

BOOK REVIEWS

Mapping Europe's Borderlands: Russian Cartography in the Age of Empire. By Steven Seegel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. xi, 368 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Plates. Photographs. Tables. Maps. \$55.00, hard bound.

This is a magnificent work and an essential read for all those interested in the history of states and empires in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century east central Europe, in the cartography and geopolitics of territorial struggles, and in the ways in which national and ethnic identities were produced and contested across the region. It draws on a wide range of map archives to develop a rich and careful reading of the shifting and contested geographies of empires and their borderlands as new technologies of power and new forms of government were merging to territorialize and normalize entire populations. At the same time, this wonderfully produced and illustrated book provides an important conceptual expansion of the role of maps and cartography in the geopolitics of territory and empire, particularly in the ways in which it traces the central roles played by the empire's technical and bureaucratic staffs as they incorporated the newly emerging cartographic science and practice into their statecraft.

Steven Seegel shows how maps and geographical knowledge were integral elements in the extension of empire across the lands between Vienna and St. Petersburg after 1772, erasing Poland-Lithuania from the map to rewrite the geographies of territory to their own ends; how the constituent regions were ethnoschematized after the 1848–49 and 1863–64 revolts; and how they were subsequently renationalized after World War I with the breakup of empires. For Seegel, Isaiah Bowman, who served as the American chief territorial specialist at the Paris Peace Conference, was on target when he argued that at that moment “a new instrument was discovered—the map language” (3).

Throughout the book the author is careful to avoid reading this march of empire and cartography as a simple and singular process of imperial control and geopolitical rationalization. Instead, he reads mapping practices as embedded in deeply contested political struggles over territory, ethnicity, and identity. Here maps never merely represent geographical realities; instead, they play an integral part in their construction, both of the territories of imperial dominion and the erasure of smaller nations and states as well as how empire was contested from the borderlands. While maps have been used to legitimize conquests, impose identities, and create administrative order, they have also been important tools of counterpowers, often with competing and changing national aspirations and with ethnic claims at their core.

The scope of the book is breathtaking. Its ten chapters trace the contested histories of power and territory from the rise of Enlightenment cartography, the rationalization of imperial Russia, and the looting of Polish-Lithuanian maps and territories between 1795 and 1797 to the 1919 Bolshevik expropriation of imperial maps, Polish state building, and the Paris Peace Conference. The book is a major contribution to our understanding of the history of central and eastern Europe's early dynastic states, their struggles with nationalism and imperialism, and “how mapped populations in empires and nations structured borders, negotiated frontiers, and protested against the confines that Europe's maps created for them” (2). Three related issues guided these struggles: the question of being part of Europe, the need to create intelligible national and ethnic identities, and the institutionalization of cartography as a science of territory and governmentality. Each is unpacked through the vast numbers of census, military topographic, communication, political boundary, and ethnic identity

maps used in the struggle over territories and identities. As a result, cartography as a science and as a political technology (linked to the development of national libraries, state archives, and map collections) became the language of politics as states became nationalized and renationalized, territorialized and reterritorialized.

Aesthetically, the book is also superb. It is based on detailed work in rich map archives in eleven languages. There are 60 black-and-white figures and 17 superb full-color plates of maps. The 55 single-spaced pages of notes are a treasure trove of rich citational and analytical material, and the 26-page index is excellent.

Mapping Europe's Borderlands is also a testament to the value of international research funding in the humanities and social sciences and how the resulting archival and field work depends on extensive contacts, support networks, and archival access. That Seegel is able to work across nearly a dozen languages is further evidence of the necessity of deep investments in extensive training in the humanities and social sciences, particularly at this time of cuts in funding. The book's acknowledgements should be required reading for scholars and students alike as a model of engaged archival and field research to which many can only aspire.

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Metternich, the Great Powers, and the Eastern Question. By Miroslav Šedivý. Pilsen: University of West Bohemia Press, 2013. 1,033 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Figures. Hard bound.

A thousand-page book on Metternich's policies toward the Ottoman empire from 1821 to 1841 might seem like a bit much, but this is an excellent piece of scholarship, thoroughly researched, clearly presented, and nicely written. I must admit that I found Miroslav Šedivý's work particularly engaging because he agreed with my own views on Austria's eastern policies in the eighteenth century and how they carried over to the first half of the nineteenth century. Metternich had no interest in annexing any of the Balkans, because it would have been a drain on the monarchy in every way imaginable. He did not want the Ottoman empire expelled from the Balkans, because that might have opened that area to national states, which would have enticed the Habsburg Serbs and Romanians to join them. Or it might have led to Russian expansion, which would have placed Russia on Austria's eastern and southern borders. Metternich believed that international security depended on the maintenance of the Ottoman empire. As to his day-to-day diplomacy, he focused on what was achievable, always keeping these overall goals in mind.

From 1821 to 1831 Metternich focused on the Greek issue. He was opposed to great power interference in the Greek Revolution, especially anything that supported the revolutionaries. He believed that the Greek uprising was an internal matter for the Ottomans and that outside interference violated international custom. The British, he noted, would be most unhappy if the great powers passed resolutions and signed agreements calling upon the British government to accept outside mediation in its dealings with the Irish. At the same time, however, he saw as events rolled along that the only way to defuse the Greek crisis was to persuade the sultan to make concessions.

After Turkey's defeat by Russia in 1829, Metternich favored an independent Greece because an autonomous Greece would be nothing but trouble for the sultan. However, he also thought the new Greece should remain small—not much above the Isthmus of