As the text lacks a thorough overview of the Egyptian economy and ʿAbd al-Nasir's political survival strategy, one is left wondering if ʿAbd al-Nasir's two-handed game was a function of genuine economic need rather than the pressure of an isolationist *effendiyya*. Further, there is little evidence in favor of the claim that internationalist interest groups could so thoroughly permeate the U.S. foreign policy establishment and guide the national security agenda (and, even if they did, it is unclear why they would care about Egypt in contrast to larger markets that were richer in resources). One might still believe that U.S. abandonment of Britain at a critical hour was instead bound to the perception that Britain could not contain Soviet influence in its former territories. Another unanswered question concerns why Israel, which had a mixed relationship with Britain at the time, participated in the conflict.

At the same time, Laron draws on an impressive range of multilingual source material and takes the reader through interesting forays to Bandung, London, Washington, and Delhi, as well as into the thoughts of officials, operatives, and politicians, both renowned and lesser known. At the very least, readers will come away with a creeping suspicion that economic interests did occasionally manifest themselves in national foreign policies during the lead-up to the Suez Crisis and may in some way have affected the course of events. As such, this book initiates an interesting project that other scholars of Egypt and potentially of other industrializing economies may also join. Indeed, it is this reviewer's belief that such an undertaking, which at once delves deeply into the economies, societies, and governmental machinery of multiple countries, will require a corpus of work to make the argument persuasively.

JAMES G. BLIGHT, JANET M. LANG, HUSSEIN BANAI, MALCOLM BYRNE, AND JOHN TIRMAN, *Becoming Enemies: US–Iran Relations and the Iran–Iraq War, 1979–1988* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012). Pp. 394. $49.95 cloth, $32.00 paper, $31.99 e-book.

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doi:10.1017/S0020743814000853

As the current U.S. administration begins to hope that it can strike a deal with the Iranian government, and others look on with varying degrees of apprehension or anticipation, it makes sense for all parties to reflect upon the reasons for the abysmal relations between the United States and Iran over the past few decades. Implicit in such a process is the idea that the present cohort of decision makers can avoid some of the mistakes of the past, but also that they can, through a more empathetic understanding of the other's perspective, build some common ground for negotiation.

This seems to have been the impulse behind the decision to hold a workshop in 2008 at Musgrove, Georgia, the proceedings of which form the content of this book. It was an exercise intended to encourage strategic self-reflection in the United States at a time when it was fairly clear—other than to die-hard, if confused, Republicans—that a very different administration would soon be taking power in Washington. Any possibility of a similar change happening in Iran was to be snuffed out in the notoriously rigged elections of 2009. However, the election of Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran in 2013 has allowed U.S. and Iranian representatives to hold substantive talks once again about Iran's nuclear program.

It was appropriate, therefore, that the workshop should have focused on the U.S.–Iran relationship during the long and bloody years of the Iran–Iraq war—the "imposed war," as

the Iranian government calls it, not without good reason. It was then that the relationship broke down to such an extent that by 1987–88 the Iranian leadership became convinced that it was in effect fighting a war against the United States that Iran could not possibly win.

Equally important for present concerns about Iran's possible ambitions for a nuclear weapon, was the fact that during those years the Iranians had watched as the UN Security Council refused to support Iran's claim that Iraq had launched a massive invasion in September 1980 and thus refused to act against Iraq. Of similar significance for Iranian thinking, the UN Security Council, driven largely by the U.S. government's interests, took no action against Iraq when it began to use chemical weapons against Iranian forces (and against Iraqi citizens). Indeed, the United States tried to pin at least some of the blame on the Iranian high command. In light of these experiences, it would not be surprising should the Iranian leadership have seen the need to develop an independent deterrent.

This is the ground covered, fairly comprehensively, by the participants in this workshop. Unusually, however, the organizers have not presented us with an edited volume of the academic papers that are generally the fruit of such labors. Instead, they have reproduced, for six out of the seven chapters, verbatim reports of the discussions of the assembled experts and practitioners—I say "verbatim," but the transcripts suggest a quite exceptional eloquence and coherence of all concerned, unless the participants did indeed speak in such faultlessly formed paragraphs of prose.

Nevertheless, it was clearly the intention of the organizers to capture the spontaneity of these interventions, not only to enliven the book, but also perhaps to lend a certain authority to the account. They sought to achieve this by bringing together a number of officials who had been responsible for carrying out or advising on aspects of policy during the Iran–Iraq war (three from the CIA, three from the U.S. State Department, and one—Giandomenico Pico—from the UN), with eleven scholars, including the five co-authors/co-editors of the book, who work on aspects of international relations, U.S. foreign policy, and/or Middle East politics. The role of the academics was to stimulate the discussions, but also to give them a critical tone by questioning those involved in U.S. policymaking during those years.

In some respects, this approach succeeds. There is a feeling of immediacy to the exchanges. The scholars use their wider knowledge of events, as well as hindsight, not only to frame critical questions for the practitioners, but also to follow these up and thus to give shape and edge to the discussions. In some cases, they manage to spark a degree of self-reflection and even regret amongst those who were engaged in some of the more distasteful aspects of U.S. support for Saddam Husayn's Iraq in its prosecution of the war against Iran.

This is all to the good since revisiting these decisions and policies can help to illuminate the bases of suspicion, mistrust, and enmity on which the current U.S. and Iranian administrations will have to build if they are to reestablish any kind of relationship. However, I ended up not wholly convinced that this format was the most productive way of doing it. Apart from anything else, it confines the discussion entirely to the individuals brought together at this one place and time. Knowledgeable as they were, and influential though they might have been at certain junctures, it always seemed that there was a higher level of decision making, political calculation, and outright prejudice that was not being interrogated here. Yet this was the level of executive decision making from which the officials were receiving their orders.

Had this been a more conventional edited volume of papers dealing with the U.S.–Iranian relationship, one would have expected the contributors to have cast their nets much wider, interviewing policymakers not only in the United States, but also in Iran and amongst those

Iraqis who were part of the process but have no voice here. It may be for this reason that I felt I did not learn much here that has not already been covered in the now extensive literature on the Iran–Iraq War and on the U.S.–Iran relationship. This is a pity, because it was an original idea to present the workshop proceedings in this way and the volume was certainly a lively read—but it did raise a host of questions that could not be easily answered in such a format. Yet these are precisely the questions that might be asked both by those generally acquainted with the topic and by those who are coming to it for the first time. In many respects, therefore, this is a book mainly for readers who already have detailed knowledge of these events and who can supply the background to these very specific aspects of policy implementation.

JOSHUA MITCHELL, *Tocqueville in Arabia: Dilemmas in a Democratic Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). Pp. 208. $20.00 cloth, $18.00 e-book.

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doi:10.1017/S0020743814000865

Ostensibly a comparison of the impact of modernity on elite students in Qatar with that on elite students in the United States, this slim volume actually is a long meditation on the meaning of modernity, its acceleration in the age of social media, and the social fragmentation that it forces and sustains. Joshua Mitchell taught at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service in Qatar and its counterpart in Washington. His book compares what he sees as the values and practices characteristic of two elite student cohorts and their different social milieux, and how they do and do not foster individualism and "democracy" or support the aspirations of democrats to achieve "well-being." Looking back at Tocqueville's lack of enthusiasm in regard to the effects of the spread of "democratic" values in America in the 1830s, Mitchell gives reason to be even more concerned today.

Despite its ambiguous title—Tocqueville has not arrived in Arabia yet—this volume has much to offer to those similarly disturbed by "modernity." To Mitchell, modernity consists in the atomization of the individual, the erosion of community, and the spread of self-oriented values—values that are "selfies" of the soul. They do not have to be directly harmful to others as are the values of a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives who think cutting food stamps to subsidize agricultural corporations is morally correct. Modern values simply put the individual at the top of each person's social hierarchy. Some of the differences that Mitchell sees between what he identifies as modern and traditional values and practices are revealed in his exploration of how each group of young people interprets fairness to others. He situates Qatari students in a culture of shame, where social control is exercised through public exposure of unapproved behavior. Qataris value personal relationships and avoid shaming others by moderating their public judgments. In the market, they prefer to pay a premium to preserve those relationships rather than seek the cheapest alternative. Mitchell contrasts the political and economic practices of Qatar, based on loyalty, honor, and a willingness to accept their costs, to the American late-capitalist rejection of what Mitchell argues is a basic condition of human life: we *all* live in a world of debt and payment. He says that his American students rejected the idea that payment to support social ends should be required of them, regardless of their positions on a left–right continuum. Instead, they prefer business and political practices that are "efficient and transparent," leading them to support government regulations that protect them.