building goals toward these groups that Mylonas is able to trace through his excellent analysis of General Governor Ioannis Eliakis' reports, I had a difficult time visualizing what a very short-stint of assimilationist policy would actually look like on the ground. Although it is admittedly beyond the scope of the chapter's timeframe, I was also hoping for more on how the Greek–Turkish war of 1919–1922 shifted attitudes towards these Muslim non-core groups and potentially rendered the issue of religion more salient. Put simply, the condensed timeframe of this chapter makes sense from the vantage point of micro-level theory testing, but I wondered if religious differences would still be seen as less significant than security/geostrategic factors if the time period of the analysis was extended by even just a few years.

Mylonas is well aware of the fact that the coding timespan of a study can affect its conclusions. In fact, one of the most interesting aspects of the book is the way in which such potential "problems" are used to generate an insightful and transparent discussion about research methodology. Chapter Four is exemplary in this respect, with its treatment of how to conceptualize the difference between transitional versus terminal nation-building strategies as well as cases where policy change is driven by a learning mechanism. This chapter, together with the section on "Methodological Contributions" in the Conclusion, should be required reading for those engaged in research on nation-building or on any other political phenomenon where intentions, policies, implementation, and outcomes risk being conflated.

To conclude, I would like to suggest that *The Politics of Nation-Building* is much more than just a book about state policies. Embedded in the two most detailed empirical chapters – Chapter Six on Greek Nation-Building in Western Macedonia and Chapter Seven on Serbian Nation-Building toward Albanians – is also a novel and illuminating argument about the popular origins of nationalism. Through its focus on the international context of nation-building and the dynamics of external agitation and support for non-core groups, this book is also sure to inspire and inform future research on why some groups turned into awakened nations while others did not.

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In the age of nationalism, many states have attempted to shape the identities of their subjects to create or enhance their loyalty to a particular nation-state project. The policies states adopt to accomplish this goal have often been referred to as forms of "nation-building." In his 2012 book *The Politics of Nation-Building* (Cambridge), Harris Mylonas develops and tests a general theory of nation-building. Specifically, he tries to account for variation in state policies, which he groups into three general types: exclusion, assimilation, or accommodation. State elites representing the nation-state's "core group" direct these policies toward what Mylonas calls "non-core groups" in order to produce a loyal population. Policies of exclusion—which include mandatory population exchanges, ethnic cleansing, and genocide—attempt to remove non-core groups whose presence is deemed, for whatever reason, inconsistent with the goals of state elites. Assimilation policies aim to induce or

compel non-core groups to adopt the identity profile of the core group. Compulsory education and universal military service are types of assimilation policies. Both exclusion and assimilation aim to erase difference. Accommodation polices preserve, and sometimes even defend or promote, difference by officially protecting non-core groups as such. Accommodation produces "national minorities," while exclusion creates "refugees" (or corpses) and assimilation makes "co-nationals."

It is often the case with very important works of scholarship that their biggest advance over prior work is in the way they pose a question, rather than in their answer to it. I believe this is the case with Mylonas's book. We have enormous literature on all three of the policy types he deals with, but we have very little that treats the three under a common theoretical umbrella, as policy substitutes. Mylonas does this in an exceptionally transparent way, with a minimum of jargon, all of which is defined and explained clearly and compactly. It seems to me not only clever, but also the right approach, even if not all the details can be successfully defended. Future scholarship on nation-building will have to address Mylonas's framework, either by using it or by explaining how to supersede it.

How does Mylonas use it? He proposes a theory in which nation-building policy choice is mainly a function of geopolitics. States ("external powers") cultivate non-core groups on the territory of other states ("host states"), providing money, diplomatic support, arms, etc., to non-core group organizations. Host states fear this activity as a potential source of secessionist movements or fifth columns, especially when it is carried out by enemies (rather than allies). In general, Mylonas assumes that all states prefer a policy of assimilation; when they are unconstrained – when a non-core group has no external power supporting them – they assimilate. They deviate from their most preferred policy under two sets of circumstances. First, non-core groups mobilized by external powers that are allied to the host state are accommodated. Second, when an external power supports a non-core group on the territory of an enemy host state, and that host state has "revisionist" goals, the host state will exclude the non-core group.

Mylonas tests this theory against quantitative and qualitative data from the early twentieth century Balkans. The Balkan Wars and World War I led to big shifts of territorial control. The states of the region, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Albania, and Yugoslavia, all contained heterogeneous populations and faced choices about how to build cohesive national communities. Mylonas uses a purpose-built group-level, cross-sectional quantitative dataset to assess how often Balkan states in this period adopted the policies his theory predicts toward non-core groups. The fit is pretty good. More importantly, Mylonas's theory outperforms its competitors. Crucially, by coding down to the group level, he shows that states have pursued different nation-building policies toward different non-core groups at the same time. In addition, Mylonas has an excellent chapter in which he carefully assesses his theory's mis-predictions. He convincingly shows that many of them stem from the necessary rigidities implied by imposing sharp thresholds on the data. When those thresholds are relaxed slightly, the theory's fit to the data is even better. Another empirical chapter provides a close-up of the decision-making process of state elites through the extraordinary correspondence of Ioannis Eliakis, the Greek governor who was charged with managing the heterogeneous population of Western Macedonia from 1916 to 1920. A fourth empirical chapter examines how Yugoslav policy toward Kosovar Albanians varied over time in response to changes in the local pattern of alliances. The evidence is imperfect, but I came away convinced that Mylonas has captured one of the key dimensions of variation in nation-building policies, at least within the somewhat narrow parameter conditions he imposes.

There are some problems. Given my expertise, I focus on issues of conceptualization and theory. To begin with, I wonder if the triple-typology of nation-building policies is exhaustive. For all three types of policies Mylonas examines, states act and groups are affected. However, we know that nation-states' conceptions of what constitutes their core groups can and do change over time. Mylonas acknowledges that the content and boundary conditions of core groups are not fixed, but if this is true then forging co-nationhood could, in principle, involve changes to the non-core group's identity or changes to the core group's identity, or both.

Mylonas's discussion of post-war Greek policy toward Muslims in Western Macedonia provides an excellent example (122–129). Although Mylonas describes the "national type" of the core group, Greeks, as including "Orthodox Christian" among its elements, Eliakis enthusiastically courted Muslim peasants in Western Macedonia as potential co-nationals. Mylonas tells us that Eliakis shared with then Prime Minister Venizelos an inclusive vision of Hellenism, reminiscent of Renan, in which "national consciousness," or the will to be a member of the nation, was the primary criterion. If the core group was, in part, defined by Orthodox Christianity, then Venizelos and Eliakis were advancing an expanded conception of the nation that could assimilate Muslims *not* by inducing Muslims to change their religion, but rather by trying to shift the criteria for inclusion in the core group. Explicitly theorizing the political tradeoffs involved in defining the boundary criteria of the core group introduces additional complications involving domestic politics that Mylonas's may have been right to avoid in the interests of a streamlined theory. Future work in this vein might productively open up some of these questions.

In addition to issues of exhaustiveness, Mylonas's policy types may be somewhat leaky as well, in the sense that it can be difficult to sort cases cleanly among the types. Consider, for instance, apartheid as a nation-building policy. It was intended to preserve racial and cultural differences between black Africans and the descendants of white settlers, and it did not physically remove blacks from South African territory. Thus, one could reasonably argue that apartheid was neither a form of exclusion, nor a form of assimilation; it created neither refugees nor co-nationals. Yet, of course, it was premised not on "respect" for cultural difference, as Mylonas says accommodation policies are, but rather on racial hierarchy and economic exploitation. Mylonas codes apartheid as a form of exclusion, but this seems to me to be inconsistent with his own conceptualization and likely to be driven more by a normative preference for modern multiculturalism. It makes much more sense to concede that state policies premised on the preservation of difference can encode profound and lasting forms of injustice and inequality and perhaps choose a term different than "accommodation," with its benign overtones. After all, the classic form of accommodation practiced in the region Mylonas studies, the Ottoman millet system, was explicitly hierarchical and unequal, though far less brutal and exploitative than apartheid. In general, it would be better to avoid collapsing normative considerations into the definition of positive concepts, as I suspect was the case here.

Finally, I have a concern about the logic of Mylonas's theory. When a non-core group is supported by an ally of the host state, the core group deviates from its most preferred policy, assimilation, and accommodates the non-core group. Why? Mylonas explains that assimilation or exclusion policies might jeopardize the alliance, which is valuable to the core group (40). This raises two linked questions. First, why would the allied external power object to mistreatment of the non-core group by the host state, especially if this mistreatment is fairly mild, as we might expect from an assimilation policy? Mylonas leans toward a realist account of alliance behavior in which expressions of communal affinity by an external power toward a non-core group on the territory of another state are merely

window-dressing for geopolitical interests (32-33). By Mylonas's logic, we should expect external powers to prioritize their geopolitical interests over any genuine commitment to the interests of non-core groups in other states (See also 46–47, where Mylonas emphasizes that alliances are unlikely to be endogenous to nation-building policies). Second, if this is true, then why should we expect a host state to deviate from its most preferred policy of assimilation? Threats by an external power to switch alliances or wage war on behalf of a non-core group it supports in the host state should not be regarded as credible when the external power has good geopolitical reasons to maintain the alliance. By the same token, a policy of accommodation risks leaving unassimilated non-core groups that could act as fifth columns later, when the alliance structure shifts and the present ally becomes a rival. Indeed, Mylonas suggests that a policy of accommodation makes such a future scenario more likely due to the legal-institutional status of the "minority group" that it creates (40–41).

In short, the theoretical rationale for a policy of accommodation does not fully add up. If we follow the logic of Mylonas's argument, we should expect rational host states to adopt policies of assimilation with respect to non-core groups that are supported by the host states' allies. The external power might not like this policy, but they should be constrained by their own geopolitical interests from interfering with it. While I believe this is a genuine flaw in the logic of the argument, it does not seem to me to be fatal to Mylonas's approach to the problem. The line between policies of assimilation and accommodation is not always easy to draw, especially given the disordered conditions of the post-World War I Balkans. Mylonas himself points to mixed types ("assimilation through accommodation," [37] for instance), which suggests that a somewhat more nuanced theory might help us to better understand the conditions under which states opt for policies of accommodation.

I conclude by reiterating that Mylonas's book makes a genuine and significant contribution to the study of nation-building. The book is, in many ways, a model for how to do theoretically ambitious and empirically multi-method scholarship on historical topics. I have now had the opportunity to use the book twice in advanced undergraduate seminars. It has been particularly useful to me as a means to unsettle naïve, oversocialized conceptions of nationalism, and to get students thinking seriously about politics.

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The Politics of Nation-Building is a highly innovative, remarkable book that combines rich archival research with comparative analysis. It is an important research in several aspects: First, it introduces a novel theory that explains nation-building policies combining national and international levels. Second, it introduces a comparative analysis by quantifying archival data and is able to identify, and introduce solutions to, its own methodological issues. Third, it does not limit itself to theoretical explanations but offers policy implications. Let me explain these points in detail.

Mylonas's theoretical contribution starts with his critique of existing explanations of nation-building. Alternative explanations of primordialism, status reversal, reputation, the dark side of democracy, and national homeland (18) usually focuses on one factor