

Amphitruo is better described as a parody or a tragicomedy (the latter); her contribution is unusual in showing some interest in Plautus' varied metres.

Both volumes end with an interesting discussion by Thomas Baier of Renaissance comedies derived from these of Plautus, Jean Rotrou's *Les Sosies* and *Les Captifs* (1636 and 1638, respectively). Rotrou, who also translated *Menaechmi* (*Les Ménechmes*, 1632) was a precursor of Molière, whose *Amphitryon* (1668) takes the corresponding place in the parallel volume of the Urbino-based *Lecturae Plautinae Sarsinates* (see *CR* 50 [2000], 598).

There is a great deal of interest here, and particularly in Lefèvre's magisterial chapters. One aspect, however, causes a little disappointment. The contributors quote Plautus from Lindsay's OCT, usually without even mentioning the fact, as if that represents the vulgate. This can only be explained as a traumatic loss of confidence by German scholarship. Lindsay is now over 100 years old; and even then, Leo had produced a better text, as is accepted by Questa in his recent edition of the *Cantica*. The great German Plautinists in the period after the first decades of the twentieth century—Fraenkel, Jachmann, Drexler, Otto Skutsch—would not have dreamt of quoting the text from Lindsay. In fact, they exercised their personal judgement on every line they quoted. Here we find scholars engaged in literary discussion quoting many lines in a form which they should not and surely would not have in any new edition of the plays.

We read, for example,

Capt.	400	meu' mihi, suo' quoique est carus
	439	fac fidele sis fidelis
	888	Siculus :: et nunc Siculus non est
Amph.	143	ego has habebō usque <hic> in petaso pennulas
	486	sed Alcumenai huius honoris gratia.

The inferiority of these editorial decisions to those in the texts of Leo, Goetz and Schoell (the small Teubner), and Ernout may not seem of major importance; but it is strange that nobody seems to mind.

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LUCRETIUS

P. H. SCHRIJVERS: *Lucreèce et les sciences de la vie*. Pp. 231. Leiden, etc.: Brill 1999. Cased, \$91. 25. ISBN: 90-04-10230-2.

This collection of essays is a stimulating contribution to an already impressive series of recent scholarly studies on the intellectual context of the *De rerum natura*. (See K. A. Algra, M. H. Koenen, P. H. Schrijvers (edd.), *Lucretius and his Intellectual Background* [Amsterdam, 1997], in which papers by Algra and Lévy engage directly with S.'s arguments in Chapters VII and X; David Sedley, *Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom* [Cambridge, 1998], whose Chapter III argues directly against S.'s general conclusions; and Diskin Clay, *Paradosis and Survival. Three Chapters in the Epicurean Philosophy* [Ann Arbor, 1998].) The volume contains eleven papers from 1974–97, presenting a coherent and rich study of Lucretius' theories of human development (*DRN* 5.780–1160) and applied psychology

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(4.907–1036). Its audience will be scholarly perforce: it presupposes not merely the absence of malign ‘Anglo-Saxon’ monoglottism (p. 170)—ten essays are in French, one in German—but a facility with the rather testing Greek of the scholia on Epicurus. (There are no translations of Latin or Greek, even when the readings are controversial or corrupt.) Those who pass these hurdles will be infuriated by its inept system of bibliographical references, amused by the odd error in the transcription of English (e.g. pp. 92 and 110), but richly rewarded by its profound learning and suggestive conclusions. Whether or not one accepts these conclusions, Schrijvers’s method in these papers—‘confronting’ Lucretius’ ideas with the full array of ancient thought on the relevant issues in order to reveal his intellectual background (p. vii)—is consistently illuminating.

The first part of the collection concerns Lucretius’ theories on the biological (Chapters I–IV) and social (Chapters V–VII) aspects of human development. Chapter I reveals the scientific status of Lucretius’ apparently bizarre explanation for the neonatal nutrition of the first generation of terrestrial animals (earth-uteruses become breast-supplements, 5.780–836): parallels with Aristotle and the medical tradition show that he was working with a model of spontaneous generation of plants, and an established analogy between embryos/veins and plants/roots. The second chapter compares the treatment of ‘human abortions’ in 5.837–54—i.e. unsuccessful variants on the human species in the first generation—with analogous Peripatetic theories (especially Strato’s); and the third argues that Lucretius’ rejection of ‘mythical monsters’ in 5.878–924 depends on the curious and partially extant treatise of Palaephatos, *De incredibilibus* (from the fourth century B.C.). The results of these chapters are generalized in Chapter IV (‘Man and Animal’): unlike any other known Epicurean, apparently including Epicurus, Lucretius was profoundly interested in biology. S. argues that he was influenced, probably directly, by Aristotle’s biological works. His four test-cases, however, are implausible: the theory of intentional action in 4.877ff. stems from Aristotle, but was clearly accepted Epicurean doctrine; the discussion of Anaxagoras in 1.830ff. relies on a doxographical source, but does not indicate a biological bent; the discussion of ‘isonomia’ in 2.527ff. need not rely on Aristotle’s *PA* merely because it mentions elephants and describes their trunks by the word ‘anguimanus’; and the connexion offered in 3.282ff. between kinds of animals, predominant elements, and consequent characterizing emotions, hardly requires prior study of Aristotle’s *HA*.

The discussion of social development in Chapters V–VII begins with a *tour de force* on the origin of language. S. argues forcefully that the Epicureans held that language was natural only in the sense that the production of sounds is natural to animals with the requisite organs; human language develops thereafter by perception of the utility of such sounds (*contra* teleological theories like Galen’s in the *De usu partium*). Chapters VI and VII portray Lucretius’ views on early human life and the sequence of political constitutions as reactions primarily to the political writings of the Peripatetic Dicaearchus (especially the description of the golden age in his *De vita Graeciae*). Chapter VI certainly shows that Dicaearchus’ work is relevant to Lucretius’ discussion; but, in the absence of a ‘smoking gun’—for instance, evidence that Dicaearchus really did mention the story that the ancient Arcadians wept all night, fearing the permanent loss of the sun—one may doubt that a set of primitivist *topoi* is enough to show direct influence. S.’s argument in Chapter VII pp. 102–7, that we need to see Stoic *oikeiosis* behind 5.1011–27 on the origins of parental love, is confusing. If, as he allows, Epicurus and Hermarchus already had doctrines of ‘self-appropriation’, why appeal to the Stoic providentialist theory, which does not fit Lucretius’ story?

The second part of the collection deals with Lucretius' treatments of sleep, dreams, and alleged sensory-illusions (Chapters VIII–X, respectively). Chapter VIII rightly situates the applied psychology of 4.858ff. in the context of the project of the *Parva naturalia* (taken up by doxographers and psychologists as various as 'Aetius', Tertullian, and, one might add, Augustine in *Confessions* 10). This is followed by an intricate discussion of the mechanisms for sleep, involving a plausible emendation for the scholion on Epicurus, *Ad Herod.* 66, based on medical parallels. Whereas Chapter VIII had noted only the possible influence of Asclepiades on Lucretius' theory of nutrition (pp. 127–9), Chapter IX suggests that Lucretius' explanation for dreams (4.962–1036) is radically eclectic, drawing on the medical tradition, Aristotle, and Roman elements. Chapter X, 'Lucretius and the Sceptics', is a brilliant conclusion to Schrijvers's discussion of Book 4, examining Lucretius' use of sceptical collections of sensory illusions and modal 'contradictions'. S. controversially concludes that Lucretius had access to both Academic and Pyrrhonist sceptical works; at least in the case of the Academics, it is hard to see how he could be wrong. The final chapter, 'Seeing the Invisible', gives a sensitive and useful analysis of the functions and deployment of analogy in the *DRN*.

A bare summary cannot do justice to the wealth of detailed insights, interesting emendations, suggestive readings, and arresting parallels from Greek scientific work S. adduces. One can, however, address his general conclusions briefly. The central conclusion he draws is that Lucretius was an eclectic Late Hellenistic writer, steeped in the philosophical and scientific lore of his age (e.g. pp. 14–15, 166, 196). This is based on his identification of a wide array of Lucretian sources—allegedly direct sources, such as Palaephatus (Chapter III), Dicaearchus (Chapters VI–VII), Asclepiades (Chapter VIII), unnamed Academics (Clitomachus?), and Aenesidemus (Chapter X), as well as possibly indirect cases, such as Aristotle (Chapters I and IV) and Strato (Chapter II). These claims provoke three disturbing thoughts. First, one may worry that a successful confrontation between prior scientific thought and the *DRN* in fact illuminates only the intellectual context of the *ideas* in the poem (and possibly its reception by well-read readers): without a 'smoking gun' of the sort provided in Chapter X, parallels tell us nothing about *Lucretius*. Secondly, as David Sedley has pointed out (*Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom* [Cambridge, 1998], p. 72 n. 51), even if S. is right to see these 'sources' behind Lucretius' words, given their dates, their influence—except in the controversial cases of Asclepiades and the Academics—may have been mediated through Epicurus' writings. Finally, one may wonder whether an 'eclectic' Lucretius is actually desirable: if this is the alternative, Sedley's 'fundamentalist' Lucretius (piously copying out lost portions of Epicurus' *De natura*) looks dangerously alluring. Perhaps there is a narrow track between the beaten path of Greek *paideia* and the Master's footsteps?

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THE APOSTLE OF EPICURUS

D. SEDLEY: *Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom*. Pp. xviii + 234. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Cased, £35. ISBN: 0-521-57032-8.

This fascinating book argues strongly for the view that Lucretius did not use any source other than Books 1–15 of the *peri physeos* of Epicurus, and that we can see the

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