

The Rise of Confessional Tension in Brandenburg's Relations with Sweden in the Late-seventeenth Century

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THE diplomatic and religious climate in Protestant Northern Europe during the era of Louis XIV was filled with competing and at times contradictory impulses, and the repercussions of Louis's expansionist and anti-Protestant policies on the relations between the Protestant states were varied and complex. Taken in conjunction with the ascension of Catholic James II in Britain in February 1685 and the succession of the Catholic House of Neuburg in the Palatinate following the death of the last Calvinist elector in May of that year, Louis's reintroduction of the mass in the "reunited" territories and his increasing persecution of the Huguenots in France added to an acute sense among European Protestants that the survival of their religion was threatened. It is a well-established theme in the standard literature on seventeenth-century Europe that the culmination of Louis's attack on the Huguenots in his revocation of the Edict of Nantes in October 1685 galvanized the continent's Protestant powers in a common sense of outrage and united them in a spirit of political cooperation against France.¹ Indeed, such an astute contem-

I would like to express my gratitude to Professors Constantin Fasolt, Allan I. Macinnes, and Herbert Jaumann, and to the participants in the *Äldrehistoriska seminariet* at Stockholm University, the Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History at the German Historical Institute and BMW Center for German and European History at Georgetown University in Washington D.C., and the Early Modern Workshop at the University of Chicago for their generous advice in improving earlier versions of this article.

1. See, for example, Donald H. Pennington, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century*, 2nd ed. (London, 1989), 516; Jeremy Black, *The Rise of the European Powers, 1679–1793* (London, 1990), 38; Geoffrey Treasure, *The Making of Modern Europe, 1648–1780* (London, 1985), 269; Leonard W. Cowie, *Seventeenth-Century Europe* (London, 1960), 271; Ernst Heinrich Kossmann, "The Dutch Republic," in *The Ascendancy of France, 1648–1688*, ed. Francis Ludwig Carsten, vol. 5 of *The New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge, 1961), 297; Geoffrey Symcox, "Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years' War," in *Louis XIV and Europe*, ed. Ragnhild Hatton (London, 1976), 183–84; Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1987), 218–19. Nicholas Henshall writes of an "outraged international Protestantism in fear of its life" in which "the Protestant brotherhood" declared "common cause . . . with the oppressed Huguenots." (Nicolas Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy* [London, 1992], 202–3.) John Stoye

Central European History, vol. 37, no. 4, 568–592

porary observer as Leibniz was to write in the early 1690s that it appeared now “as if all of the north is opposed to the south of Europe; the great majority of the Germanic peoples are opposed to the Latins.”² Even Bossuet had to declare that “your so-called Reformation . . . was never more powerful nor more united. All of the Protestants have joined forces. From the outside, the Reformation is very cohesive, more haughty and more menacing than ever.”³

According to this account, one of the most damaging international consequences of Louis’s territorial and religious policies was the alienation of his former Protestant allies in Northern Europe and the subsequent unraveling of the alliance and clientage system that French diplomacy (and French money) had put together so painstakingly in previous years.⁴ In particular, Brandenburg and Sweden were driven definitively away from the French camp, and by February 1686 these two states had set aside their long-standing differences over Pomerania and had entered into an alliance held together by a desire to preserve European Protestantism and a mutual distrust of France.⁵ In short, the prevailing historiographical consensus is that Louis’s anti-Protestant activities rekindled the flickering embers of pan-Protestant religious sympathy and unleashed a wave of Protestant political cooperation of which Brandenburg’s improved relationship with Sweden was part.

argues for a more nuanced understanding of the international political consequences of Louis’s persecutions that takes into account the vast array of other concerns affecting Protestant states’ reactions, but in the end gives a qualified endorsement to the dominant view. See his *Europe Unfolding, 1648–1688* (New York, 1970), 371–73.

2. “Maintenant, c’est quasi tout le nord qui s’oppose au sud de l’Europe; c’est la plus grande partie des peuples germaniques opposés aux Latins.” Leibniz to Bossuet, 18 April 1692, quoted in Paul Hazard, *La crise de la conscience européenne, 1680–1715* (Paris, 1961), 81–82. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

3. “Votre prétendue Réforme, à ne regarder que les soutiens du dehors, ne fut jamais ni plus puissante ni plus unie. Tout le parti protestant se ligue. A l’extérieur, la Réforme est tout ensemble, plus fière et plus menaçante que jamais.” Bossuet, *Premier avertissement aux Protestants* (1689), cited in Hazard, *La crise de la conscience*, 82.

4. Those who note the particular anger of Louis’s erstwhile Protestant allies include John Gagliardo, *Germany Under the Old Regime, 1600–1789* (London, 1991), 253; David Parrott, “War and International Relations,” in *The Seventeenth Century: Europe 1598–1715*, ed. Joseph Bergin, *The Short Oxford History of Europe* (Oxford, 2001), 133; Thomas Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe, 1598–1700* (Basingstoke, 1990), 375; Gaston Zeller, “French Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in their European Setting,” in *The Ascendancy of France, 1648–1688*, in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, ed. Carsten, 220–21; William Doyle, *The Old European Order, 1660–1800* (Oxford, 1978), 271; Robin Briggs, “Embattled Faiths: Religion and Natural Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century,” in *Early Modern Europe: An Oxford History*, ed. Euan Cameron (Oxford, 1999), 178.

5. The alliance was signed in Berlin on 10 February 1686. See Theodor von Moerner, ed., *Kurbrandenburgs Staatsverträge von 1601 bis 1700* (Berlin, 1867), no. 284, 478–81. For recent assessments of the Brandenburg-Swedish alliance of 1686 as driven by a common desire to defend European Protestantism and a shared animosity toward France, see Derek McKay, *The Great Elector* (Harlow, 2001), 252–56; Gagliardo, *Germany Under the Old Regime*, 253. Anthony F. Upton describes the alliance with Brandenburg as an integral part of Sweden’s shift toward viewing Louis XIV as the greatest threat to peace and stability in Europe. See his *Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism* (Cambridge, 1998), 102–6.

Another well-established historiographical narrative has argued that religious issues became an increasingly insignificant factor in European interstate relations following the Thirty Years' War. John Gagliardo writes that although popular religious tensions remained high after the Westphalia agreements, religion "was never again to be . . . more than a very secondary influence on the conduct of foreign policy."⁶ Theodore K. Rabb states even more plainly that from the middle of the seventeenth century "religion did cease to affect foreign policies."⁷ This line of reasoning is championed most strongly in the Swedish historiography by Sven Göransson, who argues that confessional issues ceased altogether to be a factor in European (and especially Swedish) diplomacy from around 1660.⁸

Although these two bodies of historiography may appear somewhat at odds with one another, both would seem to propose that the late-1680s and early-1690s should have been a period of relative political harmony and lack of religious conflict between Brandenburg and Sweden. However, an examination of the diplomatic relations between the states will reveal that it was precisely during this period that religious tensions between Brandenburg and Sweden that had previously been held in check boiled to the surface, igniting a spirit of confessionalized politics that posed a very real obstacle to the ability of the two states to cooperate politically, even though both agreed that the circumstances of the time made such cooperation desirable. This rise in intra-Protestant confessional tension was part and parcel of a larger shift in Brandenburg-Swedish relations that occurred within an atmosphere of heightened religious sensitivity brought to Northern and Central Europe by the French military and religious offensives. Not coincidentally, much of this tension centered on the activities of a Huguenot refugee in Brandenburg service by the name of Pierre de Falaiseau. He merits a closer look.

Falaiseau counted among his several diplomatic missions on behalf of the Brandenburg Electors an ambassadorship to Sweden from July 1685 to June 1690.⁹ Falaiseau's five years in Stockholm were marked by a series of controversies, often religious in nature and complicated by a unique confluence of international diplomacy, domestic Swedish politics, and Falaiseau's own personal contentiousness and sense of religious responsibility. Relatively little is known about Falaiseau and his background.¹⁰ The Falaiseaus were a noble family of

6. Gagliardo, *Germany Under the Old Regime*, 177–78.

7. Theodor K. Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1975), 78–82.

8. Sven Göransson, *Den Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning, 1654–1660: Religion och utrikespolitik under Karl X Gustav* (Uppsala, 1956).

9. Falaiseau also served as Brandenburg resident in England from September to December 1682, as ambassador to Denmark from September 1690 to February 1698, and as envoy to Spain from October 1699 to January 1701. See Ludwig Bittner and Lothar Gross, *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648)*, vol. 1 (Oldenburg, 1936), 30, 35, 62.

10. For biographical information see Jean Pierre Erman and Pierre Christian Frédéric Reclam,

financiers from Blois in central France who became well established in the Paris Huguenot Church. Members of the family appear to have been educated at leading Calvinist universities such as the University of Geneva.¹¹ Pierre left France several years before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and established himself in England before entering Brandenburg service in 1682. Upon the revocation of the edict some members of the Falaiseau family abjured their Calvinist faith and remained in France, while others, including Pierre's parents and sister, refused to abjure and were expelled from the country. Several of them fled to Brandenburg. Following his years of Brandenburg service Pierre returned to England in the early eighteenth century, where he died in 1726.

Like many Huguenot refugees, Falaiseau was rabidly anti-French. His reports from Stockholm are full of invective against France as a cruel and bigoted state driven by an insatiable lust for power and set upon the total destruction of Protestantism. In a report to Elector Friedrich III from March 1689 Falaiseau described France as "that arrogant and tyrannical power which for twenty years has done so much indignity to all of the princes of Europe and whose design is the destruction of the Protestant religion and the establishment of a universal monarchy."¹² In a different report that same month he wrote that "I hope that the year does not pass that God does not punish France for the incredible cruelties" that it has committed for many years, cited specifically France's "more than barbaric" excesses in the current war in the Palatinate, and called for the princes of the empire, and particularly the Protestant princes, to remain united "to abase the arrogance and the tyranny of a power that recognizes neither the law of nations nor that of nature, neither human law nor divine law."¹³ Falaiseau's own situation made him keenly aware of the plight of other Huguenot refugees forced to flee France, and of the difficulties faced by

Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire des Réfugiés Français dans les États du Roi, vol. 3 (Berlin, 1784), 31–35; Eugène and Émile Haag, *La France Protestante ou Vies des Protestantes Français qui se sont fait un nom dans l'histoire depuis les premiers temps de la Réformation jusqu'à la reconnaissance du Principe de la liberté des cultes par l'Assemblée Nationale*, vol. 5 (1846–59; reprint, Geneva, 1966), 54–55; Rev. David C. A. Agnew, *Protestant Exiles From France in the Reign of Louis XIV*; or, *The Huguenot Refugees and their Descendants in Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (London, 1871), 77–80, 315.

11. See the entries for Jean Falaiseau de Tours and Michel Falaiseau de Tours in Suzanne Stelling-Michaud, ed., *Le Livre du Recteur de l'Académie de Genève (1559–1878)*, vol. 3 (Geneva, 1972), 267–68.

12. "cette Puissance orgueilleuse et Tyrannique qui a fait éprouver depuis vingt ans tant d'indignitez à tous les Princes de l'Europe et dont le dessein estait le Ruine de la Religion Protestante et l'establisement d'une Monarchie Universelle." Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 23 March 1689, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 41, 142r.

13. "... j'espere que l'année ne se passera pas, Que Dieu ne punesse la France des Cruautés inouies qu'elle exerce de tout Costé depui tant d'années et que les Exces plus que Barbares qu'elle vient de commettre dans le Palatinas, feront connoistre à tous les Princes de l'Empire et principalement aux Protestans la Necessite qu'il y a de demeurer bien unis pour abaisser l'orgueil et la Tyrannie d'ue Puissance qui ne connoist ny le droit des Gens ny celuy de la Nature ne les Loix humaines ny les loix divines, et qui crait estre on Droit de violer impuniment tout ce qu'il doit y avoir de plus saint et de plu sacré, parmi les hommes." Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 13/23 March 1689, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 41, 123v.

persecuted religious minorities in general. He considered it his duty to assist his fellow refugees during his diplomatic career, and to discourage religious persecution where he could. These three issues — a virulent Francophobia, the desire to assist Huguenot refugees driven from France, and a heightened sensitivity to the persecution of religious minorities, especially Calvinist religious minorities, played a prominent role in his embassy to Sweden and in the controversies to which it gave rise.

Falaiseau's embassy was part of a conscious effort by Brandenburg to improve the diplomatic climate with Sweden. The two states had been at war from 1674 to 1679, and Brandenburg had not had a standing representative at the Swedish court since Christoph von Brandt departed Stockholm in January 1675.¹⁴ As late as 1684 Friedrich Wilhelm had still been seeking to rally support for a planned invasion of Swedish Pomerania. By early 1685, however, the international situation was such that Brandenburg desired a return to more normal diplomatic relations with Sweden, and Friedrich Wilhelm made the both practically and symbolically significant gesture of commissioning Falaiseau as Extraordinary Ambassador and dispatching him to Stockholm in order to further this goal.¹⁵

The aims of Falaiseau's mission, however, went far beyond the simple regularization and improvement of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic relations. Like Falaiseau himself, the Brandenburg government was deeply concerned that the actions of Louis XIV, both religious and political, were the engine of an even larger Catholic movement that posed a serious threat to the survival of Protestantism in Europe. This movement was directed against Calvinists and Lutherans equally, and resisting it demanded unity among the Protestant confessions. Friedrich Wilhelm wrote to Falaiseau in April 1686 that "it is known throughout all of Europe in what great danger the entire Protestant religion of both confessions . . . stands at this time, and with what great cunning and violence" it was confronted. The threat of this "common enemy" should lead naturally to a "much closer and more solid union" among the Protestants. The disruption of such unity by confessional conflict between the Protestant denominations, however, would equate to "none other than an acceleration of their imminent calamity, and a certain and infallible means to the highest danger and misery for both parties, nay to the entire obscuration of the Evangelical Truth."¹⁶

14. See Bittner and Gross, *Repertorium*, 61.

15. Falaiseau's instructions are dated Potsdam, 6 June 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 28. An abridged version is printed in Max Hein, ed., *Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg*, vol. 23 (Berlin, 1926), 433–34. See also Ernst Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm der Grosse Kurfürst von Brandenburg: Eine politische Biographie*, vol. 2 (Göttingen, 1978), 260.

16. "Es ist durch gantz Europa bekant in was grosser Gefahr die gesambte Evangelische Religion beyder confessionen Jetziger Zeit fast aller Notn stehet, und mit was grosser List und gewalt der-

Brandenburg's fear of Catholic aggression and its concomitant desire for Protestant cooperation were shared by Sweden. King Karl XI (reigned 1660–1697) wrote to his representative in Berlin in January 1688 about the “highly necessary unity” of the Protestants in light of the “current dangerous circumstances,”¹⁷ and similar sentiments appear repeatedly in the official diplomatic correspondence between the states. Brandenburg had good reason, however, to fear that Sweden could be lured away from a pro-Protestant/anti-French position and into a French alliance. A long tradition of military and political cooperation between Sweden and France existed, dating back to the Thirty Years' War, and as recently as 1674 the Swedes had instigated a new round of hostilities with Brandenburg at the urging of France in order to draw the Brandenburg army away from the allied force fighting the French in the west. Heavy French subsidies allowed Sweden to remain in the war for the following four years, and French influence was able to secure a favorable peace for the Swedes even though they had been soundly beaten by Brandenburg and its allies on the battlefield. Certain members of the Brandenburg ruling elite viewed the tradition of cooperation between Sweden and France as so firmly established that the foreign policy interests of the two states had become almost inseparable.¹⁸ A major purpose of Falaiseau's embassy was to prevent Sweden's return to its traditional orientation toward France.

This goal was made more difficult to achieve by another phenomenon that caused considerable concern for Brandenburg, and that cannot be properly appreciated without a brief excursion into the world of Swedish domestic politics. Falaiseau's stay in Sweden coincided with a heightened phase in the long and painful process known as the *reduktion*, a major step in the advance of Swedish absolutism in which the Crown confiscated much of the property and revoked some of the special financial privileges that had been granted to the Swedish nobility by earlier monarchs. Not surprisingly the *reduktion* was met with great bitterness by the Swedish nobility, many of whom found themselves virtually impoverished by the process. Brandenburg was well aware of this bitterness, and the initial instructions for Falaiseau's embassy warned him to pay

selben aller orten nachgehachtet wird. Es solte auch Ja billig diese, allen beyden theils bevorstehende Gefahr Sie wieder Ihren Gemeinen feind umb so Viel näher und fester Verb[inden], weiln leicht zu erachten wan Sie nicht allein Keine des egen nötige *mesures* unter sich fasten sondern sich noch dass unter einander anfeinden und Verfolgen solten, das solches nichts anders als eine beschleunigung ihres bevorstehenden Unglücks worden und zu beyder theils hochsten bedenck und Elend Ja zu einer ganser Verdunckelung der Evangelischen Waarheit ein gewisses und unfehlbahres Mittell sein werde.” Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Potsdam, 9 April 1686, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, 69v–70r.

17. Karl XI to [Macklier], Stockholm, 23 January 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

18. See Sylvester Jakob von Danckelman to Friedrich III, Regensburg, 12/22 April 1689, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 247I Schweden, fasc. 41, 169r–173v.

close attention to the sentiments of the nobility since the Crown's actions had "noticeably disgusted the greater part of its most considerable subjects."¹⁹ The French were equally aware of the disaffection and economic hardship suffered by the Swedish nobility, and they capitalized on their awareness by offering the leading members of the nobility substantial bribes in order to win their affection and use their influence to move Sweden toward a French alliance. France complemented this effort with large monetary offers to the Crown itself, and it relied upon the friends that it had made in the nobility to pressure Karl XI to accept these offers. One of the purposes of Falaiseau's embassy was to work against the machinations of this "French party" of high-ranking Swedes with an economic interest in bringing Sweden into a French alliance.

The rising influence of Sweden's orthodox Lutheran clergy was another byproduct of the *reduktion* with which Falaiseau had to contend. The clergy had always wielded considerable power in Sweden, and the alienation of a large segment of the nobility through the *reduktion* had made the Crown that much more desirous of maintaining the clergy's support. The clergy took advantage of this to increase their power in the state. Sweden's highest-ranking minister, Chancery President Bengt Oxenstierna, himself confided to Falaiseau that the king did not dare resist the clergy on certain issues.²⁰ The Swedish church was and always had been anti-Calvinist, and it utilized the increase in its influence to push forward an anti-Calvinist agenda. As the representative of a Calvinist ruling house attempting to keep Sweden in a transconfessional Protestant alliance, and as a victim of anti-Calvinist religious persecution himself, Falaiseau took it upon himself to combat this agenda.

The situation that Falaiseau found himself in, then, was one in which he had been sent to Sweden with the expressed purposes of improving Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic relations and of keeping Sweden in the anti-French camp, while at the same time feeling a sense of personal and political obligation to counteract the anti-Calvinist activities of the Swedish clergy. His challenge was to champion the Calvinist cause in Sweden without angering the Swedish authorities at a time when the strongest anti-Calvinist element in Swedish society (the clergy) was emboldened and in high favor with the Crown, and when the segment of society that was traditionally most tolerant of Calvinists (the nobility) was weakened and leaning toward a French alliance.

19. "Dieweilln es auch fast überall ruchtbar, daß Ihre Königl. Mt. in Schweden durch die bekante *reuniones* dere von Ihnen Vorfarhren am Reich *alienirten* *Domains* Güter fast den mehreren theil Ihrer *considerablesten* Unterthanen mercklich *disgustiret*, So soll gedachter *Falaiseau* zeit seiner anwesenheit in Schweden sich mit allem fleiß erkundigen, wie schon dieser und anderer ursachen halber die Schwedische *Noblesse* und andere Unterthanen gegen den König und das ietzig *Gouvernement intentioniret* . ." Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Potsdam, 6 June 1685, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 28.

20. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28 January 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

Falaiseau and the Brandenburg government saw the twin goals of combating Swedish anti-Calvinism and promoting Swedish membership in a pan-Protestant/anti-French alliance as inextricably linked. The whole concept of a pan-Protestant alliance itself demanded that intra-Protestant confessional conflict be minimized, and any expression of tension between Lutherans and Calvinists was seen as a threat to the viability of the alliance. In a mild form the fear of religious conflict and its potential for destroying political cooperation was present from the very beginning of Falaiseau's embassy. Conrad Tiburtius Rango (1639–1700) was a Lutheran clergyman and theologian residing in Stettin in Swedish Pomerania who had authored an inflammatory anti-Calvinist polemic that had greatly angered the Brandenburg government.²¹ Friedrich Wilhelm had written to Karl XI regarding Rango in 1683, declaring that his books contained “horrendous slanders, lies and injuries” against the Calvinist faith and demanding that Karl take action against him for the sake of harmony between the Protestant denominations.²² The Swedish envoy in Berlin, Eberhard von Grafenthal, had promised that Sweden would take measures against Rango, but by the time that Falaiseau was dispatched to Sweden the issue had not been addressed to the satisfaction of the Brandenburg government. Falaiseau's instructions directed him to raise the issue once more with the Swedish authorities, and to push for an “exemplary punishment” for Rango. Allowing him to go unpunished would have “grave consequences,” giving other Lutheran zealots “the courage and occasion” to act in a similar fashion, therefore threatening to “hinder and upset the mutual tolerance and unity between the Protestant fellow-believers that is so necessary at the present time.”²³ Falaiseau discussed the Rango issue in one of his first audiences with Bengt Oxenstierna, and he was careful to phrase his objections in terms of an appeal to the king's well-known piety and wisdom to take the steps necessary to preserve Protestant unity.²⁴ Falaiseau's efforts appear to have met with some success. In August 1685 he wrote to the elector that he was confident that the

21. The work in question was the *Historia Syncretismi* (Stettin, 1674–1680). For Rango's biographical information, see Lothar Noack and Jürgen Splitt, eds., *Bio-Bibliographien: Brandenburgische Gelehrte der Frühen Neuzeit: Berlin-Cölln 1640–1688* (Berlin, 1997), 317–33.

22. Friedrich Wilhelm to Karl XI, Potsdam, 6 December 1683, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 28.

23. “. . . und gleich woll es eine sache von schlimmer consequenz seyn würde, wan gedachten *Rangoni* . . . dieser ferve und bößheit dergestalt hingehen und anderen dadurch Muht und anlaß gegeben werden solte. Unser *Religion* und deren bekaennere noch ferner dergestalt zu verlüsten, und anzutesten, folglich die jetziger Zeit so nötige *mutuelle tolerantz* und cinträchtigkeit zwischen dene Evangelischen Glauben genoßen immer mehr zu hindern und zu stöhren. Als hat gedachter *Falaiseau* die sache auf eben die weise, wie in gedachtem Unserm Schreiben geschehen, abermahl gehöriger ohrten am Königlichen Schwedischen Hofe vorzustellen und umb gebührende *exemplarische* bestraffung mehrenmelten *Rangonis* anzuhalten . . .” Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Potsdam, 6 June 1685, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 28.

24. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 18 July 1685, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 28.

king would grant Brandenburg's request to have Rango punished.²⁵ In September of that year Karl had Grafenthal express to Friedrich Wilhelm the king's displeasure with Rango's writings, and indeed with intra-Protestant polemics in general because they threatened Protestant unity in those dangerous times.²⁶ Rango was eventually tried before the Wismar Tribunal, where he was acquitted.

Even though the ultimate result in the Rango issue was not what Brandenburg had desired, Falaiseau had been able to deal amicably with the Swedish authorities, and had made his point that anti-Calvinism threatened Protestant political unity without creating tension between the two states. His ability to proceed with a controlled and gentle hand, however, was soon challenged when a religious issue of higher stakes arose. In 1686 a committee of Swedish clergy made a series of suggestions for a new church ordinance, including the provision that only Lutheran schools be allowed to exist in the kingdom. When Falaiseau learned of the suggested ordinance he became alarmed, and, as he later wrote to the elector, felt immediately obliged to register a protest with Oxenstierna without waiting for orders from the elector because the clergy's suggestion was aimed at the total destruction of the Calvinist religion and "there was no time at all to waste." Falaiseau's complaint to Oxenstierna was in a decidedly more heated tone than the exchanges over Rango had been. He told the Swedish Chancery President that, if implemented, the anti-Calvinist measures "would be a scandal throughout all of Europe" at a time when even Spain, "the most superstitious Papist Kingdom in the world," was granting Calvinists asylum, and when the "most schismatic and barbaric" Muscovites were allowing them a level of religious freedom. Such actions would also pose a threat to the Protestant unity that was now so necessary. Perhaps most tellingly, Falaiseau accused the Swedish clergy of following the "pernicious example" set by France in persecuting its Calvinist population.²⁷

25. *Ibid.*, 29 August 1685.

26. Karl XI to Grafenthal, Stockholm, 16 September 1685, RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1685, 348v–353r.

27. "J'ajoutay, qu'il n'estait pas nouveau de voir Mrs: du Clergé chercher à aggrandir leur autorité, et en abuser des qu'ils estaien en pouvoir de Refaire: que la france en fournissait un grand exemple, mais que c'estait un exemple si perniseux que je n'eusse jamais crû qu'un Clergé Protestant l'eust voulu suivre . . . Et que j'avais trop bonne opinion de luy Mr. d'Oxenstern pour n'estre pas persuadé qu'il estait du Sentiment que dans les conjonctures ou sont presentement les affaires de la Religion en France, en Savoye, en Angleterre et en plusieurs autres lieux, et dans un temps ou les Lutheriens et les Reformez avaient un si grand interests d'estre dans une estroite union, Ce serait un Scandale pour toute l'Europe de voir les Reformez, exterminer, en Suede pendant qu'ils trouvaient des aziles en Espagne, qui est le Royaume du monde le plus superstitieusement Papiste, et que les Moscovites mesme tous Schismatiques et tout barbares qu'ils sont, leurx accordentit des Privileges, des franchises et l'exercice de leur Religion." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 24 March 1686, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29, 52v–53r.

Oxenstierna expressed great sympathy for Falaiseau's complaints, and promised to do what he could to resist the clergy's proposal. Friedrich Wilhelm presented a formal complaint about the ordinance to Grafenthal in Berlin.²⁸ Falaiseau eventually wrote a respectful and circumspect memoir to King Karl that stressed once more the special need for pan-Protestant cooperation against their common enemy and urged him to prevent the clergy's ordinance from being implemented.²⁹ Falaiseau wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm in early May that this memoir had been extremely well received by the king and that he was expecting the king's response to fulfill all of his expectations.³⁰ Several months later Falaiseau happily reported to the elector the king's efforts to convince the clergy of the necessity of living in harmony with the Calvinists in the interests of their mutual preservation, and of the positive steps that were taken in the Swedish *Riksdag* to protect the Calvinists' rights of religious practice.³¹ Friedrich Wilhelm responded with praise for the Swedish action and Falaiseau's conduct in this matter.³² The issue of the church ordinance appeared to have been resolved to Brandenburg's complete satisfaction.

Falaiseau's actions regarding the ordinance did, however, have one negative result that would come to play an important role later in his embassy. In a letter to Grafenthal in May 1687 Karl XI blamed Falaiseau for having made a scandal of the issue by bringing unpublished drafts of the ordinance containing unedited language to the attention of the Brandenburg Elector, which combined with Falaiseau's own fantastical interpretations had given the elector an inaccurate vision of what the ordinance had really meant.³³ The clear sense here is that Falaiseau's strong personal desire to champion Calvinist minorities had clouded the information he was providing the elector. As a result the Swedish authorities mistrusted Falaiseau because of his excessive zeal in religious issues throughout the rest of his stay. Their fears came to the fore in 1688 when Falaiseau became involved in yet another religious controversy, the last during his embassy, regarding yet another new church ordinance.

The controversy surrounding the church ordinance of 1688 was the most serious religious issue to arise during Falaiseau's embassy and the one that

28. Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Cölln/Spree, 9 April 1686, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29, [68r?]-71v.

29. Falaiseau to Karl XI, Stockholm, [1686], GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29, 100r-v.

30. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 5/15 May 1686, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29, 95v.

31. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 29 September/9 October 1686, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29, 194r-196v.

32. Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Potsdam, 16 October 1686, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29, 220r-v.

33. Karl XI to Grafenthal, Stockholm, 28 May 1687, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 30.

elicited by far the most passion. The central provision of the 1688 ordinance was that all children born in Sweden had to be baptized by a Lutheran minister. Since the baptismal ceremony included an oath to be administered by the presiding (Lutheran) clergyman that the child be educated in the precepts of true religion, the ordinance in effect demanded a pledge from the parents and baptismal witnesses that the child be raised Lutheran. When the ordinance was enacted, a Calvinist by the name of Olivet who had become a naturalized Swedish subject turned to Falaiseau for assistance in preventing his child from being baptized in the fashion demanded by the ordinance. Falaiseau adopted Olivet's cause and agreed to serve as the child's baptismal witness himself, setting off a heated conflict with the Swedish authorities in which Falaiseau made use of all arguments available to him in a no-holds-barred attempt to drum up resistance to the ordinance.

Falaiseau saw the ordinance as an open assault on the basic rights granted to all parents by divine and natural law to control the religious upbringing of their children. He complained to Oxenstierna that imposing the ordinance on Sweden's Calvinists would be a clear violation of their divine and natural law rights,³⁴ and in a later report to the elector accused the ordinance "of coercing the consciences of infants in the cradle and of stealing them away from the arms of their fathers."³⁵ Falaiseau also raised the now-familiar specter that the ordinance would bring about the total destruction of Calvinism in Sweden and a deterioration of the necessary political cooperation between Europe's Protestant states.³⁶ Falaiseau's sense of the dual religious and political dangers posed by the ordinance was strengthened by his belief that the ordinance had been brought about by an alliance of his two archenemies in Sweden, the orthodox Lutheran clergy and the (largely noble) pro-French party. His reports back to Brandenburg contain an all-out attack against this cabal of his opponents, and an intricate theory of why they were working together. Falaiseau was unrestrained in his characterization of the leading clergymen that he saw standing behind the ordinance: the king's personal minister Wiraenius was "won over by money"; the Archbishop of Uppsala was "an ignoramus" who was perhaps also ruled by money and a close friend of the unappetizing Wiraenius; and the powerful clergyman Iser was "a drunkard who leads a scandalous life."³⁷ His words

34. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28 January 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4; *ibid.*, 24 March/3 April 1688.

35. "Car il ne s'agit plus simplement de la Ceremonie des Parains. . . du Droit que Dieu et la Nature donnera un Pere de choisir a ses Enfants de Parains de sa Religion Ainsi, Monseigneur, Il s'agit presentement de forcer les Consciences des Enfants an Berceau et de les enlever d'entre les Bras de leurs Peres." *Ibid.*, 10/20 March 1688.

36. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 25 January 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 33; Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28.1.1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

37. ". . . l'Archevesque d'Upsal est un ignorant, Werrenius, est Gaigne par argent, est peut estre aussi, l'Archevesque qui est Grand amy Werrenius, Et Iser, est un Yvrogne et qui mene une Vie

for those he saw leading the pro-French party on this issue were equally strong: he described Wallenstedt as “extremely ignorant and capricious” and “one of the most brutish men in the world”,³⁸ while Count Erik Lindschöld, the marshal of the Swedish nobility and a trusted advisor of the king, was “the mortal and declared enemy of the Calvinists.”³⁹ Falaiseau viewed Lindschöld as the chief of the alliance between the clergy and the pro-French party, and the true mastermind behind the new ordinance. He wrote to Paul von Fuchs in January 1688 that, “It is certain, my lord, that the new church ordinance is not the work of the clergy alone, but is properly the work of Lindschöld, who took up the quill and wrote it” along with “some priests of his cabal,” and then with the assistance of Wiraenius convinced the king to approve it.⁴⁰

As the controversy surrounding the 1688 ordinance progressed, Falaiseau came to almost totally conflate his two groups of enemies, with the politically pro-French faction becoming increasingly identified with anti-Calvinism, and the anti-Calvinist orthodox clergy increasingly associated with pro-French sentiment. The anti-Calvinism of the pro-French party could be explained by their desire to drive a wedge between Sweden and the Calvinist states of Europe, thus serving the interests of France by destroying Protestant unity and increasing the likelihood of a Swedish-French alliance. But Falaiseau went further than this by declaring many of the members of this group, and particularly Lindschöld, to be personally papist.⁴¹ He was even more adamant in insisting, without any apparent sense of irony, that the orthodox Lutheran clerical members of the cabal supporting the church ordinance (an ordinance which, mind you, insisted that all children in Sweden be raised Lutheran) were not only pro-French, but also secretly papist. He called the cabal “powerful and entirely devoted to papism,” and estimated that three-quarters of the Swedish clergy were either Catholic or would gladly become so if allowed to keep their wives.⁴² The ultimate goal of the pro-French/clerical cabal, Falaiseau feared, was to convert Sweden to

Scandaleuse . . .” Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 10/20 March 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

38. “Wallenstedt Secd Et l’un de plus brutaux hommes du monde . . .”; “Wallenstedt est un Brutal, fort ignorant at fort capricieux . . .” Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 24 March/3 April 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

39. “Lindenschild qui est ennemy mortel et déclaré des Reformer . . .” Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 5/15 May 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 3, 3v.

40. “Il est certain Monseigneur que lu nouvelle ordonnance Ecclesiastique n’est pas l’ouvrage du Clergé seul, c’est proprement l’ouvrage de Lindenschild, qui a tenu la plume et qui l’a écrite et de quelques prestres de Sa Cabale . . . Et, c’est Lindenschild et Werenius, Predicateur du Roy, qui affirmissent Le Roy dans ce que cette ordonnance contient contre les Reformés en Suede.” Falaiseau to von Fuchs, Stockholm, 28 January 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 33.

41. See, for example, Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 1/11 August 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 35, 51v.

42. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28 April 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

Catholicism. Falaiseau had written to von Fuchs in December 1687 that, "Lindschöld does not receive a large pension from France only to work to dispose Sweden in France's favor, but also to aid in the establishment of papism. And for this design he has already won not only the principal clergymen of Stockholm, and of some provinces, but also the clergy of the court, especially Wiraenius."⁴³ Falaiseau took this danger very seriously, and in August 1688 he wrote to the elector that, due largely to Lindschöld and his support in the clergy, "Sweden is one of the lands in the world where it would be easiest to reestablish papism."⁴⁴ The church ordinance of 1688, so Falaiseau thought, was a definite step in this direction.

The Swedish authorities had been aware of the potential for conflict with Brandenburg over the new church ordinance even before any response from Brandenburg had been registered. In late January 1688 Karl XI wrote to Peter Macklier, the Swedish ambassador at the Brandenburg court, with instructions on how to counteract the potential fallout with the elector that a report from Falaiseau would likely cause. Karl wrote of the necessity for unity and cooperation among the Protestant powers in this time of Catholic aggression, and of the special need to preserve the elector's friendship. He feared that Falaiseau's zeal for his religion would lead him to give the elector false impressions regarding the true nature of the Swedish ordinance, and he ordered Macklier to work carefully to correct these impressions.⁴⁵ The Swedish diplomatic representatives in Brandenburg also recognized quickly that this issue had the potential to cause considerable strain in Swedish-Brandenburg relations, which in turn could damage important Swedish foreign policy interests. Secretary Justus Heinrich Storren wrote to Karl XI from Berlin and urged the king to act with caution in implementing the new provision concerning baptism because he feared that

43. "Lindschild Non seulement a une bonne pension de la France pour travailler à disposer la Suede en sa faveur, Mais, pour aider à établir le Papisme Et que dans ce dessein il a desja gagné non seulement les Prestres principaux de Stockholme, et de quelques Provinces, Mais aussi les Prestres de la Cour, et principalement un, nommé Werenius . . ." Falaiseau to von Fuchs, Stockholm, 14/24 December 1687, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 30.

44. "Lindschild est plus Papiste que Lutherien, Il a beaucoup de pouvoir aupres des Prestres, Et, si Dieu n'a pitie de la Religion Je puis repondre a VAE: qui un des Pais du monde, ou il serait plus aise de retablir le Papisme, c'est la Suede." Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 1/11 August 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 35, 51v.

45. "Såsom nu är at förmoda, at han [Falaiseau] af en allt för stoor yfwer och passion för sin Religions deruti torde gåå för widt, och således gifua Churförsten den impression, som brukade man emoth deß Religions förwanter här en sådan *vigueur*. Hwaraf hos Churförsten kunde forutsakes någon Anståfthelighet och den mistancka, som här man flyte wydriggeeter i sinnet som annorstedes bankas emot dhe *Reformerade*, huilken irringh mycket skulle skade det gemehna Wasendet och komma Mißförståndh åstadh emellan dhe Evangeliske, där dod deras sammanhåldh och Eenigheet nu som mäst behofwes, till at bemötha dhe Pápwiske höghmodh och Öfuerwåldh, som dhe fast alle Orther synes förhafua emoth begge Evangeliske Religions förwanter; Altså är hoognödigt at J hoos Churförsten sökien medh all flytat betagha och förkomma flyte wydrige *impressioner* och mystanckar som honom til efuentjös af denne händelsen kunde wara býbrakta." Karl XI to Peter Macklier, Stockholm, 25 January 1688, RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1688, 25v–26r.

the elector's anger over this matter could threaten the outcome of the Holstein restitution issue, perhaps Sweden's largest foreign policy objective at the time.⁴⁶ Storren went so far as to suggest that, in order to preserve the trust of the elector at this critical juncture, the king, at least for the time being, tacitly allow Calvinist baptisms to continue as they had before the publication of the new ordinance.⁴⁷

Swedish fears proved to be well founded when Falaiseau's passionate reports from Stockholm promptly elicited a sharp response from Brandenburg. An official protest was registered with Macklier in the beginning of February 1688,⁴⁸ and at the end of that month Friedrich Wilhelm wrote directly to Karl XI to protest against the ordinance. Many of the arguments used by the elector are the same as those used by Falaiseau in his reports. The ordinance would "deprive [the Calvinists] of the right over their children given to them by God and nature [as] the foremost part of their fatherly authority." It would also give great pleasure to Catholics by creating "new diffidence and animosity" between the Protestant confessions rather than the unity that was so badly needed.⁴⁹ Perhaps most interestingly, the elector warned the king that the church ordinance would likely have damaging economic consequences for Sweden since so much of Sweden's Baltic trade was carried out by and with Calvinists who would be angered by the persecutions of their coreligionists in Sweden.⁵⁰

In addition to these measures, Brandenburg also consciously tried to mobilize a European-wide Calvinist movement to apply pressure on Sweden in protest of the ordinance. Falaiseau suggested to Friedrich Wilhelm in January 1688 that the elector should write to other Protestant states to inform them of the Swedish ordinance and encourage them to resist it.⁵¹ Friedrich Wilhelm acted on this suggestion, and letters were written to the Dutch States General,

46. For a discussion of the drawn-out struggle between the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and the Danish crown, and the important role that this conflict occupied in Sweden's foreign policy, see Georg Landberg, *Den Svenska Utrikespolitikens Historia*, vol. 1, pt. 3 (Stockholm, 1952), 165–261.

47. Justus Heinrich Storren to Karl XI, Berlin, 11 March 1688, RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 32.

48. Memo of meeting, Rhetz and Meinders with Macklier, 4 February 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

49. "... denselben das Von Gott und der Natur Ihre gegebene Recht über seine Kinder gleichsam in dem Vornehmsten stück der Väterlichen *potestät* entzogen werden will;" "... also auch auf den widrigen fall andre ebenfalls gar bald damute *remittin* und folg. das Junge was bishehr mit so großer Mühe wegen eine Nähren Zusammensetzung beyder *Religionen* gebauet worden zu der Papisten großen frohlock und der Evangelischen nach fernern Verderben einen nicht geringen anstos leiden und allerhand Neue *diffidentz* und *animosität* veruhrsachen dörfte..." Friedrich Wilhelm to Karl XI, Potsdam, 28 February 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

50. Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Potsdam, 18/28 February 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

51. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28 January 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

England, Hesse-Kassel, and the Calvinist Swiss cantons.⁵² The response was positive, and diplomatic initiatives against the ordinance were instituted by several states. The States General wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm of the pleasure that they took in his efforts to conserve the Reformed religion, and the Swiss sent Friedrich Wilhelm a copy of the letter of protest they had written to Karl XI following their receipt of the elector's letter.⁵³ Brandenburg and Hesse-Kassel also became involved in correspondence regarding the Swedish ordinance and the steps they were taking against it.

Karl XI's own response to the minor diplomatic flurry Falaiseau had provoked was essentially similar to his reaction to the much smaller controversy surrounding the ordinance of 1686. The new ordinance, Karl insisted, was directed primarily against Catholics, and Sweden's Calvinists had no reason to fear for their religious liberties as long as they "kept themselves within their bounds." Once again, Karl accused Falaiseau of having sensationalized a harmless development and of having given the elector an inaccurate impression due to his "excessive zeal for his religion."⁵⁴ Karl wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm that "never before" had he seen an ambassador "explain [an issue] so adversely, and also meddle [in it] with such eagerness."⁵⁵ Macklier similarly complained to the Brandenburg authorities in Berlin that Falaiseau's extreme passion for his religion was distorting his judgment on this issue.⁵⁶ It is interesting to note that in the internal Swedish correspondence the controversy surrounding the church ordinance came almost immediately to be referred to as the "Falaiseau issue," equating the entire complex matter with the agitations of one bothersome and overzealous troublemaker. Concerns about Falaiseau's zealotry, however, were not limited to Sweden. Paul von Fuchs went so far as to suggest to the elector that it might be best to recall Falaiseau and replace him with a Lutheran ambassador lest his reputation as a biased and personally interested actor

52. See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

53. States General to Friedrich Wilhelm, The Hague, 16 March 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4; Swiss cantons to Friedrich Wilhelm, Zurich, 2 April 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

54. "hat derselbige [Falaiseau] sich sehr darüber *allarmiret* und von Nachricht zugeben keinen umgang haben könnte. weiln nun bey so gestalten Sachen zubefahren, daß Er aus übermeßigen Eiffer vor seine *Religion* etwan Zuweit gehen, und dem Churf. die *impression* machen dörfte, ob solte man deßen Glaubens Genoßen nicht Alleine hart alhie halten, sondern auch hinführo noch mehr zudrücken gesinnet sein." Karl XI to [Macklier], Stockholm, 23 January 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

55. "dahero den Mich so viell mehr befrembdet, daß E: Churfürstl. Durchl: allhier befindlicher *Minister* diese Sache nicht allein so gantz wiedrig gedeutet, sondern auch mit solchem *empressement* sich darin gemischet, daß dergleichen nie vorhin von einigen *Ministro* dieses ohrtes geschehen." Karl XI to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 17 March 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

56. Macklier to Karl XI, Berlin, 22 February 1688, RA, Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 30.

compromise the success of his negotiations.⁵⁷ Falaiseau's personal passion for defending the rights of Calvinist religious minorities had become a recognized impediment to his ability to function as Brandenburg ambassador in Sweden.

Relations between Brandenburg and Sweden concerning the church ordinance remained tense until the death of Elector Friedrich Wilhelm in early May 1688. In Macklier's last audience with the elector before his death Friedrich Wilhelm threatened to recall Falaiseau from Stockholm and not replace him with a different ambassador at the Swedish court due to the religion issue — a diplomatic threat of considerable weight.⁵⁸ King Karl in turn advised Macklier to let the issue lie for the time being in hopes that it would cool down and eventually wither away, and he cited encouraging statements from von Fuchs that made him believe this could happen.⁵⁹ This strategy seems to have worked. Following the elector's death Brandenburg's uproar over the Swedish church ordinance subsided.

When Falaiseau was finally recalled from Sweden in 1690 at Karl XI's request it was as the result of a controversy that had nothing to do with religion. While the great majority of the Brandenburg army was deployed in the Rhineland to fight the French, Falaiseau remarked in Stockholm that the Brandenburgers had been careful to keep a significant body of troops back in case the Swedish-Danish conflict over Holstein boiled over into hostilities — a lightly veiled statement that Brandenburg did not trust Swedish intentions and would if necessary be prepared to intervene on the Danes' behalf. This infuriated Karl. The Brandenburg government rushed to assure the king that Brandenburg did indeed trust Sweden, and had not actually kept such a force back. But Karl had finally had enough, and he called openly for Falaiseau's removal, which the Brandenburgers granted reluctantly.⁶⁰ Although the immediate cause of Falaiseau's recall was purely diplomatic, the cumulative effects of Falaiseau's years of religious contentiousness and (perceived) excessive religious zeal contributed to the king's desire to have Falaiseau removed. As early as March 1688 Karl instructed Macklier to insinuate to the elector that the king felt that Falaiseau's conduct in the church ordinance issue rendered him no longer "a convenient and useful instrument to maintain friendship and good trust between us and the elector,"⁶¹ a clear hint that the king would have welcomed Falaiseau's recall and

57. Von Fuchs to Friedrich Wilhelm, Hamburg, 14 February 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 33.

58. Macklier to Karl XI, Berlin, 11 April 1688, RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 30.

59. Karl XI to Macklier, Stockholm, 2 May 1688, RA, *Utrikesexpeditionens registratur*, 1688, 125v–126r.

60. For documents relating to this issue see RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 31.

61. Karl XI to Macklier, Stockholm, 17 March 1688, RA, *Utrikesexpeditionens registratur*, 1688, 84r.

replacement. Karl ordered Macklier to quietly raise the prospect of Falaiseau's removal with the Brandenburg Rat Eberhard von Danckelman in October of that same year — several months after the tension surrounding the church ordinance had died down — yet in the king's list of reasons why Falaiseau was no longer able to successfully fill his role his contentiousness in the baptismal issue was cited first.⁶² When the king made a more forceful demand for Falaiseau's recall the following year he once again listed Falaiseau's agitation over the church ordinance as the first reason.⁶³ Falaiseau had clearly come to be a religious thorn in Sweden's side, and this was partially responsible for Karl's decision that he finally needed to be removed.

What is more telling, however, is what happened after Falaiseau was withdrawn. His replacement as ambassador in Sweden was Alexander von Dohna, a man held in very high regard at the Swedish court and extremely well connected in Sweden through a network of familial, marriage and other personal connections. The von Dohnas were a powerful Prussian noble family with a long history of service to the Hohenzollern state.⁶⁴ Alexander's uncle, Christoff Delficus von Dohna, entered Swedish service in 1653 and held a variety of important military and administrative posts. Christoff Delficus married Anna Oxenstierna, the sister of Bengt Oxenstierna, and established a Swedish branch of the von Dohna family that was an active force in Swedish politics at the time of Alexander von Dohna's embassy. Alexander himself married his cousin Emilie von Dohna, the daughter of Christoff Delficus and Anna Oxenstierna and thus Bengt Oxenstierna's niece. Alexander's connections via blood and marriage to the Swedish von Dohna line, and through them to the Oxenstierna family, gave him a firmer base in leading Swedish circles than Falaiseau had ever had.

In the years before his embassy von Dohna had built up a series of personal relationships with influential Swedes to complement his familial and marriage ties. He visited Sweden on private business from October 1685 to June 1686, and Falaiseau reported in glowing terms on the warm reception von Dohna received. Within weeks of von Dohna's arrival, Falaiseau wrote, he had been able to gain "universal esteem," not only with the king, but also with "all people of quality." He went on to say that von Dohna enjoyed free entry into Sweden's highest social and political circles, and was spoken to (and allowed to speak in return) with an openness and candor that he himself was denied.⁶⁵

62. Karl XI to Macklier, Stockholm, 17 October 1688, RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1688, 395r–399r.

63. Karl XI to Friedrich Wilhelm Horn, Stockholm, 31 July 1689, RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1689, 712r–722v.

64. See Volker Press, "Das Haus Dohna in der europäischen Adelsgesellschaft des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts," in *Reformatio et Reformationes: Festschrift für Lothar Graf zu Dohna zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Andreas Mehl and Wolfgang Christian Schneider (Darmstadt, 1989), 371–402.

65. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 22 October 1685, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 28.

Before von Dohna left Falaiseau stressed to Friedrich Wilhelm once more the great good that von Dohna would be able to accomplish if he were to remain in Sweden, due largely to his close personal relationships with Bengt Oxenstierna and other leading figures at the Swedish court.⁶⁶ The full acceptance that von Dohna enjoyed at the very highest levels of the Swedish state was still evident when he arrived in Stockholm as Brandenburg ambassador in 1690. Queen mother Hedvig Eleonora personally sent the von Dohnas medicine when their young son fell ill.⁶⁷

At the time of his embassy, then, Alexander von Dohna was a well-known and highly regarded commodity in Sweden who possessed advantages that Falaiseau never had. Von Dohna's instructions make it clear that he was intended to be a compromise figure who could soothe over any wounds left by Falaiseau while continuing to work toward the two main goals of retaining Sweden within the anti-French coalition and improving Brandenburg-Swedish relations in general.⁶⁸ By all appearances von Dohna was an ideal choice for such a mission, and Falaiseau himself praised the selection of von Dohna as "the most prudent and wise choice that could be made," adding that "there could not be a better or more agreeable choice to this court."⁶⁹ However, rather than ushering in a period of calmness and concord between Brandenburg and Sweden, von Dohna's embassy burst almost immediately into a controversy far more intense than any that had occurred under Falaiseau. At the root of this controversy stood, once again, religion.

Emilie von Dohna, although raised Lutheran, had quietly converted to Calvinism after her marriage to Alexander. News of her conversion became public shortly after the von Dohnas arrived in Stockholm. Since Emilie had been born and raised in Sweden the king considered her a Swedish subject and her conversion a violation of Swedish religious law. He subsequently banned her from appearing at the Swedish court unless she renounced her conversion.⁷⁰ Von Dohna was incensed by this, and drew upon his network of high-placed connections to redress this situation. He went at once to Bengt Oxenstierna and asked for help. Oxenstierna pledged his support to have Emilie's ban lifted, claiming that it was the result of clerical pressure on the king, seconded by ill-intentioned senators.⁷¹ Von Dohna also spoke with Nils Gyldenstolpe, who

66. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 10 March 1686, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29, 35v–36r.

67. Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 25 October 1690, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 46.

68. Friedrich III to Alexander von Dohna, Königsberg, 30 March/9 April 1690, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 46.

69. Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 4/14 December 1689, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 42, 190r–v.

70. See Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 8 October 1690, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 47.

71. *Ibid.*

similarly promised his assistance.⁷² Queen Ulrike Eleonora was another source of support. During the period of the ban she wrote personal letters to Emilie on a daily basis with expressions of friendship and promises of mildness, and on one occasion even sent an expensive gift.⁷³

For his part, King Karl attempted to reassure von Dohna that he had no desire to risk his friendship with Brandenburg over this issue, and that in fact he held Alexander himself in the highest regard.⁷⁴ He was merely acting as any father would act toward his child by looking after Emilie's best interests and reprimanding her for going astray.⁷⁵ In an audience with Alexander in November 1690 the king went so far as to say that despite his great personal affection for the von Dohnas and his pleasure at having a well-intentioned Brandenburg minister at his court (a not-so-subtle slap at Falaiseau), his hands were tied by the Swedish Constitution's provisions against Swedish subjects converting from Lutheranism to Calvinism. He saw no reason why this issue should give the elector displeasure, or get in the way of von Dohna's ability successfully to carry out the elector's business in Sweden.⁷⁶

Von Dohna, although deeply insulted by his wife's banishment from court, attempted to hold his emotions in check. The cautious tone of his reports indirectly suggested that the elector should act with restraint. The official Brandenburg reaction, however, was anything but restrained. Friedrich III's response upon hearing of Emilie's ban from the court was to declare it an open attack against all of Calvinism and a particular affront to his own dignity to have his ambassador's family treated in such a fashion. He made it plain that he was prepared to recall von Dohna from Sweden if Emilie's ban was not lifted.⁷⁷ As time went by and the ban against Emilie continued to be in place, the elector's anger grew. He ordered von Dohna to confront the Swedes with a *de facto* ultimatum: unless Emilie's ban was removed von Dohna would be forced to leave. Von Dohna hesitated, particularly after consultation with Bengt Oxenstierna convinced him that a threat like this would only insult the king, strengthen the hand of those supporting the ban, and push Karl to take an even harder line.⁷⁸ The elector responded that the offense given by Emilie's ban was "so enormous, and Our subsequent resentment held by the entire reasonable world as so

72. *Ibid.*, 19 November 1690.

73. *Ibid.*, 8 October 1690, 15/25 October 1690, 5 November 1690, fasc. 46.

74. *Ibid.*, 11/21 October 1690, fasc. 47.

75. See Queen Ulrike Eleonora to Electress Sophie Charlotte, 8 October 1690, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 47.

76. Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 26 November 1690, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 47.

77. Friedrich III to Alexander von Dohna, Cleve, 28 October/8 November 1690, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 47.

78. Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 19 November 1690, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 47.

justified” that there was “no reason at all” for von Dohna to show restraint in holding back the threat of his potential recall.⁷⁹ Upon Friedrich’s insistence von Dohna finally submitted a written memorial to the king, stating his case explicitly. But Karl refused to bend. As a result von Dohna, handpicked in order to improve relations between Brandenburg and Sweden and welcomed to Stockholm with open arms, was angrily withdrawn after only eight months at the Swedish court. Friedrich even ordered Alexander to refuse the customary farewell gifts offered him by the king, an action that the shocked Swedish Master of Ceremonies Grüneberg declared as unprecedented and led some in Sweden to call for von Dohna’s arrest.⁸⁰ The elector also took the step of drawing up a report to inform other allied governments of Sweden’s unsavory conduct in the von Dohna affair.⁸¹ Most significantly, after von Dohna’s recall high-level diplomatic relations between Brandenburg and Sweden were broken off for the following three and a half years. The religious controversy surrounding Emilie von Dohna had exploded into a major diplomatic rupture, and Alexander von Dohna’s promising embassy to Sweden, aimed at improving Brandenburg-Swedish relations, had ended in a complete and disastrous failure.

Religion — or more specifically, Lutheran-Calvinist confessional conflict — thus led repeatedly to stress, and on occasion to serious diplomatic tension, between Brandenburg and Sweden in the late 1680s and the early 1690s — precisely the time when the existing historiography would lead us to believe that intra-Protestant confessional conflict would be least expected — and this despite the fact that Brandenburg and Sweden agreed entirely on the importance of Protestant political unity at this point. Why did this happen? Several potential explanations come to mind. The first turns on the conduct of Falaiseau. His personal religious passion shines clearly through in his correspondence, and there can be little doubt that his fervor in championing the Calvinist cause in Sweden was counterproductive to furthering Brandenburg-Swedish friendship. Moreover, Falaiseau’s propensity for scandal was not entirely coincidental. He wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm in April 1688 that “sometimes it is good when scandal arrives,” under which circumstances one can achieve more dramatic results than under normal conditions.⁸² Falaiseau began to earn

79. “. . . so finden Wir doch auch gantz keine Uhrsach, warumb Ihr die wegen Eures Abschieds Euch *eventualiter* ertheilte *ordre disimulis* solte . . . daß man Uns in d[er] Sache thue so *enorm*, und unser desfalls tragendes *resentiment* von der gantz *raisonnable* Welt vor so gerecht gehelt und; daß Wir beständig . . . bestehen, man Ewre Gemalin der Zutritt bey Hofe eben so frey wie Sie ihn Vorhin gehabbt nicht wider Verstatte werden solte, als dan Ihr so fort Euch Von dort wieder zuruck (. . .) sollt . . .” Friedrich III to Alexander von Dohna, Cölln/Spree, 12/22 December 1690, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 47.

80. Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 7 February 1691, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 47.

81. See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 47.

82. “Je prendray la liberté de dire encore une fois à V:A:E: ce que je me suis desja donné

a reputation as an intriguer as early as his first diplomatic mission on behalf of Brandenburg to Great Britain in 1682, when Charles II had refused to receive him at court because of his suspicion that Falaiseau was conspiring with the king's domestic opponents.⁸³ Brandenburg's choice of a zealous, scandal-loving Calvinist as ambassador to Lutheran Sweden must surely be included among the causes of the eruption of confessional tension in Brandenburg-Swedish relations at this time.

The focus on Falaiseau, however, has its limitations. Following his recall from Sweden he went on to have a successful and extended mission to Lutheran Denmark, and was later even made envoy to Catholic Spain. Furthermore, in the years after he was forced out of Sweden he continued to be a respected voice in mainstream Northern European Protestant intellectual and diplomatic circles, corresponding with (among others) Pufendorf and Leibniz, and being referred to in a letter to the Dutch statesman Anthonie Heinsius in 1706 as "highly esteemed and considered one of the great men of the good [allied] party."⁸⁴ Falaiseau himself bragged of the active political life he enjoyed in England following his retirement from Brandenburg service, including (if we are to believe him) a warm personal relationship with William III.⁸⁵ Falaiseau therefore cannot be written off as a figure from the radical fringe who created tension wherever he went. Furthermore, since Falaiseau's replacement by the conciliatory and religiously moderate von Dohna, far from marking the end of confessional flare-ups between Brandenburg and Sweden, rather led to a religious scandal even more damaging, Brandenburg-Swedish confessional conflict can scarcely be explained as the inevitable result of Falaiseau's personal characteristics.

Another possible explanation turns on Swedish domestic politics. Anti-Calvinist sentiment had always run high among the Swedish clergy, yet this sentiment had so far been contained and had not damaged Sweden's diplomatic

l'honneur de luy écrire, Que quelque fois il est bon que scandale arrive . . ." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 20 April 1688, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 249b Schweden, fasc. 2, 71r.

83. See Ferdinand Hirsch's discussion in *Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg*, vol. 21 (Berlin, 1915), 336–39. Correspondence between Falaiseau, von Fuchs and the Duke of Monmouth was indeed discovered in the papers seized from a man arrested for complicity in the Rye House Plot in the summer of 1684. See Oppenorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, 257. For further examples of Falaiseau's continued use of inflammatory and bombastic language to characterize his political enemies during his time as ambassador to Denmark, see Richard Schück, *Brandenburg-Preussens Kolonial-Politik unter dem Grossen Kurfürsten und seinen Nachfolgern (1647–1721)*, 2 vol. (Leipzig, 1889), 1:246.

84. R. Saunière de l'Hermitage to Anthonie Heinsius, London, 9/20 April 1706, *De Briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702–1720*, vol. 5, ed. A.J. Veenendaal Jr. (The Hague, 1983), 205–6.

85. Falaiseau to Alexander von Dohna, 30 July 1711, GStA PK, VI. HA, Fürstliches Hausarchiv Dohna-Schlobitten, Karton 25a (Alexander), No. 277. My sincere thanks to Dr. Sophie Mathilde Gräfin zu Dohna for permission to use her family's archive.

relations with Brandenburg or other Calvinist states. Why did this no longer seem to be the case? Certainly the *reduktion* and its attendant increase in the power and influence of the orthodox Swedish clergy may have played a role, but the *reduktion* had begun many years before Falaiseau's embassy, and in itself appears to be an insufficient explanation of the change. Karl XI's ardent defense of the prerogatives of his sovereignty also contributed to his bristling at what he saw as Falaiseau's meddling in internal Swedish affairs, and to the king's unwillingness to compromise in the von Dohna incident, even when serious diplomatic consequences were looming. Recent studies of Karl's reign such as those by Göran Rystad and Anthony F. Upton have pointed toward the important position that religion and the Swedish Church occupied in the structure of Swedish royal absolutism.⁸⁶ Scholars of Swedish Church history have long noted that the wave of church reforms in the late 1680s and 1690s that included the production of the new church law, church handbook, catechism, psalm book, and Bible translation was an integral part of the ordering and standardizing process involved in the consolidation of the absolutist system.⁸⁷ The king's ability to enforce religious uniformity in his kingdom was a direct reflection of the sovereign majesty of the Crown, and any public expression of religious dissent meant not only open disobedience, but also a denigration of the Crown's glory that could not be tolerated, even at the risk of incurring significant diplomatic difficulties. Karl's dogged insistence that Emilie conform to the mandates of Swedish religious law was thus based in the king's highly developed sensitivity to any challenge to the prerogatives of his rule that formed the cornerstone of the Swedish absolutist system. But Karl was nonetheless sincere in his desire to cultivate friendship with Brandenburg, and he had no intention of turning his religious policies into a provocation.

So the questions remain: why did Brandenburg make the questionable decision to send hotheaded Falaiseau on a delicate and sensitive mission aimed at conciliation? Why was Sweden suddenly unable to prevent long-established clerical anti-Calvinism from tainting its diplomacy with Brandenburg? In short, why did both states make important miscalculations, each with religious undertones, which interfered with their mutually recognized goal of improving relations with one another? An answer to these questions needs to start from the recognition that the rise of confessional tension in Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy in the late-seventeenth century was not an isolated occurrence, but

86. Göran Rystad, *Karl XI: En biografi* (Lund, 2001); Upton, *Charles XI*.

87. See, for example, Hilding Pleijel, *Karolinsk Kyrkofromhet, Pietism och Herrenhutism 1680–1772*, Svenska Kyrkans Historia, vol. 5 (Stockholm, 1935), 7–61. Lars Anton Anjou has also noted Karl XI's ceaseless striving for order and uniformity in Swedish religious practice during his reign. See part 3 of his *Svenska Kyrkans Historia ifrån Upsala Môte år 1593 till Slutet af Sjuttonde Århundradet* (Stockholm, 1866).

rather symptomatic of a larger shift in Brandenburg–Swedish relations that left each state searching for a new understanding of their relationship.

Falaiseau himself had a notion that a deep change was taking place. “The maxims of the government have indeed changed,” he wrote to Friedrich III in September 1689, “and it is nearly impossible that one does not see very quickly the effects of this change.”⁸⁸ In terms of Brandenburg’s relations with Sweden this change had two main components: first, a generational shift in which a cadre of Swedish officials, often sharing anti-French sentiments and an openness to cooperating with Brandenburg, were dying out; and second, a general hardening of the Lutheran–Calvinist confessional boundary between the states. Falaiseau repeatedly noted that Chancery President Oxenstierna had been his one consistent ally during his years in Sweden, and he once wrote that Oxenstierna was “the only man in Sweden” with the exception of the king who did not have pro-French inclinations.⁸⁹ Falaiseau saw Oxenstierna as isolated and surrounded by enemies. “Chancellor Oxenstierna,” he wrote, “does not have a single friend in all of Sweden.”⁹⁰ Oxenstierna was an old man, and Falaiseau feared the prospect of his death and its inevitable consequences: “the chancellor is 68 years old, which is a great age, and after his death, My Lord, one may say heartily that there is scarcely a Swedish minister on whom the allies can rely, and who is not of entirely [pro-]French disposition, and [willing] to do that which France desires for money.”⁹¹ Other pro-Brandenburg figures in the Swedish government such as Eberhard von Grafenthal, Gustav Sparre, and Knut Kurck did indeed die during this time. Falaiseau took pains to relate the sorrow felt by Oxenstierna over the death of Sparre, “who was the same age as he, and with whom he had been reared and educated.”⁹² The dwindling numbers and isolation of this anti-French group around Oxenstierna left the Brandenburgers with very few men in the Swedish government whom they felt they could trust. It also weakened the ability of this same group to contain the confessional controversies arising during Falaiseau’s and von Dohna’s embassies and to prevent them from affecting the larger course of Brandenburg–Swedish diplomacy.

This situation both contributed to, and was exacerbated by, the broader development in which the Calvinist–Lutheran confessional divide between Brandenburg and Sweden was thrown into sharper relief. The appointment of

88. “les maximes du gouvernement sont bien changées, et il est presque impossible que l’on ne voye pas bien tost des effets de ce changement.” Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 7/17 September 1689, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 42, 56v.

89. *Ibid.*, 9/19 March 1689.

90. *Ibid.*, 8/18 March 1690.

91. “ce Chancelier a 68. ans, qui est un grand age, et, apres sa mort, Monseigneur, on peut dire hardiment qu’il n’y a presque pas un seul Ministre de Suede, sur qui les Allies puissent compter, et qui ne sait pas dans des dispositions entierement Francaises, et prest à faire ce que la France voudra pour de l’argent.” *Ibid.*, 31 July/9 August 1689, fasc. 42, 17r.

92. *Ibid.*, 23 November/3 December 1689, fasc. 42, 183v.

someone like Falaiseau as Brandenburg ambassador to Sweden may point toward a larger radicalization of the Northern European diplomatic and religious climate accompanying Louis XIV's religious persecutions when angry and determined activist Huguenots entered the diplomatic and military service of the Northern European states in significant numbers. The religiously charged atmosphere of the period heightened the sensitivity of the Protestant princes of Northern Europe to threats to their faith, and although this often led to cooperation between Lutherans and Calvinists (including, at times, between Brandenburg and Sweden, as in the case of the alliance of 1686), it also carried with it the potential for intra-Protestant confessional conflict as soon as one Protestant prince felt that the actions of another ran counter to the welfare of his confession. Brandenburg therefore was especially prone to a robust defense of Calvinists' rights against either Catholic or Lutheran persecution at the time of Falaiseau's and von Dohna's embassies, whereas Sweden was equally determined to ward off any challenge to its established Lutheran Church. Neither side would have viewed its own actions as inconsistent with the larger goal of Protestant cooperation against French aggression. Geoffrey Symcox has insightfully noted that "the net result of the revocation [of the Edict of Nantes] was to add religious tension to the political factors already polarizing Europe,"⁹³ and the example of Brandenburg and Sweden shows that the religious tension Symcox alluded to was not necessarily confined to the Catholic-Protestant dichotomy. The French offensive placed pressure on Northern European political arrangements and religious borders, and this pressure could lead just as easily to the disappearance of boundaries between Protestants deciding to join in an alliance as to the creation of boundaries between the same Protestants if they had any reason to be suspicious of one another.

The tense confessional atmosphere in Northern Europe in the late 1680s and early 1690s was an active factor in the redefinition of the relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden that took place at this time. As we have seen, religious issues could lend the two states a sense of common purpose at one moment, a feeling of disorientation, alienation, or anger at another. Each of these extremes exerted tangible influence on the conduct of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy, from the alliance of 1686 to the diplomatic rupture of 1691. David Parrott has correctly described this period as "an epoch when it is widely and erroneously asserted that confessional issues had ceased to be a factor in international politics."⁹⁴ A glance at Brandenburg-Swedish relations reveals that religion did indeed remain an important factor in Northern European diplomacy and international relations as the seventeenth century drew to a close.

The increasingly confessional nature of the Northern European political

93. Symcox, "Louis XIV," 184.

94. Parrott, "War and International Relations," 133.

landscape was felt by many at the time. During Falaiseau's years in Sweden he was approached by a number of Swedish officials seeking to leave Swedish service and enter Brandenburg service. These were often people who were inclined to be tolerant of Calvinists or were even Calvinists themselves, and many of them expressed to Falaiseau their general displeasure at how things were going in Sweden and their belief that the environment in Brandenburg would be more to their liking.⁹⁵ Around the same time there may have been a parallel but opposite movement coming out of the lands of the Brandenburg Elector, with dissatisfied orthodox Lutheran elements emigrating to the more favorable (for their taste) religious climate of Swedish Pomerania.⁹⁶

The decline of the older generation of Swedish officials and the increasingly confessionalized diplomatic climate in Northern Europe created a new set of circumstances that forced Brandenburg and Sweden to interact with one another differently. This change was sensed intuitively by Falaiseau, and also by those Swedish officials who decided that Sweden was no longer to their liking and sought to move to Brandenburg. The disastrous failure of von Dohna's mission over a confessional issue showed that even a course of action that would once have been entirely safe now led in utterly unexpected directions.⁹⁷

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95. The most prominent of these was Samuel Pufendorf, who contacted Falaiseau as early as March 1686 regarding his desire to leave Sweden and enter the elector's service. Others include Senator Knut Kurck, Secretary Thomas Polus, and military figures such as Count Steinberg, Lieutenant Colonel Ridderhielm, and Captain Mardefelt. Olivet, not surprisingly, sought to leave Sweden and obtain an appointment in Brandenburg as well. See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, No. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29 [for Pufendorf]; fasc. 33 [for Olivet]; fasc. 42 [for Kurck and Steinberg]; fasc. 44 [for Polus, Ridderhielm, and Mardefelt].

96. I am grateful to Dr. Jürgen Splett and Dr. Lothar Noack of the University of Potsdam for this information.

97. The religious controversies surrounding Falaiseau's and von Dohna's embassies have not received scholarly attention, in part due to two longstanding and unfortunate factors in Prusso-German historiography. The first of these is the editorial decision-making of the compilers of the seminal *Urkunden und Actenstücke* series, who removed virtually all signs of intra-Protestant confessional tension from the documents in their volumes, especially those from the post-Westphalia period. The edited version of the documents regarding Falaiseau's embassy in volumes 22 and 23 contain no mention of the church ordinance issues. The second, and more deeply problematic factor for the study of early modern Brandenburg, is the tendency to focus disproportionately on the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm, and to view his death as a fundamental break in Brandenburg-Prussian history. This historiographical dividing line drawn in May 1688 slices through the middle of Falaiseau's embassy and unnaturally divorces the climax of the embassy (Falaiseau's forced recall in 1690) from the basis of this outcome laid by the religious controversies of the preceding years. It also prevents the formation of any linkage between Falaiseau's and von Dohna's respective religious controversies, a linkage that the archival documents make unmistakably clear and that the Brandenburgers themselves made at the time. The Swedish historical profession's almost complete turn away from diplomatic history in recent decades only adds to the historiographical obscurity of these events.