

“Christianity, the Common Law, and the American Order.” The collection of documents from the Biblical and European traditions though are necessarily incomplete given the constraints of space; while it is laudable to attempt to cover such a vast historical scope, the selectivity of presentation renders the results perhaps more misleading than informative.

Given the drawbacks to existing modes of relying on the Founders’ views in religion clause adjudication that Muñoz and Drakeman identify, how should we proceed? Although both Muñoz and Drakeman maintain that originalist interpretation cannot support the “wall of separation” approach to issues of establishment that has been an active possibility at least since *Everson v. Board of Education*, they derive disparate conclusions from that premise. The persuasive authority that Muñoz finds in members of the Founding generation leads him to advocate adopting a modified version of the position he attributes to James Madison — one of state non-cognizance of religion (7). By contrast, for Drakeman, the minimalist conception of the Establishment Clause should prevail and, apart from disallowing a national church, the courts should leave determinations about religion to the political branches. Both thereby indicate that originalist interpretation alone could not lead to the results of the Establishment Clause cases that the Supreme Court adjudicated in the twentieth century and beyond, but that historical materials might well retain value as furnishing insight into church-state relations. This sounds very much like a return to a pre-Bork and pre-Scalia vision of the utility of history, and one that could easily be shared by a pragmatist such as Justice Breyer. Strikingly, those opposed to a separationist or even nonpreferentialist position with regard to the Establishment Clause have now abandoned originalism and adopted a more eclectic vision of constitutional adjudication.

***The Political Influence of Churches.* By Paul A. Djupe and Christopher P. Gilbert. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. x + 294 pp. \$80.00 cloth, \$22.99 paper**

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Paul A. Djupe and Christopher P. Gilbert have produced a theoretically rich and (mostly) empirically satisfying account of the various ways that

church sociology, as distinct from religious belief or identity, influences mass policy preferences and political participation. In so doing, the authors have contributed meaningfully to our collective understanding of the political roles played by social networks and context more generally.

Revealing intimate awareness of the internal dynamics of mainline Protestantism, and employing an inventive data collection strategy wherein the sample is stratified *by congregation*, Djupe and Gilbert carefully distinguish six mechanisms of church influence: denominational differences, formal social networks within the congregation, informal social networks (acquaintances who serve as discussion partners), clergy cues, context (aggregated mean opinion of congregation on given issues), and personal religiosity. Furthermore, the authors explore the conditioning roles of gender, partisan majority status, group homogeneity, and other controls.

Perhaps the single most remarkable finding of the book is that *most* political influence in church does not stem from the pulpit or from the casual conversations that occur at potluck dinners. *Rather, the most consistent and powerful source of political persuasion and mobilization is within organized small groups.* Other interesting findings include the following: (1) religious commitment, as distinct from other church dynamics, is not a consistent predictor of anything political; (2) when clergy call attention to an issue, it sparks deliberation on the issue, which steers opinions toward those of the congregation as a whole — even if those opinions contradict that of the pastor; (3) substantial inter-denominational differences in opinion are observed, but those differences pale in comparison to those observed intra-denominationally; (4) church influence (*via* several mechanisms) is strongest when congregants see themselves as politically isolated in their neighborhoods and workplaces; and (5) political disagreement within social networks depresses political participation when congregants (especially women) see themselves as part of the majority, but can actually encourage participation when congregants see themselves in the minority. This last finding offers nuance to Diana Mutz's theoretically disheartening argument (*Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative vs. Participatory Democracy*) that democracy may be either deliberative or participatory, but is probably not both.

Djupe and Gilbert surely will take some heat over the composition of their sample, specifically its restriction to Lutherans and Episcopalians. Such criticism is not unwarranted, given that these denominations: (1) resemble each other closely, thereby limiting their comparative utility; (2) feature liturgical worship styles and hierarchical organizational

structures, both of which are somewhat anachronistic within American Protestantism; (3) are quite small (and getting smaller, while many other denominations are growing), (4) are geographically concentrated in the Midwest and Northeast, respectively, and (5) fill their pews with citizens who are disproportionately aged, female, educated, and “well-to-do.” As such, it is safe to say that the sample of congregants analyzed in this book probably does not accurately reflect the population of practicing Christians in the United States.

On the other hand, this sample of Christians contains much more variance in terms of political attitudes and habits than could be observed in virtually any evangelical sample, providing greater analytical leverage and thereby enabling the authors to claim with greater credibility that the social dynamics in these churches closely resemble those of communities more generally.

Furthermore, this sample may actually *understate* many of the authors’ most significant findings relative to what would be observed had they sampled evangelical congregations. First, I suspect the prospects for social influence in churches, generally speaking, are even stronger in congregations with more “democratic” governing structures and homogenous congregants (especially those of lower socioeconomic status). Second, evangelicals (especially those in “mega-churches”) are much more likely to “find their place” in church by participating in small groups, which would enhance the overall impact of those interactions. Third, the observation that church influence is greater when congregants see themselves as politically isolated further suggests that church influence would be greatest among evangelicals, who more commonly see themselves as “in this world, but not of it.” Finally, with regard to the finding that civic skill acquisition in churches suffers from a gender bias, I imagine that such bias is magnified within more conservative religious traditions.

However, sampling limitations probably do not understate all of the authors’ conclusions. As the authors acknowledge, the persuasive efficacy of clergy cues (which the authors find to be minimal) is likely to be greater in evangelical traditions, which tend to require greater deference to pastoral leadership. My biggest concern, though, has to do with the authors’ repeated assertion (articulated most emphatically on page 249) that the psychological approach to studying religio-political dynamics (which has emphasized belief-based differences between doctrinal “traditionalists” and “modernists”), has limited theoretical efficacy relative to the sociologically rooted approach these authors employ. There are

probably at least two reasons why the authors do not find much predictive utility, either in terms of opinion change or political participation, in their measure of individual “religious commitment.” First, the sample contains little variance on that score, given the exclusion of both non-religious citizens and citizens from religious traditions where traditionalists abound.

Second, and even more importantly, the authors’ measure of “commitment” conflates at least four distinct sets of characteristics: church attendance, private devotions, religious orthodoxy, and a psychological orientation toward dogmatism. In conflating these four dimensions, the authors assume (as have many other scholars of religion and politics before them) that religious traditionalists are just more “committed” to their faith than are non-traditionalists. I would argue, by contrast, that modernists and traditionalists practice entirely different faiths altogether, but frequently do so with the same levels of personal commitment. Thus, by conflating these dynamics into a single variable, we simply do not know what the real explanatory impact might be of such differences in religious beliefs, values, and mindsets.

Finally, it should be noted that several of the most important variables that students of political behavior usually seek to explain — party identification, candidate preference, and turnout — are not addressed in these pages. I do not mention that as a critique; one cannot do everything in a single study. However, these are important questions that future research following in the footsteps of this study should address.

In sum, while I consider this book to be the most important one written on the subject of religion and politics since Geoffrey Layman’s *The Great Divide*, and indeed one of the most important books written on the subject to date (I have already assigned it to two graduate classes and incorporated its findings into my undergraduate lectures), it cries out for an extension. The community of scholars in this subfield should pick-up where Djupe and Gilbert have left off, replicating this design with a sample of Catholics, Methodists, Southern Baptists, nondenominational Pentecostals, and seculars who are “religiously” committed to some other organization. As part of that effort, scholars will hopefully disaggregate the measure of “commitment” into “church attendance,” “devotionalism,” “doctrinal orthodoxy,” and “cognitive dogmatism” (exploring theoretically driven interaction effects among these variables). These measures (along with the innovative ones derived here by Djupe and Gilbert), should then be put to use explaining not only issue attitudes and uncommon forms of participation, but also partisanship, vote choice, and turnout.