comments upon it. Finally, she closes the book with a chapter upon social ideals and progress.

The book is well written, simple to read and convenient in size. The absence of an index is unfortunate and the number of pages too few. We would have appreciated many more pages of a similar nature.

G. DE M. RUDOLF.

A Survey of the Science of Psychology. By J. R. KANTOR, Professor of Psychology, Indiana University. Bloomington, Indiana: The Principia Press, Inc., 1933. Pp. 564. Price $3.75.

American text-books on psychology are often amazingly complicated things, the complexity, of course, being at the wrong place. Their authors seem to delight in a special kind of circumlocution. Instead of "growth", they may talk of "behaviour development and reactional performance in societal periods"; instead of "perception" they talk of "precurrent identifying and discriminative reaction systems". Thereby two purposes are served. They hide the truth from themselves, and they supply an abundance of talk for lecture purposes. Perhaps if American psychologists had to lecture less, their psychology would become more sensible.

The present book of 564 pages is full of new terms—"interactional setting", "inapparent stimulus function", "stimulational media", "reactional biography", "suprabasic conduct", "contingential interactionalism", "memorial behaviour segments", "bistimulational behaviour", and so on. Correspondingly, the psychology actually taught is scanty to the highest degree, vague, hurried and unsound.

On the other hand Kantor does apply, and tries to stick to, the one principle that he allows himself in psychology—that of organismic interactionalism. This is a new brand of behaviourism; but, unbelievable as it may seem, out of the 564 pages only *one* is given to a description of this "new" principle. And, moreover, on this one and only page not a single line tells us anything positive about it. Kantor proceeds as follows: First a brief description is given of "mentalistic" psychologies (p. 17). Mentalism, according to Kantor, is always dualistic. There is a mental part, and a physical or non-mental part. On the other hand, behaviourism concerns itself exclusively with the non-mental part. Organismic interactionalism, however, bridges the gap between mentalism and behaviourism, without being mental at all—or so Kantor believes. But the subterfuges and rationalizations which Kantor has to employ in the name of science to buttress his viewpoint would be a matter for humour were it not that these views have, presumably, to be inflicted on the tender minds of students.

On p. 19, the one and only page I have referred to above, Kantor tries to describe the nature of organismic interactionalism in terms of "genetic building up of mutual interactions". "The child knows how to multiply because he has previously interacted with different combinations of the multiplication table." The only other positive hint is given in terms of introspection. "Introspection is merely observing one's own interactions with things instead of some other person's (*sic*). Just as the physiologist can observe his own changes in temperature, pulse-rate, and metabolism, so the psychologist can study himself as he remembers, perceives, thinks, and feels."

Which, as Kantor understands this sentence, is simply what introspection is not.

Organismic interactionalism seems to mean this. If I am fighting a man, then my actions are followed by reactions on the part of the opponent. Not only does a stimulus lead to a response (S→R) as in behaviourism, but the response reacts on the stimulus (S←→R). It is believed by Kantor that this two-ended arrow is the secret which opens the flood-gates of science on the barren lands of mentalism and behaviourism. This little dodge allows Kantor to think of interaction as synonymous with *adjustment*, the secret of mentalism. Instead of which it merely begs the question of mentalism. Thus, I only have to hear thunder, or see a stone, and the principle of interaction breaks down. For, certainly, a realist like Kantor can scarcely expect my responses to react on the thunder *qua* object. Sensations, he says, "are only names for the colours, sounds, and other qualities of things. Calling these qualities experience does not make them psychic". The clouds hold the thunder, and the sky its blue; equally too, no doubt, the feather will hold its tickle, and the razor the pain that hurts me when it cuts me. Had Kantor been an idealist, of course, his interactionism would mean idealism itself. It is this truth that his long dissertation on stimulus and response is hiding.

As for the facts that the students are expected to assimulate, they are superficial and amateurish indeed. It is hard to believe that anyone could write about memory as Kantor does on p. 231. It is hard to believe that anyone could survey psychology without once mentioning the word "conation" (abominable though the word is). The misguided tendency to classify *ad lib.*, shown in the author's treatment of topics like knowing, imagination, dreams, etc., can only confuse the student. There is complete absence of any principle, other than this trifling one of interactionism, throughout the book. In spite of its sincerity, which cannot be doubted, the book is not one upon which a student should begin his studies. WM. STEPHENSON.

The Mind and its Body. By CHARLES FOX. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1931. Pp. 316. Price 12*s.* 6*d.*

It is a brave man who suggests that he has something new to say about the body-mind problem, particularly if he does not look to see whether the same thing has been said many times before. Prof. Fox, however, makes the attempt, and if his book has to be taken seriously, then one can only criticize it in the same spirit. To a most unusual degree, Prof. Fox manages to begin his Chapters with views that would be tenable to most English psychologists, only to distort them by unwarranted conclusions and hasty generalizations. In one breath he seems to have got hold of psychological ideas in a sound way, but in the very next he gasps out a denial of what he has just affirmed.

The main, and admirable, theme of the book is that purely psychological, and not physiological or mechanistic concepts should govern psychology. The shortcomings of reflexology are amply described (in Chapter 1). Yet, in the same chapter Fox uses the self-same reflexological notions. There is also an extraordinary conclusion on p. 49 to the effect that "it is preposterous to suppose that there is any psychological ground for the belief that inhibition or suppression can be detrimental to the organism. Yet the