

main importance and justifies the impressive academic resources which have been deployed. The question 'why does a classical author choose AO rather than PR or vice versa' is crucial and should constantly be addressed in the elucidation of texts.

The editors compare their project with putting Proteus in chains, and its difficulty should indeed not be underestimated, but it is only a beginning in the detailed analysis of aspect in classical Greek. The next step might be to extend this investigation to other facets of Plato's personal style; alternatively, an investigation in another part of Attic literature, possibly drama, could be considered. Such a project would admittedly be difficult and likely to require the cooperation of many scholars, but the results could be immensely valuable in terms of understanding both the structure of the language and the meaning of the texts.

*University of Warwick*

FRANK BEETHAM

## METAPHYSICS ZETA

M. BURNYEAT: *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta*. Pp. x + 176. Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications, 2001. Paper. ISBN: 0-935225-03-X.

This book is a valuable contribution to the interpretation of what is probably Aristotle's most vexing work. I add as a footnote that it is mistitled: Burnyeat provides a 'map' of both *Z* and *H*, which he regards as parts of essentially the same discussion. Clearly, that is not a cause for complaint. Moreover, nearly half of the work (pp. 87–149) is devoted to two topics which take us outside Books *Z* and *H*. For B. takes space to argue (in Chapter 5) that the works which we characterize as Aristotle's 'logical works' do hang together with one another, and do present a unified approach to their different topics, even if (as he suggests is probable) their composition is not confined to Aristotle's earlier period. He also discusses (in Chapter 6) how *Z* and *H* fit into the general scheme of the *Metaphysics* as a whole, which leads him to say something of each of the other books, including an attractive conjecture about the composition of book *A*. But in this brief review I shall ignore these two chapters, in order to concentrate upon the 'map' that the title promises.

After the introductory chapters *Z1* and *Z2*, *Z3* begins with a list of four claimants to be the 'substantial being' of things—i.e., as B. adds, of things that are themselves 'substantial beings'. ('Substantial being' is his translation of *οὐσία*.) These claimants are (i) the essence, (ii) the genus, (iii) the universal, and (iv) the subject. B. is orthodox in saying that (iv) is discussed in *Z3* itself, (i) in *Z4–11*, and (iii), which subsumes (ii), in *Z13–16*. He adds that a fourth discussion, apparently not promised in *Z3*, is to be found in *Z17*. He becomes unorthodox at once. Each of these four discussions, he claims, begins with a 'logical' account of the proposal, but then proceeds to a more appropriate 'metaphysical' account, the main difference being that the first does not introduce the matter/form distinction (and so is accessible to those who know only the 'logical works'), whereas the second relies upon it. As he admits, the only part of the discussion of *Z3* that counts as 'logical', on this criterion, is the opening sentence at 1028<sup>b</sup>36–1029<sup>a</sup>2 explaining what is meant by 'subject'. So his suggestion gets off to a rather weak start in *Z3*. But it is fair to claim, as he does, that all of *Z4–6* counts as 'logical', by contrast with the remainder of *Z4–11*. (B. argues, as others have done, that *Z7–9* is a later addition to *Z4–11*. He also discounts *Z12* as a later addition. I have no quarrel with these proposals.) He similarly claims that all of *Z13–14* counts as 'logical', in contrast to *Z15–16*. Finally, he sees *Z17* as breaking into 'logical' and 'metaphysical' parts at 1041<sup>a</sup>32. I concede that a case can be made for dividing *Z17* in

this way, though it is not one that I myself find convincing, but what I wish to focus upon is B.'s treatment of Z13–16.

In general, B. wishes to claim that each of his four 'metaphysical' discussions leads (independently) to the conclusion that the substantial being of things is their form. This can fairly be said to be the conclusion of Z3, Z11, and Z17, but I do not see how the same can be said of Z15–16. The last words of Z16 reaffirm the main point argued in Z13, that what is predicated universally cannot be a substantial being (1041<sup>a</sup>3–5). It has seemed to many that this contention makes it impossible for form to be substantial being; certainly it does not affirm that it is. The paragraph before this hints at the existence of eternal and separable substantial beings, which B.—like many others—takes to be an allusion to Aristotle's God (1040<sup>b</sup>27–1041<sup>a</sup>3). But since he himself insists that Aristotle does not characterize God as form (p. 76 n. 155, p. 130 n. 8), we cannot extract from this passage any moral that substantial being is form. From the opening of Z16 (1040<sup>b</sup>5–10) one might fairly infer that substantial being is not matter, but I see nothing anywhere in Z15–16 to show that it is form.

B. does not profess to have a unified account of how the 'logical' and 'metaphysical' parts of his four discussions are in each instance related to one another (cf. p. 81 n. 7), but in the case of Z13–16 he makes this proposal: Z13 ends with a dilemma and Z15 resolves it. The dilemma of Z13 is that on the one hand it is agreed that if anything is definable then substantial being is, but on the other hand Z13 has argued that substantial beings cannot be universal and cannot have parts that are themselves substantial beings, which appears to show that they cannot be definable. B. comments: 'Did Aristotle lose any sleep over this dilemma? I doubt it. Rather, the puzzle is a dialectical stratagem, contrived so that it can be resolved—by the form-matter analysis of Z15' (p. 50). In this way he calmly shrugs aside what many have felt to be the chief crux of the whole book. Z15 opens with a distinction between substantial being as form and as form compounded with matter (1039<sup>b</sup>20–1). The latter it construes as particular, and this then leads into its main argument that particulars cannot be defined. (I note that the argument divides into three parts, 1039<sup>b</sup>31–1040<sup>a</sup>8, <sup>a</sup>8–<sup>a</sup>27, <sup>a</sup>27–<sup>b</sup>4. Of these, the first is by B.'s criterion 'metaphysical', but the second two are both 'logical'.) But if, as B. claims, this distinction is to resolve the dilemma with which Z13 ends, we can only suppose that it does so because it presupposes—though it does not explicitly say—that substantial being as form is universal and definable. (B. refuses to commit himself upon this point [p. 55 n. 112], but I cannot see how else he thinks that the opening of Z15 might resolve the closing dilemma of Z13.) In that case we surely need an explanation of how the arguments of Z13, purporting to show that no substantial being can be universal, are nevertheless compatible with Aristotle's claim that form is substantial being and is universal. B. gives none.

One cannot expect a relatively short discussion of Book Z (pp. 9–86) to answer every question that it raises. B.'s idea is that one can set out to provide a 'map', i.e. an account of the overall structure, and of the relations between the various parts, while avoiding all detailed analysis of particular arguments. His pursuit of this idea has produced a great number of valuable comments on this or that particular passage, which we must all be grateful for. But I think the project is fundamentally mistaken. Generalizing from other parts of Book Z, he supposes that there is an overall pattern in each major discussion, which we must expect to find also in Z13–16. But, when one looks in detail at what these chapters do in fact say, it becomes clear that they do not conform to what B. sees as the general pattern.

*Merton College, Oxford*

DAVID BOSTOCK