

and readable investigation of heterogeneity in RRPP constituencies. The book's major contributions lie in its empirical qualitative material (125 life-history interviews with voters) and in the author's "thesis of electoral equifinality" (chap. 2) to account for variation in the preferences of RRPP voters. This thesis claims that different demands, ideological leanings, and sociodemographic backgrounds might equally lead to support for the radical right. In other words, different subgroups with different profiles and preferences coexist among RRPP electorates.

Five chapters of the volume are devoted to the empirical analyses (chaps. 4–7 and 8) showing that three main groups of voters with different social backgrounds support the PVV and the FN/RN in the Netherlands and France, respectively: individuals with lower incomes (mostly unskilled workers), voters from the "hardworking" (lower) middle class, and a group of radical conservatives from the wealthier section of the population. Damhuis illustrates that people in socially weaker positions and with lower incomes are primarily motivated by a feeling of relative deprivation in comparison to refugees and newcomers, notably with respect to social housing and elderly care. They feel that migrants are prioritized by the political parties in power. Meanwhile, voters from the (lower) middle class (such as self-employed and private sector employees) support RRPPs because they believe they themselves contribute too much to the nation's wealth and voice concerns about outgroups that contrast with their work ethic (such as the "lazy Greeks"). The third group of voters includes people who are highly educated and mostly vote based on ideological considerations: Damhuis labels them "radical conservatives." Members of this third group oppose progressive value change in societies and the loss of cultural roots that they particularly associate with what they consider to be the growing influence of Islam.

Road to the Radical Right offers an enhanced understanding of the variation in national constituencies based on rich data in France and the Netherlands. It thus provides a promising comparative research agenda for scholars and students of elections, the radical right, and populism. Damhuis successfully debunks the simplistic idea that voters of RRPPs are homogeneous and makes an impressive theoretical and empirical effort to deconstruct and critique their simplified social representation often conveyed by the media. Still, the author does not always situate this work exhaustively in relation to some important classic and emerging research on the same theme. For example, almost 20 years ago, Nonna Mayer (*Ces Français qui Votent Le Pen*, 2002) already distinguished between "ninitistes" (those who feel neither left nor right) and "droitistes" (right-wing-oriented voters) among radical right electorates. Similarly, Elizabeth Ivarsflaten ("The Vulnerable Populist Right Parties," *European Journal of Political Research*, 44 [3], 2005) demonstrated that those

most likely to vote for RRPPs are from different occupational groups with opposing occupational preferences: blue-collar workers who support extensive state intervention in the economy, and the owners of small businesses who are against such state intervention. How does the "thesis of electoral equifinality" innovate, complement, or challenge these findings? Similarly, some of Damhuis's results are in line with the recent literature on the use of producerism in the campaigns of RRPPs (see Gilles Ivaldi and Oscar Mazzoleni, "Economic Populism and Producerism," *Populism*, 2 [1], 2020); namely, the idea that the "producers" of the nation's wealth should be the only ones to enjoy the fruits of their own labors. How do producerist ideas resonate with "heterogeneous" voters? Here the question to be clarified is whether producerism opens a novel path toward the radical right, set by grievances and calling for an alternative model of particularistic redistribution of wealth and resources, restricted to the community of producers. Finally, future comparative research could also clarify whether (and why) heterogeneity is just a characteristic of radical right populist constituencies and not of other political families too and perhaps exploring the relative weight of different demands, ideological leanings, and sociodemographic trends.

Neoliberal Nationalism and Roads to the Radical Right have much to say to ongoing academic and societal debates on how contemporary democracies can deal with radical right politics and manage internal diversity and economic inequality, often pitted as a choice between openness and closure, neoliberalism and state interventionism. Overall, Joppke's and Damhuis's discussions of how RRPPs incorporate neoliberal messages into their nativist campaigns and appeal to heterogeneous constituencies deepen the scholarly understanding of radical right politics and the changing relationship between nationalism and representative democracy.

The Path to Genocide in Rwanda: Security, Opportunity, and Authority in an Ethnocratic State.

By Omar Shahabudin McDoom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. 350p. \$99.99 cloth.

doi:10.1017/S1537592722000251

— Susan Thomson , Colgate University
Sthomson@colgate.edu

Omar Shahabudin McDoom has written a remarkable book that weaves together quantitative and qualitative methods and a rich theoretical framework that nuances scholarly understanding of civilian participation in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda* finds that the genocide was a product of elite power politics and a small but willing minority of civilian killers. This book could be assigned in graduate seminars in history, political science, and sociology because it offers nuanced

conceptual value for scholars of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass violence. Although McDoom's findings are particular to the Rwandan case, careful readers will appreciate his theoretical framework as beneficial to the field of comparative genocide studies. His analysis weaves together the Rwandan case through constructivist theories on the role of ideas and the power of emotion in explaining why civilians take up state-led calls to kill the "other." Such nuance is a strength of McDoom's *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda* as he works through multiple, often competing, theories to explain—in clear language—the how and why of civilian killers in Rwanda. He does so while challenging scholarly assumptions about why men (and they are mostly men) kill.

In making his case, McDoom explicitly addresses several characteristics of the violence in Rwanda that remain underexplained in the copious volume of scholarship produced on this tiny central African country. He notes four gaps in published works that *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda* seeks to address. The first is the astounding speed of civilian mobilization; then the pace of genocidal killing; third, the extent to which the targeted killing of ethnic Tutsis consumed both urban and rural Rwanda, leaving few options for survival; and, lastly, the high percentage of Tutsi deaths at the hands of Hutu neighbors. McDoom overstates the dearth of available literature on each of these four items, perhaps because debates about them are now discussed by academics and journalists on scholarly websites written mostly since 2018. For example, debates on Tutsi lives lost during the genocide and conversations about the number of civilian killers can be found on blogs such as *African Arguments* and the *Review of African Political Economy*. Because *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda* is based on McDoom's 2009 doctoral dissertation, there is a lesson here for authors to revise their book manuscripts either to incorporate the most recent debates in their area of study or to present their findings to readers as reflective of their doctoral work.

Of particular merit are McDoom's extensive methods. He surveyed nearly 300 perpetrators and nonperpetrators inside and outside the prison system and consulted some 160 local organizers and leaders of violence. McDoom developed four ethnographic case studies contrasting local communities that experienced high and low levels of violence at the cell level (Rwanda's smallest formal administrative unit, above the family and below the commune). He also conducted what he calls a micro-comparative analysis of variation in the onset of genocidal violence across Rwanda's 145 administrative communes, employing GIS data that mapped the spatial patterns in the household locations of more than 3,000 killers, nonkillers, and victims from different communities. In addition, McDoom developed a dataset on the social networks of 130 killers and nonkillers. These methods were used to answer this question: How and why did the 1994 genocide

occur? McDoom's most revealing finding is his claim that one in five ethnic Hutu men participated in the killing, a far cry from the current government's policy to prosecute, for genocide crimes, all adult Hutu men residing in Rwanda in 1994. His research design does not include female perpetrators, which is unfortunate but understandable given that only 3% of perpetrators were women.

The strength of McDoom's analysis is its linking of microlevel effects to macrolevel causes. *The Path to Genocide in Rwanda* is ground-breaking as the first book-length study on the Rwandan genocide to generate theoretical claims about the how and why of genocidal violence at the local, regional, and national levels. It is also a product of McDoom's courageous and careful fieldwork conducted over a decade, an impressive feat in a location where the government actively determines who may study questions about the Rwandan genocide, with whom, and how. It is difficult to undertake such sustained study on a world-historical event as contentious in its causes and consequences as the Rwandan genocide. McDoom approaches his analysis in a matter-of-fact way, without moralizing about the lives of those he consulted. Such dispassion is a rarity in books on Rwanda, where political agendas are sometimes not so subtly woven into the text. This dispassion, however, sometimes comes at a cost to the reader. Readers unfamiliar with the Rwandan case may find it difficult to understand how the shifting political environment informed the timing of an interview or a survey. It is also unclear whom precisely McDoom surveyed or interviewed, which raises questions about how he interpreted answers to each of his 11 research hypotheses. A more robust engagement with methodology (as distinct from methods) would have added considerable heft to McDoom's carefully designed research project (a strength of the book).

The lack of discussion on how McDoom gained the consent of those individuals he consulted, on the process of administering surveys, and on how he worked with research assistants and translators is mystifying. He may have withheld this information to protect their physical safety, because Rwanda is a country where talking to foreign researchers has personal risks such as social shunning, imprisonment, and even death. Still, McDoom's lack of attention to his human informants is surprising, because he puts his findings in conversation with the two most influential scholars of the how and why of the Rwandan genocide: Lee Ann Fujii and Scott Straus. Their texts, published by Cornell University Press in 2009 and 2006, respectively, are master classes on studying perpetrators of genocide in their sociopolitical context. As such, graduate instructors teaching McDoom's findings could pair his book with methodology chapters from both Fujii and Straus. The political science discipline in the United States has begun to reckon with the ethics of human subject research and its costs for researched and research


alike, as evidenced in the 2020 Principles and Guidance on Human Subjects Research issued by the American Political Science Association.

Well written, thoughtfully researched, and empirically rich, Omar McDoom's *The Path to Genocide* will reward readers interested in Rwanda, mass violence, and genocide studies, as well as those keen on discussions of elite framing, the power of ideas, and the role of negative emotions (fear, hostility, resentment) in creating out-groups that they depict as worthy of extermination.

Controlling Corruption: The Social Contract Approach.

By Bo Rothstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. 208p. \$100.00 cloth, \$35.00 paper.

doi:10.1017/S153759272200024X

— Christopher Carothers , University of Pennsylvania
chracar@sas.upenn.edu

Starting in the 1990s, academics and policymakers working on issues of political and economic development began to recognize that corruption was a routinely overlooked but vitally important factor affecting the quality of a country's governance, its economic growth, and nearly all standard measures of human well-being. The past three decades have seen the rollout of numerous high-profile initiatives by national and international policy organizations, especially development organizations such as the World Bank, as well as international conventions and agreements aimed at curbing corruption. However, this global anticorruption push has to date yielded largely meager results, raising the question of what went wrong.

In his highly thought-provoking new book, *Controlling Corruption: The Social Contract Approach*, noted governance expert Bo Rothstein argues that anticorruption efforts are being hindered by a misconceptualization of the problem. Most existing initiatives are based on the principal-agent theory of corruption control, which holds that principals (government leaders and decision-makers) must construct policies that raise the costs of engaging in corruption so that rationally self-interested agents (officials and bureaucrats) are incentivized toward probity. The key flaw in this approach, Rothstein suggests, is that it depends on principals being benevolent rather than also being rationally self-interested. Rothstein instead proposes an approach to corruption control based on the "social contract theory" (p. 20). A social contract—to summarize an idea with a long history—is an agreement about what citizens can expect from the state, such as public services, and what the state can legitimately require of citizens, such as taxes (p. 21). According to this theory of corruption control, citizens in countries with a functional social contract will refrain from corruption because they expect

that most other citizens will do the same—people follow the principle of reciprocity more than utility maximization—and because they believe the government will deliver on its promises (p. 25).

The book's main chapters, which draw heavily on Rothstein's past writings on corruption control, assess various features of an effective social contract and how they develop or fail to in different countries. Chapter 2 explains that even though Protestant countries have less corruption on average, this has to do with their early establishment of fiscal social contracts to finance religion, and not the content of the religion itself. Chapters 3 and 4 explain how Sweden developed a functional social contract in the nineteenth century, highlighting both the key role of the external shock of losing a war and endogenous political processes. Chapters 5–8 are more theoretical than historical; they analyze the social contract role played by universal basic education, meritocracy and gender equality, public sector auditing, and welfare policies, respectively. Chapter 9 summarizes the main arguments and lays out conclusions.

The greatest strength of this book is that the author produces a well-informed and convincing case for social contract theory as the best overarching framework for anticorruption efforts. Showing his mastery of the subject matter and the secondary literature, Rothstein makes a series of points that sharpen our understanding of corruption control and help us see how it is connected to the broader social contract between a government and its citizens. For example, he cites both empirical and theoretical evidence to refute the idea that corruption is the result of certain cultures being more accepting of government wrongdoing; anticorruption is not a Western imposition on other cultures, although it does need to be driven domestically and adjusted to each country's unique situation. Rothstein shows that corruption is also not the result of a lack of formal rules but rather dwells in the "standard operating procedures" or norms of a society, suggesting the need to focus on institutional change (p. 13). Moreover, he rightly notes that corruption is often better understood as a collective action problem than a principal-agent problem. When citizens trust that most others (and the state) will "play by the rules," they will do so also, and a social contract that controls corruption and provides public services can be established. This logic suggests that governments should not focus narrowly on changing incentives for corruption-related crimes but rather make broader "credible commitments" to destabilize the status quo and shift society to a new equilibrium of probity (p. 24).

Nevertheless, this study has two significant weaknesses. The first is a troubling circularity or lack of clarity regarding the causality among various important factors. For example, an effective social contract supposedly leads to lower corruption, and a prerequisite of such a social