variance (pp. 350–51). They find that the combination of motivation and opportunity in Argentina has been more auspicious for reform in civil–military relations than in the rest of the countries, which has led to better outcomes in Argentina in the long run (pp. 360–66). In Chile, the authors contend, while motivation has existed, opportunity has been hindered by the strong reserve domains retained by the armed forces post-transition. In Uruguay and Brazil, on the other hand, both motivation and opportunity have been limited (pp. 360–66). Other variables which, in the authors' view, explain the variances among the four case studies with regard to their framework of analysis, involve the democratic transition mode and the conditions under which the transition negotiation happened, as well as the role played by the legislative branches in defense and security (pp. 350–51).

Pion-Berlin and Martínez have produced an impressive assessment of the civil–military relations obtaining in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil. Of course, no book is beyond criticism. On this score, one might questions the authors' claim that all four countries share a similar lack of perceived enemy or threat. My discussions and experience with officials and Ministry of Defense staffers in Chile have revealed that civilians in Chile do perceive potential enemies in Bolivia, and in Peru. Another minor critique relates to the authors' ranking of Argentina in their framework of analysis. While both Argentina and Chile are rightly viewed as the "Higher Achievers" (versus Uruguay and Brazil, which are the "Lower Achievers" [pp. 366–72]), crowning Argentina the "Highest Achiever" leaves some room for debate. The most recent scholarly literature that analyzes Argentina and Chile—for example, Zoltan Barany's *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (2012)—finds civil–military relations in Chile in better shape than in Argentina. Nevertheless, *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians* is a sine qua non in any library and curriculum that teaches civil–military relations, as well as on the bookshelves of policy and decision makers who deal with military reforms in developing democracies.

Like other luminaries of civil–military relations who have revolutionized the field, Pion-Berlin and Martínez, with this work, make their own substantial contribution to the enrichment of this body of scholarship. It provides novel and insightful analyses, a list of lessons learned, and a set of best/worst practices in military reforms and civil–military relations and democratization drawn from former Latin American military dictatorships. These lessons are useful not only to the rest of Latin America's developing democracies but also to countries from other parts of the world that have undergone transitions from military regimes to democracies.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations

By Phillip Y. Lipscy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 341p. $99.99 cloth, $34.99 paper.
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— Stephanie C. Hofmann, *Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva*

Old institutional designs do not always sit easily with contemporary politics. Demands for change arise, creating tensions among actors; however, institutional change is not ubiquitous. Some institutions are stickier than others. This puzzle nourishes Phillip Y. Lipscy's insightful and thought-provoking account of why rising or reemerging powers are sometimes successful in their revisionist policies within international institutions, and other times not. His look to international institutions as "facilitators of cooperation [and] moderators of shifts in the international balance of power" (p. 267) is a welcome addition to the international organization (IO) literature.

On the basis of theoretical foundations that rest on rational choice and historical institutionalist insights, Lipscy emphasizes the role that policy area characteristics and institutional rules play in explaining the variation in renegotiating distributive institutional change. Some policy areas (e.g., international finance), he argues, limit the creation of multilateral or bilateral alternatives and leave little leverage for states to renegotiate the institutional *status quo*. Consequently, international institutions in these policy areas can maintain rigid distributive rules—often reflecting bargaining deals that favor the United States as the most powerful state to date. Other policy areas (e.g., development aid, trade) encourage a competitive institutional environment that can be used by rising or reemerging powers to renegotiate distributive deals within multilateral institutional setups. If these initial international institutions do not already have flexible rules that govern decision-making, they have to create them or face the possibility of becoming irrelevant. The United States, in these instances, is often forced to make concessions beyond its preferred outcomes. This argument is buttressed by a formal model and diverse empirical chapters on institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, the United National Security Council, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and Intelsat based on quasi-experiments, statistical analyses and archival data, while keeping sight of alternative explanations and addressing idiosyncrasies where information is available.

Renegotiating the World Order addresses a big gap in the IO literature: comparative institutional theorizing across policy areas. While international institutions exist in most, if not all, policy areas today, their proliferation across these policy areas varies. Recent IO scholarship has begun to theorize the impact of policy area characteristics (Kenneth Abbott et al., eds., *International Organizations as Orchestrators*, 2015), but most still consider only one area, (implicitly) assuming that arguments can travel. Lipscy shows that such assumptions can be misleading. And he moves our attention away from substantive institutional outcomes, instead emphasizing IOs' variegated capacity to accommodate power disparities and wishes for more influence.

While I think that these are important contributions, Lipscy could have stated more clearly how these different institutions relate to one another in what the book's title promises to be the "world order." As it is, the book is more about comparative institutional resilience and change and is only weakly linked to world order. The author looks at a plethora of state and nonstate actors but does not discuss the role that these actors play in ordering the world. Also, he could have addressed whether the international institutions discussed are equally salient in constituting world order. Arguably, actors might be more willing to concede influence in some institutions than in others. For example, Lipscy observes that "policymakers clearly care about the terms of representation" (p. 203) in the UNSC, but do they equally care about them in other institutions? Through these omissions—and once we accept that international institutions are a good proxy for world order—the book invites further research about whether all international institutions are equal sites of determining the terms of world order, as well as whether order is primarily a reflection of the position of powerful states in institutions or also about the ideological substance that they try to bring to these institutions.

Another important insight comes from Lipscy's argument that the existence of attractive or unattractive institutional alternatives heavily influences the likelihood of institutional change. He points to scope conditions under which to expect potential inter-institutional competition (i. e., policy areas that encourage institutional alternatives and where the initial organization has rigid internal rules, pp. 27–28). However, what I find missing is any reference to the regime complexity (and all its other names) literature. A body of scholarship has been established around questions of institutional alternatives: why they exist, how they impact policymaking in various multilateral forums, and what strategies are available to actors in such circumstances. When Lipscy, for example, talks about the likelihood of having alternative options, he basically refers to regime shifting. His work provides scope conditions under which we should expect "states and nonstate actors [to] relocate rulemaking processes to international venues whose mandates and priorities favor their concerns and interests" (Laurence Helfer, "Regime Shifting in the Intellectual Property System," *Perspectives on Politics,* 7(1), 2009).

While Lipscy argues that "competitive policy areas should be characterized by the 'survival of the fittest'" (p. 120), one point that the book hardly mentions, but which the regime complexity literature addresses, is that overlapping institutions do not necessarily compete with one another—irrespective of the rules that govern them (Karen Alter and Kal Raustiala, "The Rise of International Regime Complexity," *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 14, 2018). Competition concerning the "influence over the allocation of finite resources, headquarter locations, and appointments of nationals to leadership positions" (p. 54) are not necessarily zero-sum. Institutions can pool resources, thereby freeing resources for other institutions. Also, issues can be linked and headquarters can be multiplied. That said, Lipscy provides a nourishing theoretical foundation to discuss not only the propensity for institutional change within single institutions but also the ways institutions can interact with one another, especially in terms of the kind of (inter)dependencies and inter-institutional interactions that are created based on policy area characteristics.

While I very much appreciate the effort that goes into covering an impressive array of different institutions across policy areas, one confusing aspect of the book is its definition of policy areas. Lipscy admits that the term is ambiguous, but this does not explain why regional integration projects and collective legitimization can be considered as policy areas. The UNSC for example, exists within the so-called policy area of collective legitimization (p. 33) which, according to the author, has a low propensity for competition. Conversely, as he argues, security has a high propensity for competition. Where does this leave the UNSC? And while collective legitimization is discussed in conjunction with the UNSC, it is not with the World Bank and the IMF, which arguably are also institutions that strive for this goal. Lipscy further observes that policy area characteristics "are relatively static" (p. 57), but he also claims that some IOs such as the UN "were designed to be transformative, reshaping the fundamental nature of their policy areas" (p. 205), or that policy characteristics can change due to technological innovation (p. 199) and/or become more competitive (p. 183). It remains unclear how this sits with his notion of policy area characteristics. What can explain IOs' transformative nature, technological innovation, and increased competition? As agency is secondary to his account and much explaining is being done through policy area characteristics, such questions invite further research and theorizing that contribute not only to the study of IOs but also to politics more generally.

These questions and concerns notwithstanding, Lispcy provides us with great comparative insights into the workings of a large set of international institutions over time. *Renegotiating the World Order* joins a growing number of scholarly works on the institutional complexities that more and less powerful states find themselves in, as well as on the opportunities and constraints that arise from them. It is a fruitful stepping stone from which to further conceptualize and theorize (institutional) world order-making.

Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. By Terence Roehrig. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. 272p. $90.00 cloth, $30.00 paper.

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— Matthew Kroenig, *Georgetown University*

The most prominent feature distinguishing U.S. nuclear strategy is extended nuclear deterrence. Unlike other countries, the United States does not seek to use its nuclear weapons simply to deter attacks against itself, but, rather, attempts to protect the entire free world. It provides a nuclear umbrella to more than 30 formal treaty allies in Europe and Asia, and arguably to others as well. In a new book, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella,* Terence Roehrig explores the U.S. nuclear security guarantee to two important treaty allies in East Asia, Japan and South Korea.

This is not a typical political science book that lays out a theory and then tests it against alternative explanations in a series of empirical studies. Rather, Roehrig is speaking to those who wish to better understand a prominent feature of the contemporary international security environment and helps to inform them on the issue by bringing to bear theory, history, and policy analysis.

The book is logically structured. Roehrig reviews deterrence theory as it relates to extended nuclear deterrence and chronicles the development of the history of the nuclear umbrella in East Asia during the Cold War. Next, he analyzes the threats against which the umbrella is aimed, China and North Korea. Then he turns to contemporary issues involved with extended nuclear deterrence in Japan and South Korea. Finally, he analyzes U.S. strategy and capabilities and concludes with the implications of his arguments for the future of U.S. policy.

Roehrig demonstrates a masterful command of the major issues and a subtle appreciation of the nuance of these cases. He expertly discusses, for example, the different threat perceptions of U.S. regional allies and the complications they pose for American strategy. While Washington and Tokyo perceive threats from both a rising China and a nuclearizing North Korea, the United States—South Korea alliance is focused almost exclusively on the threat from North Korea. Seoul wants to maintain constructive diplomatic and economic relations with Beijing and is wary about getting pulled into an anti-China alliance. Moreover, Roehrig discusses the difficulty of forging closer trilateral relations among America and its allies in Asia, given the antipathy between Japan and South Korea due to historical grievances over imperial Japan's occupation of the Korean Peninsula before and during World War II.

While not aiming to advance a new theory, the book does contain a central argument, and it is a provocative one. Roehrig maintains that the U.S. nuclear umbrella serves a critical role in East Asian alliance management and for the regional security architecture. Here, Roehrig is on solid ground; there is strong bipartisan support for this position in the Washington foreign policy community.

The author continues, however, with a more controversial judgment. He argues that it is highly unlikely, and would indeed be unwise, for the United States to ever actually use its nuclear weapons to defend these allies, even in response to an enemy nuclear attack. He maintains that this is because a U.S. nuclear response would have devastating consequences (such as radioactive fallout) for friends and foes alike and would weaken the global norm against nuclear nonuse, and because the United States has plenty of conventional military response options.

Many readers will sympathize with Roehrig's argument. After all, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Scholars have written about the taboo against nuclear weapons use. And less than a decade ago, U.S. President Barack Obama made the global elimination of nuclear weapons a central pillar of his foreign policy platform. Many will therefore find it difficult to imagine a U.S. president ordering a future nuclear strike in East Asia.

Many others, including the author of this review, will disagree, however. If the U.S. nuclear umbrella is nothing more than an elaborate bluff, then there is little reason for it to deter enemies or to assure allies. Indeed, this leads to a tension in Roehrig's central argument: How can the U.S. nuclear umbrella be an important tool of alliance management and regional security if it is all just pretend?

Moreover, there are strong counterarguments to Roehrig's rationale for U.S. nuclear restraint. If North Korea uses a nuclear weapon, for example, would the international community simply wait for Kim Jong Un to launch a second or a third nuclear attack? It would be irresponsible for policymakers and politicians to needlessly expose their citizens to this danger, and many in Washington and allied capitals would advocate that the United States act immediately to do whatever it can to disarm North Korea and prevent follow-on nuclear attacks. Given the size and scope of North Korea's growing nuclear and missile program and Pyongyang's well-known efforts at hiding and hardening its capabilities, it is unlikely that this mission could be accomplished in a prompt manner with conventional forces alone.

Furthermore, and perhaps paradoxically, failing to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack may be fatal for the norm of nuclear nonuse. If the United States or its allies suffer a nuclear attack and the United States does not respond in kind, it could send the message that