have refused to carry out their orders not because they believed they were contradictory but because they resented the loss of autonomy and subjection to the civilian court system for human rights abuses.

Feaver's model would explain this case as follows: The principal issued two sets of requirements, the shirking of one of which (counterinsurgency) was never punished, while the shirking of the other (respect for human rights) was punished. This would lead us to expect the military to shirk counterinsurgency in favor of respect for human rights, given the military's belief that the two were incompatible. This is precisely the contradiction that Jaskoski is talking about; I merely note that an elegant framework for explaining such behavior already exists.

In the case of Ecuador, Jaskoski argues that the military have chosen to do policing because they fear that if they do aggressive border defense, they will get involved in a war with the FARC and thus have to reallocate the resources they need to do their policing role. However, it is not obvious why the military would choose to resolve the contradiction this way when they were happy to resolve it the other way (border defense over policing) during the conflict with Peru. The Ecuadorian military seems primarily concerned about competition with the national police for the policing role. Thus, it is possible that they are prioritizing this way because no one is competing with them for the border defense role, while the policing role is threatened. It appears that this was not the case during the conflict with Peru. Furthermore, although Jaskoski characterizes both conflicts as border defense, the military clearly thinks that the conflict with Peru was a true sovereignty defense mission but that the FARC is not.

Feaver's model predicts that militaries will follow their own preferences when there is little monitoring or punishment, as in this case. The author is arguing that they are preferring predictability over the more professional, legitimate, and lucrative mission. However, I am not persuaded that they are not pursuing the more lucrative mission, in net terms. Jaskoski does not present much specific evidence that pursuing certain missions would in fact bring in more resources than others, only assurances that they *probably* would. Furthermore, she appears to be arguing that anything that would bring in more resources must be the course of action chosen by a resource-seeking actor. This is overly simplistic; very few actors seek resources *regardless of the attendant costs*. Resource seeking is about net resources, and if higher resources are attended by higher risks/costs, it is rational resource-seeking behavior to go with the less-lucrative/lower-cost transaction. This is consistent with Jaskoski's emphasis on organizational desires for predictability, but that is why resource seeking should not be treated as a pure *alternative* to her argument. It needs to be incorporated.

The idea that militaries form beliefs about the acceptability of missions and then interpret their context accordingly is persuasive. It is compatible with Kier's argument, Feaver's work–shirk model and Avant's concept of divided principals. I was not completely convinced, however, by the argument about predictability. Bringing in organizational theory concepts is a brilliant stroke, but the mechanisms remained underdeveloped, and this made it difficult to assess whether the evidence really indicated a concern with predictability as opposed to something else. Nevertheless, *Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes* is an important contribution to the discussion of civil–military relations and gives students of military organizations good material for further inquiry.

Globalization and the Distribution of Wealth: The Latin American Experience, 1982–2008. By Arie M. Kacowicz. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 262p. $95.00 cloth.
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Few contemporary issues have generated more controversy than the effects of economic globalization on human welfare. The premise of Arie Kacowicz's book is that the persistent disagreements over this question reflect the fact that globalization's impact is powerfully mediated by politics, and especially domestic politics. More specifically, the author argues that the key determinant of the trajectory of both poverty and inequality since the 1980s has been the "strength" of the domestic state. Because strong states are characterized by "good governance" they tend to implement the policies necessary to improve the welfare of their citizens, especially the most vulnerable among them. In addition, he contends that political institutions at the regional and global level also influence outcomes on these two variables. The author illustrates his "intermestic" model through a broad analysis of Latin America, a relatively in-depth case study of Argentina, and a brief attempt to compare Argentina to two of its neighbors, Brazil and Chile. In the concluding chapter he widens the empirical scope further by comparing Latin America to other developing regions of the world.

This is an ambitious book in terms of the scope of the research question and the diversity of countries and regions examined. The idea that the impact of globalization on social welfare is mediated by domestic politics is not especially counterintuitive, but is nonetheless important and worth refining. Kacowicz also demonstrates considerable fluency in a wide variety of development-related issues, from the ethics of poverty reduction to the historical evolution of Latin American economic policymaking. Unfortunately, the book suffers from a number of flaws that keep it from realizing its full potential. I focus here on problems in two key areas: the research design and the theoretical model.

To get at the causes of cross-national variation in poverty and inequality outcomes, it would make sense to examine a few cases in-depth, use large-n statistical techniques, or employ some combination of these two strategies. However, Kacowicz ends up pursuing none of these approaches. He eschews statistical analysis and the only country he examines in any significant depth is Argentina. His discussion of the Brazilian and Chilean cases (which are folded into the Argentina chapter) is simply too superficial to yield much fruit, and the chapter that examines Latin America as a whole is dedicated mainly to describing broad trends in economic performance, poverty and inequality over time, rather than to systematically examining the causes of cross-national variance.

With regard to the theoretical framework, the book suffers from a number of shortcomings. One involves the crucial notion of state strength. Kacowicz defines a strong state as one that "enjoys a high level of political legitimacy, authority, and recognition by its citizens and its civil society, as epitomized by the state's ability to collect taxes and to mobilize its population, in terms of both peace and war" (p. 70). This brief definition seems promising, but the author never lays out a clear account of the roots of state legitimacy or the relationship between legitimacy and effective, welfare-enhancing governance. Moreover, in deploying the concept of state strength in his empirical analysis the author largely ignores the idea of legitimacy. When he talks about state strength he refers to such variables as corruption, violence, institutional efficiency, property rights, and even the range of policy tools available to intervene in the economy. These may well be causally linked to legitimacy, but there is little explicit discussion of the character and direction of those links.

One seemingly important aspect of the ambiguity surrounding the concept of state strength is the author's treatment of its relationship to political regime. On page 80 Kacowicz notes in passing that success in poverty reduction is not necessarily a function of "the type of political regime." However, on the very same page he suggests that a key "policy implication" of his model is that it points to the "relative advantage of prosperous, market-oriented democracies" and the utility for developing countries of adopting "social democracy in order to cope successfully with the challenges and opportunities of globalization." There are probably ways to square these two apparently contradictory claims within a broader theoretical account of the links between politics and redistribution, but the author never really gets around to that task.

A related shortcoming involves Kacowicz's contention that state strength leads to policies that reduce poverty and income inequality. While there may be some validity to this perspective, it is too simplistic. Among other problems, it ignores the possibility that the causal arrow may point in the opposite direction. Is it not at least equally plausible that the state's legitimacy may at times derive from episodes in which authorities used state power to provide concrete benefits to large swaths of the population? Most scholars of Latin America would probably agree that the reforms initiated by pioneering leaders like José Battle in Uruguay, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico and José Figueres in Costa Rica had such an impact. However, Kacowicz does not seriously consider that possibility.

The problems inherent in the author's treatment of state strength and its relationship to redistribution are on display in his discussion of the recent decline in poverty and inequality in Argentina, beginning around 2003. This trend poses a challenge to his theory because Kacowicz characterizes Argentina as a case of almost chronic state weakness. He explains it by arguing that the Argentine state actually got stronger during this period (p. 146, 163). However, his fleeting discussion of these years (pp. 155–157 and 182–183) focuses almost exclusively on the policies that led to improving social conditions, including renegotiation of the foreign debt, high levies on booming farm exports, and increased social spending. The author would apparently have us believe that these policies reflected the impact of a stronger state, but it seems more plausible that the direction of causality is the reverse, in other words, that the change in policy tack led (at least temporarily) to an increase in the state's domestic credibility.

A final deficiency of the theoretical framework is the ambiguous incorporation of international organizations, especially those of global scope, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization. In a model that purports to explain cross-national variation in dealing with globalization, one would tend to expect these institutions to be present only as a constant aspect of the global context. Yet, the author seems to want to frame their influence as a variable that shapes different national outcomes with regard to poverty and inequality (pp. 73–78). This would be convincing only if he could show that their policies vary across countries in ways that do not simply reflect domestic conditions in the respective country. Yet, he does not make that case, either in the elaboration of his theoretical model or in the empirical chapters.

Although these problems keep *Globalization and the Distribution of Wealth* from being a truly major contribution to the scholarly literature, the book is still valuable as an introduction to the important contemporary debate on the social impacts of globalization. It also constitutes a solid and evenhanded overview, with some comparative perspective, of Argentina's puzzling economic development trajectory.