Donald Trump, the blogging of Beppe Grillo, or the "digital acclamation" (p. 187) methods used by Movimento 5 Stelle or Podemos suggest that they instead want to make *representation* more direct. Unlike traditional "mandate representation," which is based on (a degree of) mistrust toward and the close monitoring of elected partisan representatives, direct representation should generate "*trust through faith*" in the leader, a faith that remains "undivided and unreserved" (p. 164). Whether this can actually be achieved with tweets or blog posts remains, of course, an open question, but the ambition to generate unreserved faith is arguably there. Supporters are meant to believe that the leader *embodies* the people.

In sum, this is a complex and highly stimulating book that adds considerable complexity to a theoretical debate that has largely ran out of steam. The book's value lies not least in its distinctive approach: unlike most studies of populism that I am aware of, Urbinati tries to sensitize the reader to the fact that democratic institutions, procedures, and practices are always liable to dynamic change and to the role of political agency in effecting transformations of democracy.

This, then, leads me to a question raised by reading the book: Have populist parties and leaders also transformed their mainstream *political competitors* and perhaps even had a greater impact on *them* than on democratic institutions? Consider that we might be witnessing the dawn of a "post-populist" age: Trump has been voted out of office, and the same goes for Matteo Salvini's Lega or the Austrian FPÖ—to name just three high-profile cases of populists in power. And although democratic institutions have withstood the challenge, it seems to me that ostensibly moderate politicians are increasingly assuming populist features. The social democratic Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen, the conservative Bavarian minister-president Markus Söder (who may well have become German chancellor had the CDU nominated him), or the just-ousted former Austrian chancellor Sebastian Kurz have all successfully instituted highly leader-centered forms of "direct representation," silencing their party organization and opposing traditional forms of intermediation. However much one recoils from the idea of populist parties in power, the prospect of a mainstreamed post-populism is equally unsettling. Urbinati's book helps us further understand why.

Justice across Ages: Treating Young and Old as Equals. By Juliana Uhuru Bidadanure. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. 256p. $100.00 cloth.
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In our current moment, at the convergence of climate change and pandemic catastrophes, we have been reminded that the young and the old are disproportionately affected by political, environmental, and economic calamities. Juliana Uhuru Bidadanure's *Justice across Ages: Treating Young and Old as Equals* represents one of those rare instances of a book arriving at precisely the right time. Bidadanure's philosophical exploration of intergenerational justice and equality has a great deal to tell us about how we might think through these enduring problems.

Part I begins with the question of which inequalities between young and old are acceptable and which are unjust. Unlike forms of injustice rooted in immutable characteristics linked to race and sex, individuals are not frozen at a fixed age. Thus, we are all at one age a beneficiary and at another a victim of age-based inequalities. The question, then, is how to judge the justness of these differences that have a uniquely temporal dimension. Bidadanure identifies two approaches. The first, a synchronic approach, attends to the distribution of goods at a snapshot in time and assesses whether the discrepancies within that moment between people of different ages are just or unjust. Sometimes they might be acceptable because it is important that some opportunities are responsive to age, as when elderly folks quite reasonably receive the lion's share of health care resources. A diachronic approach looks at how people of a certain generation fare over their lifetimes and compares that with other generational cohorts. A commitment to equality seems to demand that no generation should be left worse off than the generation that preceded it. Granted, it might be necessary to treat two people of different ages unequally for a period of time, but their lifetimes ought to mirror one another in terms of generational prospects.

Innovating on the Rawlsian veil of ignorance exercise, Bidadanure argues that a "prudent planner" who is unaware of their age would conclude that resources afforded during one's lifetime ought to be, at a minimum, sufficient to avoid deprivation and to uphold freedom. The prudent planner would also conclude behind the veil of ignorance that resources ought to be distributed efficiently throughout one's lifetime so as to maximize opportunities, which typically entails frontloading opportunities so that young people can set themselves up early for success.

Now, there are many defects inherent in distributional models of justice. Bidadanure does not disentangle these snares directly, but she does devote a great deal of analysis to the way distributional arguments fail to capture the whole picture. The problem of unequal standing, esteem, and respect between people of different ages is an issue related to distribution but also one that falls outside its purview. These additional considerations require a synchronic approach, one that looks at particular relations of respect and equality between people of different ages at a discrete moment in time, regardless of whether the injustice is ultimately temporary or will be balanced out by some future (or past) reversal of fortunes. Bidadanure refers to this theorizing of social stigma and marginalization as the

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"relational egalitarian ideal" (there are an abundance of novel principles and ideals in this book) and shows how it can operate in conjunction with a distributional framework. In the end, justice requires that people be *both* appropriately provisioned *and* appropriately respected and included throughout their lifetimes.

The second half of *Justice across Ages* seeks to demonstrate just what happens when this hybrid diachronic-distributional/synchronic-relational approach to intergenerational justice is applied to issues of labor force exclusion, basic resource allocation, and political marginalization. Judged on the application of concepts set out in the three chapters in part I, Bidadanure does a masterful job of convincingly illustrating how discrimination against young and old people in the labor force, wealth distribution, and political representation violates principles of intergenerational justice by not providing sufficient or efficient allocation of resources and by censoriously diminishing their political visibility and representation. The book ends abruptly after this series of examples and would have benefited from a concluding chapter wherein Bidadanure pressed the theory in new directions and outlined a brief course for future research.

If there is one fault with *Justice across Ages*, it is that the methodological choices prevent taking on some of the more difficult and interesting cases. There are moments when Bidadanure is clear that suspicion is warranted when it comes to traditionally "normal" conditions and relations between people of different ages. Many norms, customs, and laws considered "normal" might simply reflect forms of generational domination that have sedimented over time. Bidadanure provides a defense of young children against infantilization and other demeaning actions and restrictions, even offering a provocative footnote observing that modern schooling might represent a kind of unjust age-based segregation.

Indeed, this is why an important initial step in theorizing intergenerational equality is placing the perspectives of different generations on equal footing, thereby exposing possible generational prejudgments built into our "normal" concepts and institutions. So, in addition to thinking about the voting age and electing younger people, we might inquire whether the formation of government through mass elections is the kind of thing that children would endorse in the first place. Might children define political agency and inclusion very differently, and advocate for institutions that radically diverge from a system created by adults so that adults could have a space to exercise adult capacities for mutual reasoning? While thinking through one's right to a job or to a basic income, we might also ask this question: If given a choice, would children choose capitalism and wage labor as the preferred mode of provisioning society with necessary goods and services? Or would they find wage labor inherently unfair, demeaning, and contrary to intergenerational justice?

More to the point is the issue of corporal punishment. The very old might be disadvantaged in many ways compared to the middle-aged, yet it is both illegal and immoral to use fear, intimidation, or physical coercion to compel behavior from any member of these demographics. In most western jurisdictions, however, it is perfectly legal, and in some cases considered morally obligatory, to use these tools of force and coercion against children. Here we have one of the hard cases of intergenerational justice. One gets the sense from the totality of arguments in *Justice across Ages* that prohibitions on disrespectful and demeaning treatment would prohibit the disciplining of children, but it remains unclear.

Justice across Ages is not unique in admitting of methodological difficulties and missed opportunities, but it is a special piece of scholarship, one that offers a timely and forcefully argued intervention into a discipline that is slowly awakening to the necessity of justice across generations.

Theory of the Earth. By Thomas Nail. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021. 352p. $90.00 cloth, $28.00 paper.
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That we are in dire need of new planetary thinking and political action, at a variety of scales, is by now perhaps indisputable. In a book both sweeping in scope and generatively unsettling, Thomas Nail sets out no less than a *Theory of the Earth*, a title borrowed from James Hutton's eighteenth-century geo-philosophical treatise of the same name, brought forward to address twenty-first-century issues. It is part of a burgeoning field of work around geological thought, deep time, and planetary scale that draws seemingly unlikely connections between the deepest strata of Earth and contemporary developments in politics, economy, and identity. Mining this deep vein, this book makes a philosophical argument at one of the largest scales that human thought can operate on— that of the planetary, all the way from its molten core to the brittle mantle where all life exists and human history is just a blip—all situated in broader patterns, motion, and energy expenditures of the cosmos. Rather than as a static earth on which humans and their mobility-driven systems of transport, economy, and migration exist, Nail argues, we need to understand the Earth as fully and constitutively in motion, and human actions therefore as part of a mobile earth: a kinetic planet in need of a new kinetic ethics.

The book makes this case in well-structured parts on theory, history, and ethics. Drawing both on various strands of process philosophy and on earth systems science, the first part proposes a theory of geokinetics, arguing that the Earth is not a thing but a mobile entity

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