Lula
14. Honduras coup against President Zelaya 2009	Hond	Third party	Lula
15. Itaipú Treaty renegotiation Paraguay 2009	Par03	Party	Lula
16. U.S. bases in Colombia 2009	Col03	Third party	Lula
17. Albina riots Suriname 2009	Sur02	Third party	Lula
18. Police riots Ecuador 2010	Ecu02	Third party	Lula
19. Paraguay coup against President Lugo 2012	Par01	Third party	Dilma
20. Peace agreement FARC-Colombia 2012–2017	Col04	Third party	Dilma/Temer
21. Bolivia Senator crisis 2013	Bol03	Party	Dilma
22. Chile-Peru maritime dispute 2014	Chi01	Third party	Dilma
23. Venezuela suspension Mercosur 2016	Ven03	Party	Temer

mitigate it by increasing the variety of cases. But QCA analysis seeks to find Boolean combinations of conditions to specific results and not a causal explanation per se.

We have included the universe of global and regional crises since the early 1990s in which Brazil had an important role in influencing the course of events (32 cases).⁹ We did not include, however, cases in which Brazil did not participate or did not aspire to any direct influence, since we aim to analyze the conditions for success or failure and not the reasons for Brazil's lack of interest in the solution of international crises. To understand the conditions of success or failure, we can only analyze crises in which Brazil engaged or tried to engage itself at some level. The same rationale explains the global crisis selection. There are innumerable global crises in which Brazil could possibly have gotten involved but did not, and which therefore do not serve our purpose of discussing the conditions in which Brazil can effectively influence results.

The cases occurred under six administrations: Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–92), Itamar Franco (1992–93), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–10), Dilma Rousseff (2011–16), and Michel Temer

Table 2. Global Crises

Crisis	Code	Brazil's Role	Government
1. AIDS Patent dispute 1997–2001	AIDS	Party	FHC
2. East Timor Independence: UNTAET 1999–2002	Timor	Third party	FHC
3. OPCW crisis: José Bustani removal 2002	OPCW	Party	FHC
4. IAEA inspections in Resende nuclear facility 2004	IAEA	Party	Lula
5. Teheran Agreement 2010	Iran	Third party	Lula
6. Libya Intervention and Responsibility While Protect 2011	Lib	Third party	Dilma
7. UN Internet Privacy Resolution and NSA espionage 2014	Privacy	Party	Dilma
8. Gaza War 2014	Isr	Party	Dilma
9. Brazilian citizens executed in Indonesia 2015	Indon	Party	Dilma

(2016–present). We analyzed 23 regional and 9 global crises. Brazil was a party directly affected by the events 11 times and acted as third party on 21 occasions. Although there are several types of crises, QCA's examination of cross-case patterns respects the diversity of cases and their heterogeneity regarding their different causally relevant conditions and contexts by comparing cases as configurations (Ragin 2008, chap. 8).

Cases were selected using different sources. Two major volumes compiling foreign policy initiatives from 1985 to 2010, written by the Brazilian diplomat Fernando de Mello Barreto, provided the baseline for the analysis (Barreto 2012a, b). Another important source was the publication of Brazil's official foreign policy speeches and statements, *Repertório de Política Externa* (2007, 2008–9, 2015), issued by the Research Institute of International Relations (IPRI) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We also profited from several archive-based studies, personal archives, interviews, and autobiographies published by foreign policy officials under Collor, Cardoso, and Lula's administrations (see the appendixes). Case studies on crises were also very important (see the appendixes). A few cases, however, had to be analyzed using primary sources, due to lack of systematic research. Cases are shown on tables 1 and 2.

To build the propositions, we defined results or outcome in terms of success and failure and translated the dimensions of entrepreneurial power into four condition sets: NORMENT, MATENT, COALENT, and USPIVOTAL. We used one control condition (THIRD PARTY/PARTY). Tables 3 and 4 show the final coding.

Success and failure (RESULT). We coded the result 1 if Brazil had successfully accomplished its revealed preference on the crisis. If Brazil either had failed to accomplish its interests or was prevented from participating in the crisis due to other parties' restrictions, we coded the outcome 0.

Normative entrepreneurship (NORMENT). We coded the set as 1 if Brazil used its normative entrepreneurship to accomplish its goals—by creating norms and rules

Table 3. Regional Crises

Code	NORMENT	MATENT	COALENT	USPIVOTAL	CONTROL	RESULT
Ecu01	0	0	1	1	1	0
Cenepa	1	1	1	1	1	1
Col02	0	0	1	0	1	1
Col03	0	0	1	0	1	1
Ven01	0	0	1	0	1	1
Per01	0	0	1	1	1	0
Ven02	0	1	1	1	1	1
Haiti	1	1	1	1	1	1
Par01	1	0	1	0	1	0
Par02	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bol01	0	1	1	0	1	1
Hond	0	1	1	0	0	0
Uru01	0	0	0	1	1	0
Sur01	0	1	1	0	1	1
Sur02	0	1	0	1	1	1
Col04	0	1	1	1	1	0
Chi01	0	0	0	0	1	1
Ecu02	0	0	1	0	0	1
Col01	0	1	0	1	0	1
Bol02	0	1	1	1	0	0
Bol03	0	0	0	0	0	0
Par03	1	1	0	1	0	0
Ven03	1	0	1	1	0	1

that were followed by others. On the contrary, if Brazil was not able to use its normative entrepreneurship, we coded the set as 0.

Material entrepreneurship (MATENT). We coded the set 1 if Brazil used its material entrepreneurship to accomplish its goals, showing willingness to spend, threatening to spend, or actually spending resources. Conversely, if Brazil did not show such a disposition, did not have the capacity, or was impeded by others from using its material resources, or was overwhelmed by others' spending, we coded the set 0.

Coalition entrepreneurship (COALENT). We coded the set 1 if Brazil created coalitions to accomplish its goals. On the contrary, if Brazil was not able to create coalitions, did not try to create coalitions, or was overwhelmed by more powerful coalitions, we coded the set 0.

Dominant power pivotal position (USPIVOTAL). We coded the set 1 if Brazil was favored by the U.S. pivotal position, if the U.S. pivotal position was neutral, or if Brazil managed to change the U.S. position in its favor. But if the United States had a pivotal position contrary to the Brazilian stance, we coded the set 0.

Control of crisis, third party vs. party (THIRD PARTY/PARTY). We coded 1 if Brazil acted as a third party and 0 if Brazil was a party directly affected by the crises.

Table 4. Global Crises

Code	NORMENT	MATENT	COALENT	USPIVOTAL	CONTROL	RESULT
OPCW	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privacy	1	1	1	0	0	1
IAEA	0	1	0	0	0	1
AIDS	1	1	1	0	0	1
Indo	0	0	1	1	0	0
Isr	0	1	1	0	0	1
Timor	0	1	1	1	1	1
Lib	1	0	1	0	1	0
Iran	1	0	1	0	1	0

All the proper coding of cases can be seen in the two online appendixes, Regional Crises and Global Crises. The final coding of all crises is reported here.

TESTING PROPOSITIONS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL POWER

We applied crisp set analysis to global crises and MvQCA to regional crises. This difference is due to crisp set's failure in regional crises. There, the use of crisp set resulted in equifinality for regional crises.

Global Crises

Using crisp set on global crises, we found that for Brazil to accomplish its goals, material entrepreneurship (MATENT 1) was both necessary and sufficient. Both consistency and coverage scores were 1.0 for success (RESULT 1). In this sense, this finding suggests that showing willingness to spend, threatening to spend, or incurring actual spending in crises beyond its traditional region of influence has proved to be a necessary and sufficient condition in all five cases of success. Conversely, when Brazil did not use its material entrepreneurship (MATENT 0), failure was the result in all four remaining cases (see table 5).

It is important to notice that there are three minimum combinations for success and three combinations for failure. Apparently, they share an equifinality problem (several paths to the same result). However, they all share the MATENT condition 0 or 1. These combinations also show that the structural condition is not relevant to either result (see table 6).

When we controlled for THIRD PARTY, one result stood out in global crises. First, Brazil was not successful in two out of three cases (0.66). On the other hand, when we controlled for PARTY, Brazil reached 0.66 of success (four out of six cases). Conversely, when we controlled for PARTY in failure instances—only two cases—we found that Brazil did not use its material entrepreneurship on either occa-

Table 5. Global Crises: MATENT Condition

Result	Condition	Consistency	Coverage	Cases
1 (Success)	MATENT 1	1.00	1.00	Privacy; IAEA; AIDS; Isr; Timor
0 (Failure)	MATENT 0	1.00	1.00	Lib; Iran; OCPW; Indo

Table 6. Minimum Conditions for Global Crises

Result	Combination	Cases
1 (Success)	NormEnt{1} * MatEnt{1} * CoalEnt{1} * USPivotal{0}	Privacy; AIDS
1 (Success)	NormEnt{0} * MatEnt{1} * CoalEnt{0} * USPivotal{0}	IAEA
1 (Success)	NormEnt{0} * MatEnt{1} * CoalEnt{1} * USPivotal{0}	Isr
1 (Success)	NormEnt{0} * MatEnt{1} * CoalEnt{1} * USPivotal{1}	Timor
0 (Failure)	NormEnt{0} * MatEnt{0} * CoalEnt{0} * USPivotal{0}	OCPW
0 (Failure)	NormEnt{0} * MatEnt{0} * CoalEnt{1} * USPivotal{1}	Indo
0 (Failure)	NormEnt{1} * MatEnt{0} * CoalEnt{1} * USPivotal{0}	Lib; Iran

sion. These controls suggest that the type of behavior—third party or party—might not be important because MATENT 1 and 0 are leading to success and failure, respectively.

Regional Crises

We first analyzed regional crises using crisp set QCA, but the results showed equifinality with no minimum combination leading to results with coverage above 0.70. Then we changed the research strategy to use MvQCA. We combined the three agency-based instruments into an ordinal scale of 0, 1, and 2, creating a super variable called SUPERENT. We coded this 0 if Brazil did not use a single instrument, 1 if Brazil used at least one instrument, and 2 if Brazil used two or more instruments. The recoding is shown in table 7.

Once agency-based instruments were recoded, we found that employing at least one entrepreneurial tool (SUPERENT 1) is a sufficient condition for success, with 0.77 of coverage and 1.00 consistency. Conversely, not using any entrepreneurial tool (SUPERENT 0) was responsible for only 0.44 of coverage for failure. These results show that for Brazil to reach its goals in regional crises, the use of a single agency-based instrument represents a sufficient condition. On the other hand, not using a single agency-based instrument—SUPERENT 0—is responsible for less than half of failure instances. On the basis of these results, it is possible to argue that reaching success in the region has a clearer path than failure. See the results in table 8.

More precisely, when we considered the SUPERENT 1 condition for success within the coverage ratio (11 out of 14 total cases of success), two results stood out. First, the NORMENT condition was never used by itself to reach success. The most common instruments of success operating alone were COALENT (0.65) and

Table 7. Regional Crises: MvQCA

Code	SUPERENT	USPIVOTAL	RESULT
Ecu01	0	1	0
Cenepa	2	1	1
Col02	1	0	1
Col03	1	0	1
Ven01	1	0	1
Per01	0	1	0
Ven02	2	1	1
Haiti	2	1	1
Par01	2	0	0
Par02	1	1	1
Bol01	1	0	1
Hond	2	0	0
Uru01	0	1	0
Sur01	2	0	1
Sur02	1	1	1
Col04	2	1	0
Ecu02	1	0	1
Chi01	1	0	1
Col01	1	1	1
Bol02	2	1	0
Bol03	0	0	0
Par03	2	1	0
Ven03	1	0	1

MATENT (0.35). More important, the use of two or three agency-based instruments together does not lead to success.

On the contrary, the use of SUPERENT 2 (nine cases) leads to failure (0.55) slightly more often than to success (0.45), which might indicate that excessive use of agency-based instruments is counterproductive, as well as the use of SUPERENT 0 (four cases), which leads to complete failure (1.0). These results could indicate that not using agency-based instruments and using two or more usually leads to failure in Latin America, but since combinations to failure suffer from equifinality, it is not possible to argue for certain in that direction (see table 9).

We also found that the structural conditional alignment to U.S. position or U.S. neutrality (USPIVOTAL) is neither necessary nor sufficient for either success or failure, which might indicate that in Latin America, a country like Brazil might more often rely on its own initiatives and instruments of influence than count on a favorable U.S. position.

When we controlled for THIRD PARTY in successful cases, Brazil used SUPERENT 1 in 0.90 of the cases (nine out of ten occasions). In turn, controlling for THIRD PARTY in failure cases, Brazil did not use agency-based instruments (SUPERENT 0) in 0.60 of the cases (three out of five occasions). On the other

Table 8. Regional Cases: Conditions Superent 1 and Superent 0

Result	Condition	Consistency	Coverage	Cases
1 (Success)	SUPERENT 1	1.00	0.77	Col02; Col03; Ven01; Bol01; Ecu02; Chi01; Par02; Sur02; Col01; Ven03
0 (Failure)	SUPERENT 0	1.00	0.44	Ecu01; Per01; Uru01; Bol03

Table 9. Regional Cases: Conditions Superent 2

Result	Condition	Consistency	Coverage	Cases
1 (Success)	SUPERENT 2	1.00	0.45	Cenepa; Ven02; Haiti; Sur01
0 (Failure)	SUPERENT 2	1.00	0.55	Par01; Hond; Col04; Bol02; Par03

hand, when we controlled for PARTY—only four cases—we found that failure was a predominant result, with 0.90 (three out of four cases). The most-often-recurring condition for failure was SUPERENT 2 (0.50), suggesting again that excess of agency-based instruments might lead to failure. On the other hand, we found SUPERENT 1 present when we analyzed the two cases of success (0.40), which reinforces the explanatory capacity of such a condition. Both controls show that SUPERENT 1 is a sufficient condition for success in regional arenas. However, the paths to failure are more complex and unclear. In this sense, the type of behavior has no importance for success, but these findings might indicate some unknown importance to failure.

CONCLUSIONS

The literature on middle powers analyzes the role of intermediate countries in a changing world order. Middle power scholars are interested in understanding these countries’ intentions, behavior, and capacities and in finding concrete evidence of their influence. In this context, we argue that scholars should move away from general conceptual statements about middle powers and seek more precise and systematic evidence of their behavior. We suggest a concept specification focused on instruments to assess systematic behavioral performances and their relations to foreign policy tools: entrepreneurial power.

This article has used Brazil’s performance in international crises as a case study of how a middle power can reach its goals in situations in which it operates under pressure of unpredicted events. The findings suggest that although we are unable to answer adequately the question of how a middle power like Brazil influences the world order, we can certainly show some interesting evidence that using some entrepreneurship tools seems to be related to results that match the country’s revealed preference regarding international crisis outcomes. The results we found, using QCA analysis in 32 global and regional crises in which Brazil played a role since the early 1990s, are fivefold.

First, we found that in global crises, only one condition is simultaneously necessary and sufficient to reach success: material entrepreneurship. QCA is useful to separate those conditions that are driving influences from those conditions (both present and absent) that are not essential. In general, QCA delivers minimum combinations of factors that lead to specific results. One individual factor driving the result is a very rare event in the social sciences. Yet we found one necessary and sufficient condition for success in global crises. This result questions the idea that Brazil is a normative power in world politics, exerting influence basically through “soft power,” and that the U.S. position is critical for Brazil’s success in global crises. On the contrary, to be successful in global crises, Brazil needs to deploy a traditional power-based instrument: material capability.

Second, our analysis shows that in the case of regional crises, Brazil needs to deploy only one kind of entrepreneurial power to obtain success. Furthermore, the intensive use of instrumental conditions (two or more) leads slightly more often to failure than to success, which indicates that policymakers should calibrate their agency-based capacities to be successful. In this sense, the most common sufficient condition for success has been either material or coalition entrepreneurship, and never normative entrepreneurship. These findings also question the idea that Brazil is a normative power in world politics. That is, Brazil’s ability to create norms followed by others is not necessarily leading to successful outcomes; on the contrary, for regional crises, Brazil more often relies on material or coalition-building instruments to succeed.

Third, the structural condition does not represent an impediment to success, either globally or regionally. Actually, the U.S. pivotal position is almost irrelevant to success cases, although a negative U.S. position might contribute to failure. This finding is interesting because most of the literature on Brazilian foreign policy indicates that Brazil’s probability of success is strongly affected by the U.S. position on the issue. At least in crisis situations, this is not necessarily the case.

Fourth, the nature of Brazil’s involvement in the crisis—whether as a third party or a party directly involved—has different results according to the arena. Being a third party in global arenas is strongly related to not using material entrepreneurship and, consequently, to failure. This result might indicate that acting as a third party in global crises is a difficult task for Brazil, and that not using material entrepreneurship most certainly leads to failure. On the other hand, since we have only two cases in which Brazil acted as third party, we are not able to argue for certain that being a third party in global crises always represents overstretching and failure. To be more positive, we would need cases in which Brazil, despite acting as third party, still reached success. The same argument goes for involvement as a party in global crises. Being a party is strongly correlated to the use of material entrepreneurship and to success. As for regional crises, being a third party is strongly related to the use of a single instrument and, consequently, to success. Conversely, acting as a party decreases the use of only one entrepreneurial instrument and increases the chance of failure. Thus, the nature of Brazil’s involvement might be influencing outcomes, although we are not sure in which direction.

Fifth, explaining success is simpler than explaining failure. The paths to failure are not as clear as the paths to success, especially in regional crises. While it is easier to say that for global crises the lack of material spending most probably leads to failure, the picture in regional crises is blurred. The use of two or more or no instruments of power most likely leads to failure, although there are many paths and combinations driving failure. Only more systematic analysis will allow for a clear understanding of failure.

In general, these results reinforce the idea that studying systematic evidence of middle powers' behavior in international affairs represents an important research agenda because it shows what are the main drivers of success or failure and how they might affect world politics. This agenda questions four topics from the literature on middle powers, showing that middle power concepts need to be constantly updated and that a more behavioral approach yields important insights.

First is the importance of analyzing middle power behavior by putting together several foreign policy instruments concurrently instead of the fragmented approaches common in the literature. It is difficult to argue that Brazil is a normative power *per se* or that Australia is a prone coalition builder if these countries use several foreign policy instruments simultaneously, especially if we analyze their behavior over time and through the course of several crises. Perhaps middle powers should be reclassified according to the number of foreign policy instruments they use to accomplish their goals, instead of defined on the basis of single foreign policy tools.

The second insight is the role of material power for success. The bulk of middle power literature does not address material power adequately when it comes to middle powers' accomplishing foreign policy goals. The literature either underestimates it or overestimates other instruments, on the basis of a loose idea that middle powers do not possess enough material power and therefore should develop other instruments of influence. The results in this study show that material power should be put back into the mix as an important foreign policy tool, alongside the other instruments that have been more convincingly developed by middle power theorization.

Third, the literature on middle powers divides them into two groups, according to their behavior toward the dominant powers. Some of these countries favor an international order in which the United States is the predominant power and thereby legitimizes this structure; other countries favor reformist strategies to improve their global positioning. At least for the second group, the results here show that the dominant power position is not as important as we think. Improving the efficiency of foreign policy tools may be more important than paying attention to the U.S. position.

The fourth insight is that regional and global arenas are intertwined in terms of success or failure. The entrepreneurial tools are as effective in regional crises as in global arenas; the main tool is material power. If the literature is divided as to the importance of regional and global arenas to middle powers, these results show that analyzing these two arenas separately disregards how middle powers, in fact, behave similarly in both domains, using the same foreign policy instruments and with comparable effectiveness rates.

NOTES

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1. This article was greatly inspired by Ravenhill’s 2014 argument that an entrepreneurial power rests on a behaviorally based definition and not a structural attribute. It should be, instead, a choice of behavior, even if limited by structural conditions prevailing in world politics.

2. The notion of niche diplomacy, conceived by Cooper (1997) for middle powers, entails the use of material resources in specific issues where comparative advantage is clear.

3. In this sense, material entrepreneurship can be considered a relational power because it depends on the recognition of others to be effective. On relational power, see Lasswell and Kaplan 1950; Schelling 1966. On the different types of materialistic power, see Barnett and Duvall 2005, 12.

4. For Brazil, the pivotal position of the United States is critical. Amorim Neto (2011) argues that the fundamental factor behind Brazil’s foreign policy positioning in the last 50 years is its own perception of material power in relation to the U.S. global position. See also Amorim Neto and Malamud 2015. Mares (1988) also argues that for a middle power, hegemony constitutes the chief potential threat to middle powers.

5. The semantic field of entrepreneurial power is similar to the concepts of smart power (Gallarotti 2015) and institutional entrepreneurship (Garud et al. 2004). At the same time, entrepreneurial power is more multidimensional than the opposing concepts of soft power and material power. Soft power works solely by attraction; that is, by cajoling others to follow, based on the appeal of one’s ideas. Material power operates by one’s capacity to coerce (Nye 1990; Schelling 1966).

6. Agent-oriented theories in IR are under development. See Hudson 2005; Thies and Breuning 2012. The literature on power says that any categorization of power relations must establish its scope and domain. In this article, the scope of entrepreneurial power is international crisis—situations of open conflict—in which Brazil decided to act. In turn, the domain is regional and global arenas alike. See Nagel 1975; Baldwin, 2013, 275–76. Furthermore, entrepreneurial power entails tangible and intangible aspects, with the latter being prominent. The concomitant use of different power resources can produce positive feedback. A power resource useful in one situation can reinforce another used in different situation. On tangible and intangible instruments, see Baldwin 2013, 278–79.

7. On adaptive preferences, see Elster 1983.

8. The use of QCA in foreign policy analysis and international relations has been limited, although there is a growing use of this technique in social sciences in general. On international relations see Rubenzer 2008; Hage 2007; Stokke 2007; Koenig–Archibugi 2004; and Blatter et al. 2009. On the growing importance of QCA in social sciences and public policy analysis see Rihoux et al. 2011.

9. For Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 263–80), time is important in qualitative analysis for three reasons. The temporal order of events or the causal sequence of events

matters, as well as the speed of historical processes. Trying to overcome such obstacles, we ran separate QCAs per administration. We ran into the equifinality problem mainly because there were not enough cases per government to be analyzed, especially for global crises.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting materials may be found with the online version of this article at the publisher’s website.

Appendix 1. Regional Crises

Appendix 2. Global Crises