women in party leadership positions indicate greater commitment to the inclusion of women.

To explore and develop this argument, Wylie draws on an impressive array of quantitative and qualitative data, including a data set of nearly 28,000 candidates to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate between 1994 and 2014, as well as more than 100 interviews with key actors in seven parties in 11 states across Brazil between 2008 and 2015. Examining the fates of both failed and successful candidates, male and female, she finds no support for traditional explanations in gender and politics research focused on socioeconomic factors and electoral system variables. The analysis instead illuminates the role of weakly institutionalized and male-dominated political parties in undermining women's electoral opportunities.

In a particularly astute part of the analysis, Wylie unravels why the 30% quota law has largely remained a "law on paper only" (*lei que não pega*), despite efforts by the legislature to strengthen its requirements in 2009 and a decision by the Supreme Electoral Court to confirm its status as law in 2010. Strikingly, nearly half of all parties did not run a single female candidate in 2010—and nearly a third did the same in 2014 (pp. 75–76). When parties do take steps to nominate women, a very large share (nearly 40% in 2010, according to Wylie's calculations) appear to be "phantom candidates" (*candidatas laranjas*), earning less than 1% of the minimum vote required by a winning candidate in their state (p. 42). Lack of party institutionalization has contributed to this state of affairs, as it enables (largely male) party leaders to act with impunity, promoting a wider culture of noncompliance with the gender quota.

Beyond its detailed attention to the mechanics of quota (non)implementation, the book also makes important strides in explaining three other related—and understudied—questions about women's political representation in Brazil. The first is the puzzle of why women have achieved greater success in being elected to the Senate, the more prestigious of the two chambers and a body where no gender quota applies. The answer, according to Wylie, can again be traced back to political parties, who—due to distinct electoral rules—tend to unify behind individual party candidates, enhancing their electoral prospects, regardless of whether they are male or female.

The second puzzle concerns explaining women who *have* succeeded in being elected, despite the inhospitable conditions in Brazil. In a highly original contribution, Wylie develops a typology of women-friendly and women-adverse districts and parties, theorizing three ideal types of electorally viable paths to women's election, illustrated with examples of women who fit each profile. Women elected in women-adverse districts and women-adverse parties tend to be *supermadres*, strategically deploying feminine, maternalist profiles to mitigate traditional gender norms, often benefiting from familial connections to male elites—thus corroborating, rather than undermining, the patriarchal order.

In women-adverse districts with women-friendly parties, elected women tend to be *lutadoras*, starting their political careers in a history of party militancy or activism in labor unions or popular social movements. With the help of supportive parties providing important organizational and material resources, these women are able to transform their extensive experience in informal politics into a pathway to election. In the opposite scenario women-friendly districts and women-adverse parties—the predominant profile is the technocrat, a woman with demonstrated professional competence whose expertise can be parlayed into political capital, in turn overcoming unsupportive parties by convincing male party elites of their electability.

The third puzzle explored by Wylie is the intersection of gender and race in explaining electoral opportunities. Since 2010, Brazil has had an Afro-descendent majority population, and in 2014, election data included candidates' self-declared racial identities for the first time. In a path-breaking analysis, Wylie finds that progress in Afro-descendent representation has been largely male: In 2015, less than 10% of these deputies were women. Yet among female deputies, the share of Afro-descendants was nearly 20%—and a striking 70% of Afro-descendant women in Congress won election in state parties with a recent history of having a critical mass of female leaders, compared to 20% of white women (p. 185). These findings indicate that increasing women's representation can also have substantial effects on enhancing racial diversity in national legislatures.

Wylie's book is a tour de force, presenting a nuanced and detailed account of a perplexing case, with implications for reigning paradigms in the comparative gender and politics literature, as well as the study of Brazilian politics. In a further twist, recent elections in October 2018 returned the highest share of women ever elected to the Brazilian lower house, 15%, a 50% increase over the 2014 results. At the same time, the country elected a well-known misogynist and antifeminist, Jair Bolsonaro, as its next president—following the disputed impeachment of Brazil's first female president, Dilma Rousseff, in 2016. These surprising and seemingly contradictory developments suggest that Brazil will continue to fascinate the world—and challenge political scientists—making Wylie's book required reading for all those seeking to better understand the gendered political dynamics at work in Latin America's largest country.

The Historical Roots of Corruption: Mass Education, Economic Inequality, and State Capacity. By Eric M. Uslaner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 216p. $89.99 cloth, $29.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S153759271900046X

— Michael Johnston, *Colgate University*

We frequently hear calls for the leaders of struggling societies to "tackle" corruption. Aid donors back project

after project aiming to improve institutions and foster better "governance" on two- or three-year time lines. Academic researchers reinforce that short-term mindset by issuing reams of cross-sectional research regressing a recent year's corruption index scores on some set of equally recent statistical indicators of national characteristics. But what if corruption—however we may define or measure it—has far deeper roots, and is a function of several intertwined developments over much longer spans of time?

In his new book, Eric Uslaner offers a strong argument that such is precisely the case. For a substantial group of countries, he shows that one of the strongest predictors of a country's level of corruption in 2010, as measured by the widely used Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TI-CPI), is its level of mass educational attainment *in 1870*—nearly a century and a half ago. That statistical relationship is stronger than similar calculations using later years' educational data, and is robust with respect to a range of competing hypotheses, such as productive factor endowments, experiences with colonialism, and so forth. The effects of education upon corruption, Uslaner shows us, are "sticky": Countries with high levels of educational attainment, and more effective at checking corruption a century ago, tend to be found at the higher end of such rankings in the current era, while those faring less well on these measures in, say, 1900 still struggle today.

After a Preface, *The Historical Roots of Corruption* begins with a chapter laying out the theoretical framework, which is followed by a chapter presenting the quantitative evidence. There follow three chapters that develop important regional variations on the overall thesis: "Education in Developed Europe" (Chap. 3, pp. 56–81); "Education Beyond Developed Europe" (Chap. 4, pp. 82–100), which takes up Latin America, Africa, and several individual non-Western countries; and "The United States and Other 'New' Anglo-American Countries" (Chap. 5, pp. 101–30). A concluding chapter, "Is Path Dependence Forever?" (Chap. 6, pp. 131–63), answers its own question with an overall assessment of "no," and then moves on to analyze several different processes of change, wisely reminding us to look beyond the data in understanding and responding to corruption in diverse settings. There are also a brief data Appendix, References, and an Index.

What are the causal linkages behind Uslaner's provocative findings and arguments? They are numerous and reflect the "embeddedness" of corruption that most analyses mention but usually do not examine in any depth. Mass education is associated with wider economic and political opportunities, giving citizens means and incentives to resist corrupt ways of doing things. It affects and reflects patterns of inequality, and is an aspect of greater state capacity: A higher-capacity state will, all else being equal, be more able to provide wider and more persistent educational opportunities. Conversely, enhancing mass educational attainment is one way to build greater state capacity over time. Extensively corrupt societies, by contrast, tend to invest significantly less in higher education. The overall significance of education for corruption control is nested, for Uslaner and colleagues such as Bo Rothstein, within broader findings about the long-term value of universal social welfare programs for societies, their inequalities, and their quality of government.

A skeptic might challenge the notion of assigning so much weight to a single causal factor over such a long time span but, as suggested here, Uslaner does point out a range of specific causal connections underlying the apparent anticorruption effects of mass education. More important criticisms might revolve around treating corruption as a single generic problem, rather than a phenomenon occurring in significantly different forms with distinctive underlying causes and extended effects.

At a methodological level, the TI-CPI faces a great many criticisms, including that it records perceptions of corruption, rather than directly measuring the phenomenon itself according to a specified set of criteria (to be fair, few if any of its competitor indices go much further toward direct measurement). That measurement question is important, however, particularly for embedded causal relationships over long time spans; arguably, TI-CPI scores are influenced, directly or indirectly, by a wide range of perceptions (affluence, state capacity and efficacy, regime durability and stability, and the like) that are themselves shaped by, and contribute to, long-term education levels. If that is the case, then the long-term statistical relationships might be said to be between historical levels of education and their own downstream effects, with corruption being embedded in, and difficult to distinguish from, a great many such consequences. To minimize that risk, however, Uslaner makes use of the superb V-DEM time-series scores on corruption and numerous other aspects of politics and government, and also incorporates data on news reports of corruption in the American states, to minimize the risk (in the U.S. case at least) of treating corruption as a single monolithic national characteristic.

Methodological issues are important but should not obscure the valuable core argument of the book: Corruption is not just a law-enforcement or administrative-process problem at any one given time, nor is it solely a function of the other sorts of political and economic influences one might approximate using national-level indicators. It is, rather, a deeply embedded and long-term aspect of relationships between state and society; politics and the economy; opportunities and constraints upon the pursuit of self-interest; and the administrative, economic, and political capacity of the state to establish and maintain an effective and legitimate system of public order.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271900046X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Mass education is arguably implicated in all of those relationships and tensions, both as an influence and as an outcome. Looked at that way, it is not surprising that long-term trends in education might have major and persistent effects upon corruption—and upon much else. Therein lies the most important anti-corruption lesson of *The Historical Roots of Corruption*: not (of course) to somehow go back to 1870 and build schools, but rather to look at education, corruption control, and many other policy and political processes as ways to build long-term demand, and support, for open, fair, and honest government in society at large. For drawing attention to these large-scale and long-term phenomena, Uslaner is to be congratulated.

Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of India. By Pradeep K. Chhibber and Rahul Verma. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 336p. $99.00 cloth, $31.95 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592719000781

— Simon Chauchard, *Columbia University*

Partisan politics is often said to have little to do with ideology in India. Pradeep Chhibber and Rahul Verma's impressive new book is intended to bury this perception, and in the process unpack the role of ideology in Indian politics. This makes it both a remarkable and an original addition to the rapidly accumulating scholarship on India, and as such, one that is required reading for all analysts of Indian politics.

Political scientists working on Indian elections over the past 20 years have largely overlooked ideology in their analyses. Most scholars have instead emphasized the role of ethnicity, patronage, vote buying, corruption, and to a lesser extent, personalistic politics. Those few scholars who have actively asked whether India's party system could be defined as ideological may in turn have made too much of the fact that the main parties have implemented similar macroeconomic policies, and not enough of the fact that they might have differed on other—yet to be labeled—dimensions.

Chhibber and Verma take on this ambitious task in *Ideology and Identity*. The authors adapt to India the argument on party systems that Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan once famously put forth about Western Europe. After convincingly showing that Western European cleavages are irrelevant to the Indian context, the authors name the cleavages around which partisan conflict tends to be structured in the long run in India, as well as the historical events that first led to these durable lines of fracture. The first cleavage is around the "politics of statism" (the extent to which the state preserves social norms or attempts to change them), while the second is around the "politics of recognition" (whether and how the state accommodates minorities). They also argue that these divisions have their origins in the foundational debates that took place in the country around independence, and that they have remained stable ever since, both among elites and voters. In that sense, the suggestion is that Indian politics may never have really recovered from the foundational debates among Gandhi, B. R. Ambedkar, Nehru, and other elites around a small number of key issues, such as the need for reservations policies.

The authors draw on an impressive array of data to test their argument. Relying on data from the National Election Study, they show in Chapter 2 that supporters of the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) diverged on these two dimensions in 2014. More generally, they show that preference for the BJP was correlated to beliefs about statism and recognition. Later in the book, they show that the relative stands of the main political parties on these two dimensions have been relatively stable over time (Chapter 8). In a welcome departure from stereotypical readings of Indian politics, Chhibber and Verma reinterpret party politics in India since 1970 in terms of ideology. They show that the demise of the Congress Party, which their tests show to be stably centrist on both dimensions (the party is often referred to as "catch-all"), may have to do with the party's ideological positioning. In short, the party's tenacious hold on the center progressively opened spaces on its flanks on either or both aforementioned ideological dimensions. These are precisely the areas in which both regional parties and the BJP invested. In that sense, the authors show that it might be wrong to think of regional parties as non-ideological. Insofar as their emergence is owing to a disagreement with Congress on one of these ideological dimensions, they may be aptly described as ideological themselves (Chapter 9). More generally, spectacular changes in India's party system over the years, though they are rarely characterized as such, may have everything to do with ideological positioning in a two-dimensional space. And a party's survival may have more to do with its strategic positioning in that space than is traditionally thought.

Additional chapters advance other aspects of the argument. Drawing on archival sources, chapter 3 retraces the origins of these cleavages in the Constituent Assembly, and before. Chapter 5 effectively challenges the idea that Indian elections can be reduced to clientelism. Making use of a remarkable assemblage of data, the authors show that elected politicians may have less to give than is commonly argued, have no real ability to monitor voters, and probably have too few resources to generate an effective quid pro quo system with voters. Meanwhile, voters have no clear sense of who delivers a benefit and where to attribute it, and their ideology correlates much more strongly with political behavior than gifts and goodies do. Chapter 6 provides welcome evidence for the role of national leaders in this picture, since preferences for specific leaders emerge as the prime motivation