

Li-Chiao Chen

The Signing of the Sino-Iranian Treaty of 1920

This article looks at the efforts China and Iran made towards strengthening themselves and their search for independence and integrity after the First World War. Since the nineteenth century, the two countries had been in a similar situation, under pressure from treaties and rivalries with European powers. The change of the world order brought about by the 1914–18 war created an opportunity for China and Iran to claim back their rights, such as ending extra-territoriality. After the war, the Fourteen Points drawn up by the American president, Woodrow Wilson, gave hope for China and Iran to maintain their independence and integrity. During the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, China and Iran made both gains and losses. China was unable to solve the Shandong Problem but became one of the founding members of the League of Nations, while Iran did not get access to the Peace Conference but obtained Britain's assurance of independence and integrity by signing the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, and then joined the League of Nations. China and Iran attempted to bring about cooperation between Asian countries, and therefore signed a treaty in 1920. The significance of the treaty was that the two countries agreed not to grant extra-territoriality to each other, which was what both countries were seeking to achieve at that time.

Keywords: Beijing Government; Self-Strengthening; Extra-Territoriality; Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919; Sino-Iranian Treaty of 1920; League of Nations

Introduction

A hundred years ago, China and Iran started their relationship with a treaty signed in 1920 (preserved in the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, in Taipei). This was a significant event after the First World War (hereafter the War), as the two countries shared a similar fate, such as unequal treaties with foreign

Li-Chiao Chen is Assistant Professor of History at the Fu Jen Catholic University, New Taipei City, Taiwan. The author thanks Ali Gheissari and Ranin Kazemi for their assistance, and the precious comments from the anonymous reviewers.

This article is a revised and extended version of the author's paper (in Chinese) "In Search of Independence and Integrity in China and Iran 1918–1921," in *"History" and "Histories" in China Diplomacy* (Taipei: Cheng-Chi University Press, 2015), 1–28.

powers and being compelled to begin westernizing reformation.¹ Hitherto, while the relationship between the West and Iran has been explored in academic studies, that between China and Iran has rarely been examined. This paper attempts to explore the reason for the two Asian countries signing a treaty at that time, and to look at the history of the War from a different angle.

Since the nineteenth century, the Qing dynasty in China had granted to foreign powers certain territories, loans, most-favored-nation status, and immunity of foreigners from Chinese laws, known as extra-territoriality,² as had Qajar Iran. During the early Qajar Iran period, the failure of disputes with Russia over the Caucasian area resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Turkmenchay of 1828, in which Iran granted extra-territoriality to the Russians.³ Some Chinese materials demonstrate that China was concerned with what was taking place in Iran during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For instance, the Chinese press covered the Iranian constitutional revolution of 1906, their interest stemming from the fact that the Chinese were making efforts toward a constitution at the same time.⁴ And, the Anglo-Russian pressure being experienced by Iran between 1907 and 1911 was featured in some Chinese magazines.⁵ Removal of unequal treaties was viewed by both Qing and Qajar as a way to their independence and integrity.

After the outbreak of the War, China had disputes with Japan over the Shandong Problem as a result of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915.⁶ The Beijing government, having previously declared its neutrality, set out to join the War by sending its citizens to Europe as workers in 1916 and declared war on Germany in August 1917.⁷ Iran had been dismembered as a result of the Anglo-Russian Convention signed by Russia and Britain in 1907 (hereafter the 1907 Convention) which had partitioned Iran into three zones: the northern zone was Russia's sphere of influence, the southeastern zone was Britain's, and there was a neutral zone in the middle.⁸ The Iranian government declared its neutrality during the War, but was nevertheless involved with it because of the battles fought between Ottoman and Russian troops in its northwestern marginal area while British troops entered southern Iran.⁹ As a result of their separate histories, one purpose shared by the two Asian countries was to remove the influence of foreign powers, especially after the War.

There have been many studies on China and Iran's diplomatic situation during the Paris Peace Conference (hereafter the Conference), but only dealing with each country separately. Regarding China, some works argue that China failed in relation

¹"Unequal treaties" was a term that was generally used in Chinese studies on the modern history of China, and can be seen in Oliver Bast's article "Duping the British and Outwitting the Russians," 262.

²Wang, "The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China," 402.

³Huweritz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 101–2.

⁴Wang, "The Iranian Constitutional Revolution."

⁵Qian, "What Happens in Persia in Recent Times," 13–21.

⁶Ling, "Japan's Policy toward China 1911–1915."

⁷See Xu, *China and the Great War*, 113–53, and Wu, *America and Chinese Politics 1917–1928*, 13–34.

⁸Huweritz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 265–7.

⁹Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, 114–36.

to Shandong during the Conference, while other more recent works state that in fact China did as well as it could at the time.¹⁰ As for Iran, research on the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 has mostly argued both for its failure and its success,¹¹ as well as examining the relationship between Iran, the United States, Britain, and Russia.¹² Oliver Bast's article on Sino-Iranian relations after the War, "Iran va Konferans-e Solh-e 1919," argues that Iran had thought of claiming its rights just as China had, but that China having entered the War, among other reasons, meant that it was not a good example for Iran to follow.¹³ It is certain that what happened in China and Iran after the War is very important to academic studies, but their relationship has not yet been discussed.

Therefore, given the similar situations under which the two Asian countries were suffering, it is worth exploring their foreign relations 100 years ago, the purpose behind the signing of the Sino-Iranian Treaty in 1920 (hereafter the 1920 Treaty), and the meaning of the Treaty. This article, based on documents from the British Foreign Office, the US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, and the Archives of the Institute of Modern History of Academia Sinica, explores China and Iran's diplomatic strategies after the War, situations that the two parties encountered during the Conference, and the signing of the 1920 Treaty and its consequences.

The America Option for China and Iran

At the end of the War, it was known that a conference would take place, and China and Iran both wished to be included. Both countries were inspired by the principle of self-determination included in the Fourteen Points issued by the president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, in January 1918.¹⁴ The Beijing and Tehran governments both attempted to take this opportunity to strengthen themselves, and Wilson's principles could be the best option for achieving this. The question was whether the United States would offer a realistic option for China and Iran to reach their aims.

¹⁰Chen, "Lu Cheng-Hsiang and the Paris Peace Conference"; Chang, "V. K. Wellington Koo's Diplomacy"; Tang, *The Peking Government and the League of Nations*; Chen, *China's Journey to the World*; Tang, *Paris Peace Conference and China Diplomacy*; and Deng, *The Paris Peace Conference and Beijing's Internal-External Struggles*.

¹¹Klein, "British Policy and the Iranian Constitution"; Olson, "The Genesis of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919"; Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, 77–9; Olson, *Anglo-Iranian Relations*; Sabahi, *British Policy in Persia 1918–1925*, 33–58; Keddie, "Iran under the Later Qajars, 1848–1922"; Volodarsky, *The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours*, 24–32; Katouzian, "The Campaign against the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919"; Bast, "Putting the Record Straight"; Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran*, 88–120; Gohli-Majd, *From Qajar to Pahlavi*, 22–6.

¹²Heravi, *Iranian–American Diplomacy*, 35–51, and Ishtiaq, *Anglo-Iranian Relations 1905–1919*, 311–29; Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, 54–56.

¹³Bast, "Iran va Konferans-e Solh-e 1919."

¹⁴Sefārat-e Iran dar Washington beh Vezārat-e Khārejeh, January 9, 1918, in Bayāt and Shahrezā'i, *Āmāl-e Irāniān*, 109.

During the War, the Beijing government negotiated with countries that had not previously signed any treaties with China, such as Cuba, Chile, and Switzerland, not to grant extra-territoriality when signing treaties.¹⁵ This has been termed “Treaty Revision Diplomacy” by Taiwanese scholar Chi-Hua Tang.¹⁶ In addition, after the Fourteen Points, Wellington Ku (Chinese name Ku Wei-Chun), the Chinese minister in Washington, argued that the United States was likely to be the only power that would support China, because they would take action to protect their own interests in China.¹⁷

Nevertheless, the United States did not give the Chinese government a satisfactory answer because of differing opinions between American diplomats and statesmen in Beijing and Washington. For instance, Japan’s interests in China were recognized by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917. Japan played an important role in America’s policies toward China at the time.¹⁸ In contrast, the United States minister to China, Paul S. Reinsch, wished China to join the War, and looked forward to more assistance from the United States to China in order to strengthen America’s efforts to stop Japanese expansion.¹⁹ It can be seen that Washington was mainly concerned with Japanese interests in East Asia, while Reinsch wished to prevent Japanese invasion and expansion. President Wilson was primarily concerned with European affairs, so it was necessary to satisfy Japan, a rising power in East Asia. In comparison to Japan, China, in a civil war in 1918, was showing its weakness.²⁰ The Shandong Problem, which was China’s argument with Japan, was not a priority for American diplomacy. Shandong remained under Japan’s control. It could be seen that China’s America option was going badly.

As for Iran, after the new Russian government was established in November 1917, the Soviets announced that the conventional partitioning of Iran (referring to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907) was annulled, and began the withdrawal of Russian troops.²¹ This could be a time for Iran to be released. The Iranian minister in St. Petersburg then asked the Soviet government for an official notice of the abolition of the 1907 Convention. The Iranian government also declared the cancellation of extra-territoriality.²² In February 1918, the Soviet government announced that there were no longer any unequal treaties with Iran, which was followed by movements to end treaties and concessions in relation to Iran.²³ Owing to the friendliness of the Soviets—which, of course, was not entirely sincere, because the Soviets were weak at that point²⁴—Iran had opportunities to claim its rights. However, at that

¹⁵Tang, “The Beginning of Treaty Revision.”

¹⁶Tang, *Treaty Revision Campaign of the Beijing Government*.

¹⁷Chang, “V. K. Wellington Koo’s Diplomacy,” 34.

¹⁸Eto, “China’s International Relations 1911–1931,” 104.

¹⁹Wu, *America and Chinese Politics 1917–1928*, 25.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 55–6.

²¹Rezun, *The Soviet Union and Iran*, 31.

²²Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, 158–9.

²³Fatemi, *Diplomatic History of Persia 1917–1923*, 8.

²⁴Kazemzadeh, “Russia and the Middle East,” 521.

time, Britain had recognized Iran's independence and integrity, but refused to withdraw its troops from Iran and to cancel the 1907 Convention. This showed that Britain was fully aware that the departure of the Soviets allowed Britain to obtain full control of Iran without intervention from other foreign powers.

Iran was negotiating its rights with the United States too, but the end to this was just like China's experience. In December 1917, Mehdi Khan, the Iranian minister in Washington, telegraphed the Secretary of State of the United States in relation to President Wilson's message to Congress earlier that month. Iran felt encouraged by Wilson, who had expressed the desire to reach a permanent peace based on international justice and to respect the sovereignty and independence of every nation. The minister also argued:

Persia feels that these losses and wrongs necessitate and justify her to have representation at the peace conference, in order that the obstacles interposed through foreign interference with her internal affairs, which have threatened her independence and retarded her progress and development, may be wholly removed.²⁵

Mehdi Khan's demands included participation in the Peace Conference, the guarantee of Persia's independence and sovereignty, the revision of the Treaty of Turkmenchay, and the abolition of all other arrangements and agreements which had been forcibly imposed upon Iran.²⁶ Although Robert Lansing, US Secretary of State, replied that Iran would have the support of the United States at the Conference,²⁷ he did not specify what form that support would take. John Caldwell, American minister in Tehran, had no clear thoughts on assisting Iran.²⁸ In fact, the United States, from its establishment in the late eighteenth century, had no specific interest in Iran, and was primarily concerned during the War with European affairs. It is clear that neither Lansing nor Caldwell knew how to deal with Iranian affairs. Mirza 'Ali Quli Khan, the Iranian minister in Washington, talked again to Lansing in October 1918, saying that Iran wished to "insure her [Iran], after the war, against a recurrence of such hopeless conditions, which have afflicted the people of that ancient land."²⁹ Lansing merely replied that decisions would be made after Wilson had arrived in Paris.³⁰

²⁵The Persian Minister (Mehdi Khan) to the Secretary of State, December 17, 1917, in Alexander and Nanes, *The United States and Iran*, 15.

²⁶The Persian Legation to the Department of State [Memorandum], in Alexander and Nanes, *The United States and Iran*, 16.

²⁷Yeselson, *United States–Persian Diplomatic Relations*, 146.

²⁸Heravi, *Iranian–American Diplomacy*, 36.

²⁹The Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Khan) to the Secretary State, October 5, 1918, no. 177, in Alexander and Nanes, *The United States and Iran*, 19.

³⁰The Secretary of State to the Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Khan), no. 26, 763.72119.3279, Washington, December 2, 1918, *United States Department of State Papers relating to the Foreign Relation of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), The Paris Peace Conference. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919, 261.

Iran and China had a similar situation and purpose, and both made efforts to eliminate pressures from foreign powers. After the War, the United States became a hopeful option to the Asian “brothers.” However, the Fourteen Points and self-determination declared by Wilson were simply ideals that could not be practiced in China and Iran. As regards the Chinese question, Japan became a factor with which the United States was concerned, while the United States had no clear way to deal with the Iranian question. Wilson’s Fourteen Points were inspiring in the beginning, but turned out to be a considerable disappointment to the international society, as Erez Manela argues in his book.³¹

The Less Than Satisfactory Paris Peace Conference

The Conference was generally viewed as a significant event in reconstructing the world and initiating a time of peace. But was it really so promising for China and Iran? Both China and Iran sought to enter the Conference to claim their rights and interests. China, as one of the victors, was eligible to be a member of the Conference, but nevertheless its admission was not smooth. The Entente Powers rejected China on the grounds that it was in a civil war and had not actually joined the War. The Beijing government appealed for assistance from the United States, and in the meantime contacted Britain with a further request to be included in the Peace Conference.³² Ku suggested to the Chinese Foreign Ministry that the United States was the only power likely to help and that, therefore, China should acknowledge statements made by them.³³ On 14 November 1918, Ku again telegraphed the Chinese Foreign Ministry:

The Vice Secretary of State of the United States said once the Entente intended to refuse the admission of China to the Conference, the United States should assist China. In addition, China in fact declared war on Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and there would not be negotiations for peace if China could not enter the Conference. Lansing also argued that the Entente had no reason to refuse China’s entrance because there were issues of the Conference relating to China’s interests. He also stated that China could be confident that the United States would make a just decision.³⁴

At the end of 1918, when the Chinese civil war came to an end, the Entente Powers in Paris had no excuse for blocking China from the Conference.³⁵

³¹Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 215–25.

³²Tang, *Paris Peace Conference*, 82.

³³To the Foreign Ministry, May 21, 1918, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 03-12-008-02-012.

³⁴To the Foreign Ministry, November 14, 1918, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 03-12-008-02-036.

³⁵Ling, *History of Modern Sino-Japanese Relations*, 164.

An intrinsic part of the mission of the Chinese delegation was in relation to the Shandong Problem. The aims included “to claim all the rights and interests in the Province of Shandong taken by Germany, and which could not be transferred to Japan,” “to cancel part or all of the stipulations of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915,” and “to cancel all the privileges granted to foreigners in China, such as extraterritoriality and sphere of influence.”³⁶ The Chinese delegation, however, encountered difficulties in the Conference.

Japan contended that all the interests of Germany in Shandong must be transferred to Japan without conditions.³⁷ When Ku talked to Wilson about resolutions to the Shandong Problem at the Conference, Wilson did not give an answer. Lu Cheng-Hsiang, foreign minister, also indicated that Britain would not help because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance since 1902.³⁸ Japan refused to return Shandong to China,³⁹ and then stated that if there was not a satisfactory resolution of the Shandong Problem, its delegates would leave Paris. Meanwhile, the Italian prime minister left Paris because of the Fiume question. Then Wilson agreed to the Japanese demand. Lu argued that China would refuse to sign the peace treaty while the Shandong Problem remained in question.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, in May 1919, the Chinese delegation signed the peace treaties, except for the part on Shandong.⁴¹ Therefore, a positive result was that China had membership of the League of Nations.⁴² Although the Chinese delegation did not get what they wanted, signing the peace treaty was an alternative to a mediated situation, creating an opportunity to see the Shandong Problem discussed at the Washington Conference in 1921.

Meanwhile, Iran was in a worse situation than China. In January 1919, George Curzon, interim British foreign minister, argued that Iran had not been a belligerent, and its admission to the Conference could not be allowed. Britain had always acknowledged Iran’s independence and integrity and, in addition, the 1907 Convention had been canceled. Britain would not therefore give any favors if Iran did not accept Britain’s friendliness.⁴³ The Iranian government was then informed that neutral parties were not allowed admission to the Conference.⁴⁴ On 30 January, the Iranian foreign minister, Moshaver al-Dowleh, requested admission to the Conference despite other neutral countries not being admitted, and the cancelation of previously signed treaties, conventions, and agreements that disregarded Iran’s integrity

³⁶Chang, *Diplomatic History of the Republic of China*, 257.

³⁷Deng, *The Paris Peace Conference*, 50–1.

³⁸Received from the Foreign Minister, April 17, 1919, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 03-33-150-01-044.

³⁹The Seventy-Second Meeting, April 22, 1919, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 03-37-011-03-008.

⁴⁰Kawashima, *The Formation of Modern China*, 236.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 240.

⁴²Tang, *The Peking Government and the League of Nations*, 18.

⁴³Curzon to Balfour, January 10, 1919, no. 20, Foreign Office, National Archives, Kew: FO248/1255.

⁴⁴Cox to Curzon, January 11, 1919, 6345, no. 20, FO371/3858.

and sovereignty.⁴⁵ It can be seen that the demands still remained the same as at the beginning, the main aim being to eliminate foreign pressures. Moshaver insisted that the eight demands perfectly fitted Wilson's Fourteen Points; however, it would be difficult, or even impossible, for Iran to enter the Conference on account of its neutrality.

The only message that Britain conveyed to Iran was that anything demanded by Iran could be negotiated with Britain rather than by the Conference.⁴⁶ Curzon had been the Viceroy of India from 1899 to 1905, and he was definitely aware of the importance of the security of India and its neighboring regions. Once Iran was stable, India would be secure. The policy remained the same even when the War had ended.⁴⁷ Curzon's objective was to ensure that British influence extended from the Mediterranean to the western side of India, where Iran was of importance for Britain to prevent Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Soviet Russia from encroaching into Afghanistan and India.⁴⁸ The British foreign minister, Arthur James Balfour, shared the same view, and tried to make the Iranian foreign minister understand Britain's perspective.⁴⁹

On 23 March 1919, the Iranian delegation in Paris set out ten demands, including annulment of the 1907 Convention, the ending of intervention in the domestic affairs of Iran, and revision of the treaties previously signed between Iran and foreign countries.⁵⁰ However, they eventually realized, in early April, that there was no possibility of participating in the Conference.⁵¹ Balfour stated that Iran must be aware of the reality that Britain would be a friend; otherwise, if Iran cooperated with other powers, Britain would not acknowledge its independence.⁵² Obviously, Britain was threatening Iran. Actually, the Conference was concerned with the partition of the Ottoman Empire and, as Wilson returned to the United States in June, there was no longer a possibility of Iran entering the Conference.⁵³

Meanwhile, the Iranian prime minister, Vosuq al-Dowleh, had negotiations with Percy Cox, British minister in Tehran. His demands were just the same as his delegates in Paris, such as to "guarantee Persia's independence; support efforts to secure war damages from Turkey and Russia; agree in principle to a revision of the tariff; and assist in the possible recovery of some lost territories."⁵⁴ Under British pressure, Vosuq al-Dowleh had the means to change Iran's situation as well. In his terms, Britain, even though it was not at all popular at that time, was the main European power in the Middle East after the War, and it was absolutely the only option at

⁴⁵The Persian Foreign Minister (Aligoli) to the Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Khan), Enclosure 2, no. 30, *FRUS*, 259.

⁴⁶Curzon to Cox, March 26, 1919, 48160, no. 38, FO416/56.

⁴⁷Olson, "The Genesis of the Anglo-Persian Agreements," 185.

⁴⁸Temperly, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, 210.

⁴⁹Balfour to Curzon, March 27, 1919, no. 178, FO248/1255.

⁵⁰Claims of Persia before the Conference of the Preliminaries of Peace at Paris, April 17, 1919, 60025, FO371/3860.

⁵¹Cox to Curzon, April 9, 1919, no. 255, FO248/1256.

⁵²Balfour to Curzon, May 2, 1919, 67783, no. 800, FO371/3860.

⁵³Bast, "Putting the Record Straight," 270.

⁵⁴Olson, *Anglo-Iranian Relations*, 231.

that time for Iran to negotiate with.⁵⁵ Iran's option to maintain its independence and integrity moved from the United States to Britain. An Anglo-Iranian treaty was signed on 9 August by Vosuq al-Dowleh and Cox, and included the following stipulations:

1. The British Government reiterate, in the most categorical manner, the undertakings which they have repeatedly given in the past to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia.
2. For the purpose of financing the reforms of this agreement, the British Government offer to provide or arrange a substantial loan for the Persian Government, for which adequate security shall be sought by the two Governments in consultation in the revenues of the customs or other sources of income at the disposal of the Persian Government.
3. The two Governments agree to the appointment forthwith of a joint Committee of experts for the examination and revision of the existing Customs Tariff with a view to accord with the legitimate interests of the country and to promote its prosperity.⁵⁶

It could not be known what would come next, owing to British dominance in Iran's economy and finances, but at least Iran received a guarantee of independence and integrity from Britain, which to some extent made up for not having admission to the Conference.

Both parties were satisfied with the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 (hereafter the 1919 Treaty). Vosuq al-Dowleh said that Iran was in a difficult position and expressed "thanks for the assistance that His Imperial Majesty, the leaders of Islam and the British Government rendered me, or else I would probably have been unable to carry out my program."⁵⁷ The Iranian foreign minister expressed the view that the 1919 Treaty would maintain Iran's independence and integrity while enabling the country to receive financial and economic assistance from Britain, and would improve Anglo-Iranian relations in the future.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the 1919 Treaty was not welcomed by public opinion in Iran, the public perceiving Iran as still under the control of Britain, the situation being similar to the Shandong Problem in China.⁵⁹

Curzon also argued that Iran was eligible to be a member of the forthcoming League of Nations.⁶⁰ The Iranian prince, Firuz Mirza, stated that the Treaty was "meant to furnish Persia with the means of directing her course, in the full enjoyment

⁵⁵Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, 31.

⁵⁶Huweritz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 64–6.

⁵⁷Delegates to the Peace Conference, Translation from Raad, August 19, 1919, Decimal File 891.00 January 2, 1919–November 12, 1922.

⁵⁸August 26, 1919, no. 89, FO248/1256, 315.

⁵⁹"En'ekās-e Qarārdād-e Iran va Engelis dar Farānseh," *Āmāl-e Irāniān*, 7 Moharram 1338 (October 2, 1919), 691.

⁶⁰Lord Curzon's Speech on Persia at the Banquet given in honor of His Highness Prince Nosrat al-Dowleh at the Carlton Hotel, September 18, 1919, FO248/1257.

of her political and economic independence, towards progress and prosperity” and that “the League of Nations is about to meet, ... we will both sides comply with our obligations as members of the League of Nations in laying immediately before it the text of our Agreement.”⁶¹

The Times reported that the Iranian tariff and customs regulations were being revised, and that the new tariffs would be part of equitable arrangements to “secure the sorely needed increase in the Persian revenue.”⁶² Vosuq al-Dowleh, also writing in *The Times*, stated that “the independence of Persia is not endangered by her foreign neighbours, but by the bad internal situation, ... to remember that nothing less than the united effort of the whole country is adequate.”⁶³ Of course, to the opposition, the 1919 Treaty was an insult to Iran; but to Vosuq al-Dowleh, the 1919 Treaty could be a first step toward easing part of the pressure on Iran. Proof of this came on 21 November 1919, when Iran was invited to join the League of Nations.⁶⁴

The Conference was important to China and Iran, but the atmosphere for the two Asian countries was tricky because they were not the main players. America and Japan were influential in the East and in Asia, and Britain was dominant in the Middle East. Therefore, China could not claim Shandong back at the Conference, while Iran was not even a member of it. However, they did still make some progress. To some extent, the strengthening of both countries achieved a measure of success in 1919.

The Sino-Iranian Treaty of 1920

When China and Iran encountered their respective problems, the two Asian countries paid attention to each other. For example, an article in a Chinese newspaper, *Shenbao*, commented that Iran, as a neutral state during the War, had suffered from the fighting between the Ottoman and Russian troops in the Province of Azerbaijan.⁶⁵ Another article commented that Iran was struggling for its freedom, and still felt pain during the War even though it was a neutral state.⁶⁶ In 1919, a document by the Beijing Foreign Ministry mentioned that:

After the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Iran was not a country at all. Britain failed to push us to join the war, but Iran also refused to declare war on Germany. ... Now Germany has failed, Iran has remained neutral so that Britain should not violate Iran’s independence which they promised before.⁶⁷

⁶¹“The Anglo-Persian Agreement,” *The Times*, September 24, 1914, 9.

⁶²“Britain’s Aid to Persia,” *The Times*, March 24, 1920, 15.

⁶³“Persian Prime Minister’s Reform Manifesto,” *The Times*, April 5, 1920, 7.

⁶⁴Howard-Ellis, *The Origin Structure*, 101.

⁶⁵“Persia in the European War,” *Shenbao*, October 19, 1919, 19.

⁶⁶Hao-Bei, “A New Situation of Persia,” *Pacific Ocean (Shanghai)*, 1, no. 10 (1918), 28–30.

⁶⁷The Suggestions made to the European Peace Conference, February 27, 1919, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 03-37-007-03-033.

Regarding the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, an article published in *Dongfang Zazhi* mentioned Iran's loss during the War and criticized the way its demands were ignored by the Conference, claiming that the 1919 Treaty was another evil action perpetrated against Iran.⁶⁸ An article in *Ta Kung Pao (Tianjin)* argued that the 1919 Treaty was also a conspiracy by Britain to control Tibet and Central Asia (including Iran) in order to end the influence of Russia completely.⁶⁹ Another comment published in *Ta Kung Pao (Tianjin)* stated that Iran's situation was just like the Shandong Problem, and so China should be on the side of Iran.⁷⁰ In February 1919, a Persian document from the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced that Britain should abolish unequal treaties and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 in relation to China and Iran.⁷¹ China's efforts at treaty revision were supported by Iran.

In March 1920, China and Iran had their first contact in the Italian city of Rome. On 6 March, a telegraph from the Chinese minister in Italy, Kuan-Chi Wang, said that Issac Khan, Iranian minister in Italy, had been instructed by the Iranian government to negotiate a treaty of friendship. Issac Khan argued that it would make good sense for Asian countries to unite and help each other, his government having emphasized that China and Iran were both in Asia, and had enjoyed a good relationship since the Tang Dynasty. After the War, signing a treaty had become a matter of urgency.⁷² For his part, Wang mentioned that "China and Iran were ancient civilized countries, but all encountered serious challenges from foreign powers now," and he agreed to sign a treaty of friendship.⁷³ It is therefore clear that the motives of the two Asian countries to unite were their similar situations and their historical connections. The next day, the Chinese Foreign Ministry replied to Wang:

"Since Iran has been a friend of business since the Tang Dynasty, and now they have the same ambition as ours, you are therefore instructed to sign an equal treaty with Iran, based on the Sino-Bolivian Treaty."⁷⁴

The Sino-Bolivian Treaty had been signed on 3 December 1919, and was the first equal treaty of the Beijing government.⁷⁵ The most significant part of the Sino-Bolivian Treaty was that extra-territoriality was not included,⁷⁶ and a

⁶⁸"Persia's Wishes," *Dongfang Zazhi*, 17, no. 5 (1920), 37–8.

⁶⁹"Foreign Press on the British Policy towards Central Asia," *Ta Kung Pao (Tianjin)*, August 23, 1919, 3.

⁷⁰"The Persian Question," *Ta Kung Pao (Tianjin)*, August 25, 1919, 2.

⁷¹Veẓārat-e Omur-e Khārejeh, Moshāver al-Mamālek, in *Āmāl-e Irāniān*, 29 Rabi 'ath-Thani 1337 (February 1, 1919), no. 121, p. 206.

⁷²Sino-Iranian Treaty and Consulate, September 16, 1920, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 112.6/0002.

⁷³Telegraph from Wang, March 6, 1920, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 112.6/0001.

⁷⁴Telegraph for Wang, 7 March 1920, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 112.6/0001.

⁷⁵Tang, *Treaty Revision Campaign of the Beijing Government*, pp. 77–79.

⁷⁶Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Collection of Treaties*, 478.

treaty without extra-territoriality symbolized respect for others' independence. Although the western powers did not abrogate their extra-territoriality in China until the 1930s, the Sino-Bolivian Treaty was significant for the Chinese government, and so China and Iran were going to sign a treaty for the same purpose. Wang's telegraph, on 12 March 1920, argued that the civilians of both countries should obey the laws of the place where they resided.⁷⁷ On 13 May, a draft of the treaty was drawn up, and *Ta Kung Pao (Tianjin)* reported that the Sino-Iranian Treaty had been signed, based on the Sino-Bolivian Treaty, excluding extra-territoriality.⁷⁸ In addition, the signing of a treaty by China and Iran denoted the strengthening of the Asian countries.

The 1920 Treaty was signed on 1 June. Article 2 stipulated:

Ambassadors, Ministers and Chargés d'Affaires that the high contracting parties may be willing to assign to the courts of each other, together with all their staff, will be accepted at the respective courts of the two Governments, and will be treated in the same manner as Ministers and other diplomatic representatives of the most favored nations are treated, and will have the same privileges, with the exception of dealing with disputes concerning their own subjects.

Article 4 stated:

The subjects of each of the high contracting parties, while residing in or traveling through the territories of the other, will be subject to the local laws, and all judicial matters arising from disputes, crimes, etc. will be settled before the local tribunals of Persia or China, respectively.⁷⁹

The meaning of these two articles was that the two countries did not grant one another extra-territoriality. Although Wang mentioned that Issac Khan was upset about the wording in the articles,⁸⁰ the details were not specifically written. The treaty was ratified by the Beijing government on 16 September, which represented the two Asian countries officially establishing their friendship. For the Beijing government it was the second equal treaty with other countries, while for the Iranian government it was possibly the first equal treaty.

After the 1920 Treaty, the two countries could be seen to cooperate with each other in the League of Nations. For example, regarding elections to the council of the League

⁷⁷Telegraph from Wang, 12 March 1920, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 112.6/0001.

⁷⁸"The Draft Treaty with Persia was ready to be ratified," *Ta Kung Pao (Tianjin)*, 13 May 1920, p. 3.

⁷⁹The Sino-Iranian Treaty, June 1, 1920, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 03-23-096-01-001. The English version of the treaty can be seen in Treaty between Persia and China, 1 June 1920, no. 712, August 18, 1921, Decimal File 791.9311, US Department of State.

⁸⁰Telegraph from Wang, July 29, 1920, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 112.6-0001.

as a non-permanent member, Iran supported the Chinese delegate.⁸¹ In June 1920, Iran agreed in the League of Nations to provide 2,000 pounds sterling for the establishment of twenty health centers in Poland.⁸² Iran's assistance in the League of Nations demonstrates that the country was attempting to enter the so-called family of nations, this concept having been used by Immanuel C. Y. Hsu.⁸³ In his work, Hsu mentioned that the Ottoman Empire had entered the family of nations from 1856, and China after 1858. After the War, Iran, an Asian country which seemed to be a less important power in world history, also finally became a member of the family of nations. The cooperation of China and Iran symbolized the united power of Asian countries after the War.

Aftermath of the Treaty

The strengthening of China and Iran after the War was not in fact supported by the United States, which had played a role of offering hope at the time. When the Washington Conference was convened by the United States in November 1921, the Chinese delegate, Shih Chao Chi, claimed that China's objective was to build a country of complete independence with ten principles,⁸⁴ later shortened by Elihu Root, the American delegate, into the Root Principles, which stated:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government, overcoming the difficulties incident to the change from the old and long-continued imperial form of government.
3. To safeguard for the world, so far as it is within our power, the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
4. To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.⁸⁵

In addition, during the Washington Conference China wished to reopen discussions on the Shandong Problem, which had been an urgent question for the

⁸¹Telegraph from Geneva, December 18, 1921, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 03-38-014-01-011.

⁸²"Daily Notes of the League of Nations," *Shenbao*, December 19, 1920, 3.

⁸³Hsu, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations*. Benjamin C. Fortna shares the same view in using the term "European club." See Fortna, "The Reign of Abdülhamid II," 44.

⁸⁴Telegraph from Washington, November 22, 1921, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 03-39-024-02-006.

⁸⁵Wang, *Unequal Treaties and China*, 74.

Chinese since 1918. The issue also related to the question of China's independence and integrity. However, Japan insisted on its rights in Shandong. In the end, the Treaty for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shandong was signed in February 1922, in which ironically China even had to "buy" back the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway occupied by Japan. The Beijing government made efforts to eliminate losses at the Washington Conference, but actually Chinese sovereignty was still not complete.

Regarding Iran, in August 1918 Caldwell telegraphed Lansing to say that Britain would continue its occupation in Iran, on account of disturbances.⁸⁶ He clearly had no confidence in Iran's central government.⁸⁷ After the signing of the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, Caldwell complained that the Treaty was not accepted by the Iranian people⁸⁸ and that it had not been ratified by the Iranian Majles (there was no Majles during the War),⁸⁹ and so the hope for independence vanished.⁹⁰ Lansing also blamed the difficulties over the entrance of the Iranian delegation to the Conference on the simple indifference of the Iranian government.⁹¹

The Americans were also critical of the 1919 Treaty, declaring that "Persia does not wish American aid or support hereafter, and this in spite of the well-known fact that the Persian Peace Commission at Paris openly and urgently sought American aid," and denied they had refused aid to Iran.⁹² Meanwhile, the United States did not want to cancel extra-territoriality, which they had been granted through the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce of 1856.⁹³ Compared with Britain, the United States looked to the Iranians like a new bullying power. The United States also insisted that it would not assist Iran in canceling capitulations and would not cede privileges that had been granted by Iran.⁹⁴ During the Washington Conference, the Iranian minister in Washington asserted that Root's four principles could be applied to Iran, as they were experiencing the same situation as China had encountered. However, the State Department of the United States rejected this because Iran was not a Far Eastern state.⁹⁵ If the United States were to give up its privileges in Iran, such as extra-territoriality, its influence would be weakened.

⁸⁶Caldwell to Lansing, August 2, 1918, Decimal File 891.00, US Department of State.

⁸⁷Sefārat-e Iran dar Washington beh Vezārat-e Omur-e Khārejeh, in *Āmāl-e Irāniān*, June 19, 1918, 166.

⁸⁸The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State, 741.91/81: Telegram, August 13, 1919, *FRUS*, 699.

⁸⁹The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State, 741.91/22: Telegram, August 16, 1919, *FRUS*, 699.

⁹⁰The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State, 741.91/83: Telegram, August 28, 1919, *FRUS*, 701.

⁹¹The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State, 741.91/83: Telegram, September 4, 1919, *FRUS*, 699.

⁹²"Persia and the Agreement," *The Times*, October 4, 1919, p. 7.

⁹³Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, in Alexander and Nanes, *The United States and Iran*, 2–5.

⁹⁴Yeselson, *United States–Persian Diplomatic Relations*, 176.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 177.

Moreover, the two Asian countries had their own problems in maintaining their mutual cooperation. The Qajar government collapsed in 1921 and was replaced in 1925 by the Pahlavi dynasty led by Reza Shah, while the Beijing government was replaced by the Chiang Kai-Shek regime in 1928. Iran, in 1923, became a non-permanent member of the council of the League of Nations,⁹⁶ which frustrated China. Although China and Iran began to negotiate a commercial treaty after 1929, it seemed that Iran was not keen to discuss the business. In their meetings in Rome, the Chinese minister was told by his Iranian colleague that the Iranian government was looking forward to the signed treaty, owing to their Asian brotherhood.⁹⁷ However, only a draft and not a formal treaty was signed. Besides, the two Asian countries had no official contact, such as a consulate or a legation, despite the Sino-Iranian Treaty of 1920. There were no legations between the two Asian countries until 1942.⁹⁸

Conclusion

At the end of the 1910s and the beginning of the 1920s, their similar situations led to China and Iran initiating a formal relationship by signing the 1920 Treaty. The two Asian countries had been under pressure from wars and treaties with foreign powers since the nineteenth century. While most studies give attention to Iran's relationship with the West, this paper explores a union of the two Asian countries, China and Iran, after the War.

A common problem in the Late Qing China and Qajar Iran was the strangling of treaties. The late Qing had made an attempt to revise the treaties inherited by the Beijing government after 1911. Regarding the cancelation of extra-territoriality, the Sino-Bolivian Treaty of 1919, the first equal treaty between China and a foreign country, stipulated that extra-territoriality was not included. Iran also suffered from the same problem through the Treaty of Turkmenchay of 1828, signed with Russia. The 1917 Soviet Revolution, however, heralded the end of pressure from the unequal treaty.

Wilson's Fourteen Points and the Paris Peace Conference played important roles for both China and Iran. Both had difficulties entering the Conference. China, as a victor, was questioned at the beginning of the Conference, and was not able to claim sovereignty over Shandong. Iran, as a neutral state, was not eligible for admission to the Conference. Nevertheless, the two countries both found an appropriate way to change their situation. China became a member of the League of Nations by signing the peace treaties, except for the Shandong part, while Iran was invited to join the

⁹⁶Telegraph from Geneva, September 23, 1923, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 03-38-015-02-030.

⁹⁷Sino-Iranian Commercial Treaty, July 29, 1930, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 112.6/0003, 103–5.

⁹⁸Sino-Iranian Treaty and Consulates, April 27, 1942, The Archives of the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica), no. 112.6/0006.

League of Nations through signing the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 with Britain's acknowledgment of Iran's independence and integrity.

The United States became an obstacle to self-determination, which had been a hope just after the War. China and Iran were both disappointed in President Wilson. Nevertheless, the two Asian countries, at that time, were each aware of the other's situation, which was why the Sino-Iranian Treaty of 1920 was signed. The most significant part was that extra-territoriality was not included. In addition, their cooperation in the League of Nations showed the ambition of these Asian countries to strengthen themselves. However, each in its own way also encountered the fall and rise of their respective central governments.

After the War, China and Iran entered into a new dimension of their history. Strengthening their position at that time was a common objective of the two Asian countries. Although developments were not completely satisfactory, the two countries were struggling for their freedom, and positive opportunities that arose after the War. Indeed, they made every effort to resist foreign pressure and protect their interests.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Yonah, and Allan Nanes, eds. *The United States and Iran: A Documentary History*. Frederick: University Publications of America, 1980.
- Bast, Oliver. "Iran va Konferans-e Solh-e 1919: Amidha-ye Barbadrafte va Sarmashq-e Chini." In *Iran va Jang-e Jahani-ye Avval (Majmu'e-ye Maqalat-e Seminar)*, ed. Safa Akhavan, 443–58. Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad va Tarikh-e Diplomasi, 1380/2001.
- Bast, Oliver. "Putting the Record Straight: Vosuq al-Dowleh's Foreign Policy in 1918/19." In *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, ed. Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher, 260–81. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.
- Bast, Oliver. "Duping the British and Outwitting the Russians? Iran's Foreign Policy, the 'Bolshevik threat', and the Genesis of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921." In *Iranian-Russian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions since 1800*, ed. Stephanie Cronin, 261–97. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Bayāt, Kāveh, and Reza Āzari Shahrezā'i, eds. *Āmāl-e Irāniān: Az Konferāns-e Solh-e Paris ta Qarārdād-e 1919 Iran va Engeliš*. Tehran: Shirāzeh Ketāb, 1392/2013.
- Chang, Chun-Fu. *Diplomatic History of the Republic of China (Volume 1)*. Taipei: Chen Chung Books, 1953.
- Chang, Chun-Lan. "V.K. Wellington Koo's Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of his Role in the Shantung Question." *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica*, no. 23 (1994): 29–52.
- Chen, San-Jing. "Lu Cheng-Hsiang and the Paris Peace Conference." *Bulletin of Historical Research (National Taiwan Normal University)*, no. 2 (1974): 189–203.
- Chen, San-Jing. *China's Journey to the World: From Participation in the First World War to Admission to the Paris Peace Conference*. Taipei: Hsiu Wei, 2009.
- Deng, Ye. *The Paris Peace Conference and Beijing's Internal-External Struggles: China's Diplomatic Disputes and the Interests of Political Factions in 1919*. Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2014.
- Eto, Shinkichi. "China's International Relations 1911–1931." In *The Cambridge History of China: 1914–1949. Volume 13: Republican China 1912–1949 (Part 2)*, ed. John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, 74–115. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Fatemi, Nasrollah Saifpour. *Diplomatic History of Persia 1917–1923*. New York: Russell F. Moore Company, 1952.
- Fortna, Benjamin C. "The Reign of Abdülhamid II." In *Cambridge History of Turkey. Volume 4: Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba, 38–61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

- Ghani, Cyrus. *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Rule*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998.
- Ghods, M. Reza. *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*. London: Adamantine Press, 1989.
- Gohli-Majd, Mohammad. *From Qajar to Pahlavi: Iran, 1919–1930*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2008.
- Heravi, Mehdi. *Iranian–American Diplomacy*. New York: Theo. Gaus Sons, 1969.
- Howard-Ellis, C. *The Origin Structure and Working of the League of Nations*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928.
- Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858–1880*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- Huweritz, J.C. *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, a Documentary Record: 1535–1914 (Volume 1)*. Toronto: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956.
- Ishtiaq, Ahmad. *Anglo-Iranian Relations 1905–1919*. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1974.
- Katouzian, Homa. *The Political Economy of Modern Iran 1926–1979: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism 1926–1979*. London: Macmillan Press, 1981.
- Katouzian, Homa. “The Campaign against the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919.” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 1 (May 1998): 5–46.
- Katouzian, Homa. *State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006.
- Kawashima, Shin. *The Formation of Modern China*. Trans. Jianguo Tien. Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2012.
- Kazemzadeh, Firuz. “Russia and the Middle East.” In *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspectives*, ed. Ivo J. Lederer, 489–530. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962.
- Keddie, Nikki. “Iran under the Later Qajars, 1848–1922.” In *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic (Volume 7)*, ed. Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville, 174–212. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Klein, Ira. “British Policy and the Iranian Constitution, 1919–1921.” *Historian* 36, no. 3 (1974): 434–54.
- Ling, Ming-De. *History of Modern Sino-Japanese Relations*. Taipei: Sanmin, 1984.
- Ling, Ming-De. “Japan’s Policy toward China 1911–1915.” In *Early Modern History of China: Early Years of the Republic of China (Volume 23 Part 1)*, ed. Chinese Culture Renaissance Movement Committee, 59–126. Taipei: Commercial Press, 1986.
- Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed. *Collection of Treaties between China and Foreign Countries*. Taipei: Wen-Hai Publisher, 1964.
- Qian, Zhixiu. “What Happens in Persia in Recent Times.” *Dongfang Zazhi* 9, no. 9 (1912): 13–21.
- Olson, William J. “The Genesis of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.” In *Towards a Modern Iran: Studies in Thought, Politics and Society*, ed. Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim, 185–216. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- Olson, W.J. *Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I*. London: Frank Cass, 1984.
- Ramazani, Rouhollah K. *The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs 1500–1941*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966.
- Rezun, Miron. *The Soviet Union and Iran: Soviet Policy in Iran from the Beginnings of the Pahlavi Dynasty until the Soviet Invasion in 1941*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.
- Sabahi, Houshang. *British Policy in Persia 1918–1925*. London: Frank Cass, 1990.
- Tang, Chi-Hua. “The Beginning of Treaty Revision Diplomacy of the Beijing Government in the Early Years of the Republic of China.” *HsingDa Humanities Journal*, no. 28 (June 1998): 117–43.
- Tang, Chi-Hua. *The Peking Government and the League of Nations*. Taipei: Tonda Books, 1998.
- Tang, Chi-Hua. *Paris Peace Conference and China Diplomacy*. Beijing: China Society Science Publisher, 2014.

- Tang, Chi-Hua. *Treaty Revision Campaign of the Beijing Government, 1912–1928: Out of the Shadow of the “Abrogation of Unequal Treaties.”* Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010.
- Temperly, H.W.V. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (Volume VI)*. London: Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1924.
- Volodarsky, Mikhail. *The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours: Iran and Afghanistan, 1917–1933*. London: Frank Cass, 1994.
- Wang, Dong. “The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China.” *Pacific Affairs* 76, no. 3 (2003): 399–425.
- Wang, Jianlang. *Unequal Treaties and China (Volume 1)*. Honolulu: Silkroad Press 2000.
- Wang, Yidan. “The Iranian Constitutional Revolution as Reported in the Chinese Press.” In *Iran’s Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections*, ed. H.E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin, 369–79. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010.
- Wu, Lin-Chun. *America and Chinese Politics 1917–1928*. Taipei: Tongda Books, 1996.
- Xu, Guoqi. *China and the Great War: China’s Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Yeselson, Abraham. *United States–Persian Diplomatic Relations 1883–1921*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1956.