

one would love to have seen these proprietary constitutions placed into conversation with the joint-stock companies that founded the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and that played such an important role in the development of American Puritanism and New England culture. And of course one wonders what sort of insights Hsueh might contribute to a study of the American constitution, were she to turn a critical lens on it. Is it hybrid in ways that might be only dimly visible to us in our conventional ways of approaching the document? Frank's claim that *Wieland* "was meant as a warning to Jefferson and his democratic followers" (p. 172) is provocative but unsubstantiated, and his prose tends toward the purple at times ("a revolutionarily self-enacted people also remains forever haunted by the immanent source of its own transcendence" [p. 9]; "forms of popular political action that seemed to interrupt the disembodied communicative economy of the public sphere and its terminus in formal representative institutions" [p. 72]). Hsueh's book might have been a bit longer, Frank's a bit shorter. But these are minor quibbles about two stellar and exciting new books.

Such deeply historical books leave themselves open to the charge that they fail to offer clear insights for contemporary political life: Indeed, Hsueh admits that her attempt to extend her analysis in the final chapter of *Hybrid Constitutions* "is a bit tricky and, in a way, runs contrary to the basic premise of this study" (p. 114). But if her attempt to finesse this bit of trickiness—using the specific historical cases as "provocation" (p. 115) to study the contested emergence of modernity—seems a bit less than convincing, she nonetheless does an admirable job in relating historical questions to contemporary concerns. Though she wisely acknowledges that historical research cannot generate remedies for historical injustices, she skillfully probes such important episodes as the *Mabo v. Queensland* decision of 1992 and the multiple American sovereignty issues raised by US treaties with Native American tribes. Frank's book certainly connects a bit more readily with our own political world, in which every election, no matter how lamentably small a portion of the electorate participates, yields inflated claims about "the people" and a governing mandate. That such claims tend to be preposterous is both true and, to an extent, beside the point. Either way, they go to the heart of Frank's claim that "the people" continue to speak to us, even as we struggle to define just who they are.

Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda in Occupied Germany. By Cora Sol Goldstein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. 240p. \$40.00. doi:10.1017/S1537592710003713

— Frederick M. Dolan, *California College of the Arts*

As Cora Sol Goldstein writes in her Acknowledgments for this informative and crisply written book, American military occupations are once again of more than merely his-

torical interest. More to the point, contemporary political life is even more saturated with visual imagery than was the case during the years following World War II. Our need to describe and explain the role played by carefully crafted and skillfully deployed visual images in the governance of contemporary societies suggests that *Capturing the German Eye* may not only contribute to our historical and political understanding of a successful American military occupation but also be part of the "genealogy" of modern approaches to government. The extraordinary degree of control enjoyed by the American occupiers, and the enormous resources they were able to put into play, constitute something like a laboratory in which especially pure (albeit dauntingly complex) conditions make possible unusually precise observations of the theory and practice of visual political propaganda.

Over the course of five chapters, together with an introduction and conclusion, Goldstein analyzes how the Americans, who initially concentrated on photography and film (with whose propaganda uses the military was already intimately familiar), gradually extended their efforts to painting and sculpture as they grasped the significance of these fine arts to the cultural consciousness of ordinary, as well as educated, Germans. In the first chapter, she examines the occupiers' early tactic of exposing the defeated population to evidence of the atrocities carried out by their leaders during the war. This sometimes took the form of compulsory visits to concentration camps and killing centers, such as Flossenbürg and Buchenwald, where, as official photographs reveal, even very young children were made to view corpses. The horrors of the camps were conveyed more broadly, however, through posters, pamphlets, exhibits of photographs, and documentary films such as *Todesmühlen* ("Mills of death"), which was produced in 1946 by the Office of Military Government U.S. in Germany (OMGUS) and which civilians were also forced to view. The aim, of course, was to persuade ordinary Germans to face up to the criminal legacy of national socialism and, in particular, to their responsibility for its crimes, carried out in their name. (Goldstein describes a complementary effort to extol the virtues of American civic life by means of documentary and feature films, in Chapter 2.)

If American authorities expected the Germans to react to all of this by expressing contrition, they were wrong. More common reactions, it seems, were to minimize the scale of the atrocities, attribute responsibility exclusively to the political and military leaders of the Third Reich, insist that the evidence of atrocities presented by American authorities had been fabricated, and in general assume an attitude of resentment and hostility to the propaganda's purveyors. Alarmed by the angry reaction of the population and worried that this would give the Soviet Union a competitive advantage in the battle for hearts and minds, the campaign was soon called off. As early as November of

1945, Byron Price, a special advisor to Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lucius D. Clay, was urging that “[o]ur propaganda needs to be given an increasingly positive character, in contrast to the long-continued attempt to impress the Germans of their collective guilt, which from now on will do more harm than good” (p. 36).

Chapters 3 and 4 show how the American Information and Control Division’s initial “blind spot” with respect to the fine arts was gradually overcome through a series of overt and covert initiatives to “reorient” German culture away from “extreme cultural nationalism and anti-modernism” and toward what Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt, a German-born American who served during the occupation as an art intelligence coordination officer, saw as the inherently more democratic and antiauthoritarian tendencies of modernism (pp. 84–85). Of course, it is understandable that American military authorities of that era would find it difficult to grasp the opportunities for propaganda present in a society in which all classes professed so profound a reverence for *Kultur*. Together with Captain Edith Appleton Standen, the director of the Wiesbaden art-collecting point of the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section of OMGUS, Lehmann-Haupt nonetheless succeeded in making the fine arts an important part of the “American cultural propaganda agenda” (p. 87) by persuading his superiors, as one of his memos puts it, of the use to be made of the “authority and prestige which all manifestations of cultural life enjoy in the German community” (p. 84).

These chapters include some of the most fascinating material in Goldstein’s book. Although, as she writes, the “resurgence of modern art in Germany after 1945 is often depicted as a grassroots phenomenon,” it was in fact “a small group of American cultural officers [who] created the context for this revival” (p. 90). This was achieved by the success of these government officials in soliciting private funding to sponsor cultural associations, prizes, exhibits, and publications that supported “political and personal links between German artists and the democratic West” in ways that, as the author points out, “provided a model of intellectual warfare and cultural control that later became—greatly developed and lavishly funded—the modus operandi of the CIA in the cultural field” (p. 90).

Here too, as with the effort to make ordinary Germans feel responsible for their leaders’ atrocities, there were unintended consequences. But these related not to unexpected or unmanageable German reactions, but rather to cultural politics in America. In the sphere of the fine arts, American propaganda efforts conflicted with members of the U.S. Congress who were inclined to view modern art not as democratic but, very much in tune with their reactionary German counterparts, as “decadent,” “Communitistic,” and certainly anti-American. Anticipating such opposition is what drove the use of private funding for the effort to begin with, but that was

not always successful in avoiding congressional scrutiny and opposition. Such conflicts are front and center in the final chapter, on “Iconoclasm and Censorship,” which through close case studies analyzes the double bind of a military occupation that aims to engender a freer, more tolerant society.

Goldstein is very much alive to the implications and provocations of what her research puts on display, but however much historical and political analysis one reads, it is still hard to shake the idea that in the case of the American military occupations of Germany and Japan, the successes were little short of miraculous. The idea that they could form the basis of “models” to be applied elsewhere seems to have led to endless disappointments. Perhaps the problem lies in the very idea of a model. This book suggests that the successes of the occupation stemmed from its ability to improvise, to take seriously the observations of special people with unique insights into a concrete situation, and, trusting them, to change its ways to achieve its aims. Obviously, the American occupiers of Germany after World War II felt that the stakes could not be higher. One wonders whether our failures (so far, at least) in Iraq and Afghanistan have something to do with the perception that the stakes are not so absolute, that there are scripts to be followed, and that one’s career depends, not on success, but on one’s efforts to implement the assigned model.

Nietzsche’s Noble Aims: Affirming Life, Contesting Modernity. By Paul E. Kirkland. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,

2009. 306p. \$75.00.

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In his book, Paul E. Kirkland responds to those who claim that Nietzsche’s philosophy offers only a critical or deconstructive project. Instead, he asserts that Nietzsche has his own affirmative project of overcoming modernity and inaugurating a new nobility. Nietzsche aims to realize this project through a variety of rhetorical tactics and believes it will come about only *after* an era of great wars and tyrannies that, according to the author, Nietzsche predicts but does not necessarily endorse.

The centerpiece of Kirkland’s interpretation is *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and particularly the eternal recurrence. The heart of this lengthy study, eternal recurrence is presented as the epitome of Nietzsche’s affirmative teaching, the foundation for a new, life-affirming ethics, and the basis for the development of a “politics of contest” (Chapter 8). This politics of contest is the necessary corrective to a democratic age that values egalitarianism, certainty, and security above all that is elevated or noble. And, on Kirkland’s reading, Nietzschean nobility prizes self-overcoming, affirmation of life, courage to confront one’s own limitations as well as those of time and knowledge, and laughter