

support programs that promote marriage (like the federal marriage initiative).

Her desire that relationships be long term—life long if possible—leads Brinig to advocate stricter provisions for divorce, including repeal of “no-fault” divorce laws and the reinstatement of fault grounds, and for the kind of “covenant marriage” now available in Louisiana.

Despite these positions, Brinig differs from most in the marriage movement because she favors (or at least does not oppose) same-sex marriage (it is actually hard to tell what her position is), and favors gender equality (although if people chose to follow traditional gender roles, it appears that she would not object). Because Brinig thinks that community recognition of and support for relationships should precede legal recognition, she does not enthusiastically embrace same-sex marriage, but on the other hand, she believes that the Constitution may require state law to allow such marriages: “Governments should not rush to legalize or create status (without constitutional reasons for doing so, as some courts have found for same-sex couples) for relationships before these relationships are likely to have societal support” (p. 48). I long for Brinig to share more directly her intellectual wrestling with contradictory loyalties to traditional social norms on the one hand and the Constitution on the other. Is it only the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection and due process that leads Brinig to accept relationships that society at large may look at askance—including mixed-race and same-sex unions—or should we support these couples because their love deserves protection regardless of a constitutional mandate?

Similarly, I want to hear more about how Brinig squares her commitment to gender equality with her policy and legal recommendations to stick with the status quo. As she is fully aware, traditional marriage law reflected a deeply gendered view of both family and larger society. As numerous scholars have shown with regard to both race and sex, applying antidiscrimination rules is not sufficient to alter distributions of social power. How are we to move from current inequitable social arrangements to a more equitable future?

One pathway forward is found in the list of policy recommendations with which Brinig concludes the book. She suggests that “spouses should be encouraged to work out their own arrangements for housework, child-care, and labor force responsibilities,” and adds that “family friendly policies should be made more attractive in the workplace, and care should be taken to police gender discrimination in the paid labor force” (p. 202). *How* family-friendly policies are to be made more attractive deserves attention from all those who want to strengthen family relationships. At present, social and economic arrangements in the United States convey the message that family well-being is a private responsibility. We have almost none of the supports found in European countries for parents and children. One exception is public education for grades

K–12. Another is the Family and Medical Leave Act, which stands almost alone in US public policy as a statement that caregiving relationships are important enough to require employers to give workers unpaid leave time to engage in caregiving.

Women disproportionately bear responsibilities for housework and childcare, and this perpetuates their vulnerability within the family and the larger society. It is not no-fault divorce or extending benefits to cohabiting couples that conveys a message of disregard for the permanency and value of family relationships, but the daily lack of accommodation of caregiving.

Brinig’s conviction that families are better able to provide stability and unconditional love when the surrounding community values family life and supports it is correct. The way to make that support palpable to those who enter committed adult and parental caregiving relationships is, in my view, not to circle the wagons around the heterosexual couple and their children, but instead to adopt public policies that convey the message that caregiving relationships are significant to adults, children, and society as a whole. All those who enter into relationships of caregiving assume enormous responsibilities; policy must play a role in providing the social context and services necessary to make caregiving not only possible, but also rewarding. I hope that Brinig agrees with this, and will develop what is a passing suggestion in *Family, Law, and Community* into a fully developed brief for pro-family policies.

When the French Tried to Be British: Party, Opposition, and the Quest for Civil Disagreement, 1814–1848. By J. A. W. Gunn. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009. 498p. \$95.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592711000727

— Jeremy Jennings, *Queen Mary University of London*

Anyone who knows anything about the nature of French politics will be aware that until relatively recently, the French political system provided inhospitable terrain for the practices of organized opposition. Likewise, with the exception of the Bolshevik-inspired Parti Communiste Français, political parties have tended to be fragile and fleeting constructions. Indeed, one of the primary aims of the constitution of Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic has been precisely to put an end to “the regime of parties” and to encourage the expression of national unity through both the person of the president and the institution of the presidency. It is no accident that the sessions of the French parliament are among the shortest in the European Union and that today Nicolas Sarkozy is referred to as the “Omni-President.”

Similarly, a brief acquaintance with political discourse in contemporary France reveals that debate about the merits or otherwise of the distinctive French social and economic model is frequently carried out by way of comparison

with developments in the United Kingdom. This was especially so, for example, during the premiership of Tony Blair, when much was made of the British government's embrace of neoliberalism, globalization, and Atlanticism. For many in France, this was a politics that had little to recommend it. More generally, the "Anglo-Saxons" have had rather few admirers on the other side of the Channel.

That this has and remains so gives added pertinence to J. A. W. Gunn's magisterial examination of the political thought of what was probably the only period in French history when men of rare distinction and ability were prepared to consider the possibility of transplanting British constitutional practices onto a French setting. In truth, and as Gunn ably explains, versions of constitutional Anglophilia existed in the eighteenth century, and the unique features of British government were especially evident to French commentators after the Seven Years War. If this often amounted to a vivid appreciation of the corruption of British parliamentary life, it also gave rise to a consideration that, in the eyes of some, dwarfed all others: namely, the capacity of British parliamentarians "to join together for the purpose of responding to pressing public issues" (p. 22). For French commentators, it was this which served to turn otherwise petty rivalries to some larger national purpose, and this which explained Britain's flourishing condition.

In the eyes of some, France's difficulties—demonstrated to most savage and destructive effect during the revolutionary period after 1789—arose from the fact that France had no equivalent to the British parliament and, thus, no location where opposition could be both institutionalized and expressed. Dissent was crushed and there was little enthusiasm for what J.A.W. Gunn terms "the ethics of civic disagreement" (p. 61).

With the Revolution brought to a close and the monarchy restored after 1814, could an ethics along these lines be envisaged? Could the voice of political pluralism make itself heard over the clamor for unity and the indivisibility of the sovereign will? This is the central question addressed by Gunn, and in addressing it, he scarcely leaves a stone unturned or a pamphlet unread. The scholarship is faultless and the writing style flawlessly elegant. The analysis, as well as the conclusions drawn from it, are never less than judicious and astute.

In outline, the narrative begins with two thematic chapters surveying, first, the views of political commentators on pluralism and conflict during the prerevolutionary and revolutionary periods and, second, the broader debate about faction and party in the Restoration period. It then offers extended discussions of the parliamentary royalism of men such as the comte de Vaublanc, of the (unjustly ignored) journalist Joseph Fiévée, of the liberal Benjamin Constant (described by Gunn as the voice of left-wing opposition and the dominant political figure of the time), of the unclassifiable (and always intriguing) François-René de Chateaubriand, and, finally, of the influential

coterie of writers and politicians known as the Doctrinaires. If there is a criticism to be made, it is that the author might have looked upon his readers with a more forgiving and less demanding eye. The occasional broad brush stroke highlighting the conclusions reached along the way, as well as a more substantial concluding chapter, would have facilitated a better comprehension of the arguments being advanced.

More substantially, how does Gunn explain the animus toward party and the British pattern of politics among French political commentators? Even among those who believed that the British model was worthy of respect and reproduction, there was an acute awareness of the difficulties of assimilation. In part this derived from the perceived burden of the past. A postrevolutionary legacy of fear and hatred inhibited the growth of parliamentary institutions resting on mutual trust and compromise. Just as enduring was the view that the activities and spirit of parties was both foreign and un-French. Loyalty to party was simply alien to the French national character, which prized honor and freedom of debate, rather than slavish subservience and pecuniary advantage. As Gunn points out (p. 104), under the Restoration parliamentary representatives sought to seat themselves according to locality rather than ideological leaning. More profoundly, there was ignorance about the workings of constitutional and parliamentary government and, in particular, a failure to comprehend that it required both party and organized opposition for it to function properly.

Gunn's conclusion is that progress of a limited kind was made in the period between 1814 and 1848. Those who wanted the French to be British, he believes, did at least succeed in setting an agenda and in advancing an ideal that could not be easily set aside. "Their signal accomplishment," he writes (p. 463), "was to create the presumption that a ministry ought to stand for something and those who opposed it for something else." This was a political truth subsequently confirmed by the lessons of experience. Yet the difficulties of institutionalizing opposition in a deeply divided polity and nation remained. Not only this, but old habits died hard. Not mentioned by the author is the fact that until well into the 1930s and even beyond, most parliamentary representatives remained without formal party affiliation, and parliamentary majorities were not held together by tight party discipline along British lines. The individual deputy continued to be prized above all for his rhetorical eloquence.

As Gunn concedes, none of the major figures treated in this volume offered a response to these pressing problems that was not without ambiguity and hesitation. Each to an extent remained troubled by the phenomenon of political competition. But each, it could be argued, advanced the causes of political civility and pluralism. To recall them and to assess their contribution to political debate is, therefore, as Gunn wishes us to recognize, far from being oti-

ose. For his part, he has made a more than valuable contribution toward increasing our understanding of the complexities and originality of the political thought of the French Restoration period.

Habermas: Introduction and Analysis. By David Ingram.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2010. 384p. \$65.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592711000077

— Jason Kosnoski, *University of Michigan at Flint*

Although many authors, such as Thomas McCarthy and Martin Beck Matustik, have written illuminating, comprehensive studies of Jürgen Habermas's expansive body of work, David Ingram's new *Habermas: Introduction and Analysis* should become the standard against which all other such books are judged. Ingram deftly accomplishes two tasks that in less skilled hands could undermine each other, offering thorough, fair explication of a large body of scholarship while arguing the important thesis that Habermas does not fully consider the possible contribution of aesthetic considerations to formulating social and moral theory. Ingram is able to conduct this simultaneously fair and incisive critique by highlighting undervalued themes within Habermas's corpus, therefore providing constructive criticism as opposed to merely imposing his own theoretical agenda. Thus, not only will readers gain a better understanding of multiple aspects of Habermas's thought, but they will also be challenged, whether they began the work with a sympathetic or skeptical attitude toward Habermas, to think in new ways concerning fundamental questions in political theory.

Ingram organizes the book in two main sections, the first covering Habermas's writing concerning conceptual issues such as epistemology, communication, and the philosophy of science, and the second outlining the application of these more esoteric works to politics and social theory. The book proceeds thematically, focusing on the texts Ingram believes to be most relevant to explaining fundamental concepts. Although some might quibble with his choices concerning which works to emphasize and which debates to recount, all in all he provides a clear and comprehensive account of the major concepts and arguments of Habermas's thought.

In the first section of the book, which contains chapters recounting Habermas's biography and his views on truth, ethics and language, Ingram chronicles Habermas's move away from anthropomorphic and psychoanalytical groundings of critical theory due to the "linguistic turn" in philosophy. This leads Habermas to recast his thought in terms of a communicative reason that relies on the internal logic of individuals engaged in the process of reaching mutual understanding. Although Habermas shifts his explanation of human action to contingent acts of

communication, he derives the procedural necessities of the open, inclusive dialogue necessary for justification of facts and norms from what he deems to be unavoidable principles of philosophy and developmental psychology, thus endowing his concept with the "quasi-transcendental" properties he believes necessary to ground any effective critical theory.

While the outlines of Habermas's account of communicative action are well known, Ingram does an important service in linking this older work with his more recent writing on contemporary politics and social issues in the second half of the book, where he presents chapters on law, social pathology, and modernity. All of these examples demonstrate Habermas's overarching position that legitimate political institutions must reconcile the norms and interests generated through the give and take in the public sphere with the instrumental necessities of policy and efficiency. This balancing act creates a number of tensions identified by Ingram, most notably how to protect the open, egalitarian debate characteristic of public discussion free from colonization by the systems logic of bureaucracy, economy, and law, while ensuring that these instrumental social spheres remain open to the influence of communicative reason. Ingram goes on to analyze a number of Habermas's interventions concerning specific political controversies through this communicative lens. Questions of multiculturalism, immigration, and the separation of church and state are all seen by Habermas as challenges of allowing the flexible proceduralism of communicative action to operate without the interference of the rigidity of state, economy, or tradition.

Ingram seems generally impressed with the ability of Habermas's communicative proceduralism to act as a model for viable institutions and present a productive moral compromise between liberalism and republicanism. But he is not so sure that Habermas provides compelling answers to a question that preoccupied his mentors in the critical theory tradition—whether democracy, and the egalitarianism and autonomy on which it is based, can survive the incessant expansion of capitalism. This question becomes all the more important to Ingram in the current geopolitical environment where the states and publics find it harder and harder to influence the activities of GEMs ("global economic multilaterals"). Ingram criticizes Habermas for embracing the ability of the very economic and political elites he previously warned against to both respect democratic will making and curb each other's excesses. Ingram states, "in short, the immediate interest of 'national citizens' and government leaders in the developed world incline them toward self-serving policies that perpetuate inequitable trade relations and economic practices" (p. 304). Thus Ingram argues that Habermas relies too much on the systems of power and money that he hopes will be ultimately controlled by