Entangled Transitions: Eastern and Southern European Convergence or Alternative Europes? 1960s–2000s

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Ever since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the enthusiasm it inspired about the potential for European unity and democracy, it has become fashionable to see post-war European history in terms of convergence.[1] Historians have researched the integration of the European continent into the global, in the context of the Cold War, decolonisation and economic globalisation.[2] Internally, processes of convergence are seen to link the trajectories of nations on a continent where integration eventually trumped the divisions of nationalism, regionalism and the Iron Curtain.[3] This story of an 'ever deeper and wider union' was also reflected in the ways in which the transformations of Southern and Eastern Europe were narrated. The idea of a so-called 'return to Europe' inspired histories that connected the fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes in the Southern European states of Portugal, Greece and Spain from the mid-1970s with the end of communism in Eastern Europe from 1989.[4] This dominant account has presented Southern and Eastern European 'peripheries'

[1] For a critical account of these narratives of unity and diversity see Patrick Pasture, *Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD* (New York: Palgrave, 2015), 157; Wilfried Loth, *Building Europe: A History of European Unification* (Berlin: De Gruyter-Oldenbourg, 2015).

[2] In the 1990s European history was often written through the lens of East–West convergence; in the last decade this transnational frame has broadened to situate Europe in broader global history. For a critique of earlier absences, see Klaus Kiran Patel, 'Provincialising European Union: Co-operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective', *Contemporary European History*, 22, 4 (2013), 649–73.

[3] Hartmut Kaelble, *Sozialgeschichte Europas. 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: CH Beck, 2007).

[4] Jacques Rupnik, 'The Legacies of Dissent. Charter 77, the Helsinki Effect, and the Emergence of a European Public Space', in Friederike Kind-Kovacs and Jessie Labov, eds., *Samizdat, Tamizdat, and Beyond: Transnational Media During and After Socialism* (New York: Berghahn, 2013), 324; Joanna Bar, 'From Communism to Democracy; the Concept of Europe in Cracow's Press in the Years 1975–1995', in José M. Faraldo, Paulina Gulińska-Jurgiel and Christian Domnitz, eds., *Europa im Ostblock: Vorstellungen und Diskurse (1945–1991)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008), 221–30; Teresa Pinheiro, Beata Cieszynska, and José

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moving towards the (Western) European core and its norms, values and models of liberal democracy.[5] Even though some have raised objections to these teleological and Western-dominated narratives of transition they have remained strikingly potent in histories of post-war Europe.[6] Only very recently have they received historiographical critique.[7] Partly this is due to the enduring appeal of centre-periphery approaches that continue to influence intellectual debates about European identity and history.[8] This is also because research on the transitions in Southern and Eastern Europe has for a long time remained rather insular. Historians have been slow to enter a research field that has been dominated by institutional and political approaches, and they have remained more focused on national histories. Where historians of either Eastern or Southern Europe have addressed the transnational or transregional aspects of transition, this has mainly focused on the appeal of the West or its Atlanticist dimensions.[9]

This special issue on 'Entangled Transitions' posits that European post-war history has much to gain when seen from the vantage point of not only these so-called peripheries, but also the interconnections between them. Into our view come new geographies in which circulations and encounters between peripheries have significance not only in the transformation of the continent's East and South, but also in reshaping European institutions and broader notions of the continent's identity. Historical actors under recognised in our histories of Europe's late twentieth-century democratic and economic transformations are given agency: many contributions here point to the crucial mediating role of the left in transition. Moreover, histories of 'alternative transitions' are brought to light: the story of East–South interconnection was not simply one of liberal democracy, the journey to free market capitalism and the European Community's version of Europeanisation – this nexus gave rise to other ways of imagining both transformation and what it meant to be European.

Eduardo Franco, eds., *Peripheral Identities. Iberia and Eastern Europe Between the Dictatorial Past and the European Present* (Chemnitz: Pearl Books, 2011).

[5] Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, 'Introduction: Southern Europe and the Process of Europeanization', *South European Society and Politics*, 5, 2 (2009), 1–24.

[6] See, for instance, Dan Stone. *Goodbye to all that? The Story of Europe since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 167; Tony Judt, Postwar. *A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Vintage, 2010), 504–34.

[7] See, for instance, Haakon A. Ikonomou, Aurélie Andry and Rebekka Byberg, 'Introduction. Towards a New Understanding of Enlargement', in idem., eds., *European Enlargement across Rounds and Beyond Borders* (New York: Routledge, 2017); Kostis Kornetis, 'Introduction: The End of a Parable? Unsettling the Transitology Model in the Age of Crisis', *Historein,* 15, 1 (2015), 5–12; Gregor Thum, '"Europa" im Ostblock. Weiße Flecken in der Geschichte der europäischen Integration', *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History* 1 (2004), 379–95; Ángeles Huerta González, *La Europa periférica. Rusia y España ante el fenómeno de la modernidad* (University of Santiago de Compostela Press, 2004); Sabine Rutar, 'Introduction' in idem, ed., *Beyond the Balkans: Towards an Inclusive History of South-Eastern Europe* (Zurich: Litverlag, 2007), 9–14.

[8] For an attempt to decentre a history of European cultural linkages, see Beata Elżbieta Cieszyńska, ed., *Iberian and Slavonic Cultures: Contact and Comparison* (Lisbon: CompaRes, 2007).

[9] See Francisco Villar, *La Transición Exterior de España. Del aislamiento a la influencia (1976–1996)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2016).

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Conceptualising the East and South

In order to grasp why such approaches have not gained prominence, one must address the history of how these regions have been conceptualised and related to each other both in public and academic discourse. The idea of two distinct 'Southern' and 'Eastern' regions, isolated and shorn of connection, was a product of the first decades of the Cold War.[10] The longstanding right-wing regimes of Salazar in Portugal and Franco in Spain, as well as the right-wing governments that ruled over Greece after the end of the civil war, presented themselves as the antitheses of those state socialist regimes that were established across Eastern Europe from the late 1940s onwards.[11] Western countries, too, saw them as a bastion against international communism and gave them a vital role in NATO, their military bases viewed as necessary to the ideological defence of the continent. Domestically, communist parties were outlawed and their members persecuted. In turn, communist-ruled Eastern European countries opposed what they dubbed 'fascist' regimes in Spain, Portugal and Greece, harbouring exiles, refugees and opposition movements in capitals such as East Berlin, Prague and Moscow, and launching international campaigns on behalf of democracy and human rights. Such divergence was reflected in the scholarship during the first decades of the Cold War, in which the two regions were dealt as entirely different ideological zones, with connections between them generally not noted.

Strikingly, distinctions between these regions were increasingly blurred in the 1960s in both intellectual and political discourses. One of the most potent frameworks was offered by the concept of totalitarianism, which equated Southern European 'fascism' and Eastern European 'communism', and opposed them both to a liberal democratic Western Europe.[12] In the first decade after the end of the Second World War, the concept of totalitarianism initially equated Soviet communism with Italian and German fascism and was widely propagated in the United States. However, it was only in the 1960s that similar frameworks became used widely by scholars in Europe. In this context, the social democratic political scientist Maurice Duverger went as

[10] 'Eastern Europe' as a regional descriptor dates back to the Enlightenment. See Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 'Southern Europe', by contrast, did not exist before the Second World War – interwar Italy's imperial pretensions faced East, making it quite distinct from the Iberian world: Guido Franzinetti, 'Southern Europe and International Politics in the Post-War Period' in Martin Baumeister and Roberto Sala, eds., *Southern Europe? Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece from the 1950s to the Present Day* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2015), 221. For a comparative exploration, see Edward Malefakis, 'Southern Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries: An Historical Overview', *Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones*, Estudio/Working Paper 1992/35, January 1992. For a useful summary, see Effie Pedaliu, *The Making of Southern Europe: An Historical Overview* (LSE Report) available online: http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR017/Pedaliu.pdf (last visited 17 Aug. 2017).

[11] Indeed, in the interwar period they had been more often seen as peripheries that suffered from similar issues of underdevelopment: Derek H. Aldcroft, *Europe's Third World. The European Periphery in the Interwar Years* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

[12] Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Marco Duranti, *The Conservative Human Rights Revolution. European Identity, Transnational Politics, and the Origins of the European Convention* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

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far as to claim a direct link between the 'dictatorship' of the peoples' democracies in the East and the threat Franco posed to democracy in Western Europe.[13] The totalitarian idea that fascism and communism were not opposites but rather shared many characteristics, and were interconnected phenomena, stimulated analysts to seek out common features between the regions: it became, for example, the story of Franco as another Stalin, or the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 as a replay of the repression of the left by the Colonels' Coup in Greece one year earlier.[14] New left critiques brought both regions together as common victims of a broader imperialism, whether it be the Southern European regimes supported by United States or the Eastern European socialist rulers kept in power by Moscow.[15] From the late 1960s onwards world systems' theorists connected these regions as European semi-peripheries which had chosen different variants of an autarkic authoritarianism as a development strategy to catch up with the continental core.[16] The rise of such comparisons in an era of East–West détente was not a coincidence: it offered the emerging new left ammunition to oppose the accession of a non-democratic Spain and Greece to the European Economic Community (EEC) – which was tied to their growing concerns about the closeness of Europe to the United States.[17] The highlighting of such equations of communism and right-wing authoritarianism in fact forced the European Community to distance itself from Southern European dictatorships.[18] Whereas anti-communism had once fostered the integration of Spain, Greece and Portugal into Western organisations such as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and inspired the NATO membership of Greece and Portugal, an authentic struggle on the part of a Western 'democratic Europe' against communism on behalf of human rights and democracy in the 1970s demanded a distancing from authoritarian right-wing regimes in the South too.[19] The struggle against communism and fascism became two sides of the same coin.

The collapse of authoritarian systems in both East and South between the mid-1970s and 1989 meant that these regions could be brought together as common zones

[13] Maurice Duverger, *De la dictature* (Paris: René Julliard, 1961), 7.

[14] Alain Peyrefitte, *Quand la rose se fanera. Du malentendu à l'espoir* (Paris: Plon, 1983), 157; Martin Klimke, Jacco Pekkelder and Joachim Scharloth, eds., *Between Prague Spring and French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960–1980* (New York: Berghahn, 2011).

[15] James Mark, Nigel Townson and Polymeris Voglis, 'Inspirations' in Robert Gildea, James Mark and Annette Warring, eds., *Europe's 1968. Voices of Revolt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 99–100.

[16] See, for example, Giovanni Arrighi, ed., *Semi-peripheral Development: The Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985), 279. Balázs Szalontai, 'A regionalizmus és a fejlődés problematikája – Egy szemlélet alakváltozásai az Eszmélet oldalain', *Eszmélet*, 1 (1996) online.

[17] Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s* (New York: Berghahn, 2004).

[18] Víctor Fernández Soriano, 'La CEE face à l'Espagne franquiste. De la mémoire de la guerre civile à la construction politique de l'Europe', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 108, 4 (2010), 85–98.

[19] Emma De Angelis and Eirini Karamouzi, 'Enlargement and the Historical Origins of the European Community's Democratic Identity, 1961–1978', *Contemporary European History*, 25, 3 (2016), 439–58; Víctor Fernández Soriano, *Le fusil et l'olivier: Les droits de l'homme en Europe face aux dictatures méditerranéennes (1949–1977)* (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2015); Duranti, *The Conservative Human Rights Revolution*, 107–8, 174–5.

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of democratisation. The very concept of 'Southern Europe' was revived as a category of analysis among Western Cold War strategists in the 1970s as a zone that was losing its right-wing leaders, and was hence threatened by communism. Such a fear prompted US and European leaders to try to moderate the direction of the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal[20] and helped garner support for the country's application for European Economic Community (EEC) membership in 1977. In Spain, communists turned from Stalinists into Eurocommunists,[21] embraced cooperation with social and Christian democrats and crumbled electorally. Social democratic governments were the beneficiaries of the triumph of democracy in Portugal, and in Spain and Greece in the 1980s. In sum, transitions in Southern Europe were not simply the end of right-wing authoritarianism but entailed the end of the communist alternative too.[22] Such understandings helped underpin later comparisons with the revolutions that shook Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that '1989' had taken the West by surprise, writers were soon able to present events in Southern Europe as 'a precocious forerunner of the largely peaceful transitions from authoritarianism to democracy' that followed in Eastern Europe and in Latin America.[23]

A common anti-totalitarian understanding of dictatorships in the East and South flourished after the end of the Cold War, as part of what has been dubbed 'conservative revisionism' in post-1989 Europe.[24] Memories of dictatorships in Spain, Portugal and Greece that had been silenced in the late 1970s and 1980s were revived in the 1990s.[25] Alongside the influence of the German model of remembering the Holocaust, Southern European memory cultures were influenced by the totalitarian model of the communist past which was propagated in Eastern Europe after 1989.[26]

[20] Ana Mónica Fonseca, 'The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (1974–1976)', *Journal of European Integration History*, 1 (2009), 35–6; Geoffrey Pridham, 'The Politics of European Communist, Transnational Networks and Democratic Transition in Southern Europe', in idem, *Encouraging Democracy*, 212–45; Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, 'The Rise of "Political Aid"', in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Regional Perspectives. Volume Two* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 295–324.

[21] See Paul Preston, *The Last Stalinist: The Life of Santiago Carrillo* (London: Collins, 2014); and Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2006).

[22] Pascal Delwit, *Les gauches radicales en Europe. XIXe-XXIe siècles* (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2016), 395–8. The electoral and ideological decline of communism in Southern Europe became linked to the region's development in economic and social terms – industrialisation and civil society – understood as a consequence of their journey from insulation to integration in the European Community. Judt, *Postwar,* 504; Víctor Pérez Díaz, *El retorno de la sociedad civil: Respuestas sociales a la transición política, la crisis económica y los cambios culturales de España, 1975–1985* (Madrid: Colección Tablero, 1987).

[23] Kenneth Maxwell, 'Portugal's Revolution of the Carnations, 1974–75', in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton-Ash, eds., *Civil Resistance and Power Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 161.

[24] Helen Graham and Alejandro Quiroga, 'After the Fear was Over? What Came after Dictatorships in Spain, Greece and Portugal', in Dan Stone, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 505–25.

[25] António Costa Pinto and Leonardo Morlino, eds., *Dealing with the Legacy of Authoritarianism: The "Politics of the Past" in Southern European Democracies* (London: Routledge, 2011).

[26] On the wider memory influences in Spain, see Alejandro Baer and Natan Sznaider, *Memory and Forgetting in the Post-Holocaust Era* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), especially chapter 3.

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The Spanish and Greek civil wars entered the 'black books' of Communism.[27] The repressive surveillance states in Greece, Spain and Portugal became understood by means of comparisons with communist security states, most notably with the East German 'unconstitutional state' (*Unrechtstaat*).[28]

The two regions were also brought together as comparable forms of dictatorship in the efforts of so-called 'transitology', an emerging field which charted and compared the processes of transformation from authoritarianism to democracy across multiple world regions to develop models of democratic transition and consolidation. Such work conceived of Southern Europe as a regional unit of 'transition' that could be compared with Latin America, and, after 1989, Eastern Europe.[29] Setting the trend was Samuel Huntington's *The Third Wave*, which provides a rather teleological narrative of global transitions beginning with the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal, spiraling outward to Latin America and ending in the revolutions in Eastern Europe fifteen years later.[30] This work stimulated a plethora of comparative studies on post-authoritarian transitions, and the European integration process in both regions. Against the backdrop of an ever closer and wider European Union (EU), such works buttressed a rather 'flattening' and teleological account in which the economic modernisation of both regions was closely connected with their decision to escape their supposed isolation and 'return to Europe'.[31] Democratisation, too, was usually equated with Europeanisation and the mediating role of Western European institutions.[32] At the dawn of the millennium, theories that connected lessons drawn from the 'successful' Southern European transitions to post-communist Europe jumped from academic textbooks into political discourse – with the prospect of

[27] Stéphane Courtois, Andrzej Paczkowski, Jean Louis Panne and Nicolas Werth, eds., *Le livre noir du communisme. Crimes, terreur, et repression* (Paris: Laffont, 1997).

[28] Neni Panourgiá, *Dangerous Citizens: The Greek Left and the Terror of the State* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009); Graham and Quiroga, 'After the Fear was Over?', 517.

[29] For the production of the idea of Southern Europe in this period, see both Guido Franzinetti, 'Southern Europe' and Massimo Piermattei, 'Ptolemaics and Copernicans. Southern Europe and the European Integration Process', in Martin Baumeister and Roberto Sala, eds., *Southern Europe? Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece from the 1950s to the Present Day* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2015). For the construction of 'Southern Europe' in expert discourses see 'Die Verhandlung des Westens. Wissenseliten und die Heterogenität Westeuropas nach 1945', special issue *Comparativ*, 25 (2015) http://research.uni-leipzig.de/comparativ/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=150&Itemid=29 (last visited 17 Aug. 2017); on units of regional comparison, see Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, 'Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should they Go?', *Slavic Review*, 53,1 (1994), 173–85.

[30] Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

[31] Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos, eds., *The Second Enlargement of the EEC. The Integration of Unequal Partners* (London: Macmillan Press, 1982).

[32] See, for instance, Geoffrey Pridham, 'The International Dimension of Democratisation: Theory, Practice and Inter-Regional Comparisons', in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford, eds., *Building Democracy? The International Dimensions of Democratisation in Eastern Europe* (London: Leicester University Press, 1997), 8; Laurence Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

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Eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004.[33] In particular, the example of Spain's integration in the Common Market played an important role in mollifying concerns about the impact of the Eastern enlargement among first and second generation member states.[34] Most of this literature found itself aligned with the memory politics of the European Union, which presented itself as the embodiment and protector of a democratic 'third way' that triumphed over Southern European fascism and Eastern European communism. The Nobel Committee awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union, employing exactly this narrative.[35]

Despite such works that incorporate the East and South, we actually know strikingly little about the exchanges between these 'peripheries'. This is not a complete absence: work on connections between Poland and Spain especially have a long tradition.[36] Yet even where links and entanglements are drawn out, observations remain indeed at a very general level.[37] Despite their claims about an interconnected 'global third wave', most works tell separate regional stories that illustrate – in parallel – a broader global phenomenon. There are many reasons for this. First, most of the work on these phenomena has been carried out by political scientists and transitologists whose work has focused on institutional aspects such as legal institutions, elections and party systems.[38] For the most part they have adopted comparative approaches that explain the range of variables necessary to

[33] Sebastián Royo, 'The Challenges of EU Integration: Iberian Lessons for Eastern Europe', in Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez, eds., *Towards the Completion of Europe: Analysis and Perspectives of the New European Union Enlargement* (Miami: University of Miami, 2006).

[34] Krzysztof Pomian, 'Western prejudices, Polish Fears', *Transit. Europäische Revue*, 2003: http://www.eurozine.com/western-prejudices-polish-fears/ (last visited 17 Aug. 2017).

[35] Loth, *Building Europe,* 433.

[36] Guy Hermet, 'La democratisation à l'amiable: de l'Espagne à la Pologne', *Commentaire*, 50 (1990), 279–86; Pawel Machcewicz, 'Hiszpanska droga do demokracji', *Tygodnik Solidarność* 3 (1989), 4; Adam Michnik, 'La derrota de Stalin. La vía española como la esperanza para Polonia', *El País*, 23 Mar. 1989; Jan Kieniewicz, 'Hiszpania-przykład czy wyzwanie', *Przeglad Powszechny*, 1 (1990), 92–104; Jan Kieniewicz, 'Doświadczenia hiszpańskie w rzeczywistości polskiej', *Polska w Europie*, 21 (1996), 102–14; Dariusz Filar, 'Polonia es diferente, czyli Socjoekonomiczna paralela Polski z Hiszpania u schyłku wieku totalizmów', *Przegląd Powszechny* 1 (1990), 105–16; Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska, *Hiszpania i Polska: elity polityczne w okresie przejścia do demokracji. Analiza porównawcza* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1996). Some influences and contacts – mainly of an anecdotal nature – were referenced in works about transitions, see Javier Tusell Gómez and Álvaro Soto Carmona, eds., *Historia de la Transición y consolidación democrática en España (1975–1986)* (Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1995), 3–14. Some bilateral comparisons explore the entanglements, albeit briefly, see Guillermo A. Pérez Sánchez, 'Transiciones y europeísmo: de la Península Ibérica a la Europa Central', *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* (Madrid), 24 (2002), 317–33; Carmen Gonzáles Enríquez*, Crisis y cambio en Europa del Este. La transición húngara a la democracia* (Madrid: CIS, 2003).

[37] See Roberts and Garton-Ash, eds., *Civil Resistance & Power Politics.*

[38] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarianism: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Vajk Farkas, 'Rendszerváltás Spanyol Módra. Hasonlóságok és különbözõségek a spanyol és a Magyar jogállami átmenetben' *Iustum Aequum Salutare*, V. (2009/3), 171–94.

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democratisation to occur.[39] Second, most analyses have accepted core-periphery models, viewing transitions in both the South and East of the continent as essentially convergences towards the standards of Western democracy and economy. Literature dealing with the difficult pasts of European dictatorships has been dominated by similar methodologies: comparing, for example, Spanish and Polish ways of dealing with the past, rather than investigating the way in which approaches travelled between countries dealing with the legacies of different dictatorships.[40] Third, presentism has continued to hang over comparative research on transitions: research is updated with each regional political shift newly imagined as a transition, but with little questioning of the overall framework.[41] With these comparative or centre-periphery approaches to European history, not only the diversity of exchanges and crossovers across Europe has been lost but also often the agency and perspective of actors in these peripheries themselves.[42]

In order to assess the importance of interactions between these European regions, the authors in this collection draw on multiple circulations involving a wide range of actors, institutions and societies. The role of exile and activism stands out, as Southern Europe became a refuge for anti-communist exiles from Eastern Europe, just as Spanish, Greek and Portuguese Communists found exile and support in

[39] Other approaches to comparative transition include: Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, eds., *Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). An early comparison of politics of memory is Edward Malefakis 'Spain and its Francoist Heritage', in John H. Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy, Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism* (London: Greenwood Press 1982).

[40] Alexandra Barahona De Brito, Carmen Gonzàlez Enriquez and Paloma Aguilar, eds., *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jordi Guixe i Coromines, *Past and Power. Public Policies on Memory. Debates, from Global to Local* (Barcelona: University of Barcelona, 2015); Filipa Raimundo, 'Dealing with the Past in Central and Southern European Democracies: Comparing Spain and Poland', in Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer, eds., *History, Memory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Memory Games* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 136–54; Stefan Troebst and Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, eds., *Diktaturbewältigung und nationale Selbstvergewisserung - Geschichtskulturen in Polen und Spanien im Vergleich* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2004) and Thomas Großbölting and Dirk Hofmann, *Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart. Vom Umgang mit Diktaturerfahrungen in Ost- und Westeuropa* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2008). See also Troebst's 'comparison of comparisons' of memories of the dictatorships in South and East in his *Diktaturerinnerung und Geschichtskultur im östlichen und südlichen Europa. Ein Vergleich der Vergleiche* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2010).

[41] See also Marilyn Booth, '25 Years of Revolution Comparing Revolt and Transition from Europe 1989 to the Arab World', *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 23 (2014), 99–103; Jérôme Heurtaux, 'Comparer « transitions » postcommunistes et révoltes arabes. Un point de vue semi-sceptique', CERI, 2016: http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/fr/content/dossiersduceri/comparer-transitions-postcommunistes-et-revoltes-arabes-un-point-de-vue-semi-sceptique (last visited 17 Aug. 2017); *Conferencia sobre Transición y Consolidación Democráticas* (Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Siddharth Mehta Ediciones, 2002).

[42] For such comparative histories, see, for example, Howard J. Wiarda, Dale Roy Herspring and Esther M. Skelley, *Development on the Periphery: Democratic Transitions in Southern and Eastern Europe* (Boulder, CO.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Arnd Bauerkamper, 'Wege zur europäischen Geschichte. Ertrage und Perspektiven der vergleichs- und transfergeschichtlichen Forschung', in Agnes Arndt, Joachim C. Haberlen and Christiane Reinecke, eds., *Vergleichen, Verflechten, Verwirren? Europäische Geschichtsschreibung zwischen Theorie und Praxis* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 33–60.

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the Eastern Bloc (Szobi). Others focus on political exchange, stressing the role of Communist Party links, social and Christian Democrats, as well as dissidents (Mark, Christiaens, Faraldo), in bilateral exchanges between states and international organisations and campaigns, or in relationships mediated through Western Europe. Still others explore the role of economics, either in terms of the international circulation of economists (Mark) or the role of business people or tourism firms (Holleran) in bringing ideas from South to East. Some examine why particular ideas travelled, addressing common questions of economic development, democratisation, European culture and human rights. Some articles also address the multiple ways in which media culture in either region imagined the 'other'. Others explore the influence of such shifting imaginaries on which ideas could travel, and which could not.

Democratisations Beyond Europeanisation

This collection provides alternative ways of conceptualising democratisation in late twentieth-century Europe. In many contributions here, the political transformations of Eastern and Southern Europe are not, contrary to much scholarship, presented simply as convergences towards liberal democratic political systems. Instead, first, they suggest that the relationship with Western Europe was only one of many, and that in some cases solidarities, and intellectual and political ideas, circulated between these European peripheries with little mediation through the West. Second, some argue that such circulations were not based on fixed notions of (liberal) democratisation but were rather far more often messy explorations through a variety of democratic forms. At the same time, democracy was not the only game in town: the East–South connection often stimulated consideration of authoritarian transitions to the market or globalisation. Third, contributions here bring to the fore the role of actors, notably those on the left, whose roles are seldom given sufficient attention in accounts of the fashioning of a post-authoritarian Europe.

Several articles highlight the role that Eastern Europe played in the processes of democratisation in the South of the continent. They reveal the ways in which democratic socialists and communists played a pivotal role in creating bonds between the two regions. Christiaens emphasises that European support for the struggle against the Greek dictatorship was not led by liberal human rights organisations – a story, he notes, that fits too conveniently into a narrative of Europe converging on Western democratic norms – but rather by the solidarity organs of Eastern Bloc regimes, whose efforts helped stimulate bonds of solidarity across Europe. Political changes in the East also stimulated shifts in the South that were important on their road to democratisation. Even 'left Falangists' in Spain took inspiration from the technocratic, democratising and less rigidly ideological reform efforts in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. This prompted important shifts in their worldview, notably undermining the Manichean vision of an ideologically divided

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Europe that had helped sustain the legitimacy of Francoism, whilst also stimulating their interest in slow, evolutionary technocratic reform. This would lead them to play a central role in the transition out of Francoism in the guise of reformers such as ex-Falangist Adolfo Suarez.[43] Faraldo and Szobi, by contrast, stress the important role that communists' accommodation with multi-party democracy played in the Spanish and Portuguese transitions, and the importance of their encounter with the East in this regard. Faraldo notes the shock of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on Southern European communists, its impact magnified by the presence of Iberian communist exile groups in Eastern Bloc capitals, including Prague – 'the Geneva of the East'.[44] However, he also cautions against the perception that dissidents were important in communicating a disillusionment with Eastern European communism. Rather, he argues that such movements were seen as culturally backward looking in Spain, noting that prominent figures such as Solzhenitsyn were supporters of Franco. He rather identifies the incapacity of Eastern European regimes to liberalise, and their elites' increasingly close relationship with the Franco regime in the early 1970s, as crucial factors in the Spanish communists' decision to distance themselves from Eastern European communism and to make their accommodation with the liberal democratic transition.

Some authors also highlight the lack of support from the East for a state-socialist future in Southern Europe following the collapse of their authoritarian regimes. Certainly, the hope was there in the early 1970s in Eastern Europe, as Mark points out. Indeed, to Western observers, too, communist forces seemed poised to make their move not only in 1970s Spain, Greece and Portugal, but also in Italy, a NATO member where Enrico Berlinguer's successful Communist Party loomed over an unstable democracy.[45] Yet in the event, as Szobi demonstrates, neither Moscow nor Prague were really committed to forcing the Portuguese Carnation Revolution – the Southern European transition most likely to radicalise – to 'go communist'. Despite some financial support for the Portuguese Communist Party, and the missions of a few Czechoslovaks to organise collective farming in the countryside, Szobi notes that Eastern Bloc elites were in fact more invested in preserving East–West détente, and to opening up new markets in the independent countries that were emerging from the collapse of Portuguese Empire in southern Africa. Despite their rhetoric about the future of communism in the South, Eastern Bloc regimes helped to enable – through their reluctance to support leftist alternatives – such liberal democratic transitions.

The Southern European transitions were important for the East too. When this issue is addressed, scholars usually point to the impact of the Spanish *consenso* model

[43] Miguel Ángel Ruiz Carnicer, 'Leftist Fascists, Rightist Communists: The Case of Spanish Fascists Confronted with Third World Communism and Reformists in Eastern Europe' (paper presented at 'Entangled Transitions' conference, University of Leuven, 8–10 Dec. 2014).

[44] Karel Bartošek, *Zpráva o putování v komunistických archivech: Paříž–Praha (1948–1968)* (Prague: Paseka, 2009), 103.

[45] Sotiris Rizas, *The Rise of the Left in Southern Europe: Anglo-American Responses* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

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on opposition to state-socialist regimes.[46] There is certainly some evidence of this: the iconic Polish dissident Adam Michnik, for example, termed the Spanish experience the 'New Evolutionism' in 1976 and saw the negotiation between regime and opposition as a possible way out for the impasse between state and society in mid-1970s Poland too.[47] The Eurocommunist parties of Southern Europe became an important point of orientation for Eastern European dissidents in their quest for recognition and support in Western Europe over the 1970s.[48] Yet support remained rather half hearted. The prominent Czechoslovakian dissident Jiří Pelikán reflected on his failures in the early 1970s whilst exiled in Rome to enlist support from Enrico Berlinguer – despite his efforts to encourage support for human rights campaigns on behalf of oppositionists in Spain, Portugal and Greece.[49] Similarly, Faraldo reveals the rather cool reception given to Eastern European dissidents by Spanish Eurocommunists. As Szobi argues in his contribution, the overarching figure of the Portuguese transition, the socialist Mário Soares, did not really 'discover' dissidence until 1989, whilst Papandreou and PASOK in Greece were highly critical of dissident movements in Eastern Europe. Only in Spain did such a culture of solidarity eventually develop, but even here it was a later development: as Faraldo notes, the declaration of martial law by General Jaruzelski prompted many Spaniards to make comparisons to their own recent coup attempt under Antonio Tejero in February 1981, which might have brought their own democratisation to an end. Yet over the course of the 1980s the idea of the South as a source of support or inspiration had fallen away for Eastern European dissidents.[50] Indeed, as Eurocommunists' influence in Southern Europe rapidly ebbed away, they became much less interesting as interlocutors.[51] Their dwindling interest in Southern Europe was also due to the hardening relationship between oppositions and regimes in Eastern Europe – the *consenso* model seemed for some years no longer relevant.

Mark's contribution suggests that it was in fact reform communists in the Eastern Bloc that gained most from the relationships with, and models of transition derived from, the South. Amongst all the Southern European transitions, it was the Spanish

[46] Dominik Trutowski, 'Poland and Spain "Entangled". Political Learning in Transitions to Democracy' (paper presented at the 'Entangled Transitions' conference, University of Leuven, 8–10 Dec. 2014).

[47] Adam Michnik, 'A New Evolutionism', in idem., *Letters from Prison and Other Essays* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 135–48; Adam Michnik, 'Le nouvel évolutionnisme', in Peter Kende and Krzysztof Pomian, eds., *1956: Varsovie-Budapest. La deuxième revolution d'Octobre* (Paris: Seuil, 1976), 201–14.

[48] Robert Brier, 'Broadening the Cultural History of the Cold War: The Emergence of the Polish Workers' Defense Committee and the Rise of Human Rights', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, 4 (2013), 104–27.

[49] Marc Lazar, 'La gauche ouest-européenne et l'année 1968 en Tchécoslovaquie: Les cas français et italien', in Antoine Marès, ed., *La Tchécoslovaquie, sismographe de l'Europe* (Paris: Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 2009), 177–93.

[50] Trutowski, 'Poland and Spain "Entangled"'.

[51] Kim Christiaens, Idesbald Goddeeris and Magaly Rodríguez García, 'A Global Perspective on the European Mobilization for Chile (1970s–1980s)', in idem, eds., *European Solidarity with Chile, 1970s–1980s* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), 23, 7–46.

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that became the exemplar for them.[52] This is of course not surprising. The Greek dictatorship collapsed as a result of military failure in Cyprus, and the Portuguese transition was deeply unstable for its first two years: neither provided convincing material that could be used to construct a road map for transition elsewhere. By contrast, Spanish elites, particularly the socialist Prime Minister Felipe González, invested much energy in creating and then exporting the idea of a Spanish-branded planned consensual negotiated settlement, not only to Eastern Europe but also in Central and South America.[53] Yet we also need to address the question of reception: Mark explores the interactions between Hungarian reform communists and Spanish socialists from the early 1980s and explains how they saw in the Spanish transition a useful model with which to discipline a population into accepting evolutionary change from above, so as to ensure their own survival into a new multi-party democratic system. The lack of punishment or exclusion for those who had once led authoritarian rule in Southern Europe lessened the fear of punishment for communists in Eastern Europe too.[54] Even the head of the Soviet KGB initiated a dialogue with the Spanish security services in 1990 over how to draw a 'thick line' under 'difficult pasts'.[55]

In this sense, this issue revises a history of Europeanisation and democratisation which has remained largely centred on the enabling role of Western European social democracy.[56] The contributions here explore, for example, the importance of links between socialists in Greece, Portugal and Spain and the reform communists of Eastern Europe in engineering change in the 1980s. The rise of Southern European social democracy in the 1980s paralleled evolutions in post-Communist Europe, where major political formations that emerged in the 1990s were reform

[52] On exporting the model, see Omar G. Encarnación, 'Democratising Spain. Lessons for American Democratic Promotion', in Gregorio Alonso and Diego Muro, eds., *The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition. The Spanish Model* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 236–56.

[53] See also the role of the story of Instituto de Estudios Soviéticos: http://elpais.com/diario/1990/10/26/espana/656895608_850215.html (last visited 27 July 2017). It was inaugurated in 1990 when Gorbachev visited Spain to encourage Spanish-Soviet cooperation. On its board were many social democratic politicians who had been involved in spreading the message of the Spanish *transición*.

[54] Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); António Costa Pinto, 'The Authoritarian Past and South European Democracies: An Introduction', *South European Society and Politics*, 15, 3 (2010), 339–58.

[55] 'Stenogramma zasedaniya Komissii Politbyuro TsK KPSS po dopolnitel'nomu izucheniyu materialov, svyazannykh s repressiyami, imevshimi mesto v period 30-40-kh I nachala 50-kh gg', 29 May 1990, in *Reabilitatsiya. Kak eto bylo. Dokumenty Politbyuro TsK KPSS, stenogrammy zasedaniya Komissi Politbyuro TsK KPSS po dopolnitel'nomu izucheniyu materialov, svyazannykh s repressiyami, imevshimi mesto v period 30-40-kh i nachala 50-kh godov, i drugie materialy. Tom 3.* (Moscow: Materik, 2004), 450.

[56] Christian Salm, *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Marina Costa Lobo and Pedro C. Magalhães, 'From "Third Wave" to "Third Way": Europe and the Portuguese Socialists (1975–1999)', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online*, 3, 1 (2001), 25–35; Antonio Muñoz Sánchez, 'The Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Spanish Socialists during the Transition to Democracy, 1975–1982', *Contemporary European History*, 25, 1 (2016), 143–62; Bernd Rother, 'Exporting Democracy? European Social Democrats and the European Community's Southern Enlargement', in Claudia Hiepel, ed., *Europe in a Globalising World. Global Challenges and European Responses in the »long« 1970s* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 185–200.

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communist-turned social democratic parties, such as the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (*Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej*; SdRP) (until 1999), or Hungarian Socialist Party (*Magyar Szocialista Párt*; MSZP): it was elites from these traditions who often played major roles in bringing their countries 'back to Europe'.[57]

Nevertheless, interaction between East and South did not always support the development of liberal democracy. Even those Spanish organisations which had been tasked with promoting the Spanish model of democratisation – such as the Institute of Ibero-American Cooperation (*Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana*; ICI) – were still populated with Franco-era technocrats who were ambivalent about democratic reform – as they believed that it strengthened those social forces which prioritised workers' rights over economic efficiency and development. Indeed, Spain was of great interest in the East in part because of the Franco-era modernisation which had successfully opened up the country's economy to the world market. As Mark argues, the very fact that this opening had occurred under authoritarian conditions made it an attractive alternative route to globalisation in the 1980s for reform communists, who would be able to effect change whilst maintaining one party rule.[58] The authoritarian modernisation of the Bloc did not lose its appeal for some in the South either.[59]

Nor was democracy promotion initially purposefully pursued by Western European institutions. The European Union would later claim democracy and human rights as the central pillars of its self-identity and crafted histories in which the role of its predecessor, the European Community, was crucial in overcoming authoritarian regimes in the East and South of the continent.[60] Yet this narrative concealed how Western European institutions were in fact rather reluctant to support political initiatives that might be disruptive. Certainly there is some evidence of engagement: Western European social democratic foundations played an important role in promoting parties that supported democratic transition on the Iberian peninsula, although they were often caught out by the course of events and late

[57] Iván Szelényi and János Ladányi, 'Prospects and Limits on New Social Democracy in Transitional Societies of Central Europe', András Bozóki and John T. Ishiyama, eds., *The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 47.

[58] This was part of a broader fascination with authoritarian routes to globalisation in Eastern Europe that included Pinochet's Chile and the East Asian Tigers. See, for example, Tobias Rupprecht, 'Formula Pinochet. Chilean Lessons for Russian Liberal Reformers during the Soviet Collapse', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 51, 1 (2015), 165–186; James Mark and Tobias Rupprecht, '1989 in Global Context', in Juliane Fürst, Silvio Pons and Mark Selden, eds., *The Cambridge History of Communism* Volume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 227.

[59] Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, *O socialismo e o futuro da Península* (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1969); José M. Magone, *The Developing Place of Portugal in the European Union* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004).

[60] Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie, eds., *The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). For such a narrative, see also, for example, José Manuel Barroso's speech commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of 1956: 'Acting Together: The Legacy of 1956', Budapest, 23 October 2006 at http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=d7QJlklkU6sQYNwIDUgDVo3zCkc2wKqZj0oQBoLM2cRnbGEAeExh!-898031139?docId=155350&cardId=155350 (last visited 12 July 2017).

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to engage.[61] Yet, over the past few years, historians have cast doubts about the extent of Western Europe's engagement with democracy on the continent's 'peripheries'.[62] As Holleran notes in his contribution, European Community elites in the 1960s and 1970s were much more concerned about the economic development of Southern Europe and the long-term redressing of North–South inequalities than they were in democratisation per se. Western Europe's fascination with development, industrial growth and 'expert societies' in Eastern Europe, Portugal's *Estado Novo* and Franco's Spain over the 1960s and 1970s remains a story which has remained under researched and has still been overshadowed by self-congratulatory post-transition narratives.[63]

It was in fact only in the last decade of the Cold War that the European Community began to understand democracy promotion as an important part of its mission. In particular, it was through the incorporation of Southern Europe into the European Community that an institutional identity was discovered beyond the economic.[64] In this sense the interaction with the periphery was central to the shaping of the institution itself.[65] It was the perceived instability of the Portuguese transition that was of particular importance to this story: fearing communist influence, economic support (loans) was offered in the late 1970s on the condition that democracy and the rule of law were consolidated according to certain criteria. Over the course of the 1980s the European Community increasingly saw itself as a community based around values of human rights and used 'conditionality' to enforce them. Such values were finally embedded in The Maastricht Treaty (1992) which introduced democracy and human rights into the primary law of what was now called the European Union (EU). Stable institutions, democracy, rule of law and human rights officially became then the political conditions required by any country applying for accession to the

[61] As far as Germany's role was concerned see Del Pero's and Guirao's and Gavin's chapters in Mario Del Pero, Víctor Gavín, Fernando Guirao and Antonio Varsori, eds., *Democrazie. L'Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature* (Firenze: Le Monnier, 2010); Mario del Pero, 'A European Solution for a European Crisis. The International Implications of Portugal's Revolution', *Journal of European Integration History*, 15, 1 (2009), 15–34; Antonio Muñoz Sánchez, 'A European Answer to the Spanish Question: The SPD and the End of the Franco Dictatorship', *Journal of European Integration History*, 15, 1 (2009), 77–94.

[62] Carlos Sanz Díaz, 'La ayuda al desarrollo de la República Federal de Alemania a España (1956-1970)', *Historia Contemporánea*, 30 (2005), 179–203; Birgit Aschmann, 'The Reliable Ally. Germany Supports Spain's European Integration Efforts 1957–1967', *Journal of European Integration History*, 7, 1 (2011), 37–51.

[63] Ana Mónica Fonseca, 'The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (1974–1976)', *Journal of European Integration History*, 15, 1 (2009), 35–56; Patricia Hertel, 'Ein anderes Stück Europa? Der Mittelmeertourismus in Expertendiskursen der Nachkriegszeit, 1950–1980', *Comparativ-Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung,* 25, 3 (2015), 75–93.

[64] Tom Buchanan, 'Human Rights, the Memory of War and the Making of a 'European' Identity, 1945–1975' in Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel, eds., *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century. Historical Approaches* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 166; Othon Anastasakis, 'The EU's Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a More Pragmatic Approach', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,* 8, 4 (2008), 365–77.

[65] Antonio Varsori, 'Enlargement Disenchanted? Two Transitions to Democracy and Where We Are with Today's Crisis', and Helene Sjursen, 'Enlargement and Identity: Studying Reasons', both in Haakon A. Ikonomou, Aurélie Andry and Rebekka Byberg, eds., *European Enlargement across Rounds and Beyond Borders* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 19–35, 57–74.

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EU. This form of Europeanisation, shaped by the EC's encounter with the Southern European transition, led to the set of criteria that Eastern European states needed to meet to accede to the Union – demands for deep structural reform of political and legal systems which most Southern European states had not had to face during their earlier transitions.[66]

East–South Détente, the 'Third World' and Alternative European Identities

Traditionally, the relaxation of the Cold War from the late 1960s has been seen as a critical element that allowed – or at least set a favorable background for – the political transformations that unfolded (for the most part) peacefully in Southern and Eastern Europe.[67] Détente, in this view, helped transform 'revolution' into the moderate form of 'transition'. Yet until very recently these processes have been seen primarily as phenomena initiated in the West and followed in the South and East. Here, however, a number of contributions point to an important and specific East–South dimension to the ending of a divided Europe that cannot be reduced to a subset of East–West relations.[68] Indeed, the very creation of a divided Europe had an important East–South angle. Both of these European peripheries initially understood each other through the logic of the military and political confrontation of the early Cold War: their own countries' political projects were on the 'right side' of a broader battle for ideological supremacy that spanned the continent and the world. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War General Franco had in fact initially been reluctant to allow radical Eastern European anti-communists to settle in Spain – as their presence might confirm for world opinion that his was a fascist state.[69] It was only after 1948, with the intensification of the Cold War, that such exiles were more openly welcomed: they now enabled Spain to become a refuge for Eastern European anti-communist refugees and to see itself as the advocate for the 'enslaved' half of Europe, its commitment proven by its origins in the struggle against communism.[70] Inversely, the 'othering' of Southern Europe provided legitimacy to communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Mark's and Christiaens' contributions

[66] Víctor Fernández Soriano, 'Bringing up Political Conditionality. The European Community in front of Southern and Eastern Transitions', paper presented at 'Entangled Transitions: Between Eastern and Southern Europe, 1960s–2014', Leuven, 8–10 Dec. 2014.

[67] See for instance, John. A. L. Hall, 'The Transformation of Modern Europe: Banalities of Success' in T.V. Paul, ed., *International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 233–54, 239; Geir Lundestad, 'The European Role at the Beginning and Particularly the End of the Cold War', in Olav Njølstad, ed., *The Last Decade of the Cold War. From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 60–79.

[68] See, for instance, Svetozar Rajak, Konstantina E. Botsiou, Eirini Karamouzi and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, eds., *The Balkans and the Cold War* (London: Palgrave, 2017).

[69] José M. Faraldo, 'Azyl Ariberta Heima. Powojenna Hiszpania', in *Tygodnik Powszechny,* 39 (24 Sept. 2006), 14.

[70] George Uscatescu, *Europa Ausente* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1957); Matilde Eiroa, 'El comunismo, sostén del anticomunismo: el Telón de Acero, España y la Guerra Fría', *Cuadernos Constitucionales de la Cátedra Fadrique Furió Ceriol*, 45/46 (2003–2004), 199–210.

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outline how Eastern Bloc states located their own origins in the civil war struggle against 'fascism' in Spain in the 1930s and Greece in the 1940s.[71] In this reading, the battles for Spain and over Greece were not distant events but rather part of a broader European struggle which had failed in Southern Europe but found its victorious realisation in the East. After the coup by the Greek Colonels in 1967 and the growth of 'neo-fascism' in 1960s Italy, domestic and international propaganda pushed the image of a fascist South of the continent, supported by US imperialism. Moreover, the expansion of right-wing dictatorship in Latin America led socialist theorists to posit the growth of a Hispanic 'zone of fascism' in Latin countries of 'middling development' that linked the Iberian Peninsula across the Atlantic.[72] The Communist Bloc presented itself in public discourse as a bulwark against this now globalising fascism. Socialist countries also contrasted themselves in economic terms in the first post-war decades: as both Mark and Christiaens argue, underdevelopment, poverty and (neo)colonialism in NATO countries such as Greece and Portugal that received Marshall Aid were an important part of Eastern European states' arguments for their own legitimacy, as they compared the 'other European periphery' with their own high growth rates, levels of development, industrialisation and modernity.[73]

However, this juxtaposition became blurred when, from the late 1960s onwards, East and South began to converge – both in political and economic terms. These shifts did much to reconfigure these earlier Cold War imaginaries and relationships. Mark explores the importance of Eastern European expert cultures: in particular, he explores how Hungarian economists began to imagine Eastern and Southern Europe as part of a common 'semi-periphery' that shared structurally similar positions in the European and global economies, and hence faced similar economic issues. Yet developmental hierarchies in this exchange were questioned: in the immediate post-war period, international organisations had used ideas about development tested in interwar Eastern Europe on the depressed areas of Southern Europe.[74] From the late 1960s, by contrast, Franco's *apertura* policies reached out to the Soviet Bloc and exported Spain as a model for development. Indeed, such a model looked increasingly attractive as Eastern Bloc states feared their displacement by Spain in Western European – and in particular West German – export markets. Holleran's contribution examines the growing links between the tourist industries across peripheries, linking them to later post-Cold War transfers from Spain to Bulgaria. Markets and trade links helped to undermine the ideological opposition of the early Cold War too. In his contribution, Szobi reveals how Czechoslovakia – despite criticising Portuguese

[71] Riki van Boeschoten, 'From "Janissaries" to "Hooligans": Greek and Macedonian Refugee Children in Communist Hungary', in Maria N. Todorova, ed., *Remembering Communism: Genres of Representation* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2010), 155–86.

[72] Iván Harsányi, 'A chilei és a dél-európai baloldal közti kapcsolat és kölcsönhatás', *Múltunk* (2008/4), 246–7.

[73] Michele Alacevich, 'Postwar Development in the Italian Mezzogiorno. Analyses and Policies', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 18, 1 (2013), 90–112.

[74] Michele Alacevich, 'Planning Peace. Development Policies in Postwar Europe', paper presented at 'Development and Underdevelopment in Post-War Europe', workshop held at Columbia University, 10 Oct. 2014.

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fascism and imperialism in line with the rhetoric of African liberation movements it supported – nevertheless invested in brewing and mining industry, trucks and pavement works in Portuguese Angola.

From the late 1960s state socialist countries insisted on the inclusion of Southern Europe's authoritarian regimes in the Helsinki talks which came to herald the relaxation of tensions in Europe – and both East and South aligned themselves on several issues during the negotiations at the early 1970s.[75] The Portuguese, Spanish and Greek dictatorships' anti-communism was now trumped by the pressures of economic modernisation and their desire for a counterbalance to the West – factors which inspired cooperation with state socialist regimes.[76] Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s East–South collaboration as part of the Helsinki/Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process became part of the overall matrix of intra-European cooperation. Mark's contribution here outlines the importance of alliances between these regions in giving 'peripheral' (and often smaller) countries voice in the institutional processes of cultural Europeanisation of the 1970s and 1980s. He outlines how these alliances forged in international arenas spawned new bilateral links that addressed a range of cultural issues – from book translation, to film, to folk culture. Such initiatives helped give form to a revived sense of European culture, providing a framework in which countries belonging to different ideological worlds could now collaborate.[77]

In these stories of East–South convergence, Western Europe often played a rather limited role. In the 1960s and early 1970s it was indeed disinterest from – or even marginalisation by – 'core Europe' that brought East and South together. Eastern European exiles who had been welcomed in Western Europe in the 1940s and 1950s were often relegated to the margins in the context of East–West détente and *Ostpolitik* in the 1960s: as embodiments of an earlier aggressive anti-communism they were no longer politically useful.[78] Faced with a diminution of status, they started to link their causes to Southern European issues. Social democratic Hungarian exiles in Western Europe, for instance, started to profess solidarity with the anti-Francoist opposition in Spain in the 1960s.[79] Southern European oppositionists faced a similar fate of oblivion in Western Europe until the collapse of their regimes.[80] As Faraldo notes in his contribution, the French government banned the Spanish communist opposition

[75] Francisco José Rodrigo Luelmo, 'España y el proceso de la CSCE: la conferencia de Helsinki (1969–1975)', Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2015, 148–74.

[76] Rosa María Pardo Sanz, 'La politique extérieure espagnole de la fin du franquisme et son héritage sur la transition démocratique', *Histoire@Politique*, 29, 2 (2016), 125–140.

[77] There were other examples of such interactions: in 1989 Italy's 'Adriatic Initiative' attempted to address Yugoslavia's economic plights and political instability. See Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia e la fine della Guerra fredda. La politica estera dei governi Andreotti (1989–1992)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013).

[78] Kim Christiaens, Idesbald Goddeeris and Wouter Goedertier, 'Inspirées par le Sud: Les mobilisations transnationales Est-Ouest pendant la guerre froide', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 109, 1 (2010), 155–68.

[79] United Federation of Free Hungarian Workers, 1965, no. 1821, International Union of Socialist Youth, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.

[80] Pedro Aires Oliveira, 'A Sense of Hopelessness? Portuguese Oppositionists Abroad in the Final Years of the Estado Novo, 1968–1974', *Contemporary European History*, 26, 3 (2017), 465–86.

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in exile in their country – and in doing so strengthened the political role of those exiles who had gone to Eastern European capitals.

Connections between East and South were also important in the creation of the idea of a common anti-totalitarian struggle that superseded the labels of anti-communist or anti-fascist. From the late 1960s onwards some recognised the political advantages afforded by trying to identify the similarities of their causes: the protest of Greek and Spanish opposition movements to the crushing of the Prague Spring or on behalf of Eastern European dissident movements was often instrumentalised on behalf of their own fight. In 1968 the Greek exile Andreas Papandreou was quick to flaunt his country as the 'Czechoslovakia of the West' to secure and strengthen Western European support. Christiaens argues in his contribution on campaigns against the Greek junta that Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian dissidents and exiles aimed to construct a common 'anti-totalitarian' struggle by linking their own cause with that of the anti-fascist struggle in Southern Europe. Using the anti-fascist language of their own regimes they sought to hold their systems to their own claims of human rights and democracy.[81] Likewise, the unofficial hymn of the Polish August in 1980 and the later underground Solidarność opposition was the song 'Walls' (*Mury*), based on the Spanish songwriter Lluis Llach's *L'estaca*, one of the iconic songs of the anti-Francoist movement. Yet these were often the product of distant imaginaries rather than of concrete connections. Greek exiles and solidarity movements directed against the Colonels' regime were galvanised by the Soviet-Greek détente to construct a common cause with the plight of Eastern European dissidents; however, as Christiaens argues, the desire for shared struggle could not hide the major ideological differences between the movements.

The bonds that were forged between Eastern and Southern Europe continued – and in some cases even expanded – after the transitions to democracy in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s.[82] After the *metapolitefsi,* the Greek left's interest in Eastern Europe expanded, stimulated by new possibilities for travels, common borders, anti-Americanism and the continued presence of civil war refugees in Eastern Europe.[83] Links between Eastern and Southern Europe were promoted not only by newly legalised communist parties but also by the new democratic regimes that emerged in Portugal, Greece and Spain. A 'Balkan détente' was initiated in the 1960s and expanded under the post-authoritarian Karamanlis government in Greece.[84] It

81 Mark et al, 'Inspirations' in Gildea et al. *Europe's 1968*, 84–5; Pierre Hassner, 'L'Europe de l'est entre l'est et L'Europe', *Revue française de science politique*, 19, 1 (1969), 101–44, 117.

82 Paloma Serrano Postigo, 'El giro hacia el Este en la política exterior española tras el franquismo. El ejemplo del reencuentro con Polonia', in Carlos Flores Juberías, ed., *España y la Europa oriental: tan lejos, tan cerca: actas del V Encuentro Español de Estudios sobre la Europa Oriental* (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2009), 354–55.

83 Nikolaos Papadogiannis, 'Political Travel Across the "Iron Curtain" and Communist Youth Identities in West Germany and Greece in the 1970s and 1980s', *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire*, 23, 3 (2016), 526–53.

84 Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, '*Détente* as a Strategy: Greece and the Communist World, 1974–9', *The International History Review*, 35, 5 (2015), 1052–67.

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brought Balkan states together on themes such as tourism, environment and trade through the 1970s and 1980s.[85]

Relations between East and South also had an important extra-European dimension which is often missed in what are still very Eurocentric histories of Europeanisation.[86] In particular, identification with the Third World – as a site of revolution and as another 'periphery' – both inspired transformations in Eastern and Southern Europe and also enabled actors in both regions to come together. Such an identification was reinforced in worldviews in which Southern and Eastern Europe were seen not so much as regions of Europe but rather as constituent parts of the Third World and its associated problems – such as underdevelopment, dependency and neo-colonialism – as well as its solutions – national liberation and socialism.[87] Rejection by or disinterest from Western European-dominated institutions and social movements helped shift attention to alternatives outside Europe, both for regimes and the movements that opposed them. The rejection of the Spanish accession to the EEC, and Greece's forced withdrawal from the Council of Europe, turned these countries' regimes towards growing economies in the Third World, such as in Latin America, Gaddafi's Libya, Nasser's Egypt and Mobutu's Congo.[88] Cold War divides and ideological opposition were often trumped by attempts at economic development: as part of its *apertura* the Franco regime extended cooperation even to Allende's Chile.[89] Moreover, Eastern and Southern Europe were involved in each other's discovery of the Third World. Recent research, for instance, has revealed how the Greek left's interest in the Third World was mediated through Eastern European governments and Greek communists in exile, who translated documents and texts from Spanish and other foreign languages into Greek.[90] Likewise, as Christiaens argues, Portuguese, Greek and Spanish communists made contact with anti-colonial movements at the level of international communist organisations, such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions. In the early 1980s Spanish Christian democrats helped the fledging Polish trade union Solidarność to reach out to the Southern cone, whilst Spanish firms helped Hungarian enterprises, through joint ventures, to crack the Latin American market.[91]

[85] F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Greece's Balkan Policy in a New Strategic Era', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,* 5, 3 (2005), 405–25.

[86] Patel, 'Provincialising European Union'.

[87] Kostis Kornetis, 'Cuban Europe'? Greek and Iberian Tiersmondisme in the "Long 1960s"', *Journal of Contemporary History,* 50, 3 (2015), 486–515. This association has a long genealogy: in the 1930s, Paul Rodenstein-Rodan, one of the fathers of developmental economics, identified five vast internationally depressed areas; the far East, Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East and Eastern and Southern-Eastern Europe.

[88] See for instance: John Sakkas, 'The Greek Dictatorship, the USA and the Arabs, 1967–74', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 9, 3 (2004), 245–57.

[89] María José Henríquez Uzal, *¡Viva la verdadera amistad! Franco y Allende, 1970–1973* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 2014).

[90] Eugenia Palieraki, '"Le Chili est proche". Les mouvements antidictatoriaux grecs et les septembres chiliens', *Monde(s)*, 2, 8 (2015), 45–64.

[91] Kim Christiaens and Idesbald Goddeeris, 'Solidarność and Latin America in the 1980s: Encounters, Conflicts and Failures', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte,* 56 (2016), 445–61.

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Importantly, these connections with the Third World illustrate how the transitions in Eastern and Southern Europe were also a quest for alternative ways of being European, and not simply an integration into seemingly hegemonic ideas that were being produced in the Helsinki process. There were a variety of imaginaries within the Soviet sphere of influence. For some countries of the Eastern Bloc, a return to the values of Western Europe became predominant in 1980s – this was a zone that included Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland and would become known as 'Central Europe'. To their Southeast, however, alternative ideas of 'being European' were being promoted. The 1960s had seen the resurgence of a Southeastern European identity or the concept of 'Balkan Europe'. This concept situated the Balkans as the 'true Europe' whose heterogeneity and liminality could now be celebrated as providing the continent's true values in a post-imperial world. In so being, they did not need to be defined by Western Europeans as peripheral any longer. Such a rhetoric drew on ideas of recognition for former peripheries from the vocabulary of emancipatory projects of decolonisation in the Global South.[92] In the mid-1970s there also emerged a new geopolitical notion of the 'Mediterranean' – a political imaginary that brought together Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal and Spain as semi-peripheral areas facing similar issues of underdevelopment regardless of their bloc affiliation. Often the notion of a 'Mediterranean identity' articulated an opposition to the Northern 'capitalist' EEC and aimed to offer an alternative for Euro-sclerosis and Westernisation, identifying with non-alignment and détente.[93] This idea of a Mediterranean unity of progressive and socialist forces could also include new economic powers in the Arab World – most notably Gaddafi's Libya and Socialist Algeria.[94] The latter backed the development of initiatives that saw the former fascist states of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece as a harbinger for East–West reconciliation and Third World liberation.[95]

Western suspicions of such 'Southern European passions' led some of its leaders and observers to characterise Southern Europe as the continent's 'Third World', especially against the backdrop of the weakening of détente from the late 1970s

[92] Bogdan Iacob, 'South-East by Global South: The Balkans, UNESCO and the Cold War', in James Mark, Steffi Marung and Artemy M. Kalinovsky, eds., *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (forthcoming).

[93] Sofia Papastamkou, 'Greece between Europe and the Mediterranean, 1981–1986. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Greek-Libyan Relations as Case Studies', *Journal of European Integration History,* 21, 1 (2015), 49–69.

[94] See, for instance, Elena Calandri, Daniele Caviglia and Antonio Varsori, eds., *Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015). When Spain joined the European Community in 1986, it made significant efforts to bring the 'Mediterranean question' to the attention of Brussels. Further suggestions for a more institutionalised Mediterranean cooperation appeared within the frame of the Barcelona Process in the 1990s, leading to the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008. See Paul Kennedy, *The Spanish Socialist Party and the Modernisation of Spain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 120.

[95] See, for instance, on this 'Mediterranean' identity: Arab Peoples' Conference in Tripoli, 1977, Palestina, S. 1, B. 4, Fasc. 11, Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso Issoco, Rome.

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onwards.[96] In the 1980s the economic crisis and the coming to power of socialist governments in Spain, Greece and France prompted right-wing and conservative critics to see Southern Europe as leading a new 'Third Worldisation' of Europe: González in Spain and Papandreou in Greece were seen as new Salvador Allendes, whose assumption of power would herald the end of Western European democracy, stability and autonomy.[97] Similarly, in Eastern Europe, dissidents and their supporters in the West framed their struggles in Third Worldist terms, touting the Jaruzelski government in Poland as another Apartheid or Pinochet regime.[98] The Polish exile and Christian democratic trade union leader Jan Kułakowski – who would become chief negotiator during Poland's integration into the EU over the 1990s – promoted a coming together of the Third World and Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s as common victims of colonialism.[99]

These discourses interiorised Western narratives that established similarities between communism in Eastern Europe and colonialism since the 1940s.[100] This association between the European periphery and the Third World went into abeyance in the late 1980s[101] but resurfaced in Southern Europe in the context of the crisis of confidence in the European project after the financial crisis of 2008, particularly among a left that identified with the Global South, such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain.

Conclusion: A Specific Historical Moment of Interconnection?

This special issue deals with a particular political moment – between the 1960s and 2000s – when two peripheries came together, and the interactions between them shaped not only the other, but also the history of the broader continent. These

[96] Pierre Hassner, 'L'avenir des alliances en Europe', *Revue française de science politique*, 26, 6 (1976), 1049 Pierre Hassner, 'L'avenir prévisible des deux alliances en Europe', *Le Monde diplomatique*, June 1977, 8.

[97] Katherine Kanter, 'Spain's Socialists: Transition to a Coup?', *Executive Intelligence Review*, 9, 44 (16 Nov. 1982), 41; Bruce. R. Kuniholm, 'Rhetoric and Reality in the Aegean: U.S. Policy Options Toward Greece and Turkey', *SAIS Review,* 6, 1 (1986), 137; Hassner, 'L'avenir des alliances en Europe'.

[98] Adam Michnik, *Letters from Freedom: Post-Cold War Realities and Perspectives* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998), 99; Robert Brier, 'Poland's Solidarity as a Contested Symbol of the Cold War: Transatlantic Debates After the Polish Crisis', in Kiran Klaus Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode, eds., *European Integration and the Transatlantic Community in the 1980s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 99–100.

[99] Patrick Pasture, 'Jan Kułakowski, From Exile to International Trade Union Leader and Diplomat', in Michel Dumoul and Idesbald Goddeeris, eds*., Intégration ou représentation? Les exiles polonais en Belgique et la construction européenne* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Bruylant, 2005), 99–120; Kim Christiaens, 'The ICFTU and the WCL: The International Coordination of Solidarity', in Idesbald Goddeeris, ed., *Western European Trade Unions and the Polish Crisis, 1980–1982* (Lanham: Lexington, 2010), 101–27.

[100] See, for instance, Jan Vladislav, 'Cultural Resistance: Parallel Literature in Czechoslovakia', in Vladimir Tismaneanu and Judith Saphiro, eds., *Debates on the Future of Communism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 135–41, 139.

[101] Jasper M. Trautsch, 'Tagungsbericht: The South in Postwar Europe: Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, 27.06.2013 – 28.06.2013 Rom', *H-Soz-Kult*, 1 Oct. 2013. www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-5048 (last visited 26 July 2017).

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connections had not been prominent before this period – and came apart after it. Yet throughout this era debates about the nature of development, democratisation and Europeanisation brought actors and countries in both regions together. The most important mediating roles were played by the political left, compromising both social democrats and communists. However, there were even interconnections between those – such as conservative Catholics – who found common cause in their opposition to a social democratically-shaped transition across both regions.[102]

These connections would continue even after the end of the Cold War, as both regions dealt with similar questions of memory and dictatorship, as Eastern European migration to Southern Europe increased, or, as Holleran notes in his contribution, EU-sponsored programmes transferred developmental thinking from the South to the East. The idea of 'following the Spanish model' still had power in the early 1990s when leftist elites attempted to build consensus for radical economic reform; however, the relevance of *consenso* disappeared as Eastern European polities became politically deeply divided by the middle of the decade. Invigorated nationalisms 'spoke' to each other across peripheries too. States and borders that were shaped by dictatorships and saved by transitions connected separatist movements in Spain and Eastern Europe.[103] Nationalists in Catalonia and the Basque country drew inspiration from the break-up of communist states such as Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González was well aware of the contagiousness of this reinvigorated nationalism from the East. More than any other Western political figure, he encouraged Gorbachev to keep the Soviet Union together; Madrid later refused to recognise the independence of Kosovo, whose citizens still cannot travel to Spain.[104]

The interconnections that had deepened through parallel experiences of transition began to weaken over time. Indeed, the very names of these regions – often used as signifiers of economic or political peripherality – became less used, or were deliberately downplayed by agents from these regions. Seeking to distance themselves from an association with a backward East, a variety of elites in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia had referred to themselves as Central European from the late 1980s: such a term signalled their natural connection to core Europe and moved 'Eastern Europe' into the Balkans or the former republics of the Soviet Union. Likewise, with the successful integration of Greece, Portugal and Spain into European institutions in the 1990s, the term 'Southern Europe' was employed less and less.[105] Nevertheless, new forms of 'othering' kept these regional signifiers, and the connections they enabled, alive. Southern European politicians used Eastern Europe's

[102] Maria Thomas, 'Twentieth-Century Catholicisms: Religion as Prison, as Haven, as Clamp', in Helen Graham, ed., *Interrogating Francoism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 27–48, 40; Helen Graham, *The War and its Shadow: Spain's Civil War in Europe's Long Twentieth Century* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).

[103] Giulio Sapelli, *Southern Europe since 1945. Tradition and Modernity in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey* (London: Longman, 1995), 181; Göran Therborn, *European Modernity and Beyond. The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945–2000* (London: Sage, 1995), 300.

[104] Michail Gorbatschow, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), 763.

[105] Guido Franzinetti, 'Southern Europe and International Politics', 226–8.

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relative backwardness to define the South's normality as part of a mainstream Europe – as they sought to escape from their peripheral 'Third Worldist' image of the 1980s. The European Union's association agreements with post-communist states sparked anxiety in Southern Europe. Eastern Europe had the potential to become a serious competitor for EU funding: this concern was made manifest in Southern European diplomatic initiatives against the rapid accession of the post-communist countries to the EU. In the early 2000s Spanish Christian democrats – including prime minister José Maria Aznar – ventured doubts about division of European cohesion funds, feared the migration of companies from Spain to Poland and opposed the opening of Central European labour and agriculture to the European market.[106]

In the wake of the crisis of 2008 the concept of 'Southern Europe' returned, following the economic collapse and 're-peripheralisation' of the so-called PIIGS (Portugal-Ireland-Italy-Greece-Spain), a group dominated by states from the South of the continent.[107] Indeed, 'formerly Eastern European' countries such as Poland, which had escaped the worst of the crisis and now saw themselves as financially compromised for what they considered the profligacies of the South, began to define themselves as 'Northern European', seeking to align themselves with core Europe in new ways.[108] Elsewhere in the former East, the validity of an EU model of development derived from the Southern European experience was called into question: Holleran's contribution here explores how the disillusionment with tourist development fed nationalist and populist movements in Spain and Bulgaria, which widened the gulf between East and South after 2008. As he argues, many of those involved in development policy started to question the economic and political capacity of the EU to assist Eastern Europe in the same way it had helped Southern Europe. From a contemporary vantage point, the erosion of the distance between East and South from the 1970s to 1990s, as these two European peripheries faced similar issues of political and economic modernisation, appears more and more as a very particular, bracketed moment in post-war European history.

[106] Peter A. Poole, *Europe Unites: The EU's Eastern Enlargement* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2003), 177.
[107] On the return of peripheries in Europe after 2008, see Pamela Ballinger, 'Whatever Happened to Eastern Europe? Revisiting Europe's Eastern Peripheries', *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 31, 1 (2017), 60–1.
[108] Philipp Ther, *Europe since 1989. A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 248–58.

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