

followed a path shared by some fortunate slaves, both male and female. The trajectories of the Sardinian and Senegalese women during roughly the same period are intriguingly comparable.

We do not know the circumstances of how the *Baya* (wife of the bey or prince) drew the ruling family's attention, converted to Islam, and was manumitted; she was, however, legally married to the ruler. Even the daily existence of her childhood in the Husaynid court and *harim* (women's quarters) remains opaque since the chroniclers did not normally narrate the private lives of princely or notable women. Nonetheless, Islamic court records prove that the dynasty's women held, bought, and sold often-extensive properties. And the *harims* were multi-generational and multi-racial households where the line between the enslaved and free domestic was not always firm. Large parts of Rosalie's past, too, remain obscure. Color and race, as constantly reconfigured in the Atlantic world, and Rosalie's modest social origins, as well as her largely involuntary physical displacements, made piecing together her story difficult. Yet Rosalie's life reveals a kind of social mobility not unlike that of her Sardinian counterpart.

In 1816, "white" or European slavery was ended in the Mediterranean, although clandestine traffic persisted. Between 1840 and 1846, Ahmad Bey, the son of a Sardinian former slave, banned the African slave trade and consequently slavery itself in Tunisia, although here, too, clandestine trans-sea commerce in now "illegal" African and Black Sea slaves endured. One might be tempted to explain the divergent social paths of these two women by religion—Islam—or by the fact that Rosalie was African and black and Ahmad Bey's mother was "white," although Mediterranean island folks, while Catholics, were not necessarily considered "white" (admittedly an anachronism) by northern Europeans in this period. In both Atlantic and Mediterranean "systems" of slave holding we detect the mutability and malleability of color, race, and legal as well as ascribed status, in specific times and places, within the larger envelope of human mobility and individual navigations. Until now, historians have been largely content to contrast something called Islamic and/or Mediterranean slavery with the Atlantic or New World, looking for and finding difference. Scott and Hébrard's rich study beckons us to search for unsuspected similarities, for the clarity of mutability.

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Masooda Bano, *The Rational Believer: Choices and Decisions in the Madrasas of Pakistan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012.

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Masooda Bano's book poses the following questions: Why have the ulama (religious scholars) of Pakistan set themselves on the course of armed struggle

against the state when they have not done so previously? What explains their choice of adopting a course that was not in their obvious interest insofar as it involved the potential loss of their lives, not to mention of their standing with the state and the broader public? She poses these questions with respect to the Red Mosque incident of 2007, during which the state first tried to negotiate the end of a barricade of the mosque by ulama with their students, and then stormed the premises, which led to innumerable deaths. While questions have been raised about the ethicality and efficacy of the state's actions, few have posed such questions about the ulama themselves or their students and supporters; it is as if their motivations for the barricade are transparent.

Bano disagrees with the commonplace understanding of madrassa education as religious indoctrination, and she set out to elicit the complexity and rationality of motivations through extensive fieldwork involving interviews, participant observation, surveys, and group discussions in no fewer than 110 madrassas in eight districts of Pakistan. In selecting her research subjects Bano sought diversity in terms of region, ethnicity, sectarian affiliation, and rural-urban divides. In the end, this diversity is diluted when she represents her subjects as simply the ulama, students, parents, jihadists, sympathizers, and so forth. Yet she is nonetheless able to draw out and bring together ordinary desires for bringing up moral and hardworking children with more emergent goals of criticizing the state and seeking justice—a concept that crops up insistently in her interviews with jihadists and radicalized ulama.

In other words, Bano grounds the explanations for why Pakistani ulama do what they do, and garner the sympathy they receive, in both discursive formations and an analysis of structural realities. Her commitment to the rational actor model of political theory leads her to jump through hoops to show how certain actions undertaken in the expectation of divine rewards still fall within rational choice and decision-making, but her focus on how both formal and informal institutions craft actors and their actions mitigates the excessive emphasis on individual calculations within the rational actor model. Historians will wish Bano had given more attention to the deep historical record of ulama activism in the region (to which she refers, albeit briefly). Anthropologists will wish that she had dispensed with her tortuous efforts to account for the rationality of the ulama, since the anthropological record has richly demonstrated the place of reasoning and disputation within the Islamic tradition and everyday life.

That said, this book has much to offer: its perspectives on contemporary Pakistani society and key religious institutions such as the *waqaf*; its on-the-ground reportage of the Red Mosque incident; its brief but useful contextualizing of madrassas in the South Asian context by bringing in the case of India and Bangladesh; and a curious comparison of the foundation of Oxford University with that of key madrasas within the Islamic world. Beyond these contributions, Bano's book provides a lively introduction to the political,

theoretical framing of issues around Islamic movements, and enables a critical engagement with that framework.

———Naveeda Khan, Johns Hopkins University

Nile Green, *Sufism: A Global History*. Chichester, West Sussex and Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, ISBN: 9781405157650; pp. xxi + 263.

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Green's book is the latest survey of Sufism's history. Its four chapters are arranged chronologically, from "origins" to "globalization." Its endnotes and "Further Reading" mention at least half a dozen recent histories and surveys of Sufism, so Green must explain why another is needed. He argues that his book uniquely presents Sufis "as powerful and influential social actors rather than conscientious objectors acting from the margins of society" (pp. 5–6). Accordingly, the author conceives "Sufism as primarily a *tradition* of powerful knowledge, practices and persons" (3), and he downplays its "antinomian" and "marginal" aspects in favor of viewing Sufism as a "social and religious 'establishment'" (6). Sufism's social, political, and cultural influence on societies in which it is embedded thus rests on three types of power: "discursive, miraculous and economic" (*ibid.*). The workings of these three powers are traced in the narrative that follows. Finally, the author proposes to regard Sufism as a sum total of various relationships, namely "between [Sufi] saints and their followers, between the readers and writers of Sufi texts; between the Prophet, the mediating master and the humble believer; between the subjects and objects of the devotion that has been the emotional heartbeat of Sufi tradition" (9–10). Special attention is given to the processes of the tradition's adaptation to vastly different social and cultural environments over the *longue durée* (8–11, see 130). The book's geographical breadth makes it truly "global" (12)—it explores the truly worldwide reach of Sufi individuals, teachings, and institutions.

To any scholar of Sufism and Islam generally, Green's methodological premises make perfect sense, and in fact they are not so novel. The author uses as his polemical foil the now seriously outdated approach to Sufism of Arthur J. Arberry (1905–1969) (1, 6), yet over the past fifty years what has prevailed among Western scholars of Sufism is the much more nuanced and broad "civilizational" vision of Islam and Sufism of Marshall Hodgson (1922–1968). Surprisingly, Hodgson's seminal treatment of Sufism in his *Venture of Islam* is absent from the author's narrative and footnotes, but the author nonetheless makes good on his promise to provide a comprehensive and contextually grounded survey of Sufi tradition in its relations with various historical actors, socio-cultural environments, and institutions.