

MARKOV'S PRINCIPLE AND SUBSYSTEMS OF INTUITIONISTIC ANALYSIS

JOAN RAND MOSCHOVAKIS

Abstract. Using a technique developed by Coquand and Hofmann [3] we verify that adding the analytical form $MP_1: \forall \alpha (\neg \neg \exists x \alpha(x) = 0 \rightarrow \exists x \alpha(x) = 0)$ of Markov's Principle does not increase the class of Π_2^0 formulas provable in Kleene and Vesley's formal system for intuitionistic analysis, or in subsystems obtained by omitting or restricting various axiom schemas in specified ways.

§1. Introduction. In [6] Kleene proved that Markov's Principle MP_1 is neither provable nor refutable in his formal system **I** for intuitionistic analysis. By the Friedman–Dragalin translation, Markov's Rule is admissible for **I** and many subsystems.

We show that adding MP_1 as an axiom to **I** does not increase consistency strength, in the sense that no additional Π_2^0 formulas become provable. The method, adapted from Coquand and Hofmann's dynamic modification [3] of the Friedman–Dragalin translation, works also for subsystems of **I** with a few interesting exceptions.

§2. Language, logic, and basic mathematical axioms.

2.1. The two-sorted formal language and intuitionistic predicate logic. Kleene and Vesley's language \mathcal{L}_1 for two-sorted intuitionistic number theory or “intuitionistic analysis” has variables $a, b, c, \dots, x, y, z, \dots$, intended to range over natural numbers; variables $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \dots$, intended to range over one-place number-theoretic functions (choice sequences); finitely many constants $0, ', +, \cdot, f_4, \dots, f_p$, each representing a primitive recursive function or functional, where f_i has k_i places for number arguments and l_i places for type-1 function arguments; parentheses indicating function application; and Church's λ .

The *terms* (of type 0) and *functors* (of type 1) are defined inductively as follows. The number variables and 0 are terms. The function variables and each f_i with $k_i = 1, l_i = 0$ are functors. If t_1, \dots, t_{k_i} are terms and u_1, \dots, u_{l_i} are functors, then $f_i(t_1, \dots, t_{k_i}, u_1, \dots, u_{l_i})$ is a term. If x is a number variable and t is a term, then $\lambda x.t$ is a functor. And if u is a functor and t is a term, then $(u)(t)$ is a term.

There is one relation symbol $=$ for equality between terms; equality between functors u, v is defined extensionally by $u = v \equiv \forall x(u(x) = v(x))$ (where x is not free in

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u or v). The atomic formulas of \mathcal{L}_1 are the expressions $s = t$ where s, t are terms. Composite formulas are defined inductively, using the connectives $\&, \vee, \rightarrow, \neg$, quantifiers \forall, \exists of both sorts, and parentheses (often omitted under the usual conventions on scope). $A \leftrightarrow B$ is defined by $(A \rightarrow B) \& (B \rightarrow A)$.

The logical axioms and rules are those of two-sorted intuitionistic predicate logic, as presented in [6] (building on [4]). If the intuitionistic axiom schema $\neg A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)$ were replaced by $\neg\neg A \rightarrow A$ (of which Markov's Principle MP_1 is a special case), two-sorted classical predicate logic would result.

2.2. Two-sorted intuitionistic arithmetic IA_1 . This is a conservative extension, in the language \mathcal{L}_1 , of the first-order intuitionistic arithmetic IA_0 in [4] based on $=, 0, ', +, \cdot$. The mathematical axioms of IA_1 are:

- (a) The axiom-schema of mathematical induction (for all formulas of \mathcal{L}_1): $A(0) \& \forall x(A(x) \rightarrow A(x')) \rightarrow A(x)$.
- (b) The axioms of IA_0 for $=, 0, ', +, \cdot$ (axioms 14–21 on page 82 of [4]) and the axioms expressing the primitive recursive definitions of the additional function constants f_4, \dots, f_{26} given in [6] and [5].¹
- (c) The open equality axiom: $x = y \rightarrow \alpha(x) = \alpha(y)$.
- (d) The axiom-schema of λ -conversion: $(\lambda x.t(x))(s) = t(s)$, where $t(x)$ is a term and s is free for x in $t(x)$.

For readers familiar with [6], IA_1 is the subsystem of the “basic system” \mathbf{B} obtained by omitting the axiom schemas of countable choice and bar induction ($^x2.1$ and $^x26.3$, respectively).

In addition to the open equality axiom (c), the equality axioms

$$\alpha_1 = \beta_1 \& \dots \& \alpha_{l_i} = \beta_{l_i} \rightarrow f_i(x_1, \dots, x_{k_i}, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{l_i}) = f_i(x_1, \dots, x_{k_i}, \beta_1, \dots, \beta_{l_i}),$$

are provable for all function constants f_i . Thus IA_1 satisfies the replacement property of equality for functors as well as for terms.

IA_1 can only prove the existence of primitive recursive sequences, in the sense that each closed theorem of the form $\exists \alpha A(\alpha)$ has a primitive recursive witness. The finite list of primitive recursive function constants, with their corresponding

¹ $f_0 - f_3$ are $0, ', +, \cdot$ respectively. $f_4(a, b) = a^b$ (exponentiation), and f_5, \dots, f_{20} represent the primitive recursive function(al)s $a!, a^{-b}, pd(a), \min(a, b), \max(a, b), \overline{sg}(a) = 1 - a, sg(a) = 1 - (1 - a), |a - b|, rm(a, b), [a/b], \Sigma_{y < b} \alpha(y), \Pi_{y < b} \alpha(y), \min_{y \leq b} \alpha(y), \max_{y \leq b} \alpha(y), p_a$ (the a^{th} prime, with $p_0 = 2$), and $(a)_i$ (the exponent of p_i in the prime factorization of a) respectively. We write $(a)_i$ for $f_{20}(a, i)$, and similarly for the other function constants. $f_{21}(a) = lh(a) = \Sigma_{i < a} sg((a)_i)$ represents the number of positive exponents in the prime factorization of a . Bounded quantifiers are defined with the help of bounded sum and product. $Seq(a)$ is a prime formula equivalent to $a > 0 \& \forall i < lh(a) (a)_i > 0$, expressing “ a codes the finite sequence $((a)_0 - 1, \dots, (a)_{lh(a)-1} - 1)$ ”. $f_{22}(a, b) = a * b$ produces a code for the concatenation of two finite sequences from their codes. $\langle \rangle = 1$ codes the empty sequence, and $f_{23}(x, \alpha) = \overline{\alpha}(x) = \Pi_{i < x} p_i^{\alpha(i)+1}$ represents the standard code $\langle \alpha(0) + 1, \dots, \alpha(x - 1) + 1 \rangle$ for the x^{th} initial segment of α . This coding is not onto \mathbb{N} , but it satisfies $\langle a_0 + 1, \dots, a_k + 1 \rangle * \langle a_{k+1} + 1, \dots, a_m + 1 \rangle = \langle a_0 + 1, \dots, a_m + 1 \rangle$. In contrast, $f_{24}(x, \alpha) = \tilde{\alpha}(x) = \Pi_{i < x} p_i^{\alpha(i)}$ cannot code finite sequences directly as $\langle a_0, \dots, a_k \rangle = \langle a_0, \dots, a_k, 0 \rangle$. $f_{25}(a, b) = a \circ b = \Pi_{i < \max(a,b)} p_i^{\max(a)_i, (b)_i}$, and $f_{26}(y) = ccp(y)$ represents the course-of-values function for the characteristic function of the predicate “ y is a computation tree number.” These suffice for Kleene’s formal treatment ([5] Part I) of recursive partial functionals, including the recursion theorem and a normal form theorem.

axioms, is intended to be expanded as needed. Here we use the λ notation to explicitly define termwise multiplication of sequences: $(\alpha \cdot \beta)$ will abbreviate $\lambda x(\alpha(x) \cdot \beta(x))$. We also define $\text{sg}(\alpha) = \lambda x.\text{sg}(\alpha(x))$, in effect adding binary sequence variables to \mathcal{L}_1 .

2.3. Intuitionistic recursive analysis IRA. The principle of countable choice for numbers is expressed in \mathcal{L}_1 by the schema (*2.2 in [6]):

$$\text{AC}_{00} : \quad \forall x \exists y A(x, y) \rightarrow \exists \alpha \forall x A(x, \alpha(x)),$$

where α, x must be free for y in $A(x, y)$. Intuitionistic recursive analysis **IRA** can be axiomatized, as a subsystem of Kleene and Vesley’s **B**, by $\text{IA}_1 + \text{qf-AC}_{00}$, where qf-AC_{00} is the restriction of AC_{00} to formulas $A(x, y)$ without sequence quantifiers and with only bounded number quantifiers. **IRA** ensures that the range of the type-1 variables contains all general recursive sequences and is closed under general recursive processes. Troelstra’s **EL** and Veldman’s **BIM** are alternative axiomatizations of **IRA**, cf. [7], [8].

In the two-sorted language, **IRA** + MP_1 + CT_1 formalizes Russian recursive analysis (**RUSS** in [2]), where MP_1 is the functional form of Markov’s Principle

$$\text{MP}_1 : \quad \forall \alpha [\neg \neg \exists x \alpha(x) = 0 \rightarrow \exists x \alpha(x) = 0]$$

and CT_1 expresses Church’s Thesis:

$$\text{CT}_1 : \quad \forall \alpha \exists e \forall x \exists y [T_0(e, x, y) \ \& \ U(y) = \alpha(x)].$$

The general recursive functions form a classical ω -model of **RUSS** and hence of **IRA**, but **RUSS** + AC_{00} (unlike **IRA** + AC_{00}) is inconsistent with classical logic.

§3. Definition of the translation, and properties proved in IA_1 .

3.1. Definition. Let $Z(\alpha)$ abbreviate $\exists x \alpha(x) = 0$. To each formula E of \mathcal{L}_1 and each sequence variable α not occurring in E , we associate another formula E^α with the same free variables plus α , by induction on the logical form of E as follows. For cases 4 and 5, β should be distinct from α , and $A^{\text{sg}(\beta)}$ is the result of substituting $\text{sg}(\beta)$ for γ in the definition of A^γ . Similarly for $B^{\alpha \cdot \beta}$ in Case 4.

1. P^α is $P \vee Z(\alpha)$ if P is prime.
2. $(A \ \& \ B)^\alpha$ is $A^\alpha \ \& \ B^\alpha$.
3. $(A \vee B)^\alpha$ is $A^\alpha \vee B^\alpha$.
4. $(A \rightarrow B)^\alpha$ is $\forall \beta (A^{\text{sg}(\beta)} \rightarrow B^{\alpha \cdot \beta})$.
5. $(\neg A)^\alpha$ is $\forall \beta (A^{\text{sg}(\beta)} \rightarrow Z(\alpha \cdot \beta))$.
6. $(\forall x A(x))^\alpha$ is $\forall x A^\alpha(x)$.
7. $(\exists x A(x))^\alpha$ is $\exists x A^\alpha(x)$.
8. $(\forall \gamma A(\gamma))^\alpha$ is $\forall \gamma A^\alpha(\gamma)$.
9. $(\exists \gamma A(\gamma))^\alpha$ is $\exists \gamma A^\alpha(\gamma)$.

From now on, let $\alpha \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ abbreviate $\alpha = \text{sg}(\alpha)$.

3.2. Proposition.

- (a) $\text{IA}_1 \vdash \forall \alpha \forall \beta (Z(\alpha \cdot \beta) \leftrightarrow Z(\alpha) \vee Z(\beta))$.
- (b) $\text{IA}_1 \vdash \forall \alpha (E^\alpha \leftrightarrow E^{\text{sg}(\alpha)})$ for all formulas E .
- (c) $\text{IA}_1 \vdash \forall \alpha \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (E(\alpha) \leftrightarrow E(\text{sg}(\alpha)))$.

PROOF. (a) holds by intuitionistic logic, (b) is proved by formula induction, and the replacement property of equality for functors guarantees (c). \dashv

3.3. Lemma. $\mathbf{IA}_1 \vdash \forall \alpha \forall \beta \forall \gamma (E^\alpha \ \& \ \gamma = \alpha \cdot \beta \rightarrow E^\gamma)$.

PROOF. Only Cases 4 and 5 require attention. If E is $A \rightarrow B$ where A, B both satisfy the lemma, assume $(A \rightarrow B)^\alpha \ \& \ \gamma = \alpha \cdot \beta$. If $A^{sg(\delta)}$ then $B^{\alpha \cdot \delta}$ by definition of $(A \rightarrow B)^\alpha$, and $\delta \cdot \gamma = (\alpha \cdot \delta) \cdot \beta$ so $B^{\delta \cdot \gamma}$ by the induction hypothesis on B. So $(A \rightarrow B)^\gamma$.

If E is $\neg A$ where A satisfies the lemma, assume $(\neg A)^\alpha \ \& \ \gamma = \alpha \cdot \beta$. If $A^{sg(\delta)}$, then $Z(\alpha \cdot \delta)$ by definition of $(\neg A)^\alpha$, so $Z(\gamma \cdot \delta)$ by Proposition 3.2(a). So $(\neg A)^\gamma$. \dashv

3.4. Lemma. $\mathbf{IA}_1 \vdash \forall \alpha (Z(\alpha) \rightarrow E^\alpha)$ for all formulas E.

3.5. Lemma.

(a) $\mathbf{IA}_1 \vdash \forall \alpha \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} ((A \rightarrow B)^\alpha \rightarrow (A^\alpha \rightarrow B^\alpha))$.

(b) $\mathbf{IA}_1 \vdash \forall \alpha \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (A \rightarrow B)^\alpha \leftrightarrow \forall \alpha \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (A^\alpha \rightarrow B^\alpha)$.

PROOF. (a) follows immediately from the definition and Proposition 3.2(b) with the fact that $\alpha \cdot \alpha = \alpha$ for all $\alpha \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$.

For (b), the implication from left to right follows from (a) by logic. For the converse assume $\forall \alpha \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (A^\alpha \rightarrow B^\alpha)$ and $\alpha \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ and $A^{sg(\beta)}$; then $B^{sg(\beta)}$ by the assumption, so B^β by Proposition 3.2(b), so $B^{\alpha \cdot \beta}$ by Lemma 3.3. So $(A \rightarrow B)^\alpha$. \dashv

3.6. Lemma. If E is $\exists x \alpha(x) = 0$ (i.e., $Z(\alpha)$), then \mathbf{IA}_1 proves:

(a) $\forall \beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (E^\beta \leftrightarrow E \vee Z(\beta))$.

(b) $\forall \beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} ((\neg E)^\beta \leftrightarrow (E \rightarrow Z(\beta)))$.

(c) $\forall \beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} ((\neg\neg E)^\beta \leftrightarrow E \vee Z(\beta))$.

(d) $\forall \beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (\neg\neg E \leftrightarrow E)^\beta$.

PROOF. (a) is immediate by Definition 3.1 with intuitionistic logic. For (b), under the assumption $\beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ and using (a), Proposition 3.2, intuitionistic logic and the fact that $\beta \cdot \beta = \beta$, we have the following chain of equivalences:

$$\begin{aligned} (\neg E)^\beta &\leftrightarrow \forall \gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (E^\gamma \rightarrow Z(\beta \cdot \gamma)) \\ &\leftrightarrow \forall \gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (E \vee Z(\gamma) \rightarrow Z(\beta \cdot \gamma)) \\ &\leftrightarrow \forall \gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (E \rightarrow Z(\beta \cdot \gamma)) \leftrightarrow (E \rightarrow Z(\beta)). \end{aligned}$$

For (c), under the assumption $\beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$, by (b) we have

$$(\neg\neg E)^\beta \leftrightarrow \forall \gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} ((\neg E)^\gamma \rightarrow Z(\beta \cdot \gamma)) \leftrightarrow \forall \gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} ((E \rightarrow Z(\gamma)) \rightarrow Z(\beta \cdot \gamma)).$$

If $\forall \gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} ((E \rightarrow Z(\gamma)) \rightarrow Z(\beta \cdot \gamma))$, let $\gamma = sg(\alpha)$; then $Z(\gamma) \leftrightarrow Z(\alpha)$ and $\gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$. Then $(Z(\gamma) \rightarrow Z(\gamma)) \rightarrow Z(\beta \cdot \gamma)$ since E is $Z(\alpha)$, so $Z(\beta \cdot \gamma)$, so $Z(\beta) \vee Z(\gamma)$ by Proposition 3.2(a), so $Z(\beta) \vee E$, so $E \vee Z(\beta)$. For the converse use Proposition 3.2(a). Then (d) follows from (a) and (c) with Lemma 3.5(b). \dashv

3.7. Lemma.

(a) If E has no \rightarrow or \neg then $\mathbf{IA}_1 \vdash (E^{\lambda z.1} \leftrightarrow E)$.

(b) $\mathbf{IA}_1 \vdash (\neg A)^{\lambda z.1} \rightarrow \neg(A^{\lambda z.1})$ for all formulas A.

(c) If E is constructed from prime formulas and their negations using only $\&$ and \vee , then $\mathbf{IA}_1 \vdash (E^{\lambda z.1} \rightarrow E)$.

§4. Applications to subsystems of Kleene’s formal system I for intuitionistic analysis.

4.1. Theorem. If \mathbf{T} is a theory extending \mathbf{IA}_1 by axioms and axiom schemas F_1, \dots, F_n such that $\mathbf{T} \vdash \forall \beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (F_i)^\beta$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$, and if E is derivable in \mathbf{T} from assumptions A_1, \dots, A_m with all free variables held constant in the deduction, then E^β is derivable in \mathbf{T} from the assumptions $\beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}, (A_1)^\beta, \dots, (A_m)^\beta$ with all free variables held constant.

PROOF. $\mathbf{IA}_1 \vdash \forall \alpha \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} E^\alpha$ when E is any axiom of \mathbf{IA}_1 , using the lemmas in the previous section with $\forall \alpha \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (\alpha \cdot \alpha = \alpha)$ as appropriate (e.g., for the mathematical induction schema). If B^β and $(B \rightarrow C)^\beta$ are derivable in \mathbf{IA}_1 from $\beta = \text{sg}(\beta), (A_1)^\beta, \dots, (A_m)^\beta$ with the free variables held constant, then by Lemma 3.5(a) so is $B^\beta \rightarrow C^\beta$, and therefore also C^β . Similarly for the other rules of inference. \dashv

4.2. Lemma. $\mathbf{IA}_1 + \text{AC}_{00} \vdash \forall \beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (\text{AC}_{00})^\beta$, and similarly for qf-AC_{00} and for Kleene’s stronger countable choice principle (axiom schema $^x 2.1$ in [6]):

$$\text{AC}_{01} : \quad \forall x \exists \alpha A(x, \alpha) \rightarrow \exists \beta \forall x A(x, \lambda y. \beta(\langle x, y \rangle)).$$

PROOF. By the definition with Lemma 3.5(b). \dashv

4.3. Lemma. $\mathbf{IA}_1 + \text{BI}_1 \vdash \forall \beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (\text{BI}_1)^\beta$ where Kleene’s version of Brouwer’s bar induction principle (“the bar theorem,” axiom schema $^x 26.3b$ in [6]) is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{BI}_1 : \quad & \forall \alpha \exists x \rho(\bar{\alpha}(x)) = 0 \ \& \ \forall w (\text{Seq}(w) \ \& \ \rho(w) = 0 \rightarrow A(w)) \\ & \ \& \ \forall w (\text{Seq}(w) \ \& \ \forall s A(w * \langle s + 1 \rangle) \rightarrow A(w)) \rightarrow A(\langle \rangle). \end{aligned}$$

PROOF. Assume $\beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ and

- (i) $(\forall \alpha \exists x \rho(\bar{\alpha}(x)) = 0)^\beta$,
- (ii) $(\forall w (\text{Seq}(w) \ \& \ \rho(w) = 0 \rightarrow A(w)))^\beta$,
- (iii) $(\forall w (\text{Seq}(w) \ \& \ \forall s A(w * \langle s + 1 \rangle) \rightarrow A(w)))^\beta$.

By Lemma 3.5 it will be enough to prove $A^\beta(\langle \rangle)$. By the definition and the lemmas in the previous section, over \mathbf{IA}_1 the numbered assumptions are equivalent respectively to

- (i’) $\forall \alpha \exists x (\rho(\bar{\alpha}(x)) = 0 \vee Z(\beta))$,
- (ii’) $\forall w \forall \gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} ((\text{Seq}(w) \ \& \ \rho(w) = 0) \vee Z(\gamma) \rightarrow A^{\beta \cdot \gamma}(w))$,
- (iii’) $\forall w \forall \gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} ((\text{Seq}(w) \vee Z(\gamma)) \ \& \ \forall s A^\gamma(w * \langle s + 1 \rangle) \rightarrow A^{\beta \cdot \gamma}(w))$.

In \mathbf{IA}_1 we may define $\sigma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ so that

$$\sigma(w) = 0 \leftrightarrow \rho(w) = 0 \vee \exists x \leq w \beta(x) = 0.$$

From (i’) it follows immediately that $\forall \alpha \exists x \sigma(\bar{\alpha}(x)) = 0$. From (ii’) with $\gamma = \beta$ and the fact that $\beta = \beta \cdot \beta$ we have $\forall w (\text{Seq}(w) \ \& \ \sigma(w) = 0 \rightarrow A^\beta(w))$. From (iii’) similarly, $\forall w (\text{Seq}(w) \ \& \ \forall s A^\beta(w * \langle s + 1 \rangle) \rightarrow A^\beta(w))$, so $A^\beta(\langle \rangle)$ follows by BI_1 . \dashv

4.4. Lemma. $\mathbf{IA}_1 + \text{CC}_{10} \vdash \forall \beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (\text{CC}_{10})^\beta$ where CC_{10} is

$$\forall \alpha \exists x A(\alpha, x) \rightarrow \exists \sigma \forall \alpha (\exists y \sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) > 0 \ \& \ \forall y (\sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) > 0 \rightarrow A(\alpha, \sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) \dot{-} 1)).$$

CC₁₀ is a minor variation of, and is equivalent over **IA**₁ + qf-AC₀₀ to, Kleene and Vesley's continuous choice schema *27.2 ("Brouwer's Principle for numbers").

PROOF. Assume $\beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ and $\forall \alpha \exists x A^\beta(\alpha, x)$. By Lemma 3.5(b) it will be enough to find a σ such that for all α :

- (i) $\exists y(\sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) > 0 \vee Z(\beta))$ and
- (ii) $\forall y \forall \gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}(\sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) > 0 \vee Z(\gamma) \rightarrow A^{\beta \cdot \gamma}(\alpha, \sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) \dot{-} 1))$.

CC₁₀ provides a σ such that for all α :

- (i') $\exists y \sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) > 0$ and
- (ii') $\forall y(\sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) > 0 \rightarrow A^\beta(\alpha, \sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) \dot{-} 1))$.

Obviously (i') entails (i). To prove (ii), let $y \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$. If $\sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) > 0$ then $A^{\beta \cdot \gamma}(\alpha, \sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) \dot{-} 1)$ by (ii') with Lemma 3.3, and if $Z(\gamma)$ then $A^{\beta \cdot \gamma}(\alpha, \sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) \dot{-} 1)$ by Lemmas 3.4 and 3.3, so $\sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) > 0 \vee Z(\gamma) \rightarrow A^{\beta \cdot \gamma}(\alpha, \sigma(\bar{\alpha}(y)) \dot{-} 1)$. \dashv

4.5. Lemma. **IA**₁ + qf-AC₀₀ + CC₁₁ $\vdash \forall \gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (CC_{11})^\gamma$ where CC₁₁ is

$$\forall \alpha \exists \beta A(\alpha, \beta) \rightarrow \exists \sigma \forall \alpha \exists \beta [\forall x \exists y (\sigma(\langle x + 1 \rangle * \bar{\alpha}(y)) = \beta(x) + 1 \\ \& \forall z < y \sigma(\langle x + 1 \rangle * \bar{\alpha}(z)) = 0) \& A(\alpha, \beta)],$$

which is equivalent over **IA**₁ + qf-AC₀₀ to Kleene's strongest continuous choice principle, "Brouwer's Principle for functions" (axiom schema ^x27.1 in [6]).

PROOF. Assume $\gamma \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ and $\forall \alpha \exists \beta A^\gamma(\alpha, \beta)$. By Lemma 3.5(b) it will be enough to find a σ such that

$$\forall \alpha \exists \beta [\forall x \exists y ((\sigma(\langle x + 1 \rangle * \bar{\alpha}(y)) = \beta(x) + 1 \\ \& \forall z < y \sigma(\langle x + 1 \rangle * \bar{\alpha}(z)) = 0) \vee Z(\gamma)) \& A^\gamma(\alpha, \beta)].$$

CC₁₁ provides a σ which suffices. \dashv

4.6. Corollary. If **T** is **IA**₁, Kleene's neutral theory **B** = **IA**₁ + AC₀₁ + BI₁, Kleene's intuitionistic analysis **I** = **B** + CC₁₁ or any subsystem of **I** obtained by adding to **IA**₁ any of the schemas qf-AC₀₀, AC₀₀, AC₀₁, BI₁ and/or CC₁₀, then **T** + MP₁ and **T** prove the same Π_2^0 statements.

PROOF. By Lemma 3.6(d), $\mathbf{T} \vdash \forall \beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} (\text{MP}_1)^\beta$. Hence by Theorem 4.1 with Lemmas 4.2–4.5, if $\mathbf{T} + \text{MP}_1 \vdash E$ then $\mathbf{T} \vdash \forall \beta \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} E^\beta$.

If E is $\forall x \exists y A(x, y)$ where $A(x, y)$ has only bounded numerical quantifiers, then $A(x, y)$ is equivalent over **IA**₁ to a formula of the type described in Lemma 3.7(c), so by Theorem 4.1: if $\mathbf{T} + \text{MP}_1 \vdash E$ then $\mathbf{T} \vdash E^{zz,1}$ so $\mathbf{T} \vdash E$. \dashv

4.7. Remarks. Lemma 3.7(c) holds also for formulas E constructed from prime formulas and their negations using only $\&$, \vee , \forall and \exists , in particular for all prenex formulas. It follows, for each subsystem **T** of Kleene's **I** described in the statement of Corollary 4.6, that any prenex formula provable in $\mathbf{T} + \text{MP}_1$ is provable in **T**.

Kleene's original versions of the continuous choice principles would also satisfy Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 over **IA**₁ + qf-AC₀₀. By Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 3.5, the equivalences between our versions and Kleene's persist under the translation, and the proofs for CC₁₀ and CC₁₁ are simpler.

The question whether or not the “minimal” system $\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{IA}_1 + \mathbf{AC}_{00}!$ proves the same Π_2^0 formulas as $\mathbf{M} + \mathbf{MP}_1$ is still open, as far as we know, because $(\forall x \exists! y A(x, y))^\alpha$ does not entail $\forall x \exists! y A^\alpha(x, y)$ unless $\alpha = \lambda x.1$. However, if

$$\mathbf{AC}_{00}^\vee : \forall x(A(x) \vee B(x)) \rightarrow \exists \alpha \forall x[(\alpha(x) = 0 \ \& \ A(x)) \vee (\alpha(x) \neq 0 \ \& \ B(x))]$$

is the axiom of countable choice for two alternatives, then $\mathbf{IRA} + \mathbf{AC}_{00}^\vee + \mathbf{MP}_1$ is Π_2^0 -conservative over $\mathbf{IRA} + \mathbf{AC}_{00}^\vee$ by Theorem 4.1. Since $\mathbf{AC}_{00}!$ is equivalent over \mathbf{IRA} to

$$\forall x(A(x) \vee \neg A(x)) \rightarrow \exists \alpha \forall x(\alpha(x) = 0 \leftrightarrow A(x))$$

by [8], any prenex formula provable in $\mathbf{M} + \mathbf{MP}_1$ is provable in $\mathbf{IRA} + \mathbf{AC}_{00}^\vee$.

Because the translation $E \mapsto E^\beta$ essentially involves binary sequence quantifiers, it does not appear to solve the corresponding problem for $\mathbf{IA}_1 + \mathbf{AC}_{00}^{Ar}$ or for Solovay’s system $\mathbf{S} = \mathbf{IA}_1 + \mathbf{AC}_{00}^{Ar} + \mathbf{BI}_1$, where \mathbf{AC}_{00}^{Ar} is the restriction of \mathbf{AC}_{00} to arithmetical formulas $A(x, y)$ (with sequence parameters allowed). In the presence of bar induction, arithmetical countable choice interacts strongly with \mathbf{MP}_1 ; e.g., Solovay showed that the classical version $\mathbf{S} + (\neg\neg A \rightarrow A)$ of \mathbf{S} can be interpreted negatively in $\mathbf{IRA} + \mathbf{BI}_1 + \mathbf{MP}_1$.²

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PROF. EMERITA OF MATHEMATICS, OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE
 721 24TH STREET
 SANTA MONICA, CA 90402, USA
 E-mail: joan.rand@gmail.com
 URL: www.math.ucla.edu/~joan/

²In fact, his proof justifies a stronger result: $\mathbf{S} + (\neg\neg A \rightarrow A)$ can be interpreted negatively in $\mathbf{IRA} + \mathbf{BI}_1 + \mathbf{DNS}_1$, where \mathbf{DNS}_1 is the schema $\forall \alpha \neg \neg \exists x A(\bar{\alpha}(x)) \rightarrow \neg \neg \forall \alpha \exists x A(\bar{\alpha}(x))$ for quantifier-free formulas $A(w)$. Another note with this and related results is in progress.