Culture, Citizenship Norms, and Political Participation: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan

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Abstract

This study investigates the role of religion in shaping the norms of citizenship from a cultural perspective for an East Asian country that exhibits fundamental differences in social contexts from Western advanced democracies. Using data drawn from the Taiwan Social Change Survey, we find that the Eastern religions of Buddhism, Taoism, and Folk Religions are important for explaining the formation of the concept of being a good citizen. This study further examines the relationships between citizenship norms and various conventional and unconventional types of political participation. The empirical results herein suggest that duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship have significant differences in their effects on political participation.

Introduction

Studies on the recent debate about changing citizenship norms caused by economic advances and societal transformation have focused mainly on the United States and Western advanced democracies and largely neglected East Asian countries, even though socio-economic transformations have occurred in many of them, along with rapid political and economic development in the region over the past decades. In particular, a different concept of 'citizenship norms', i.e. being a good citizen, may have quietly emerged with the embedded cultural and social contexts that are formed and established under the strong influence of a value system stemming from Eastern cultural and religious factors.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the important economic and socio-cultural factors in explaining the concepts of 'duty-based citizenship' and 'engaged citizenship' in Taiwan – an East Asian country with a traditional value system stemming from Eastern religions that experienced a political transformation from an authoritarian system to a democratic system in the early 1980s. Its process of democratic solidification, economic liberalization, and globalization has caused a growing income inequality that might lead to a greater gap between the nation's rich and poor in political representation. As described by Dalton (2008), Inglehart and Catterberg (2002), and Inglehart (2008),

when a country transforms to a post-materialist society, 'engaged citizenship' becomes the main democratic value for people to fulfill their social responsibilities through various unconventional forms of political participation. Thus, it is interesting to address some important questions from a socio-cultural perspective. Do socio-cultural factors significantly influence the formation of citizenship norms in an East Asian new democracy? Do the concepts of 'duty-based citizenship' and 'engaged citizenship' have different impacts on people's political participation in an East Asian new democracy? Will this trend further deteriorate the political inequality between the rich and the poor?

This study addresses these questions through an empirical investigation, with data drawn from the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) 2004. The findings from this study can help clarify the determinants of citizenship norms in Taiwan, as well as their impact on the inequality of political participation caused by the rising economic inequality. Given the fact that the majority of recent empirical studies in this field have focused on the United States and Western advanced democracies, this study will investigate whether socio-cultural factors are important in explaining the norms of 'engaged' citizenship and 'duty-based' citizenship in an East Asian new democracy. This study also investigates the effects of citizenship norms on conventional and unconventional forms of political participation.

Citizenship norms and the decline in political participation

It has been well documented that conventional types of political participation, such as voting and engagement in political party activities, have declined in recent years in the United States and many Western advanced democracies (Brady *et al.*, 1995; Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Blais and Rubenson, 2013). A more recent argument for this trend, however, suggests that to fully explain the solidification of a democratic system, it is necessary to shift attention to the changing norms of citizenship, instead of simply focusing on the conventional type of political participation such as voter turnout (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 2008; Oser and Hooghe, 2013). Empirical evidence from the United States and Western advanced democracies argues that when citizenship norms are appropriately examined, it indicates that even though turnout rates are lower in elections, people are still strongly engaged in various forms of political participation in terms of their citizenship norms.

Researchers have suggested somewhat different understandings of describing this new trend of political engagement. Most notably, these can be interpreted as the concept of defining 'being a good citizen' with the classification of 'duty-based citizenship' and 'engaged citizenship' (Dalton 2008). According to these understandings of citizenship norms, even an individual who does not emphasize conventional forms of political activity, like voting to be a good citizen, may still normatively engage in many unconventional forms of political activities as a good citizen. Indeed, previous literature, such as Inglehart and Catterberg (2002), Copeland (2014), Dalton (2008), Dalton *et al.* (2010), van Deth (2009), Bolzendahl and Coffé (2013), and Oser and Hooghe

(2013) emphasizes that far from being politically disengaged, people who have 'engaged citizenship' norms are usually supportive of elite-challenging political activities, such as protesting, signing petitions, or boycotting products for political or ethical reasons. Moreover, these studies also show that people who have embraced citizenship norms tend to have stronger post-modern values in supporting political engagement that concerns issues such as environmental conservation and human rights.

Dalton's (2008) studies on citizenship norms are among the most influential on this topic. His studies on the concept of 'being a good citizen' have led to groundbreaking research in this field. Most importantly, there is a specific argument about the linkage between citizenship norms and political participation. While studies by scholars such as Pattie and Seyd (2003) and Norris *et al.* (2005) have also discussed many aspects, Dalton specifically proposes that this new form of citizenship norms is best described as 'engaged', not only because people place high values on democratic norms, but also because it indicates new ways of political engagement, along with the shifting values and attitudes toward democracy and public affairs. Dalton's argument asserts that researchers who emphasize only voting and electoral-related political behaviors substantially overestimate people's disengagement with democracy. As a result, the approach of focusing on voter turnout and electoral-related engagement is empirically inadequate to fully explain the overall changes in political participation. To fully capture the pattern of people's engagement in democracy, it is necessary to take a different approach to understand the changing pattern of political participation.

The groundbreaking approach of this new concept of good citizenship provides further insights into the impacts of upcoming changes in political behaviors caused by generational changes in population and the advances in information technology. Indeed, Dalton (2008) suggests that values changing to those of post-materialism and modernization among younger generations are the main reason for the increasing prevalence of engaged citizens and the decline in duty-based citizens. Therefore, focusing only on the decline in a duty-based citizenship norm and examining the decline in voter turnout would be inadequate. Instead, it should be understood that even though the declining electoral turnout is evident, people are still actively engaged in political affairs in different ways and will likely be politically active in the future. This argument suggests that 'engaged citizenship' will lead to an expected increase in the prevalence of political engagement over time in many advanced democracies.

Some other studies in this field have also shown that the main reason for explaining the decline in electoral turnout is the generational changes in values (Blais and Rubenson, 2013). This implies that, in order to better recognize the pattern of their future political engagement, targeting young people's attitude toward normative values is necessary (Kittilson and Dalton, 2011; Blais and Rubenson, 2013; Oser and Hooghe, 2013). In particular, with the development of the Internet and new forms of media, previous studies have found that media use has strong effects on civic culture and political engagement (Kittilson and Dalton, 2011; Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela, 2011; Swigger, 2013; Weinstein, 2014). It is in fact argued that media use enhances information

acquisition, community formation, and the promotion of civic-oriented behaviors, as well as providing lower-cost opportunities to involve people in public affairs and to enable them to express their personal opinions. As a result, the change in the range of available media may significantly alter people's perceptions about political parties, politicians, and public policies, and therefore change the existing political institutions and the pattern of people's political engagement.

Culture, developments, and citizenship norms

Previous literature on shifting values has consistently observed a rise in new citizenship norms in the United States and European countries (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Inglehart, 2008). As the most notable study, Dalton (2008) focuses on engaged citizenship in the United States and speculates that the findings from there can be generalized for other advanced democracies over time. Moreover, Dalton's (2008) argument has been supported by studies investigating the cases of Eastern Europe (Coffé and van der Lippe, 2010) and Scandinavian countries (Oser and Hooghe, 2013). It is believed that more empirical research, covering countries across different geographical regions and cultural dimensions, is necessary to obtain a better understanding of the generalizability of the research into the changing of citizenship norms and the impact on various forms of political participation. From the perspective of political culture, the political system is usually formed by value systems consisting of culture, social norms, moral traditions, people's ideological orientation and subjective attitudes about the political institutions, and the responsibilities of a citizen toward his/her country and society (Alesina and Guiliano, forthcoming; De Koster and Van Der Waal, 2007; Inglehart, 2000; Lewis *et al.*, 2013; Lipset, 1959). Therefore, in addition to economic factors, social and cultural features also affect people's perceptions about citizenship norms such as 'being a good citizen', that is differences in social and cultural contexts may lead to different understanding of citizenship norms.

The argument about political culture has caused a debate over whether many East Asian countries dominated by the 'Asian values' of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and folk relegions are fundamentally different from Western societies in attitudes toward political institutions and support of democracy (Diamond and Plattner, 1998; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Hsieh, 2000; Park and Shin 2006; Pye, 1985; Shin, 2012). The critical concern is that people's ideological orientation cultivated by these 'Asian values' – which emphasize more on obedience to authority, social hierarchy, social stability, social harmony, and collective interests – might lead to differences in the perceptions about duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship (Pye, 1985; Park and Shin 2006). In other words, the argument of 'Asian values' suggests that the cultural basis of East Asian societies might be more favorable towards forming a duty-based citizenship that emphasizes social orders and collective interests versus engaged citizenship, which is more related to the liberal or communitarian norms of citizenship. In contrast, Bell (2006), Fukuyama (1995), Kim (1994), and Sen (1999) advocate that the argument of the

incompatibility of Asian values with liberal democracy is only potentially motivated to legitimate authoritarian rule.

Compared with Western countries, the literature has argued that the value systems of East Asian societies, emphasize more on social stability, social cohesion, conformity, tolerance, and obedience to government authorities (e.g., Wright, 1962; Berling, 1982). The meaning of people's rights and attitudes toward a political system in the political discourse of East Asian societies may differ significantly from the Western Anglo-American traditions that focuss on individual rights (Bell, 2006; Huntington, 1996; Pye, 1985; Tu, 1996). However, only a few studies have empirically explored how the value systems in East Asian countries affect the process of democratization and people's attitudes toward political institutions (e.g., Blondel and Inoguchi, 2006; Chu *et al.*, 2008; Dalton and Ong, 2006; Dalton and Shin, 2014; Fetzer and Soper, 2007; Park and Shin, 2006; Welzel, 2011). For example, Park and Shin (2006) show that attachment to Confucian Asian values makes it more difficult to reject authoritarian rule than to embrace democracy. Their findings suggest that Asian values detract from cultural democratization primarily by keeping the mass public oriented toward the virtues of authoritarian politics. Adversely, Dalton and Ong (2005) indicate that orientations toward authority in Asian societies are not an obstacle to the formation of democratic norms among contemporary publics. As the trend of post-modernism, which Flanagan and Lee (2003), Inglehart (2008), and Dalton (2008) argue for, continues to lead to changes in attitudes toward politics, whether cultural factors have a significant influence on the concept of being a good citizen in East Asian societies becomes important for the development and consolidation of democracy in this region.

Culture and religion in Taiwan

Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religions are considered traditional religions in Taiwan. Taoism is a traditional Chinese religion and became widespread as early immigrants from mainland China moved to Taiwan during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Folk religions in Taiwan are a mixture of ethical ideology and philosophy of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism (e.g., Jordan, 1985; Katz, 2003). Therefore, Confucianism is often considered as a system of social and ethical philosophies that defines accepted standards of behaviors in everyday life (Yao, 2000). Even though it is not mutually exclusive to Confucianism, Taoism considers Tao (way or path) as the ultimate origin of all creation and the force that lies behind the functions and changes in the natural world. In principle, Taoism asserts that the order and harmony of nature are more stable and enduring than any institutions constructed by humans, and human life can only flourish in accordance with the natural way of things (Berling, 1982; Kirkland, 2004).

As the basis of Asian values, there are at least two important concepts embedded in Confucianism and Taoism that are related to people's perceptions about citizenship norms. On the one hand, Confucianism and Taoism emphasize the concept of virtue governance. When a political leader's behavior follows moral doctrines, his or her

personal virtue can spread positive values throughout the country, and the leader can achieve more of the collective interests by doing less and allowing everything to function smoothly. On the other hand, Confucian tradition also stresses the principle of meritocracy such that personal efforts can break through the barriers of social class and the hierarchic structure in society (Berling, 1982; Yao, 2000). As a result, it is expected that the concept of virtue governance might lead to a positive attitude toward duty-based citizenship, while the emphasis of meritocracy potentially promotes the value of self-determination and strengthens engaged citizenship. The effects of Confucianism and Taoism on the formation of citizenship norms may depend on the interplay of these two features.

Buddhist beliefs, in contrast, are based on the law of Karma, which is the principle that good conduct will be rewarded and evil conduct will be punished (Gethin, 1998). While confronting the problems of society, Buddha Dharma provides the general principles through which society can be guided toward greater humanism, improved welfare of its members, and more equitable sharing of resources. The influence of Buddhism on attitudes toward democracy can be perceived in advocating tolerance, freedom of choice, and equality. These Buddhist values require the government to protect its citizens from exploitation with political justice and economic welfare to achieve the way of salvation. Thus, Buddhism encourages the spirits of social cooperation and active social participation, while stressing the importance of establishing political and social systems in accordance with humanitarian principles (Dhammanada, 2002). These Buddhist values tend to have a positive influence on the formation of duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship.

Purposes of the research

As discussed in some previous literature (e.g. Tu, 1996; Weller, 2000; Laliberté, 2004; Katz, 2003), these beliefs of Eastern religions and moral principles have shaped the form of self-governance in many activities organized by social groups. They have also established the long-standing traditions for the relationships among people, society, authority, and the government in Taiwan. As a new East Asian democracy, Asian values have been shaped by over 20 years of democracy in Taiwan after the lifting of martial law in 1987. During this course of development, Taiwan has experienced drastic social and political movements. The democratization of Taiwan has followed a steady path by moving from the one-party rule of authoritarianism to a liberal democracy with multiple-party competition. In 2000, the Nationalist Party (KMT) lost to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the presidential election, ending its more than 60 years of being the ruling political party in Taiwan since retreating from mainland China in 1938. At the same time, the average level of educational attainment has continued to increase with a series of educational reforms and policies at enhancing human capital for further economic development. The demand for democratic reform, especially among those with a better education, is probably attributed to the enormous changes in social and economic conditions (Dalton and Shin, 2014). These phenomena

appear to be consistent with the literature emphasizing that economic modernization generally leads to political modernization with the emergence of emancipative values that are more supportive of democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Dalton and Shin, 2014; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013).

The growing income inequality, resulting from the trends in economic liberalization and globalization, has more recently begun to cause disparity in political representation between the rich and the poor when pursuing political outcomes with public policies to meet their respective needs. In particular, redistribution policies to reduce income inequality have drawn the most attention from voters, policy makers, and politicians, as well as scholars in the fields of economics, sociology, and political science. The understanding of this empirical observation is often taken with a concern for the solidification of democracy in a country, because it is possible that the interests of the poor can gradually be neglected when considering policy formation if their political representation continues to decline.

Previous studies have shown that value patterns vary largely across different cultural and geographical areas (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 2008; van Deth, 2009). Based on these previous studies, it is expected that the case of Taiwan examined in this study should display different patterns of 'duty-based citizenship' and 'engaged citizenship' from those found in the United States and Western advanced democracies. Due to the lack of empirical research on citizenship norms in East Asian democracies, this study fills such a gap by investigating the determinants of citizenship norms and their corresponding effects on political behavior in Taiwan from the perspective of the cultural and social contexts. We expect that religion, as an important cultural factor, strongly influences the citizenship norms in Taiwan with the value changes resulting from its rapid economic and political transformation. At the same time, affiliations with different religions can lead to different perceptions about duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship. From a comparative perspective, the roles of duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship in determining the patterns of political participation in Taiwan are of interest when explaining the differences between Western democracies and East Asian new democracies.

Despite the accomplishments in studying political engagement and the changing norms of citizenship in many Western advanced democracies, researchers have paid less attention to the cases of East Asian democracies, which mostly have different social and cultural contexts that are critical for the formation of citizenship norms. The empirical analysis in this study intends to address at least four important questions. First, does religion play an important role in shaping citizenship norms? Second, what are the determinants of engaged and duty-based citizenship norms defined by Dalton (2008) for an East Asian democracy, and are these determinants substantially different from those found in the United States and Western advanced democracies? Third, what are the roles of the cultural and social factors in forming the citizenship norms in an East Asian democracy such as Taiwan, and does religion play an important role in forming the concept of 'being a good citizen'? Fourth, what are the relationships between citizenship

norms and political participation in a new East-Asian democracy such as Taiwan? This research should provide interesting results for other emerging democracies in the same region. The empirical findings from this study also contribute to the literature on citizenship norms and to an understanding of the recent developments in East Asian democracies.

Data and method

This study uses data from the 2004 Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) to examine the determinants of citizenship norms, as well as the relationship between citizenship norms and various types of political participation. Since 1984, the TSCS has been conducted annually, with different main topics, by the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica. Starting in 2002, the TSCS joined the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and became part of an East Asian survey team that initiated the East Asian Social Survey (EASS) in 2003. The 2004 TSCS consists of two modules: Religion and Culture, as well as Citizenship. We utilize the Citizenship Module, which contains information about respondents' perceptions of the concepts of 'citizenship norms', being a good citizen, as well as respondents' political participation and partisanship, along with respondents' socioeconomic characteristics. After excluding from the sample those who were ineligible to vote and those for whom there was insufficient information about their engagement in political behaviors, there were 1,741 observations in this study. Appendices 1 and 2 provide definitions of the variables used. Appendix 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The study examines the relationship between citizenship norms and engagement in conventional and unconventional types of political participation.

Following the definitions of Dalton (2008), we use 'duty-based citizenship' and 'engaged citizenship', respectively, as the dependent variables in estimating the factors explaining citizenship norms. More specifically, we first use factor analysis to obtain factor scores with the variables constructed from respondents' answers to the following questions by first asking: In being a good citizen how important is it to: (1) Always to vote in elections (*Elect*); (2) Never try to evade taxes (*Tax*); (3) Always obey laws and regulations (*Law*); (4) Keep watch on the actions of government (*Govt*); (5) Be active in social or political associations (*Group*); (6) Try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions (*Opinion*); (7) Choose products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more (*Ethic*); (8) Help people in Taiwan who are worse off than yourself (*Help*); (9) Help people in the rest of world who are worse off than yourself (*World*); (10) Be willing to serve in the military in a time of need (*Military*). Table 1 reports the scoring coefficients for the extracted four factors.

With the results from the factor analysis, we construct an index of duty-based citizenship (*Duty*), which is the factor (Factor 3) mostly defined by *Elect*, *Tax*, and *Law*. Similarly, an index measuring engaged citizenship (*Engage*) is also constructed by adding up the factors mostly defined by *Help*, *World*, *Group*, *Opinion*, *Ethic*, and *Military* (Factors 1, 2, and 4). In accordance with Dalton's (2008) description,

Table 1. *Factor analysis of citizenship norms*

Variable	Factor 1 (engaged)	Factor 2 (engaged)	Factor 3 (duty-based)	Factor 4 (engaged)
Elect	− 0.0525	0.0790	**0.2045**	0.0268
Tax	0.0140	− 0.0552	**0.3188**	0.0139
Law	− 0.0098	− 0.0215	**0.3105**	− 0.0266
Govt	0.0012	**0.1894**	0.1159	− 0.0463
Group	0.0206	**0.2904**	− 0.0256	− 0.0167
Opinion	0.0404	**0.2771**	− 0.0308	0.0158
Ethic	0.1143	0.1419	− 0.0189	**0.0476**
Help	**0.3719**	− 0.0656	0.0179	0.0003
World	**0.3362**	− 0.0243	− 0.0696	− 0.0288
Military	0.1086	0.0555	0.0726	**0.0682**

Notes: Extraction method: principal components analysis. Scoring coefficient based on varimax rotated factors.

duty-based citizenship primarily involves norms of social orders, while engaged citizenship is related to liberal or communitarian norms of citizenship.

   To examine the formation of citizenship norms, we mainly focus on the effects of age, education, religion, and the ways of attaining information about political affairs. In particular, a growing body of recent research emphasizing the linkage between culture and political institutions has emerged in recent years (e.g. Greif, 1994; Alesina and Giuliano, forthcoming), while the widespread usage of new media and information technology has drawn attention from scholars studying civic society and political behaviors (e.g. Kittilson and Dalton, 2011; Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela, 2011; Swigger, 2013; Weinstein, 2014). It is interesting to examine whether religion plays a significant role in the formation of citizenship norms for an East Asian country such as Taiwan. Therefore, aside from education (years of schooling), we also construct the variables of religious affiliations (*Budda*, *Taoist*, *Folk*, *Catholic*, and *Protestant*) and frequency of religious attendance (*Attend*), as well as five variables representing the frequently used ways for a citizen to obtain information about political affairs: reading newspapers (*Paper*), watching television (*TV*), listening to the radio (*Radio*), using the Internet (*Netnews*), and listening to or watching call-in programs (*Call-in*). With these constructions of religious and media variables, we can conduct estimations on the effects of cultural factors in the formation of 'duty-based citizenship' and 'engaged citizenship'.

   To analyze the relationship between citizenship norms and political participation, we construct variables for both conventional types and unconventional types of political participation. The conventional types of political participation include electoral turnout in the last presidential election (*Votep*), electoral turnout in the last legislator election (*Votel*), attending meetings, election campaigns, or activities held for candidates

Table 2. *Correlation coefficients between core predictors and citizenship norms*

	Age	Education	Buddha	Tao	Folk
Age	1.0000				
Education	− 0.5270	1.0000			
Buddha	0.0984	− 0.0442	1.0000		
Tao	− 0.0150	− 0.0668	− 0.02895	1.0000	
Folk	0.0147	− 0.1298	− 0.3967	− 0.2899	1.0000
Catholic	− 0.0245	0.0473	− 0.0478	− 0.0350	− 0.0479
Protestant	− 0.0178	0.0839	− 0.1199	− 0.0879	− 0.1201
Attend	0.0457	− 0.0175	0.0648	0.0019	− 0.0223
Duty	0.0559	− 0.0152	0.0216	0.0085	0.0576
Engage	− 0.0480	0.0904	0.0736	− 0.0540	− 0.0143
	Catholic	Protestant	Attend	Duty	Engage
Catholic	1.0000				
Protestant	− 0.0145	1.0000			
Attend	0.0405	0.3846	1.0000		
Duty	0.0035	− 0.0023	0.0082	1.0000	
Engage	0.0026	0.0354	0.0354	0.3141	1.0000

Source: Taiwan Social Change Survey 2004.

during elections (*Meeting*), and donating money to a certain candidate or political party during elections (*Donate*). In contrast, the unconventional types of political participation include signing a petition (*Petition*), boycotting or deliberately buying certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons (*Boycott*), joining a protest (*Protest*), expressing opinions to government officials, elected officials or political parties (*Express*), making a complaint through mass media (*Media*), and making a complaint via the Internet (*Internet*).

As mentioned previously, the Western literature emphasizes that duty-based citizenship often can nurture voting- and campaign-related activities, and engaged citizenship stimulates protest and other elite-challenging forms of action. To further examine these potential relationships, we construct an index measuring the frequency of participation in conventional forms of political behaviors (*Conventional Participation*) by adding up the values of *Votep*, *Votel*, *Meeting*, and *Donate*. In contrast, a variable (*Unconventional Participation*) measuring the frequency of participation in unconventional, elite-challenging, forms of actions is set up by summing up the values of *Petition*, *Boycott*, *Protest*, *Express*, *Media*, and *Internet*.

Before discussing our empirical results, it is helpful to briefly describe the correlations between the core predictors (age, education, and religion) and duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship. As Table 2 reports, age is positively correlated with duty-based citizenship and negatively correlated with engaged citizenship, while education is negatively correlated with duty-based citizenship and positively correlated with engaged citizenship – that is, people who are older have a higher level of duty-based

Table 3. *OLS estimation results of predicting duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship norms with factor analysis*

Variable	Duty-based citizenship			Engaged citizenship		
	coefficient	S.E.	Beta	coefficient	S.E.	Beta
Age	0.0253***	0.0053	0.6531***	0.0291***	0.0094	0.4246***
Age^2	− 0.0002***	0.0001	− 0.6088***	− 0.0003***	0.0001	− 0.4454***
Education	0.0077	0.0063	0.0371	0.0244**	0.0111	0.0664**
Buddha	0.1061**	0.0461	0.0729**	0.2138***	0.0814	0.0831***
Tao	0.1044**	0.0511	0.0604**	− 0.0534	0.0902	− 0.0175
Folk	0.1472***	0.0459	0.1012***	0.0736	0.0810	0.0286
Catholic	0.0875	0.2071	0.0101	− 0.0345	0.3658	− 0.0023
Protestant	0.0786	0.0985	0.0220	0.1807	0.1739	0.0287
Attend	− 0.0120	0.0121	− 0.0258	0.0057	0.0214	0.0070
Paper	0.0751**	0.0372	0.0549**	0.0983	0.0656	0.0407
TV	0.0888**	0.0354	0.0658**	0.1959***	0.0625	0.0821***
Radio	0.0421	0.0463	0.0223	0.2377***	0.0817	0.0713***
Netnews	− 0.1019*	0.0575	− 0.0456*	0.0528	0.1015	0.0134
Call-in	0.0804*	0.0426	0.0482*	0.0515	0.0752	0.0175
constant	− 0.8617***	0.1634		− 1.1814***	0.2887	
R^2	0.0476			0.0490		
N	1,741			1,741		

Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Beta indicates the standardized coefficient.

citizenship than individuals who are younger. By contrast, people with more education possess a lower level of duty-based citizenship and a higher level of engaged citizenship than individuals with less education. Moreover, duty-based citizenship is positively correlated with affiliations to Buddhism, Taoism, folk religions, and Catholicism, but negatively correlated with Protestantism. At the same time, engaged citizenship is positively correlated with affiliations to Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, but negatively correlated with Taoism and folk religions. Generally speaking, there are interesting differences in the patterns of correlations between the core predictors and citizenship norms.

Empirical results

To examine the formation of citizenship norms and the effects of citizenship norms on political participation, we first investigate the roles of age, education, and religion in explaining duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship. From the results of OLS estimations in Table 3, age has an inverted-U shaped relationship with duty-based and engaged citizenship norms, while education is positively associated with engaged citizenship, but is not significantly associated with duty-based citizenship. In other words, people with a higher level of education are likely to have a higher level of engaged

citizenship than people with less education, but education is not a significant predictor of duty-based citizenship. As age increases, duty-based and engaged citizenship norms get stronger initially, but as age continues to increase to a certain level, duty-based and engaged citizenship norms begin to decline. Consistent with the arguments of value change (e.g., Inglehart, 2008; Dalton, 2008), this suggests that there is a generational difference in the concept of being a good citizen. In addition, education does play a significant role in the formation of citizenship norms, and this effect appears to be important only for the cultivation of engaged citizenship, but not for duty-based citizenship.

The religious factors are also important when explaining the formation of citizenship norms. More specifically, the affiliations of Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religions are positively associated with duty-based citizenship. While Buddhism is significantly positively associated with engaged citizenship, the religious affiliations of Taoism, folk religions, Catholicism, and Protestantism are insignificant in explaining the formation of engaged citizenship.[1] Moreover, the frequency of religious attendance is not a significant predictor for duty-based or engaged citizenship. Consistent with the findings from previous studies on Western societies (e.g. Schyns and Koop, 2009; Coffé and van der Lippe, 2010) suggesting that religions influence citizenship norms, we also find that some religious affiliations are strongly related to citizenship norms. By contrast, the Eastern traditional religions of Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religions are positively associated with duty-based citizenship, but do not have a significant influence on the norms of engaged citizenship.[2] In other words, the traditional religions continue to have a positive influence in promoting the norms of social orders defined by duty-based citizenship, while education tends to enhance the importance of the liberal or communitarian norms of engaged citizenship in Taiwan.

As for the effects of media use, those people who obtain information about political affairs through newspapers, television news, and call-in programs tend to have a higher level of duty-based citizenship, while individuals who frequently use the Internet to obtain political information have a lower level of duty-based citizenship. With the provision of a new platform for political discussions and expressing opinions about political affairs, and with a lower cost and a faster path of information transmission, Internet use has a negative impact on the formation of duty-based citizenship. In contrast, watching television news and listening to political news on the radio

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[1] We also conduct the estimations with four different factors as the dependent variables, respectively. For the estimated coefficients of religious variables, the findings show similar results, indicating that Buddhism is significant for explaining engaged and duty-based citizenship (Factor 1: *Help* and *World*, and Factor 3: *Elect*, *Tax*, and *Law*), while Taoism and folk religions are significant only for explaining duty-based citizenship (Factor 3: *Elect*, *Tax*, and *Law*). By contrast, education is significant only for explaining engaged citizenship (Factor 2: *Govt*, *Group*, and *Opinion*, and Factor 4: *Ethic* and *Military*).

[2] The estimations of using additive indices presenting duty-based and engaged citizenship indicate similar results to those using factor analysis to construct the variables of duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship. The details are not discussed, but are available upon request.

are positively associated with the formation of engaged citizenship. The estimated coefficient of using the Internet to obtain political information is also positive, but it is insignificant for explaining the formation of engaged citizenship. In short, watching political news on television has positive effects on the formation of duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship, while using the Internet for obtaining political news and information leads to a lower level of duty-based citizenship. In other words, Internet use reflects the changing concepts of being a good citizen, as it potentially lowers the norms of duty-based citizenship.

Despite previous studies (e.g. Kittilson and Dalton, 2011; Gel de Zúñiga and Valenzula, 2011; Swigger, 2013; Bimber and Copeland, 2013; Weinstein, 2014) suggesting that media use has a strong influence on political participation, whether the effects are positive or negative and whether the changes show up in patterns of participation remain less clear. Researchers studying the relationship between Internet use and civic engagement argue that informational use of the Internet can promote civic engagement by enhancing information acquisition, facilitating community formation, and promoting civic-oriented behaviors, as well as providing lower-cost opportunities for involvement in public affairs and expressing personal opinions (e.g. Eveland, 2004; Shah *et al.*, 2001). However, previous studies have not extensively examined the relationship between media use and citizenship norms. With the availability of a wider range of media derived from new information technology, the changes in people's perceptions of political parties, politicians, and public policies may lead to a changing concept of being a good citizen. The results from this study provide some further understanding about the role of media use in the formation of duty-based and engaged citizenship norms.

After examining the factors explaining citizenship norms, we further investigate the effects of duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship on conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. From the results of ordered logit estimations in Table 4, duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship are positively associated with conventional participation, but the estimated coefficient of duty-based citizenship is much larger than that of engaged citizenship. This implies that the role of duty-based citizenship in stimulating voting and campaign activities is much stronger than engaged citizenship – that is, people with a higher level of duty-based citizenship norms are more likely to vote in elections, as well as to attend political meetings, election campaigns, or activities held for candidates during elections, and are also more likely to make political donations. By contrast, people with a higher level of engaged citizenship are more likely to engage in unconventional forms of political participation. However, duty-based citizenship is not a significant predictor for unconventional participation.

Consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Dalton, 2008; Flanagan and Lee, 2003), these results indicate that the norms of duty-based citizenship are strongly related to engagement in conventional forms of political participation, but the norms of engaged citizenship tend to enhance participation in elite-challenging forms of

Table 4. *Ordered logit estimation results for predicting political participation*

Variable	Conventional participation		Unconventional participation	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
Gender	0.1542*	0.0907	0.0925	0.1049
Age	0.0502**	0.0223	0.0059	0.0267
Age^2	− 0.0004*	0.0002	− 0.0001	0.0003
Married	0.0663	0.1141	− 0.0808	0.1351
Education	− 0.0095	0.0198	0.0781***	0.0218
Unemployed	0.0510	0.1971	0.1533	0.2250
Blue	1.4900***	0.1226	0.7104***	0.1304
Green	1.4924***	0.1103	0.5925***	0.1221
Efficacy	0.2172***	0.0415	0.2882***	0.0468
Income	0.0025***	0.0006	0.0017***	0.0006
Duty	2.3583***	0.6158	− 0.1813	0.6859
Engage	0.5655*	0.3136	1.6527***	0.3536
Cut 1	0.3687	0.6255	2.4796	0.7121
Cut 2	1.9112	0.6273	3.8049	0.7168
Cut 3	4.0680	0.6330	4.8634	0.7232
Cut 4	5.9108	0.6403	6.0790	0.7376
L-likelihood	−2250.5714		−1698.8263	
N	1,741		1,741	

Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

unconventional political activities.[3] In other words, those who have a higher level of engaged citizenship are more likely to boycott certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons, to join a protest, to express opinions to government officials, to make a complaint through mass media, or to make a complaint via the Internet.

As for other demographic variables, age has an inverted-U shape relationship with conventional political participation. Partisanship, political efficacy, and income are positively associated with the engagement in both conventional and unconventional political participation.

In summarizing the results of Tables 3 and 4, religion as a cultural factor does play a significant role in the formation of citizenship norms. Furthermore, the influence of duty-based citizenship, in promoting the conventional types of political participation, is much stronger than that of engaged citizenship. However, unconventional forms of political participation can be enhanced by the stronger norms of engaged citizenship.

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[3] The logit estimations of using individual participation as dependent variables produce similar results as those with conventional and unconventional participation. The results indicate that duty-based citizenship leads to higher probabilities of *Votep*, *Votel*, and *Donate*, while engaged citizenship is significant for explaining the probabilities of *Meeting*, *Petition*, *Boycott*, *Protest*, *Express*, *Media*, and *Internet*.

This also provides a piece of empirical evidence for the argument, that changing citizenship norms caused by economic and social development can explain the decline in election turnout and engagement in activities organized by political parties. With the growing emphasis on the norms of engaged citizenship, it is expected that people will be more engaged in unconventional political participation and less so in conventional political participation.

Conclusion

The decline in conventional types of political participation, such as electoral turnout and engagement of political parties, has raised numerous concerns about the functioning of political systems in many Western advanced democracies. Some previous studies argue that this declining trend is caused by decreasing political interest and involvement, partly resulting from growing income inequalities, while others suggest that it is a result of diversifying patterns of political engagement accompanying changing citizenship norms caused by economic and social development. It is inadequate to simply focus on the conventional types of political participation, and to conclude that the decline in electoral turnout and party engagement could be harmful to the functioning of a democratic system and potentially increase the inequality of political presentation between the rich and the poor. Therefore, it is necessary to examine further the relationship between changing citizenship norms and political participation in both conventional and unconventional forms. Despite this, changing citizenship norms are well-documented for many Western countries, while very few studies emphasize differences in the socio-cultural contexts of the East Asian new democracies. The important socio-cultural factors shaping citizenship norms and the relationship between citizenship norms and patterns of political participation in East Asian democracies remain less understood.

This study investigates the role of religion in shaping the norms of citizenship from a cultural perspective for an East Asian country that has fundamental differences in social contexts from Western advanced democracies. Using data drawn from the Taiwan Social Change Survey, we find that Eastern religions of Buddhism, Taoism and folk religions are important in explaining the formation of the concept of being a good citizen. Age and education are also important predictors for the perceptions of citizenship norms. This study further examines the relationships between citizenship norms and various conventional and unconventional types of political participation. The empirical results from this study suggest that duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship show significant differences in their effects on political participation.

The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religions are positively associated with duty-based citizenship, while Buddhists have a higher level of engaged citizenship compared to non-religious people. Second, age has inverted U-shaped relationship with both duty-based citizenship and engaged citizenship, and education is positively associated with engaged citizenship, but not significantly correlated with duty-based citizenship. Third, media use also has a strong

influence on the formation of citizenship norms. Specifically, obtaining information about political affairs, by reading newspapers, watching television news, and listening to or watching call-in programs, leads to a higher level of duty-based citizenship, while those who obtain political information through the Internet tend to have a lower level of duty-based citizenship. At the same time, watching television news and listening to political news on the radio have a positive relationship with engaged citizenship. Fourth, duty-based citizenship leads to a higher likelihood of engagement in conventional political participation such as voting and campaign activities, whereas engaged citizenship tends to increase the probability of participating in unconventional forms of elite-challenging political behaviors.

From the perspective of value changes, Taiwan has experienced drastic social and political movements since the 1980s as its economy continues to develop steadily. After moving from the one-party rule of authoritarianism to a liberal democracy with multiple-party competition, the process of democratic consolidation is not yet complete, but is at least on a smooth path in Taiwan. In this study, we have empirically demonstrated that the Asian values, reflected by the cultures of Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religions, still influence the norms of duty-based citizenship. This implies that citizenship norms based on Asian values tend to emphasize social orders and collective interests through the obligations of citizens to society in maintaining a stable political system.

In contrast, there are generational differences in the understanding of being a good citizen, and education leads to a greater importance of individual choices, freedom, and mutual benefits described by liberal and communitarian norms. Consequently, we have also identified empirical support that duty-based citizenship is related more to the conventional types of political participation, while engaged citizenship, strongly influenced by education, leads to more non-compliant modes of elite-challenging political behaviors. Socioeconomic modernization along with increased education in Taiwan has contributed to the changes from authoritarian to liberal values and the transition to liberal democracy.

Even though there are many cultural similarities among Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and other East Asian countries, this study of the case of Taiwan still provides valuable results, as a reference for, or comparison with, other countries in the region. For example, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are all strongly influenced by Confucianism and Buddhism, but there are some differences in their respective courses of transition to democracy and processes of economic development. Japan started its transition to democracy after World War II, South Korea experienced a series of authoritarian civilian governments and formed a democratic regime in the late 1980s, and Taiwan began its process of democratization in 1988 with the launch of a democratic government election.

As for traditional culture and religions, Japan is dominated by Shinto and Buddhism, religion in South Korea is mainly characterized by Buddhism, Protestantism, and Catholicism, and the traditional religions in Taiwan consist of Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religions. The cultural values emphasizing social orders and collective interest

influenced by the religious beliefs of Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religions often provide a stabilizing effect for the political and economic development of East Asian countries. Religion is significant for shaping people's attitude toward political institutions and fostering the norms of duty-based citizenship. As many East Asian countries continue to advance economically, the influence of education upon enhancing the norms of engaged citizenship will become increasingly important.

For future research, it will be interesting to investigate the role of religion in the formation of citizenship norms by comparing the differences across East Asian countries either with similar or different levels of democratic consolidation. In the social contexts of East Asian countries, education and traditional values may be the critical components for defining citizenship norms as socioeconomic modernization continues to take place, leading to different consequences in different countries in the region. Furthermore, there are other countries such as Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, and Mongolia with more or less cultural similarities, but substantially lower levels of socioeconomic modernization than that of Taiwan. This is another area that can be further explored.

About the author

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Appendix 1. *Definitions of independent variables*

Variable	Definition
Education	Years of schooling
Buddha	Religious affiliation, if Buddhist, then Buddha = 1; otherwise Buddha = 0 (baseline category: no religion or others)
Tao	Religious affiliation, if Taoist, then Tao = 1; otherwise Tao = 0 (baseline category: no religion or others)
Folk	Religious affiliation, if Folk religionist, then Folk = 1; otherwise Folk = 0 (baseline category: no religion or others)
Catholic	Religious affiliation, if Catholic, then Catholic = 1; otherwise Catholic = 0 (baseline category: no religion or others)
Protestant	Religious affiliation, if Protestant, then Protestant = 1; otherwise Protestant = 0 (baseline category: no religion or others)
Attend	How frequently have you participated in religious activities? If several times every week, then Attend = 6; If once every week, then Attend = 5; If two or three times a month, then Attend = 4; If once a month, then Attend = 3; If several times a year, then Attend = 2; If once a year, then Attend = 1; If not or almost never, then Attend = 0.
Paper	If you read the political content of a newspaper at least 3 days a week, then Paper = 1; otherwise Paper = 0.
TV	If you watch political news on television at least 3 days a week, then TV = 1; otherwise TV = 0.
Radio	If you listen to political news on the radio at least 3 days a week, then Radio = 1; otherwise Radio = 0.
Netnews	If you use the Internet to obtain political news or information at least 3 days a week, then Netnews = 1; otherwise Netnews = 0.
Call-in	If you listen to or watch call-in programs on political issues at least 3 days a week, then Call-in = 1; otherwise Call-in = 0.
Gender	Gender of the respondent. If male, then Gender = 1; if female, then Gender = 0.
Age	Age of the respondent
Age2	Square of age of the respondent
Married	If the respondent is married, then Married = 1; otherwise Married = 0 (baseline category: single, divorced, or widowed)
Unemployed	Employment status, if the respondent is unemployed, then Unemployed = 1; otherwise Unemployed = 0.
Blue	Partisanship. Do you think of yourself as leaning to the Pan-Blue political camp (Nationalist Party (KMT), People First Party (PFP), and New Party (NP)), or the Pan-Green political camp (Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU))? If leaning to Pan-Blue political camp, then Blue = 1; otherwise Blue = 0 (baseline category: no partisanship)
Green	Partisanship. Do you think of yourself as leaning to the Pan-Blue political camp (Nationalist Party (KMT), People First Party (PFP), and New Party (NP)), or the Pan-Green political camp (Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU))? If leaning to Pan-Green political camp, then Green = 1; otherwise Green = 0 (baseline category: no partisanship)

Appendix 1. *Continued*

Variable	Definition
Efficacy	Political efficacy. A composite index measuring whether the respondent thinks that common citizens can influence government policies; should get involved in public affairs; should often express opinions to influence social development; and improving society and politics is not difficult as long as people make the effort.
Income	Monthly family income in NT$1,000

Appendix 2. *Definitions of dependent variables*

Variable	Definition
Citizenship Norms	Variables used in factor analysis are constructed by the respondent's answers to: How important is it to: 'Always vote in elections' (*Elect*); 'Never try to evade taxes' (*Tax*); 'Always obey laws and regulations' (*Law*); 'Keep watch on the actions of government' (*Govt*); 'Be active in social or political associations' (*Group*); 'Try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions' (*Opinion*); 'Choose products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more' (*Ethic*); 'Help people in Taiwan who are worse off than yourself' (*Help*); 'Help people in the rest of world who are worse off than yourself' (*World*). 'Be willing to serve in the military in the time of need' (*Military*).
Duty	Duty-based citizenship. An index constructed by the factor mostly defined by *Elect*, *Tax*, and *Law* with the result from factor analysis.
Engage	Engaged citizenship. An index constructed by the factors mostly defined by *Govt*, *Group*, *Opinion*, *Ethic*, *Help*, *World*, and *Military* with the result from factor analysis.
Votep	Electoral turnout in the presidential election; if the respondent has voted in the previous presidential election, then Votep = 1; otherwise Votep = 0.
Votel	Electoral turnout in the legislator election; if the respondent has voted in the previous legislator election, then Votel = 1; otherwise Votel = 0.
Meeting	If the respondent attended meetings, election campaigns, or activities held for candidates during the recent elections, then Meeting = 1; otherwise Meeting = 0.
Donate	If the respondent donated money to a certain candidate or political party during the recent elections, then Donate = 1; otherwise Donate = 0.
Petition	If the respondent had signed a petition in the past year or in the distant past, then Petition = 1; otherwise Petition = 0.
Boycott	If the respondent had boycotted, or deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons, then Boycott = 1; otherwise Boycott = 0.

Appendix 2. *Continued*

Variable	Definition
Protest	If the respondent joined rallies, protests, or sit-ins, then Protest = 1; otherwise Protest = 0.
Express	If the respondent expressed his (her) opinions to government officials, elected officials, or political parties, then Express = 1; otherwise Express = 0.
Media	If the respondent made a complaint through mass media, then Media = 1; otherwise Media = 0.
Internet	If the respondent made a complaint via the Internet, then Internet = 1; otherwise Internet = 0.
Conventional Participation	A composite index measuring participation in conventional forms of political behaviors (from 0 to 4) constructed by adding up the values of Votep, Votel, Meeting, and Donate.
Unconventional Participation	A composite index measuring participation in unconventional forms of political behaviors (from 0 to 6) constructed by adding up the values of Petition, Boycott, Protest, Express, Media, and Internet.

Appendix 3. *Descriptive Statistics of Variables (N = 1741)*

Variable	Mean	S.D.
Education	12.0373	3.1551
Buddha	0.2837	0.4509
Tao	0.1746	0.3797
Folk	0.2843	0.4512
Catholic	0.0057	0.0756
Protestant	0.0350	0.1839
Attend	0.8461	1.4168
Paper	0.3578	0.4795
TV	0.6169	0.4863
Radio	0.1407	0.3478
Netnews	0.0953	0.2938
Call-in	0.1907	0.3930
Gender	0.5146	0.4999
Age	45.5468	16.9204
Age2	2360.65	1680.72
Married	0.6445	0.4788
Unemployed	0.0534	0.2249
Blue	0.2326	0.4226
Green	0.3079	0.4617
Efficacy	1.3774	1.1678
Income	64.5491	77.9722
Duty	− 4.62e-09	0.6561
Engage	− 2.76e-09	1.1596
Conventional Participation	1.7972	1.0821
Unconventional Participation	0.6140	0.9961