

groups, from service providers with clients to advocacy groups representing communities, influenced the trajectory of disability reform politics and the movement toward more rights-based or identity-based politics.

Pettinicchio periodizes disability reform politics into two stages. The first—beginning in the 1920s—follows a “client-service model,” where legislator–volunteer partnerships focus on providing rehabilitative services to “help the disabled help themselves” (p. 19). This period is marked by several key characteristics. First, government actors see themselves as pioneers in supporting large-scale practical and evidence-based approaches to helping individuals with disabilities become self-sufficient. In their own words, legislators of the time envisioned their role as “provid[ing] opportunities to ‘the unfortunate people who have been handicapped’” and to help them “become thoroughly independent of any help in order to take care of [their] personal affairs” (p. 40). Second, these “rehabilitative” services are targeted to specific challenges; there is no conception of “disabled” as a unifying broad-based community or identity. Third, because of their expertise and the complexities of client needs, disability service providers and organizations achieve an “elite status” and are consulted by “legislators and bureaucrats...as community representatives, helping to both ensure and entrench rehabilitation policies and programs” (p. 33). In this way, this phase of disability policy reform follows a trajectory of stakeholder entrenchment and client demand that typifies many social welfare programs. Social policy initiatives fill critical needs and motivate client demands for service provision and for innovation provided by technically trained professionals. By the late 1970s, disability-focused organizations outpaced organizations focused on race and gender. However, as Pettinicchio points out, even as late as the 1960s, when rights-framed movements were in full swing, there was still no conception of disability rights—nor was there an advocacy-based approach to fighting for access or accommodations.

The shift to phase two, from services to rights—and rehabilitation to accommodation—Pettinicchio tells us, is as much a story about legislator narrative as it is about a rights-based movement. Legislators are moved to action by their personal connections to legislative aides or grandchildren who have contended with service or structural barriers. These experiences drive legislative efforts to draft, sponsor, and market legislation. Pettinicchio highlights the ways in which these narratives catalyzed legislative support for the first whispers of disability *rights*—for thinking about the challenges of disability as problems of societal accommodation rather than only individual capabilities. Personal appeals, coupled with structural innovations in Congress (the creation of the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped) provided both space and leverage for legislators and providers to push for rights-based language—language that would address universal

principles of nondiscrimination and accommodation—to be included in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

By highlighting this two-step process from service provision to barrier reduction and self-sufficiency to civil rights, Pettinicchio reveals the significance of disability politics reform—not only as an important (yet distinct) story of civil rights policy but also, more broadly, as a window into agenda setting, interest group formation, and a rights evolution. Of course, no project—particularly not one as ambitious as *Politics of Empowerment*—can adequately cover every nuance of a policy debate or every aspect of scholarly intervention. Thus, there are two noteworthy omissions that scholars should be aware of—particularly as they are thinking about how best to use this book in a classroom setting. First, Pettinicchio’s treatment of political science and public policy scholarship is limited. Although the book offers an abundance of empirical material—detailed descriptions of legislative maneuvering, in-depth analyses of hearing testimony—there is far less engagement with the political science scholarship that would help readers contextualize these findings within established scholarly frames. A second, and more empirical, omission is Pettinicchio’s treatment (or lack thereof) of legal doctrine and litigation. Legal advocacy and court action are strangely and noticeably absent from his discussions of the evolution of disability policy reform. The courts played a significant role in interpreting legislative initiatives and providing leverage for providers to push for policy innovations. Furthermore, as the primary institutional engines for rights claims, courts played an especially critical role in devising the meaning and scope of the “reasonable accommodations” doctrine—a core platform for disability rights narratives. Consequently, readers are left with the mistaken impression that courts were of little significance to disability rights reform.

However, on the whole, these omissions do not detract from the overall value of the book. Pettinicchio’s research and insights provide a much-needed and important introduction to the broader politics of progress and retrenchment in disability rights legislation.

Disenfranchising Democracy: Constructing the Electorate in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. By David A. Bateman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 348p. \$99.99 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

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For obvious reasons, the study of the limits of American democracy is cresting just now. Scholars of American politics are discovering that it is not as immune from democratic backsliding as we might once have imagined,

and studies of the United States as a case study in democratization and democratic fragility are beginning to reframe the way we think about every aspect of American politics.

No recent work pushes this project further than David Bateman's outstanding book. In *Disenfranchising Democracy*, Bateman offers a compelling and truly gripping account of the connection between democracy's expansion and its limits. He shows that the extension of voting rights in the early nineteenth century was accompanied by the widespread disenfranchisement of African Americans, and he demonstrates that these two moves were closely connected as part of a common, and deeply contested, political project to define the boundaries of the US political community. Universal white male suffrage, often invoked as the first step in the progressive realization of an American democratic ideal, was purchased at a terrible price.

Bateman's deeply researched account highlights the political processes and strategic behavior that underlay this push and pull of democratization and de-democratization; often the same actors who supported extending the franchise by dropping property qualifications also supported disenfranchising African Americans, especially in the North. Bateman takes pains to demonstrate that this double move was far from preordained by any kind of overarching ideology of white supremacy. Rather, it resulted from evolving partisan and sectional dynamics as the early republic groped toward a common definition of American "peoplehood"—in the presence of black chattel slavery, territorial expansion, federalism, and newly evolving mass political parties. The result—with tragic consequences—was the "white man's republic," which operated both as a description of reality (white men had political power; others did not) and as an increasingly rooted myth about "the origins, purpose, and boundaries of American political community" (p. 140).

Bateman sets this powerful American story alongside parallel nineteenth-century cases of democratization in the United Kingdom in the decades leading up to the Reform Act of 1832 and in France during the birth of the Third Republic out of the ruins of the Second Empire. In the United Kingdom, a similar dynamic prevailed; the expansion of the electorate to include the urban middle class, as well as Catholics and Dissenters, went along with the disenfranchisement of Irish peasants and many working-class voters. In France, "universal" male suffrage (that was not quite universal) prevailed as the guiding principle of the new republic, but only just. The comparison highlights the similar push-pull dynamics of party building, political strategy, and the definition of peoplehood as those that drove developments in the United States, not to advance a single compact theory but to show the common challenges of the birth pangs of democratic politics.

The book has numerous virtues. First, it punctures the common view of American political development as a

story of progressive democratization. American democracy has always been uneven and precarious, as Bateman very effectively demonstrates. Second, it does not reduce the story of American disenfranchisement to an overly simple narrative of racism and white supremacist ideology. Racism and white supremacy were present, even prevalent, of course, although they were not universal, nor did they alone determine the course of American democratization. In fact, Bateman shows that a distinct conception of black disenfranchisement, rooted in ideas about the "white man's republic," emerged out of a series of political struggles over the franchise, especially in the context of partisan conflict and sectional tension, particularly within the Democratic Party.

Third, the book joins a growing list of works that examine American politics, and especially American political development, in comparative context. This is an intellectually compelling move for Americanists, never more so than in a moment when events have overwhelmed the American politics subfield's unspoken presumption that a stable democratic regime underlies our efforts and that our job is merely to describe and explain the regime's ordinary workings. In a world of democratic fragility, even in the United States, looking beyond our boundaries is essential, and Bateman offers an ingenious contribution to this expansion of our horizons. Finally, and for similar reasons, *Disenfranchising Democracy* is a work of powerful contemporary resonance at a moment when the boundaries of American peoplehood are once again a matter of deep contention and conflict and when American democracy is in peril as a consequence.

The narratives that drive the book's core empirical sections are rich, well constructed, and exquisitely researched, and they highlight the powerful analytical use to which scholars of political development might put such effective narrative writing. But the cost of such narrative emphasis is that the book's core theoretical claims and contributions occasionally seem somewhat elusive. Early on, Bateman sets his approach alongside classic macro-historical accounts of democratization by the likes of Barrington Moore, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Evelyne and John Stephens, and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. He powerfully shows how careful and close-range attention to the political dilemmas and coalition-building strategies of democratic elites can supplement these more structural accounts that focus on large and lumpy categories such as class. But the cost of this move is a somewhat fuzzier conceptual framework. The core argument is that ruling coalitions in democratic regimes must make choices in the presence of challengers to the regime, and maintaining or expanding these coalitions often involves negotiating new boundaries of the political community, which may result in enfranchising some groups and disenfranchising others. This account makes for striking and convincing accounts of the cases at

hand, but it is not always conducive to crisp observable implications that might make the theory clearly portable to other places and times.

The book also provokes questions about the extent to which elites in these three countries observed and learned from each other. Britain, France, and the United States were deeply entangled with each other as colonizers and colonized, allies and antagonists, trading partners, and intellectual and political interlocutors. The American and French Revolutions and the waves of democratization that they set off were signal events in transatlantic history, celebrated by some as models to be emulated and reviled by others as horrors to be avoided. What, if anything, did these countries learn from each other as they fumbled their ways toward democracy? If there was transnational learning among these (and other) countries, we might have to rethink theories of democratization that treat individual nations as independent cases and to take questions of timing and sequence more seriously.

These cavils aside, David Bateman has produced an essential study that no student of American political development or comparative democratization—or indeed of American or comparative politics more broadly—can afford to ignore.

The Supreme Court: An Analytic History of Constitutional Decision Making. By Tom S. Clark. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 450p. \$99.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

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Tom Clark's *The Supreme Court: An Analytical History of Constitutional Decision Making* is a tour de force. It is, in many respects, a Court-nerd's dream. The book connects major models of judicial behavior and constitutional development with recent advancements in text and ideal-point estimation to provide a series of nuanced and detailed descriptions of the Court's behavior over the last 130 years. There are seemingly countless analyses that are carefully described and undertaken with a high degree of rigor and precision. In sum, there is a lot to like about this book, and it is a must-read for any scholar who studies the Court.

The book has eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the central argument and provides a motivating example. It also introduces the two-dimensional descriptive model that gives way to four intellectual traditions that are reviewed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 details the previously introduced case-space model that generates estimates used throughout the book. Chapter 4 reviews the data, and chapter 5 begins the analysis, estimating the six legal preference dimensions. Chapter 6 analyzes the development of constitutional law from the period of

Reconstruction through 1937. Chapter 7 analyzes the Court from the 1930s through 2012. The final chapter offers some lessons learned, limitations, and discussion of some remaining puzzles.

The book's argument consists of several parts. It starts with a basic descriptive process model that argues that social disputes give rise to cases of different types that then determine what types of preference cleavages are created among justices. It next argues that justices' preferences are multidimensional. Crucially, the argument assumes that the median justice determines the disposition and that the justices engage in collegial bargaining over opinion content.

The book takes this process model and argues that the path of constitutional law over time is best described by different approaches that are organized along two dimensions. The first dimension is labeled structural and agency. The structural end of the dimension represents the broad forces that drive behavior into common patterns. These are things like institutions, collegial courts with majority rule, and separation-of-power structures. At the other end is agency. This end of the spectrum emphasizes the role of choice and preferences being exercised by political actors (think judicial preferences or electoral forces). The second dimension is characterized by the locus of attention—whether the focal point is on the internal dynamics of the Court or if it is on things external to the Court.

Clark uses this two-dimensional framework to organize the four main approaches to studying legal decision making and constitutional development: (1) judicial institutions (internal-structural), (2) judicial behavior (internal-agency), (3) social structure (external-structural), and (4) social conditions (external-agency). This organizational framework provides structure for when he interprets various empirical patterns in the rest of the book. For example, he argues that external-structural forces “will be likely to affect how litigants, lawyers, and other branches of government interact with the Court” (p. 9).

This analytical framework is then put into action with the introduction of the case-space model that is used to map judicial preferences onto different legal dimensions. At the risk of oversimplifying it, Clark models the text of Court opinions by applying a latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic model to identify six dimensions of constitutional conflict onto which judicial votes can be mapped: (1) judicial power, (2) economics and business, (3) central authority, (4) balance of power, (5) crime and punishment, and (6) individual and civil rights. Cases are then decided along different dimensions, and the importance of these dimensions changes over time, with different forces and actors playing a role in the dimensional nature of the decision.

The book has many findings, too many to detail here, but it is worthwhile to highlight a few. First, it finds that in the period after the Civil War, the Court largely