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Conditions of civilian control in new democracies: an empirical analysis of 28 'third wave' democracies

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Institutionalizing civilian control over the military is a crucial challenge for newly democratized nations. This paper aims to answer the question under which conditions civilian control can be established after the transition to democracy, and under which conditions civilian control fails. To answer this question, we draw on original data on civil–military relations in 28 new democracies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America and run a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis. We find that no single explanatory factor can be considered necessary for the success or failure of civilian control in new democracies, but identify a number of sufficient variable combinations to explain the development of civil–military relations after the transition to democracy.

Keywords: civilian control; democratization; military; fuzzy sets; QCA

Introduction

Reforming civil–military relations and institutionalizing civilian control of the military is a crucial challenge for all post-authoritarian systems. Despite this, empirical research on civil–military relations in political regimes that find themselves in a transition from dictatorship to democracy remains rare (Bruneau and Matei, 2012). Furthermore, there is a rich literature on the causes of military intervention into politics, but little theorizing on the evolution of civilian control in consolidating democracies, and existing theories fail to specify the causal mechanisms through which the purported causal factors affect civil–military relations in new democracies.

In another contribution, we have proposed a fully specified causal model that systematically combines the 'structure' of causal factors and the 'agency' of relevant actors. According to this model, the strength of control over the armed forces in new democracies depends on the ability of civilian elites to enforce institutional change through 'control strategies' (Croissant *et al.*, 2013). These control strategies are the mechanism through which civilian control works. However, they can only be employed successfully if civilians can draw on the required resources. This raises the question if there are certain resources, or combinations thereof, that are necessary or sufficient conditions for civilians to employ control strategies successfully.

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This article proposes a first answer to this question. It proceeds in five steps. The first section presents the conceptual framework to trace the development of civil–military relations in new democracies.[1] The next section summarizes the theoretical argument. The third section outlines the research design and methodology of the empirical analysis. The penultimate section presents the results of a *fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis* (fsQCA) of 28 new democracies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. The final section summarizes and evaluates the empirical evidence, and discusses fruitful avenues for further research.

Conceptualizing civilian control of the military in new democracies

Until recently, most of the literature equated civilian control with the absence of military *coup d'états*. However, this ignores that 'military or security forces today are more likely to endanger democracy by lessening its quality and depth than by threatening its outright and swift overthrow' (Agüero, 2009: 60). The *de facto* political power of militaries that emerges from their ability to engage in collective action or to use brute force (North *et al.*, 2009: 170) enables them to limit the effective power of democratically elected authorities to govern, even without supplanting governments (Valenzuela, 1992). Therefore, civilian control over the military should be conceptualized as a gradual phenomenon. Moreover, to analytically capture different aspects of civil–military relations it is necessary to delineate different areas or dimensions of civil–military relations. Building on previous works by Colton (1979) and Trinkunas (2005), Croissant *et al.* (2010) conceptualize civilian control as a continuum of the distribution of decision-making power between the military leadership and civilian elites over five substantive decision-making areas: elite recruitment (ER); public policy (PP); internal security (IS); national defense (ND); and military organization (MO).[2] Full political control exists when civilian leaders enjoy uncontested decision-making power in all five areas, while in the ideal-type military regime, soldiers rule over all five areas.

The degree of civilian control in each area depends on the existence of institutions that enable civilians to exert their authority *vis-à-vis* the military. By identifying the extent to which effective civilian institutions have been established, civilian control over each area can be measured ordinally with three intensities: high, medium, and low. Civilian control in a given area is high if the military does not enjoy formal prerogatives and does not contest civilian authority. It is medium if the armed forces, due to formal regulations or informal challenges to the civilian leadership, enjoy political privileges

[1] Civilians are the non-military members of the government and legislature with the authority to formulate, implement, and oversee political decisions. The military includes all state-organized and uniformed armed services which share three defining criteria: (1) they possess the monopoly over weapons of war; (2) their primary purpose is the defense of the nation-state and its citizens against external military threats; and (3) they are legalized and legitimized as instruments of the state (Edmonds, 1988).

[2] We provide a full summary of the five areas and the respective indicators of civilian control in online Appendix 1.

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but are unable to monopolize them; or if civilian decision-making authority is not institutionalized but depends on the personal rapport of civilians with the military. Civilian control is low if the military dominates decision-making or implementation in that area. By evaluating the degree of civilian control over each of the five areas, it is possible to identify the level of civilian control in a given country at a given point in time, as well as track changes over time and identify cross-country differences.

Explaining civilian control

While civil–military relations research has produced various arguments on the causal efficacy of individual causal factors, there are few theoretical models that clearly specify causal mechanisms through which these factors affect the degree of civilian control in new democracies (Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011). In a previous publication we have developed a theoretical model that specifies a causal mechanism and combines the 'structure' of causal factors and the 'agency' of relevant actors into a coherent explanatory argument (Croissant *et al.*, 2013).

The causal mechanism

Analytically, the theoretical argument centers on civilians as relevant actors who do or do not initiate change in civil–military relations (see also Agüero, 1995; Trinkunas, 2005). The argument starts from the finding that civilian control of the military is a relevant political goal for all new democracies, including those that developed from civilian dictatorships. During and after the transition from authoritarian rule, civilians must eliminate the military's remaining prerogatives and establish new or strengthen existing institutions of effective civilian control. Institutional change in civil–military relations, however, will only be successful if the military complies with civilian reform initiatives. The success or failure of institutionalizing civilian control can be explained by the political elites' ability to contain the military's political power through 'control strategies', which make the military comply with their political decisions and reduce the armed forces' 'disposition and opportunity' (Finer, 1962) to resist them.

Civilian strategies vary in the extent of coercion applied against the military and the degree of intrusion into military autonomy. A strategy is *robust* if it includes a coercive element and intrudes deeply into military autonomy. This includes strategies such as sanctioning, counterbalancing, and monitoring the military. Conversely, a strategy is *weak* if it neither uses coercion nor intrudes deeply into internal military issues. This includes, for instance attempts to appease the military by offering corporate or personal political, material and ideational benefits to the military. Strategies of *intermediate* robustness are intrusive but do not include a coercive element, such as selecting the military leadership based on political instead of professional considerations.

We expect that robust strategies have a more profound and lasting impact on the military's opportunity and disposition to counter civilian control than weaker

strategies (see also Trinkunas, 2005): monitoring military conduct closely and punishing transgressions raises the costs of opposing the civilians and thus reduces the military's incentives as well as their capabilities for defending institutional prerogatives and contesting political leaders. Intermediate strategies, in contrast, might reduce the military's disposition to contest new rules of civilian control but do not impose costs for subversive behavior. Finally, weak strategies neither punish military opposition nor do they mold the military's preferences, but rather accept the military's political demands and thus solidify the *status quo* and reward opportunistic behavior; hence, they do not significantly weaken the military's disposition and capability to resist institutional change.

The conditions of civilian control strategies

Political leaders' decisions to employ specific control strategies and their effects do not occur in an historical or political vacuum, but are affected by the resources available to civilians: robust strategies require a better endowment with material and institutional resources, such as political capital, institutional channels, time, or expert knowledge (Trinkunas, 2005). This means that even though robust strategies may grant civilians the best leverage against the military, they will not always succeed in enforcing civilian control. In fact, an all-too-robust approach can have unintended consequences and might lead the military to openly challenge civilian authority if civilians do not possess sufficient resources to back up their attempts to enforce military compliance. Hence, civilians might need to resort to weaker strategies.

Therefore, we expect that the strategic choices of civilians are mainly determined by the specific context they are faced with: civilians will choose robust strategies if resources are plenty and weaker strategies if resources are scarce. 'Context', of course, is a very encompassing category and the list of all possible substantive factors that have been considered to affect civil–military relations is very long (Feaver, 1999; Pion-Berlin, 2001; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Kuehn, 2013). However, not all of these potentially relevant factors can or should be integrated into a single explanatory model. Consequently, we only include potentially relevant factors into the analysis that fulfill three requisites. First, they must refer to the 'structure' in which civil–military interactions take place; actors' behavior, their preferences or the control strategies themselves cannot be a condition. Second, they must be able to affect civil–military relations as resources for rational, strategic choices for control strategies; this excludes all ideational factors such as normative convictions of the officer corps or the civilian decision-makers. Third, theoretical expectations concerning the effects of a given condition must be consistent.[3]

A critical survey of the literature leaves five factors that could plausibly affect the successful application of civilian control strategies (Croissant *et al.*, 2011,

[3] This excludes, for instance, the existence of external security threats, which some authors hold to be conducive for firm civilian control (e.g., Desch, 1999), while others argue the opposite (e.g., Agüero, 1995).

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2013): (1) the absence of domestic security threats; (2) strong international support for democratic reforms; (3) a strong civil society; (4) the pre-existence of some effective institutions of civilian control before the transition to democracy; (5) and the degree of consolidation of the overall democratic institutions:

1. *Internal security threats* and domestic armed conflict make civilians dependent on the military's coercive capacities and thus reduce the willingness and ability of civilians to employ robust control strategies (Alagappa, 2001). Consequently, we expect that the absence of domestic security threats is a condition for the strengthening of civilian control and that internal security threats lead to weak civilian control.
2. If *external actors support* the establishment of civilian control, this increases civilians' ability to employ more robust control strategies and enact them successfully (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2008). Therefore, we expect that international support contributes to the strengthening of civilian control.
3. A strong *civil society* allows civilians to pursue more robust strategies, as it 'constitute[s] a powerful safeguard against military intervention' (Belkin and Schofer, 2003: 605; Caparini *et al.*, 2006). Consequently, we expect that a well-developed civil society leads to the strengthening of civilian control institutions.
4. Civilians will find it easier to employ robust control strategies if they can rely on *existing institutions of civilian control* that have been established during the authoritarian regime (Agüero, 1995; Cottey *et al.*, 2002). Thus, we expect that the historical legacies of a former civilian dictatorship will lead to strong civilian control, while legacies of military rule will lead to weak civilian control.
5. Finally, the literature suggests that civilians will be better able to employ robust control strategies if the broader process of *democratic consolidation* supports them, that is, when institutional checks-and-balances limit executive power, popular support for democracy is strong, and unified political elites agree not to pull the military into politics (Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Serra, 2010).

To reiterate, these factors do not affect the degree of civilian control directly, but they are mediated through civilian control strategies. Furthermore, the context in which civilians decide on their control strategies is complex: individual factors might interact in complex causal ways or even offset each other, and causal relations between individual context factors and the outcome of civil–military relations might be asymmetric, such that some factors are sufficient for civilians to successfully employ robust control strategies, whereas others are necessary. As of now, civil–military relations theory is too weak to solve these issues analytically and to generate clear and unambiguous causal hypotheses beyond the expectations formulated above. This has implications for the most appropriate methodological approach to test the theoretical argument.

Research design and methodology

In principle, the proposed causal mechanism suggests empirical testing through in-depth case studies that trace the development of civil–military relations in

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individual countries. While such a 'process tracing' approach would provide strong evidence at the *within-case level* concerning the causal mechanisms, it would not be able to make robust statements at the *cross-case level* (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). After having found some robust but preliminary evidence for the relevance of control strategies as a causal mechanism in seven 'third wave' democracies in South, East, and Southeast Asia (Croissant *et al.*, 2013), we think the next step in testing the theoretical argument should be based on a systematic *cross-case* analysis. First, a systematic cross-case analysis needs to identify the causal conditions and their relationship to the development of civil–military interactions in new democracies. Second, based on the cross-case results, cases could be selected for further in-detail study to provide additional tests of the proposed causal mechanism.

For such a first systematic cross-case analysis, fsQCA provides the adequate methodological tools: the method was designed to identify multi-causal and equifinal relationships between causal conditions and the observed outcomes and aims at identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions under which an outcome occurs or not (Ragin, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Furthermore, other than statistic regression analyses, fsQCA does not require the *a priori* specification of the expected causal interactions of individual variables, and neither assumes linear causal addition nor causal symmetry. Rather, fsQCA allows for the inductive identification of complex causal combinations, interactions between causally relevant factors, asymmetric causal relations, and varying effects depending on the combination of factors. This is in line with our research goal and fits our expectations that civilian control strategies may be influenced by different combinations of contextual conditions.

Case selection

In order to maximize the robustness and generalizability of our findings, we ideally should evaluate the development of civil–military relations in all newly democratized nations. Since tracing civil–military relations along the five dimensions introduced above requires in-depth research, and fsQCA relies on profound familiarity with the cases, we decided to draw on a stratified subset of all 'third wave' democracies. Cases to be included were chosen based on a three-step selection approach: first, we identified as the universe of cases all countries with a population of at least 500,000 that have made the transition to democracy between 1974 and 2010 according to the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2013).[4] From these, we purged all externally induced and supervised transitions (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor), as well as countries with no permanent armed forces (Haiti, Panama). We further removed countries with 3 years or less

[4] A regime qualifies as 'democracy' if it displays a Polity value of +6 or higher. In order to identify the time of the transition, we chose the first year in which the Polity value was >5 in the 1974–2010 period. Periods of transition (coded -88 in the Polity data) were included if the Polity value was at least 6 after this period.

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Table 1. Case selection

	Africa	Asia	Europe	Latin America
Former military regime	Nigeria	Pakistan	Greece	Brazil
	Liberia	Indonesia	Portugal	Honduras
	Sudan	South Korea	Turkey	Nicaragua
	Mali	Thailand		Peru
Former civilian regime	South Africa	Nepal	Poland	Mexico
	Zambia	Philippines	Romania	
	Senegal	Sri Lanka	Soviet Union	
	Namibia	Taiwan		
	Czech Republic			

of democratic rule during the research period. This yielded a total of 67 countries from all geographical regions except Northwestern Europe (see online Appendix 2). Second, we differentiated these 67 countries into four world regions: Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Third, we classified countries in each of these groups based on the type of the outgoing authoritarian regime into military-led and civilian dictatorships based on Geddes *et al.* (2014). From each sub-group, we selected four countries for empirical analysis, except for those regions where the diversity of authoritarian regime types was limited, where we selected all military/former civilian regimes (see Table 1).

While not a selection criterion, it is worth mentioning that this sample also maximizes heterogeneity with respect to the outcome of institutionalizing civilian control, and in terms of the outcome of the democratization process at large. It includes stable democracies, where civilians were able to gain full control over the military (e.g., Greece, Taiwan, Portugal, and Poland), and countries where the failure to establish civilian control contributed to the sudden breakdown of democracy (e.g., Mali, Pakistan, Honduras, and Thailand).

Operationalizing civilian control of the military

To evaluate the degree of civilian control, we undertook extensive and in-depth surveys of the scholarly literature on civil–military relations for each of the countries. While the quantity and quality of the existing scholarship is uneven, at least 15 articles, book chapters, and monographs were consulted for each country. These data were complemented by additional information gathered from legal texts, interviews, and newspaper articles. Based on these data, we inductively identified 'phases' of civil–military relations in which significant changes in the degree of civilian control took place. Each of these phases constitutes a single 'case' for the analysis. All in all, this yields a total of 57 cases (see online Appendix 2). For countries that experienced a breakdown of democracy in the period under review (e.g., Russia, which Polity codes democratic from 2000 to 2007), or with multiple breakdowns of and transitions to democracy (e.g., Sri Lanka, from 2001 to 2003,

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and again from 2006 to 2010), we only included the democratic spells as 'phases' in the analysis.

The transformation of this qualitative information into coherent fuzzy set membership scores of the degree of civilian control in a given 'phase' followed a three-step approach. First, each ordinal value received a suitable fuzzy set score: low civilian control was coded 0, medium as 0.4, and high civilian control as 1. Second, the individual indicator values were aggregated into five sub-values of civilian control, one for each decision-making area [ER; PP; IS; ND; MO] by averaging their scores. Finally, we calculated the mean of these five values to receive a single measure of civilian control for each case. While all five areas matter for civilian control, we consent with recent scholarship on civil–military relations (Pion-Berlin, 1992; Trinkunas, 2005) that certain decision-making arenas are more important than others, depending on their proximity to the core of a civilian government's function. To capture this, we combine the individual scores as a weighted average of the fuzzy set values of the five decision-making areas. Given that, on the one hand, civilian dominance over the rules and processes of elite recruitment (ER) is central for democracy, but on the other hand, even the complete absence of military influence over these matters is insufficient for fully fledged civilian control, we weigh it such that full civilian control over ER in combination with at least some degree of civilian control over the other areas is sufficient for the case to be a member of the set of countries with 'civilian control' (i.e., an aggregate fuzzy score of 0.5 or more). Similarly, civilian control over PP and IS is more relevant to the overall degree of civilian control than civilian control over ND and MO.[5] This yields the following formula for the overall membership value in the set 'civilian control':[6]

$$\frac{ER \times 5 + PP \times 2 + IS \times 2 + ND + MO}{11}$$

Operationalizing the conditions of civilian control

Our model includes five conditions that affect the ability of elected civilians to employ control strategies and thus strengthen civilian control: internal security threats; international support; civil society; authoritarian civilian control institutions; and democratic consolidation:[7]

i. We operationalize *internal security threats* (inthreat) based on the CONIAS dataset (Schwank, 2013). This dataset includes country-year data on domestic conflicts for all

[5] The formula suggests that, mathematically, a case could be in the set of full civilian control even if there was no civilian influence on ER, but complete control over all other areas. This is, however, a conceptual artifact without any empirical relevance. For a comprehensive substantiation of these arguments, see Alagappa (2001), Trinkunas (2005), Croissant *et al.* (2011, 2013).

[6] See online Appendix 3 for an overview of the fuzzy scores of the decision-making areas and the weighted average outcome for each case.

[7] The data on which the operationalization of the conditions is based is in country-year format. To construct the membership scores, we rely on different aggregation rules of country-year observations within a given phase according to the conceptual definitions of the individual conditions.

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cases and differentiates five intensities of conflict, from 1 (non-violent latent conflict) to 5 (civil war). We calibrate 'inthreat' according to the conceptual thresholds of the CONIAS dataset: we code the absence of internal armed conflicts (CONIAS value 1) as absence of a substantial internal threat (fuzzy score 0). We consider limited or all-out internal wars (CONIAS values 4 or 5) as the presence of a meaningful internal threat (fuzzy value 1). Following CONIAS, we define the degree of violence as the central criterion for set membership of meaningful vs. not meaningful internal threat (fuzzy score 0.5). Consequently, we code non-violent crises (CONIAS intensity of 2) as more in the set of 'no meaningful threats' (fuzzy score 0.3), and low intensity conflict (CONIAS value of 3) as more in the set of 'meaningful threats' (fuzzy score 0.7). As we expect civilians to be risk averse, we draw on the maximum intensity a conflict reaches in a given phase to code the complete phase.

ii. The literature on civil–military relations suggests different forms of support civilians can receive from external actors, ranging from aid, international military co-operation, to membership in supranational organizations (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2008). In order to capture this broad range of international influence, we operationalize the condition 'intif' as an index of three individual conditions: (1) membership or credible expectation of membership, based on the beginning of membership application procedures, in NATO or the EU as organizations that demand strict civilian control of the military from member states (Barany, 1997).[8] We code the condition as a crisp set (i.e., score of either 1 or 0), with 1 denoting (credible expectation of) membership, and 0 denoting non-membership in either organization. (2) The presence of US military forces in the country as a proxy indicator of direct military co-operation, based on the Global US Troop Deployment dataset (Kane, 2004). We code this partial condition as a crisp set, with presence of US military troops in at least half the years of the phase sufficient to count the case within the set of cases with presence of US troops (membership score 1), otherwise, we code the case as outside that set (score 0). (3) The literature also suggests that a country's trade or aid dependence can be used by external donors or trade partners to push for stronger civilian control. We measure international leverage as the sum of trade and aid ratios, drawing on World Bank data (Wahman *et al.*, 2013). We code this partial condition as a crisp set: a case belongs to the set of high dependency countries (membership score 1) if the average sum of trade and aid ratios within a phase is 0.5 or higher, otherwise, we code the case as outside that set (score 0). Because the literature is too weak to generate robust expectations on the interrelationship between these forms of international support, we assume first, that international influence will have a stronger impact on the ability of civilians to employ robust strategies the more forms of international influence combine; and second, that each of these partial conditions contributes equally to the overall degree of international influence. Consequently, we code the index condition 'intif' as fully out of the set of countries with high international influence (fuzzy score 0) if the sum

[8] Other regional organizations in the Americas, Asia, and Africa are less strict in minimal requirements for democracy or civilian control (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2008).

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of the fuzzy scores of the three partial conditions is 0, we code it 0.3 (more out of the set) if the sum is 1, we code it 0.7 (more in the set) if the sum is 2, and we code it 1 (fully in the set 1), if the sum is 3.

iii. The operationalization of the strength of civil society (civsoc) follows Belkin and Schofer (2003: 606). They suggest that in the absence of direct and reliable data on the strength of domestic civil society organizations, the 'number of associational memberships that individuals and groups maintain in international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs)' is a reliable proxy indicator. To measure this indicator, we draw on the annual data handbooks of the Union of International Associations (various issues). Missing data was interpolated linearly. Because there are no substantively or conceptually sound justifications for qualitative set membership thresholds, we follow Schneider and Wagemann's (2012: 36) suggestion to identify notable 'gaps' in the empirical distribution and use them as 'qualitative anchors'. Plotting the number of INGO memberships (online Appendix 4), we found three such 'steps' in the distribution, and defined the center of these 'gaps' as the thresholds. Thus, we defined 756 INGOs as the threshold for being out of the set of strong civil society (fuzzy score 0), while the fuzzy score 0.5 is located at 2370, and 4339 marking full membership in the set of countries with strong civil societies (fuzzy score 1). Based on these qualitative anchors, we then coded the condition according to Ragin's 'direct' logistic transformation method of calibration (Ragin, 2008).

iv. In the absence of reliable data on the degree of civilian control under authoritarian regimes we operationalize the legacies of the authoritarian institutions of civilian control as a proxy condition (autinst) developed from the type and the degree of institutionalization of the last regime prior to the transition to democracy: (1) in military regimes the institutions for controlling the military-as-institution are less developed and effective than in civilian dictatorships (Agüero, 1995). The measurement of regime type draws on the classification of military or civilian dictatorship by Cheibub *et al.* (2010). (2) Personal rulers assure control over the military less by institutional means but informally and through patron–client relations. Consequently, democracies that follow a personalist regime cannot make use of institutional resources, but have to build them up from scratch, which poses greater challenges to the employment of robust control strategies. We measure personalization of authoritarian rule based on the Geddes *et al.* (2014) dataset, and consider all regimes that include the 'personal' characteristic as personalized, all others as institutionalized regimes. Combining these two dimensions, we expect that personalized military regimes will provide the least institutional resources for post-authoritarian governments and code them as fully out of the set of cases with authoritarian control institutions (membership score 0). Institutionalized, non-personal civilian dictatorships are coded as fully in that set (score 1); institutionalized military regimes are more in the set (score 0.7) and personalized civilian regimes are more out of the set (score 0.3).

v. Democratic consolidation denotes a complex and multi-dimensional process that involves multiple analytical and substantive levels, including the consolidation of

democratic institutions, the interactions and patterns of conflict of political elites, and the expectations and trust in the democratic institutions of the mass public (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Moreover, because consolidation is generally considered to be a process, it is hard to specify exactly when it has occurred (Svolik, 2008). In order to operationalize this concept, we draw on the age of the democratic regime as a necessarily crude proxy indicator for the degree of consolidation.[9] This is substantively based on Rustow's (1970) argument, that democratic institutions and actors' expectations and behavior become stable over time. In defining the relevant qualitative thresholds, we draw on recent research on military coups, which finds that in new democracies coups are particularly likely to occur in the first 5 years after the transition to democracy, while 'the risk of a coup almost disappears once a democracy survives for two decades' (Svolik, 2014: 5). Consequently, we code the age of the democratic regime at the end of each phase: all democracies 5 years or younger are considered to be fully out of the set of consolidated democracies (fuzzy score 0), while democracies aged 20 years or older are coded as fully in that set (fuzzy score 1). The qualitative cut-off (fuzzy score 0.5) was defined as a democratic age of 10 years, which is based substantively on Valenzuela's (1992) argument that the minimum threshold for democratic consolidation is that at least one democratic election has taken place after the founding elections. Based on these qualitative anchors, we then coded the condition according to the 'direct method of calibration'. In the following, we denote this condition as 'age'.[10]

Results of the empirical analysis

This section presents the results of the fuzzy-set analysis of post-transition civil–military relations in 28 third wave democracies. As specified by Schneider and Wagemann (2012), we conduct independent analyses for the outcomes 'civilian control' and 'absence of civilian control'. All calculations were implemented with the *QCA 1.1–4 for R* (Duşa and Thiem, 2014).[11]

[9] This, of course, is a very general measure of the degree of democratic consolidation, and there are other overtly political variables that affect the political strength of democratic incumbents who need to institutionalize their control over their militaries, such as political party strength, the strength of party coalitions surrounding the incumbent government, or the strength of mass support for democracy. While some of these indicators will be made available to the public by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)-Project in 2016 (https://v-dem.net/en/), at the time of conducting this analysis, there are just too many missing data for many of the more fine-grained indicators to produce reliable and valid measures. In addition, using a broader selection of variables and partial indicators and the construction of a new, composite indicator for democratic consolidation may create problems of reverse causality and aggregation problems.

[10] Online Appendix 3 summarizes the membership scores for the conditions of all cases; online Appendix 4 shows the distribution of the raw data for the two conditions that were coded based on the 'direct method of calibration'; Appendices 5 and 6 show the distribution of fuzzy scores for the outcome and all conditions, and *XY*-Plots for the outcome and each conditions, respectively.

[11] The R code and the full dataset are available for replication purposes through the corresponding author. The R code also includes a number of additional calculations, and statistical, set-theoretical, and visual tests to ensure the robustness of the findings.

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Table 2. Summary of conditions for civilian control

Condition	Expected direction of causality
Strength of internal security threats (inthreat)	Absence of meaningful threats positively affects the ability and willingness of elected civilians to employ control strategies and thus strengthens civilian control
Strength of international influence (intif)	Presence of strong international influence positively affects the ability and willingness of civilian governments to employ control strategies and thus strengthens civilian control
Strength of civil society	Presence of strong civil society positively affects the ability and willingness of civilian governments to employ control strategies and thus strengthens civilian control
Authoritarian institutions of civilian control (autinst)	Presence of authoritarian control institutions positively affects the ability and willingness of civilian governments to employ control strategies and thus strengthens civilian control
Degree of democratic consolidation (age)	The presence of a high degree of democratic consolidation positively affects the ability and willingness of civilian governments to employ control strategies and thus strengthens civilian control

Conditions for civilian control

The first step in any QCA analysis is to test if any of the conditions might be *necessary*. In fsQCA, a condition is necessary if the outcome can be described as a consistent subset of a condition. Following Ragin (2000), we set the minimal consistency benchmark for necessity at a level of 0.9. We find that none among the five conditions or their negations is a necessary condition for the presence of civilian control. This is an important empirical finding, as it not only corroborates our expectations, but also goes against the tendency in some of the literature to consider certain variables as preconditions for civilian control (Barany, 2012).

To identify sufficient conditions, that is, those causal factors or combinations of factors that bring the outcome about, we create a *truth table*, which assigns each case to exactly one of the 2^k logically possible combinations of conditions (so called 'types', which define the rows in the truth table), with k being the number of conditions. For our set of cases, the truth table has $2^5 = 32$ rows. Table 2 reproduces an abbreviated truth table for the outcome civilian control, purged from all logical types for which there are no empirical cases. Table 2 shows that the 57 cases are distributed over 20 out of the 32 logically possible combinations of conditions. The remaining 12 types are 'logical remainders', that is configurations of conditions for which there are no empirical cases. To identify the conditions or combination of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome civilian control, we need to define a minimal consistency value, which should not be smaller than 0.75 (Ragin, 2000). Inspecting the truth table, we notice a substantial drop in consistency between types 26 and 18. Including cases below that threshold would significantly reduce overall consistency of the solution. Consequently, we decided to set the consistency cut-off

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Table 3. Truth table for the outcome civilian control[a]

Type	inthreat	autinst	civsoc	age	intif	outcome	*N*	Consistency	Cases
16	0	1	1	1	1	1	3	1.00	CZE1, KOR3, POL2
31	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1.00	BRA3
8	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	1.00	PRT3, ROU1
15	0	1	1	1	0	1	2	1.00	BRA2, TWN2
14	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.99	POL1
21	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.98	PER4
27	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	0.97	NAM1, PER3
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	0.96	GRC1, MEX1, ZAF2, THA2, TUR2, TUR3
20	1	0	0	1	1	1	2	0.94	MLI2, PHL1
24	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	0.93	IDN3, PHL2
22	1	0	1	0	1	1	2	0.93	IDN2, RUS1
28	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	0.92	NIC2, TUR1
12	0	1	0	1	1	1	3	0.90	HND4, HND5, KOR2
26	1	1	0	0	1	1	6	0.89	NPL1, NPL2, NIC1, LKA1, LKA2, THA1
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	4	0.78	IDN1, LBR1, MLI1, PRT1
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	0.78	NGA1, NGA2, PER1, PER2, ZAF1
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.76	PAK1, SDN1
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.72	BRA1, TWN1
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.70	PRT2
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	6	0.66	CZK1, HND1, HND2, HND3, KOR1, ZMB1

inthreat = internal threat; autinst = authoritarian institutions; civsoc = strength of civil society; age = democracy's age; intif = international influence.

[a]*Type* identifies a given combination of conditions; *n* specifies the number of cases that fall into a given type; *outcome* states if the cases that fall under a given type exhibit the outcome civilian control (1) or not (0); *consistency* gives the consistency value; *cases* shows the id number of the cases that fall under a given type as shown in Appendix 3.

at 0.8 and only include the rows above that threshold in the Boolean minimization to identify the sufficient (combinations of) conditions for the outcome civilian control. The minimization produces a 'complex solution' of eight individual combinations of conditions, which is highly consistent (0.867) and covers a relatively broad range of the cases (coverage 0.755; see Table A in Appendix 7).

To reduce the complexity of these results, we follow Ragin (2008: 160–175) and derive the 'intermediate solution' by specifying assumptions about the expected effect of the individual conditions on the outcome. Based on our theoretical discussion above, we assume that the presence of each individual condition will contribute to civilian control, except the presence of an internal threat, which we expect will lead to the absence of civilian control. This yields a solution term that identifies one individual condition (the presence of a strong civil society, CIVSOC) and three combinations (democratic consolidation together with international influence,

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Table 4. Intermediate solution of sufficient conditions for civilian control[a]

Intermediate solution term: CIVSOC + AGE*INTIF + AUTINST*AGE + INTHREAT*AUTINST*INTIF				
		Coverage		
Sufficient combination	Consistency	Raw	Unique	Cases
CIVSOC	0.919	0.470	0.065	CZE1, KOR3, POL2, BRA3, PRT3, ROU1, BRA2, TWN2, POL1, PER4, GRC1, MEX1, ZAF2, THA2, TUR2, TUR3, IDN3, PHL2, IDN2, RUS1
AGE*INTIF	0.891	0.510	0.054	CZE1, KOR3, POL2, PRT3, ROU1, GRC1, MEX1, ZAF2, THA2, TUR2, TUR3, MLI2, PHL1, IDN3, PHL2, NIC2, TUR1, HND4, HND5, KOR2
AUTINST*AGE	0.886	0.460	0.036	CZE1, KOR3, POL2, BRA3, BRA2, TWN2, NAM1, PER3, GRC1, MEX1, ZAF2, THA2, TUR2, TUR3, NIC2, TUR1, HND4, HND5, KOR2
INTHREAT*AUTINST*INTIF	0.873	0.421	0.129	GRC1, MEX1, ZAF2, THA2, TUR2, TUR3, NIC2, TUR1, BRA3, NPL2, NIC1, LKA1, LKA2, THA1

Intermediate solution consistency: 0.855.
Intermediate solution coverage: 0.803.
inthreat = internal threat; autinst = authoritarian institutions; civsoc = strength of civil society; age = democracy's age; intif = international influence.
[a]Capital letters in the column 'Sufficient combination' indicates that the presence of the combination is sufficient for the outcome; * denotes logical AND; + denotes logical OR.

AGE*INTIF; existing authoritarian control institutions and democratic consolidation, AUTINST*AGE; and the combination of high internal threat, the presence of existing control institutions of the authoritarian regime and international support, INTHREAT*AUTINST*INTIF) as individually sufficient for civilian control. The overall solution consistency of 0.855 and overall coverage of 0.803 indicate a good model fit. We summarize the full solution term along with consistency and coverage values and the cases that are members of each partial solution in Table 4.[12]

The findings suggest five conclusions concerning the theoretical expectations formulated above. First, as expected, there is no single condition to explain the establishment of civilian control in new democracies. Instead, different institutional and structural variables can serve civilians as resources to successfully enact control strategies. This is also underscored by the fact that the four different partial solutions each have a relatively small unique coverage term, which indicates a high degree of overlap between the different (combinations of) conditions. Second, all conditions discussed above are part of the solution term. This means that all of them

[12] For completeness, we reproduce the most parsimonious solution in Table B of online Appendix 7.

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can provide civilians with the necessary institutional, structural, and political resources to enforce their authority over a hesitant military.

Third, only the existence of a strong civil society suffices on its own for the strengthening of civilian control in new democracies. All other conditions are only efficacious in combination with each other: solid democratic consolidation can unfold its positive influence on civilians' ability to employ robust control only if combined with strong international support or if civilians can also make use of the existing institutions of civilian control that are the historical legacies of the preceding authoritarian regime. Similarly, the existence of historical legacies of civilian control can only provide sufficient resources if combined with international support or an overall smooth process of democratic consolidation. We cannot answer why exactly these combinations and not others are sufficient for civilian control in new democracies because the cross-case fsQCA does not shed light on within-case causal processes. Similarly, the current state of civil–military relations theory does not provide sufficient explanatory leverage to answer this question. Consequently, we consider our study as an explorative step in better understanding the conditions of civilian control and their interaction, which requires further and more qualitative process-oriented research.

Fourth, four of the five conditions work in the theoretically expected directions and there are no contradictions in the causal efficacy of a strong civil society, existing authoritarian control institutions, democratic consolidation, and international influence.

Fifth, it is only in the fourth combination that an unexpected relationship is observed, with the presence of an internal threat being part of one partial solution term: the combination of internal security threats, existing authoritarian institutions, and international support is sufficient for the existence of civilian control. 37 out of 57 cases in our analysis (65%) are confronted with an internal security threat, of which 23 (62%) do belong to the set of cases with civilian control. At this point there is no plausible explanation for this finding, as both the theoretical literature as well as our previous empirical research (Croissant *et al.*, 2013) strongly indicates a detrimental effect of internal threats on civilians' ability to establish civilian control. This finding, therefore, sheds some doubt on the conventional wisdom and strongly demands further qualitative research.

To test the robustness and validity of these findings, it is useful to visually inspect the distribution of cases in an *XY*-graph that plots the membership of each case in the solution term against its membership in the set of civilian control. Figure 1 presents such an *XY*-plot for the intermediate solution term. The diagonal line signifies the 0.5 threshold for membership in both sets, and allows for identifying necessary and sufficient solutions: for the solution term to be a consistently sufficient solution, all cases must be situated above the diagonal; for a consistently necessary condition, they need to be below the bisecting line. The horizontal and vertical lines denote membership in the outcome set of civilian control (all cases above the horizontal line are members of that set), and in the intermediate solution



Figure 1 *XY*-plot of intermediate solution term: civilian control.

set (all cases right to the vertical line are members of that set). The plot visualizes, first, that the intermediate solution is actually consistently sufficient for the outcome: the majority of cases (34 out of 57, about 60%) are located under the diagonal, and the 23 non-consistent cases are not too far from that dividing line. Second, all cases located in the upper right quadrant of the plot and above the diagonal can be considered 'typical' cases for the solution (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013).[13] Third, of all deviant cases, that is cases that are situated in the right half of the XY-plot ($X > 0.5$) and below the diagonal, only seven cases are 'deviant in kind', that is cases whose degree of civilian control is considerably lower than their membership in the solution term would suggest.[14]

Conditions for the absence of civilian control

To identify the conditions for the *absence* of civilian control in new democracies, we follow the same steps as above. The analysis of possible necessary conditions demonstrates that none of the five conditions qualifies as a strong necessary condition for the absence of civilian control. A consistency score of 0.935 indicates

[13] These include Czech Republic (1993–2010), Indonesia (2005–2010), South Korea (1995–2002), South Korea (2003–2010), Mali (2002–2010), Nepal (1999–2001), Nepal (2006–2010), Poland (1991–1998), Poland (1999–2010), Portugal (1983–2010), Romania (1996–2010), Senegal (2000–2010), South Africa (1994–2010), Sri Lanka (2001–2002), Sri Lanka (2006–2009), Taiwan (2002–2010), Thailand (1992–2000).

[14] These cases are Honduras (1998–2008), Honduras (2009–2010), Indonesia (2001–2004), Peru (1990–1991), Philippines (1986–2000), Philippines (2001–2010), Turkey (1983–1997).

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Table 5. Truth table for the outcome no civilian control

Type	inthreat	autinst	civsoc	age	intif	outcome	*N*	Consistency	Cases
17	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.93	PAK1, SDN1
21	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.88	PER4
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	4	0.84	IDN1, LBR1, MLI1, PRT1
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.83	PRT2
9	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.81	BRA1, TWN1
25	1	1	0	0	0	1	5	0.81	NGA1, NGA2, PER1, PER2, ZAF1
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.78	NAM1, PER3
22	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	0.77	IDN2, RUS1
20	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.75	MLI2, PHL1
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.73	BRA3
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	6	0.72	CZK1, HND1, HND2, HND3, KOR1, ZMB1
24	1	0	1	1	1	0	2	0.72	IDN3, PHL2
28	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.71	NIC2, TUR1
26	1	1	0	0	1	0	6	0.63	NPL1, NPL2, NIC1, LKA1, LKA2, THA1
32	1	1	1	1	1	0	6	0.54	GRC1, MEX1, ZAF2, THA2, TUR2, TUR3
12	0	1	0	1	1	0	3	0.53	HND4, HND5, KOR2
14	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.51	POL1
15	0	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.46	BRA2, TWN2
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	2	0.33	PRT3, ROU1
16	0	1	1	1	1	0	3	0.25	CZE1, KOR3, POL2

inthreat = internal threat; autinst = authoritarian institutions; civsoc = strength of civil society; age = democracy's age; intif = international influence.

that the absence of a strong civil society is a necessary condition for weak civilian control; however, with only 0.529, its coverage is rather low. In other words, only a very small proportion of all cases that exhibit weak civilian control also has a weak civil society (see online Appendix 6). Consequently, we do not consider weak civil society as a necessary condition for the failure of civilians to strengthen civilian control. Turning to the identification of sufficient conditions for the failure to strengthen civilian control in new democracies, Table 5 presents the truth table for the five conditions and the outcome 'no civilian control'.

We define 0.8 as the consistency cut-off point. Based on the cases that are part of the types above this cut-off point, the minimization produces a marginally consistent 'complex solution' of three individual combinations of conditions with relatively low coverage (see Table C in online Appendix 7). Grounded on our expectation that the absence of all conditions except internal threats will weaken civilians' ability to employ robust control strategies and lead to weak civilian control, we derive an intermediate solution term that identifies three configurations as sufficient for weak civilian control: the lack of authoritarian control institutions combined with a weak civil society and unconsolidated democracy (autinst*civsoc*age); a weak civil society plus

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Table 6 . Intermediate solution of sufficient conditions for NO civilian control[a]

Intermediate solution term: civsoc*age*intif + autinst*civsoc*age + INTHREAT*autinst*age*intif				
		Coverage		
Sufficient combination	Consistency	Raw	Unique	Cases
autinst*civsoc*age	0.816	0.459	0.061	PAK1, SDN1, IDN1, LBR1, MLI1, PRT1, PRT2
civsoc*age*intif	0.812	0.574	0.176	PAK1, SDN1, BRA1, TWN1, NGA1, NGA2, PER1, PER2, ZAF1
INTHREAT*autinst*age*intif	0.894	0.336	0.007	PAK1, SDN1, PER4

Intermediate solution consistency: 0.753.
Intermediate solution coverage: 0.642.
inthreat = internal threat; autinst = authoritarian institutions; civsoc = strength of civil society; age = democracy's age; intif = international influence.
[a]Small letters in the column 'Sufficient combination' indicates that the absence of the combination is sufficient for the outcome; * denotes logical AND; + denotes logical OR.

unconsolidated democracy and a lack of international support (civsoc*age*intif); and the combination of significant internal threat combined with a lack of pre-existing control institutions, an unconsolidated democratic regime, and the absence of international support (INTHREAT*autinst*age*intif). However, while the consistency values of the individual partial solutions are acceptably high, the overall consistency of the intermediate solution (0.753) indicates that the three sufficient configurations are not particularly strong predictors of weak civilian control. Similarly, the solution coverage is only 0.642, which indicates that the solution does not capture a large share of the variance of the cases with weak civilian control. We summarize the full solution term along with consistency and coverage values and the cases that are members of each partial solution in Table 6.[15]

This analysis points to three insights. First, the significantly lower consistency and coverage scores show that the five structural and institutional factors perform worse in explaining the absence of civilian control in new democracies than in accounting for its presence. This suggests that another theoretical model might be necessary to explain the failure to strengthen civilian control in new democracies, and that future research should consider including additional conditions into the analysis. The insight that different causal arguments might be necessary to explain the negation of the outcome is in line with existing research on democratization: Svolik (2008), for instance, argues that explaining the breakdown of democracy is explained by different factors than democratic stability and consolidation. Second, there is no single structural or causal factor whose absence (or presence) alone will totally inhibit the ability of civilians to strengthen civilian control of the military. The results, rather, suggest that the failure to

[15] See Table B of online Appendix 7 for the most parsimonious solution.

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

Figure 2 *XY*-plot of intermediate solution term: no civilian control.

strengthen civilian control is due to a 'syndrome' of pathologies and unfavorable conditions that interact in constraining civilians' ability to employ robust control strategies. In fact, even domestic armed conflict, which many authors view as the most unfavorable restriction (e.g., Finer, 1962; Alagappa, 2001), will only lead to weak civilian control if a new democracy also lacks pre-existing institutions of civilian control, is unconsolidated, and does not receive meaningful support from the outside. Third, the analysis shows that our theoretical expectations hold: all five conditions affect the absence of civilian control as we expected them to do and there are no results that contradict our theoretical model.

Figure 2 demonstrates that the solution is much less consistent than the solution to the outcome 'civilian control' (see the Conditions for civilian control section): While there are relatively few cases below the diagonal (13 out of 57), these are much farther from the diagonal, and thus, pose a much starker contradiction to the theoretical expectations. Furthermore, there are only four cases that could be considered typical. This explains the relatively low coverage of the solution term, as the majority of cases (situated in the upper left quadrant) reduce the solution coverage. These cases have high outcome scores, but relatively low membership scores in the solution term. Moreover, 11 cases can be considered deviant from a consistently sufficient condition.[16] These cases, which are situated in the right half

[16] These are Brazil (1985–1987), Indonesia (1999–2000), Nigeria (1978–1979), Nigeria (1980–1983), Pakistan (1988–1996), Peru (1978–1982), Peru (1983–1989), Peru (2001–2010), Portugal (1974–1975), Portugal (1976–1982), Sudan (1985–1988).

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of the XY-plot ($X > 0.5$) and below the diagonal, are particularly interesting to analyze in-depth for improving the theoretical model.

Conclusion

This article aimed to investigate if there are necessary or sufficient conditions for civilians to strengthen their control over the military in newly democratized nations. The analysis on 28 countries in this article provides three important findings.

First of all, there seems to be no single necessary condition for the strengthening or failure of civilian control in new democracies. Rather, we found that a number of conditions and combinations of conditions explain these different outcomes. This supports our argument that, ultimately, no single factor can explain the development of civil–military relations in new democracies and that relevant factors are prone to interact in complex, often unpredictable ways that diverge from the often simplistic linear-additive assumptions implicit in much of the existing literature.

Second, the fsQCA findings indirectly support our purported causal mechanism that structural and institutional conditions become causally efficacious through the agency of civilian actors for whose strategic actions they become resources or constraints. The evidence is circumstantial, but is solidified by the fact that all the conditions and combinations of conditions work in ways as our model suggested for both the presence and the absence of civilian control. Actually testing the proposed causal mechanism empirically would require within-case analyses and process tracing case studies; our analysis provides a solid foundation for this next step. While we cannot discuss this topic or the principles of choosing cases based on their distribution in the solution terms in detail (for the latter, see Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013), we suggest two types of case studies. First, in order to corroborate the findings concerning the sufficient (combinations of) conditions for civilian control, process tracing on 'typical cases', that is those cases that are members of both the outcome and the solution, should be undertaken (see online Appendix 8). Because of causal heterogeneity, at least one case should be chosen for each partial term of the intermediate solution (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013: 566).[17] Given the high degree of overlap of the cases' membership in the partial solution term, we suggest the four cases that have the highest consistency in each of the partial solutions: South Korea (2003–2010), Czech Republic (1993–2010), Poland (1999–2010), and Greece (1974–2010). Second, to enhance the model for the outcome 'no civilian control', which was found comparatively weak in explaining the empirical evidence, process tracing on 'deviant cases' appears most appropriate (see online Appendix 9).

[17] Ideally, one should study 'unique cases', that is cases that are members of just one partial solution term (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013: 567). However, there are none such ideal-typical cases in the sample. This is exactly what is to be expected based on our theoretical argument.

Third, it is desirable to further test the relationship of conditions and outcomes on the cross-case level of analysis. In order to verify the generalizability of our findings they should be contrasted against the evidence from other 'third wave' democracies. While the stratified sampling procedure employed in this study provides for some degree of generalizability, evaluating all new democracies would allow for even more solid conclusions. Furthermore, in order to check the robustness of the fsQCA findings, the solution terms should be transformed into statistical models and these should be tested against the empirical data from which the solution terms were derived. Finally, the implication of the theoretical model can also be tested comparatively against the empirical evidence of alternative explanations. Given the rationalist foundations of our model, much could be gained by testing it against an ideational model that explains civil–military relations in new democracies based on the 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 1984). However, despite the importance of normative factors in explaining civilian control (Huntington, 1957; Barany, 2012), there is still no coherent ideational theoretical model that stringently connects these causally relevant factors and the outcome with a well-specified causal mechanism.

Supplementary material

For supplementary material/s referred to in this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S1755773916000011

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