

libraries in China, with special emphasis on the strategy of Niccolò Longobardo, initiated in 1610–1611 and implemented by Nicolas Trigault and Johann Schreck Terrentius (“Terrenz”) between 1616 and 1619. Again, Golvers relies extensively on a series of ‘indirect’ sources such as manuscript notations and references from letters to reconstruct the history of the (predominantly) Jesuit libraries in China. In addition to the three main libraries in Beijing (Xitang/Nantang, Dongtang and Beitang), he also discusses the Jesuit collections at Macau, Canton (present-day Guangzhou), Hangzhou and other sites, established in the period between roughly 1600 and the 1820s, when the last Beijing library at Nantang was closed.

Golvers argues that his study reveals a largely neglected chapter of European book and reading history, and that it highlights at the same time a crucial chapter in the intercultural exchange between the late-humanistic Western culture and Chinese culture, in which the printed book played a pivotal role. I think that he has done an excellent job, and I enjoyed perusing both volumes. We are promised a third and final volume in this series at some point in the future, which will describe different classes of Western books, reflecting the domains of interest of both Jesuits and Chinese and the “exchange of knowledge and encounter of ideas” between early modern Europeans and Late Imperial Chinese ‘literati’. I hope that this final volume will also include a comprehensive concluding chapter, since I miss such a summary (an “executive summary”, if you wish) in the currently available volumes. While the author provides an excellent set-up in the Introduction to Volume 1, I would have expected to come across a final, concluding chapter in which the reader would be reminded of the key message Golvers wants us to take away from the large amount of material presented here for digestion. Given the wide-ranging nature of the narrative, this would certainly enhance the accessibility of this otherwise excellent scholarly work. Nevertheless, I highly recommend both current volumes to anyone with a serious interest in European–Chinese intellectual exchange and its historical context.

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CHINA’S WAR WITH JAPAN, 1937–1945: THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL. By RANA MITTER. pp. xxi, 458. London, Allen Lane, 2013.

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For decades, both Western and Chinese readers have known little about the truth of China’s war with Japan in the Second World War (1937–1945). What really happened in that war? Were there events, the understanding of which could help us elucidate complicated currents in East Asia in the post war period? Any readers seeking the answers to these questions will be quickly drawn into Rana Mitter’s *China’s War with Japan, 1937–1945*.

Based on the facts and images extracted from the archives and documents, Mitter ingeniously combines a grand narrative with individual perspectives (e.g., Chinese political leaders and Chinese refugees in the war), which present the multi-fold aspects of the China’s war with Japan. Mitter’s arguments serve as a firm reminder that China was “the first and most consistent foe of Axis aggression” (p. 244), but acted “as if it were a first-rank ally while being treated as a third-rank one” (p. 316). In the immediate post-war years, Chinese’s wartime sacrifices were finally acknowledged by international society. As a result, China became one of the five permanent states on the Security Council of the United Nations. As Mitter suggests, contemporary China should be regarded as “the product of the war against Japan”. (p.11)

This well-researched book has 19 chapters, a prologue, and an epilogue. The chapters are arranged in four thematic parts. Part I (Chapters 1–3) overviews China's international and domestic situation, and Sino-Japanese relations before the outbreak of the China's war with Japan. The following chapters (4–9) explain the preliminary stage of the war, from Japan's invasion into China in the early 1930s to the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. Next, Chapters 10–12 focus on the three years between the fall of Wuhan and Pearl Harbour at the end of 1941. In the final part (Chapters 13–19), Mitter stresses that there were three challenges facing Chiang Kai-shek's regime which finally led to the fall of Chiang's regime in 1949, the Japanese attack, domestic displacement and unreliable allies.

The most significant attribute of this book is the impartiality which Mitter displays while analyzing the controversial issues in China's war with Japan. First his appraisal of the reasons why the history of China's war with Japan has been wrapped in neglect for decades, in the words of Mitter, the root cause lies in "a toxic politics for which both the West and the Chinese themselves (on both sides of the Taiwan Strait) were responsible". (p.11) For instance, during the Cold War, when the West showed little concern about the history of the war, China "reversed most of the key parts of its narratives about the war years". (p.12)

Mitter does not avoid the dark sides of human behaviour in the war. He seriously condemned the warring parties gaining strategic advantage at the expense of human lives. On one hand, he describes the Japanese troops' massacre at Nanjing which killed 300,000 Chinese as "inexcusable". (p.137) On the other hand, he also criticises the consensus shared among the leading officials in the Nationalist government in China, which regards "the lives of individuals as expendable" (p.157). The most notorious example is Chiang's order to blow up the Yellow River's dykes in central Henan province, in a desperate attempt to contain the Japanese troops, which claimed lives of 500,000 Chinese.

In Mitter's opinion, Britain held a pragmatic attitude towards China in her war against Japan. So it's not surprising that British's attitude toward China "veered between affable detachment and contempt". (p.244) In contrast, Japan took an active part in advocating the ideology of pan-Asianism, while fuelling the strategy of division that "China was not one entity, but a patchwork of regimes". (p.96) Following this strategy, Japan established a series of client regimes in China, such as the Nanjing Regime of Wang Jingwei.

The United States maintained a more open attitude toward China but, as Mitter argues, there was an essential misconception that "the Chinese aspired to become like Americans, and that it was the job of the Americans to train them to achieve that goal" (p.43). For instance, the political leaders (i.e., Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong and Wang Jingwei), did not seek to establish what the United States would regard as a democracy.

In fact, the three political leaders successively took the ideas from the legacy of Dr Sun Yat-sen's 'Three People's Principles' of nationalism, democracy and livelihood for the people. Chiang advocated these principles, without defining or developing those principles; while in contrast, Mao Zedong re-wrote the principles. In Mao's well-known article entitled 'On New Democracy', he proposed a 'New Three People's Principles', that is, cooperating with the Soviet Union, the international Communist Party and assisting peasants and workers. Wang Jingwei however used Dr Sun's notion of pan-Asianism, to argue that "collaboration with Japan was in fact a version of the nationalist project that Sun had pursued." (p. 229)

From a comparative perspective, Mitter contextualises the scenarios in which Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei took different responses to the war, and reveals a more complex truth. Though Chiang has always been criticised for his military thinking in the war, he was "repeatedly forced to deploy his troops in ways that served Allied geostrategic interests but undermined China's own aims" (pp. 13–14). Ironically all the stakeholders realised that "if Chiang was killed, there was nobody else of his status to rule China" (p. 65).

Wang Jingwei lacked sufficient standing to lead. He had served as “second in command” to Dr Sun, and then believed himself to be the legal heir to Dr Sun Yat-sen. (p. 7) As Mitter perspicaciously reveals, Wang’s obvious deficiency was “his lack of military support”. (p. 218) Due to this deficiency, Japan held Wang in reserve, rather than taking him seriously. (p. 218) In contrast, Chiang Kai-shek was able to mobilise 4 million troops to fight against half a million Japanese troops. At the same time, Mao Zedong led a guerrilla war to prevent Japan from controlling large parts of northern China.

On the whole, *China’s War with Japan, 1937–1945* deserves all of the acclaims it has earned. It provides extremely valuable insights to scholars and students interested in the China’s war with Japan (1937–1945), and represents a significant advancement in the literature of the history and politics of modern China. It is an ideal textbook for classes devoted to the studies of modern China. For general readers, no previous knowledge of modern China is required. It deserves a place in serious libraries around the world for many years to come. [chenkai@zju.edu.cn](mailto:chenkai@zju.edu.cn)

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ROBERT MORRISON AND THE PROTESTANT PLAN FOR CHINA. By CHRISTOPHER A. DAILY. pp. 261. Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2013.  
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In 1807, under the auspices of the London Missionary Society (LMS), Robert Morrison (1782–1834) arrived in Guangzhou 廣州 as the first Protestant missionary to China. Throughout his missionary career, Morrison baptised only very few Chinese converts. Nevertheless, with the help of William Milne (1785–1822) and Chinese assistants, Morrison produced a number of pioneering works that would benefit those following in his footsteps. These works include a complete Chinese translation of the Bible, a Chinese–English/English–Chinese dictionary, a Chinese grammar in English, and several Christian tracts in Chinese. Moreover, Morrison and Milne established the Anglo–Chinese College in Malacca, which was intended to impart both Christian and secular knowledge to the Chinese, and to instruct missionaries and others in Chinese language and literature.

While there is no lack of secondary literature on Morrison’s life and experiences, none of them examines in detail the missionary training received by Morrison and whether this exerted a profound influence over the development of his mission among the Chinese. Drawing on archival materials from libraries in London, Edinburgh, Hong Kong and Lampeter, Daily looked into this neglected aspect of studies on Morrison. His *Robert Morrison and the Protestant Plan for China* makes a strong case that whilst introducing Protestantism to China, Morrison faithfully implemented the mission strategy prescribed by his tutor at Gosport Academy, David Bogue (1750–1825), a Scottish dissenting minister who was among the founders of the LMS.

In the first chapter, Daily gave us concise background information about the birth of British evangelicalism and the formation of the LMS. He then explored the LMS’s inaugural mission to the South Sea Islands, for which Thomas Haweis’s (1733/1734–1820) “godly mechanic missionary strategy” (p. 25) was adopted. This strategy suggested that despite having only the basic rudiments of education, ‘godly mechanics’, who “excelled in the industrial arts” and “energetically felt the Word” (*ibid*), would be able to impress the islanders with their technological and mechanical skills and thus convert them to Protestantism. The strategy proved to be a disaster. Lacking the ability and willingness to engage