Mother and friends in a Holocaust life story

D E B O R A H   S C H I F F R I N

Department of Linguistics
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20057
schiffrd@georgetown.edu

A B S T R A C T

Although oral histories about the Holocaust are increasingly important sources of public commemoration, as well as data for historians, they also provide opportunities for survivors to recount life stories that describe intensely personal and painful memories. One type of memory concerns relationships with significant and familiar "others." By analyzing the linguistic construction (through variation in the use of referring terms and reported speech) of two relationships (with mother and friends) in one Holocaust survivor's life story, this article shows how survivors' life stories position "others" within both their own lives and more broadly construed matrices of cultural archetypes and historically contingent identities (victim, survivor, bystander). (Narrative, life story, oral history, identity, mother/daughter, friendship, referring terms, reported speech, Holocaust discourse, language and history)*

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Although only a small percentage of American Jews have had direct experience with the Holocaust, the Nazi extermination of 75 percent of European Jewry in World War II has become a centralizing symbol in American Jewish life (Novick 1999), as well as a potent and pervasive reference point for the description of other human catastrophes that both precede (e.g., the enslavement of African Americans) and postdate (e.g., AIDS) the Holocaust (Schiffrin 2001a). The reasons for the symbolic resonance of the Holocaust include not only historical, demographic, political, ideological, and religious factors (Flanzbaum 1999, Friedlander 1993, Greenspan 1999, Hertzberg 1996, Novick 1999, Schiffrin 2001a, Shandler 1999), but also worries about the effect of passage of time on the availability of eyewitness testimonies about the Holocaust: since Holocaust survivors are aging and dying, scholars want to capture as many personal memories about the Holocaust as possible.

The collection of Holocaust oral histories has been undertaken by community groups, local and national museums, and national and international foundations. More than 180 collections of tens of thousands of Holocaust oral histories have transformed what had once been personal memories and individual testimonies

confined to private domains – such as diaries, psychotherapy, and family talk – to public institutions such as research archives, schools, and museums. Holocaust oral histories have thus complemented the many other material and symbolic resources (e.g., museums, monuments, memoirs, films) commemorating the Holocaust, and they have added the voices of survivors to the multitude of historians, theologians, journalists, and others who have spoken of the Holocaust. As Geoffrey Hartman, one of the first scholars to undertake the collection of Holocaust oral histories, has proposed and demonstrated, "The conviction has grown that local knowledge, which speaks from inside a situation rather than from the outside in an objectifying manner, can provide a texture of truth that eludes those who adopt a prematurely unified voice" (1996: 135).

In this article, I analyze portions of the oral history of one Holocaust survivor: Ilse Kahane, a German Jew who spent her adolescence in forced labor, imprisonment, and concentration camps. My particular interest is in Ilse's life story, and within that story, in the discursive construction of her relationship with family and friends. I focus specifically on people within these two groups whom Ilse herself marks as relevant: within Ilse's family, her mother; among Ilse's friends, four women with whom she shared her camp experiences.

Living through catastrophic events such as the Holocaust changes one's life in multiple and complex ways. In addition to the most extreme of dualities felt by many survivors – one self has died, another self has lived (Greenspan 1999:45– 49; Langer 1991:48–49) – comes the impact of having lost some or all of one's family, friends, and community. As social constructivist theories of identity (e.g., Gergen 1987) suggest, the massive loss of significant and familiar "others" not only disrupts one's former sense of normal social relationships and the moral order in which they are supposed to reside; it also threatens one's sense of self as an integrated and continuous entity.[1] Thus, by analyzing the discursive construction of Ilse's relationships – relationships in which Ilse presents her self through interaction with others – we may be able to gain some insight into the continuity and coherence of identity over time.

In addition to serving commemorative and psychological functions (see below), Holocaust oral histories serve as data for historians. Completely different wartime roles were played by Ilse's mother and Ilse's friends: whereas her mother abandoned her in Germany in 1939, Ilse and her friends survived Nazi persecution from 1942 to 1945. Analyzing mother/daughter and friendship discourse thus also allows us to explore several issues that bear on historically acquired identities (e.g., "victim," "bystander," "survivor") that recently have been examined through the dual lenses of history and gender (Baumel 1998, Ofer and Weitzman 1998). Thus, by analyzing Ilse's discursive construction of her mother and her friends, we may also be able to learn more about how historically contingent identities intersect not only with personal relationships, but also with broader domains of social, cultural, and moral meanings.

In my background to the analysis, I summarize the functions of Holocaust oral histories, my methodology, and the content of Ilse's life story. My main analytic focus is on the use of referring terms for mother and friends to represent "who they are" and the use of reported speech to demonstrate "what they do." After summarizing the linguistic lessons of the analysis, I discuss the overlapping networks of relationships in which Ilse's discursive identity is embedded. I conclude with a brief statement on the relationship between linguistics and Holocaust studies.

BACKGROUND

What we can learn from listening to Holocaust survivors speak about their experiences during oral histories complements what we learn about the Holocaust from the other genres in which it has been represented, such as written texts (history, fiction, poetry), visual media (plays, films, photographs, television), or public displays (museums, ceremonies, commemorations). As we will see in this section, Holocaust oral histories have varied functions, whose manifestation in their structure and performance sets parameters around what we can learn and thus motivates the methodology through which I will analyze identity.

Holocaust oral histories

The experience of European Jews in World War II was a relatively unrecognized event in the early postwar years, not frequently distinguished in academic, mass media, or private discourse from the general discourse of the war (Dawidowicz 1981, Hertzberg 1996). By the 1990s, however, what came to be called the "Holocaust" had become a centralizing symbol for American Jews (Flanzbaum 1999, Novick 1999) and a familiar topic in American discourse (Schiffrin 2001a). Holocaust oral histories have both contributed to and provided evidence of this transformation in collective memory.[2] Holocaust oral histories have three different functions: they contribute to collective memory and public commemoration; they serve as historical documents that provide information about the Holocaust; and they provide interactive opportunities for survivors to recount their past experiences. Since each one of these functions contributes to the broad educational goal of teaching about the Holocaust, they are all relevant to the important symbolic role that the Holocaust has come to play in American life.

Let us begin with the commemorative function of Holocaust oral histories. Edited segments and excerpts from oral histories are replayed in museums, on television, and in movies; they are also condensed, edited, and reproduced in print media, on interactive media such as computerized learning centers, and on web sites. Holocaust oral histories thus complement the many other material and symbolic resources commemorating the Holocaust, and they add the voices of survivors to the multitude of those commenting on it. Like other commemorative resources (Linenthal 1995, Young 1993), oral histories are at least partially de-

signed for the audience – including the general public – who will be learning from them (Kacandes 1994).

Although public memorial of the Holocaust often embodies its sheer vastness, hearing one person tell about the changes and losses in his or her life personalizes its otherwise numbing horror; subjective involvement in the details of individual lives is often observed (e.g., by Hammer 1998, Miller 1991, and Strassfeld 1985) to offer a more accessible route toward understanding the devastating effects of the Holocaust on individual, family, communal, and cultural life. Thus, the firm niche that the Holocaust has come to occupy within American collective memory is partially created "one by one by one" (Miller 1991) through the intersubjectivity between narrator and audience that pervades the telling of narratives of personal experience in general.

The second role of Holocaust oral histories is to provide first-person testimony for scholars. Although oral histories offer unique opportunities to focus on personal experiences of everyday life, they can also address broader social, cultural, and political inquiries. In this sense, their use in Holocaust studies is comparable to the Italian microhistory perspective developed in the 1970s (Iggers 1997, chap. 9). This perspective draws from a wide range of disciplines – including interpretive anthropology and Marxist social theory – to analyze both modern 20th-century history for which oral histories are available, as well as earlier periods for which scholars rely on more conventional sources. Microhistory does not substitute for the analysis of large-scale social and political processes; nor does it completely reject the use of social science methodology for investigating changes in those processes (see Bartaux 1981 for comparable points about the use of personal biography for studying society). Rather, by supplementing analyses of those processes with information about how they were experienced by ordinary men and women, they add the perspective of those whose everyday lives might have helped set those processes into motion and those who felt the consequences of those processes. The wealth of detail offered by Holocaust oral histories can offer the same depth of insight.

Although many Holocaust scholars quote freely and extensively from oral histories, others treat them with caution and skepticism: because the stories within them have been told so many times, in so many settings, and to so many people, the worry is that they no longer represent an authentic, unmediated voice. Sets of guidelines have developed that propose solutions for a range of questions concerning the use of oral histories as factual documents. Thus, the *Oral history interview guidelines* (Ringelheim, Donahue, & Rubin 1998) published by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, includes both general guidelines for learning about the basic historical facts of the Holocaust prior to an interview (chap. 3) and specific guidelines for authenticating information (identifying places, names, dates, and so on) after an interview (Appendix 9). Tec 1993 advocates checking basic dates and events, comparing different sources, and conducting multiple inter-

views with the same person, asking "the same questions again and again" (p. 273); see also Greenspan 1998. Gurewitsch (1998:xx) supplements her collection of oral histories with extensive footnotes that reveal the extent to which she was "able to verify and corroborate the information in the interviews."

The two relatively public roles of oral histories discussed thus far – public commemoration and historical inquiry – are supplemented by a third, more private role: oral histories can provide survivors with an empathetic milieu in which to tell their life stories, thus locating what Laub (1998:802) calls the "trace" of a "loss of place":

> Because of the radical break between trauma and culture, victims often cannot find categories of thought or words to contain or give shape to their experience. That is, since neither culture nor past experience provide structures for formulating acts of massive destruction, survivors cannot articulate trauma even to themselves.

Comments from survivors in the oral histories that I have been analyzing coincide with observations from social scientists (e.g., Abzug 1985) that their wartime experiences were largely ignored in both private and public discourse in the early postwar years. Ilse, for example, states that *at that time, I . . . . if I was asked, I was willing to answer. But if I wasn't asked, I won't – I didn't volunteer anything*. A silence occupies even the space with her parents: *I don't know if they were afraid of asking me, and I didn't volunteer too much*.

The few survivor stories that were publicly told were reconfigured into culturally acceptable American themes (e.g., "people move on from their past") and/or concluded with happy endings (e.g., "lovers/family members are reunited," see Shandler 1999, chap. 2). Academic scholarship focused largely on perpetrators and bystanders. It was not until the 1967 trial of Adolf Eichmann that many Holocaust victims spoke publicly of their experiences; and it was only after the fictional miniseries drama *Holocaust* was seen by 120 million television viewers in 1978 that many other Holocaust victims decided to contribute their memories to the public record (Shandler 1999:288).

Holocaust oral histories help locate the "trace" of a "loss of place" by providing an interactive and textual environment in which to bear witness not only to the events of destruction, but also to "the psychological and emotional milieu of the struggle for survival, *not only then but now*" (Hartman 1996:142; emphasis mine). Holocaust oral histories have thus sometimes enabled individuals to deal with a past whose memories had not yet found a language in which to be conveyed (Ballinger 1999, Eitinger 1998, LaCapra 2001, Laub 1998) – that is, to "work through" their trauma. However, the potential therapeutic outcome is not always realized. Survivors' oral histories also reveal continuous struggles with "what happened," with how to convey what happened, and with how to integrate the self of past experience with the self of current existence. Both the depth and breadth of such strug-

gles are reflected in Langer's (1991) distinction among different types of memories (deep, anguished, humiliated) in which the Holocaust remains simultaneously part of – but separate from – one's current life world. Friedlander's (1992b:54) contrast between Holocaust memories at the collective and individual levels can thus be extended to texts: although historians' texts may unintentionally end up erasing the "excess" of the Holocaust, it seems unlikely that all individual narratives of survivors will achieve "a redemptive closure (comforting and healing in effect)."

In sum, I have suggested that Holocaust oral histories have three functions that contribute in different ways to a broad educational goal: they complement other material and symbolic resources that commemorate the Holocaust; they provide data about "what happened" for scholars; and they provide a venue in which survivors talk about their experiences. Both interviewers and respondents show explicit awareness of all three functions of oral histories. Respondents indicate awareness that what they say can serve collective memory in a positive way: they hope that it can do some good in the world, and that what they went through will not be forgotten. Also indicated by both respondents and interviewers is the need to present accurate information for the historical record: respondents, for example, compare what they know now with what they knew then; they not only add but also comment on the accuracy of time, place, people, and setting. Finally, awareness of all three functions of oral histories appears in interviewers' questions and in the co-construction of the structure, themes, and genres within oral histories. In the next section, I turn to the genre – life story – most relevant for my interest in identity.

Life story and identity in Holocaust oral histories

The basic structure of a Holocaust oral history interview facilitates the telling of a life story. Within the general question/answer format, respondents are not only allowed but often encouraged to expand their answers through descriptions, examples, reflections, and explanations. Despite the general fluidity of topics that such opportunities provide on a local sequential level, both interviewers and respondents also maintain a global structure by adhering to two overarching but interlocking frameworks: the linear passage of time (both personal life stages and historical phases), and the nonlinear distribution and recurrence of themes (e.g., discrimination, contact with family, efforts to escape/survive). These temporal and thematic frameworks help co-construct a life story because they encourage temporally structured recountings of experiences (stories, chronicles) as well as recurring themes that facilitate intertextual connections among nonadjacent parts of discourse (Schiffrin 2000).[3]

The life stories told during oral history interviews nevertheless differ from those defined by Linde (1993: 21) as "all the stories and associated discourse units, such as explanations and chronicles, and the connections between them, told by an individual during the course of his/her lifetime that ... have as their

primary evaluation a point about the speaker [and] have extended reportability." Whereas Linde's life stories share with narrative the quality of "extended report-ability," not all narrativized parts of life stories within the oral history interviews are reportable in and of themselves. What they resemble, instead, is what Linde defines as another important part of a life story – a chronicle. Like narratives, chronicles follow a general rule of temporal juncture. Unlike narratives, how-ever, chronicles do not organize reported actions around a particular problem that needs to be solved or a single reportable event; they are typically not emplotted and often lack evaluation. Moreover, whereas Linde's life stories are discontin-uous (not told all at once) and progressive (constructed, told, and revised over time), the life stories of oral history interviews are told in one or two tapings, in a short time, and to one person, a relative stranger.[4]

Along with shifts in setting and audience comes the important addition of a displaced audience, large, anonymous, and heterogeneous, who may know little about the Holocaust. Similarly, in terms of their means of production – including possible anticipation of their eventual destinations in electronic media – Holo-caust life stories are also thoroughly grounded in the modern technological world of recording studios and video cameras that facilitates their reception by an ex-tremely varied audience distant in time and place.

These considerations suggest that Holocaust life stories told during oral his-tory interviews are mediated by the contexts in which they are produced. Yet, at an even more basic level, all life stories (and oral histories) are situated in a complex interaction between past and present: although ostensibly about the past, they are firmly located in the public world of the present. Knowledge accrued from numerous "pasts" and continuing "presents" creates complex, nonlinear relationships between what we think of as "past" and what we view as "present," and these relationships intrude on the linear chronology of "events" that we might assume to actually underlie a life story. Examples of such knowledge range from language itself (although Holocaust oral histories are often provided in English, most survivors did not learn English until after the experiences they recount) to information culled from membership in a community of practice, including the recounting of events that have little basis in reality (e.g., survivor myths; Wieviorka 1984) and renditions that are factually accurate but not actually experienced at first hand (Schiff et al. 2000). Other factors that mediate between what is "said" and what "happened" include the organization of long-term memory (Laub 1992, but see Pillemer 1998), experiential and discursive changes during a lifespan (Coupland & Nussbaum 1993), social, cultural, and political changes (e.g., Baumel 1996, Ofer 1996), and perhaps the impact of continuing trauma (LaCapra 2001).

Like narratives, life stories provide ideal environments for analyzing identity (Linde 1993, chap. 4).[5] Although both include portrayals of interactions between self and others within "storied" worlds – worlds displaced from the here and now by person, time, and place – the scope of a life story creates a large, heteroge-

neous array of people initially differentiated by time, place, experience, and role. The telling of the life story transforms this array into an equally large and heterogeneous network of characters and also links them either directly (e.g., as family members) or indirectly (e.g., through the life of the teller). Life stories also contain a variety of discourse types: narratives, of course, but also chronicles, descriptions, assessments, lists, and explanations. A life story thus discursively constructs a self that sits at the center node of a network of relationships that create sets of mini-communities within which initially diverse and potentially unrelated people have gained textually based communal identities.

At this point, I wish to clarify certain terms: IDENTITIES, PEOPLE, CHARACTERS, and SELF. I use *identities* to refer to social categories: roles and statuses that are attributed by social institutions and communities and that can be filled by different people in different ways at different times. My references to *people* are to specific persons who take up a certain identity at a specific time and place. "Friend," for example, is an identity/social category that can be filled by a range of specific people. I use the term *characters* to refer to the textual display of people. The referring term *my four friends*, for example, would display four specific people, in their identity as "friend," as characters in a text. Finally, I intend the term *self* as one's own personhood and personality, which include integration and continuity over time, space, and interaction with others. The notion of self crosscuts the three levels just distinguished. Although *self* is tautologically always taken up by one person, it can comprise a cluster of identities and can be displayed as different characters, depending in part on which other characters are co-present in the text. Discursive representations of self as a character, then, contribute to a construction of one person who may occupy a number of different (not always simultaneously relevant) identities.

Many parts of language (phonological, morphological, syntactic, pragmatic, stylistic, discursive) are intricately tied to our own identities, our perceptions of the identities of those with whom we are interacting, our identification of people, and our means of evoking characters. My overview of Ilse's discourse about her family and friends suggests that referring terms and constructed dialogue are revealing indicators of how Ilse views the people of whom she is speaking and the actions that they take, and also of her own place within a relationship, and hence, of her self. I summarize each briefly below.

REFERRING TERMS are noun phrases that evoke a referent – a person, place or thing – that a speaker has "in mind" in such a way that a hearer may interpret (roughly) the same referent. Speakers' selections of referring terms are based on both cognitive factors (e.g., the salience of a referent for the speaker, or speaker assumptions about hearer familiarity with the referent) and social factors (e.g., how the referent is situated within conversation, narrative, or other discourse genres; how a particular referent fits into a speaker's communicative intentions and interactional goals).

Cognitive and social constraints explain both initial selections among referring terms and the typical sequential distribution of referring terms in discourse. Whereas speakers frequently introduce referents with terms that are indefinite (e.g., with an article such as *a*) and informative (full nouns), they usually continue with terms that are definite and less informative (pronouns). A switch from noun to pronoun displays a speaker's expectation that a hearer will be able to identify an entity similar to one that the speaker has "in mind" (Ariel 1990, Gundel et al. 1993, Prince 1981). Although such expectations are cognitive – they are assumptions about knowledge – their viability rests on principles of social cooperation that may sometimes remain tacit (e.g., Grice's Cooperative Principle) but may also need to be interactively managed (Brown 1995, Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1992). Likewise, alterations of the expected sequence of NOUN → PRONOUN also arise from both cognitive factors (e.g., speaker's anticipation of recipient problems based on possible ambiguity) and social/expressive factors; the latter include the creation of evaluative and pragmatic meanings at both micro and macro levels of discourse goals and organization.

REPORTED SPEECH – or, in Tannen's (1989) term, CONSTRUCTED DIALOGUE – is the presentation of verbal actions that are displaced by person and/or time. According to Bakhtin (1981), any act of reporting speech is both an appropriation of another's words and a transformation of the original act. Here I include a continuum of devices that vary in terms of the degree to which they transform an original act, ranging from seemingly verbatim (direct) quotation (e.g., *She said "I'm sorry"*) to indirect quotation (e.g., *She said that she was sorry*) and labeling through speech act verbs (e.g., *She apologized*). Also included is a broad distinction between what is "said" and what is "not said," as in *she didn't say "I'm sorry"/that she was sorry/apologize*. Although all reported speech is constructed (Tannen) or transformed (Bakhtin), "direct" quotation not only requires deictic and grammatical transformations; it also allows a wider range of expressive devices (intonation, prosody) than "indirect" quotation. When someone is directly quoted, her words are not only represented as if they were the deictic center (they are the "I," their time is "now," their place is "here"), but they can also be performed (Hymes 1981, Wolfson 1978) or demonstrated (Clark 1990). Although direct quotations are not necessarily accurate representations, then, their deictic and prosodic shifts create an "aliveness" that not only adds a tone of authenticity and veracity but also creates a more descriptive portrait of the "author" whose speech is being "animated" (to borrow Goffman's 1981 terms).

Since speaking is the most pervasive way that people act, react to, and interact with each other, representing what self or other says – and providing clues as to how they said it – can provide a sensitive index to both the quoting and the quoted speaker (for a range of recent studies, see deFina forthcoming, Hamilton 1998, Satoh 1999). The representation of identity through verbal action is thus a route

to what (roughly following Bruner's 1986 notion of agentive self) we may think of as an "acting self." [6]

Although the primary focus of my linguistic analysis is referring terms and reported speech, I will also draw on NARRATIVE ANALYSIS and CONTEXTUALIZA-TION CUES for supplementary insights and support. Narratives are well-known resources for the representation of self and other simply because narrators can create "worlds" through their stories. In addition to providing basic descriptive material (who, where, when), and (re)constructing, emplotting, and evaluating a series of events that are temporally and often causally related, narrators bring together a cast of characters who interact with one another: they talk, do things, assess and think about each other, react to each other, create and/or solve problems, and manage the challenges and contingencies of everyday life. The interactions between characters within a story world thus provide a framework within which relationships – and hence the interacting self and other comprising that relationship – can be situated, enacted, displayed, and evaluated.

Four kinds of narratives, differentiated by sequential location, style, function, means of production/reception and theme, appear in Holocaust life stories (Schiffrin 2000). EXPLANATORY narratives provide sequences of temporally and causally linked events that explain a transition, and thus occur at temporal/spatial junctures. ILLUSTRATIVE narratives elaborate and evaluate a particular instance of a more general experience. PERFORMATIVE narratives (which also serve either explanatory or illustrative functions) are marked as oft-told stories in which characters behave in ways emblematic of their general roles, and plots re-create major themes of the life story. Whereas explanatory, illustrative, and performative narratives are all bounded units, comprised of (largely) adjacent clauses, INTERTEX-TUAL narratives are noncontiguous units that emerge across a set of discourse segments that are linked in some way – for example, by characters (e.g., mother and daughter), type of episode (work), interaction (conflict), or goal (efforts to stay with one's friends).

In addition to drawing on narrative analysis, I use CONTEXTUALIZATION CUES (Gumperz 1982) as a means of identifying recurrent themes in Ilse's life story. Contextualization cues are features of language (or other expressive modalities) often thought of as "marginal" to the communication of referential meaning (e.g., prosody, paralanguage, facial expression). Such cues frame the meaning of what is said by providing information (a meta-message; Tannen 1984) about how the speaker is defining the context(s) in which utterances are produced and interpreted. By indexing contexts that are salient for the speaker – contexts ranging from situations and settings to relationships and affect – contextualization cues work along with semantic meanings to provide a contextually rich interpretation of the meaning of utterances.

In sum, the analysis to follow focuses primarily on referring terms and constructed dialogue. Referring terms display "who" a character is; constructed di-

alogue conveys what a character "says." Each provides a speaker with options: How do I identify a character? How do I report what that character has said and done? A secondary analytic resource is narrative analysis, both internally and functionally within a life story, and contextualization cues, especially as they reveal speaker affect. Before turning to this analysis, however, it is important to have some background information about Ilse's life. Keeping in mind the complex of functions within – and influences on – Holocaust life stories, I briefly retell what I learned about the basic facts of Ilse's life from her oral history.

Ilse's life story: A summary

Ilse was born in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1926. Her parents divorced when she was very young, and she spent her early years in a foster home. After living with her mother from age five to ten, Ilse was sent to a series of children's homes and associated schools while her mother considered options for leaving Germany. In 1939, when Ilse was almost fourteen, her mother remarried and immigrated to America with her new husband, leaving her daughter behind in Germany.

The series of homes and schools in which Ilse spent her childhood years were intended for – and restricted to – Jewish children. In 1942, Ilse was forcibly evacuated from a home and transported, along with other Jews picked up at various locations, to a camp in Estonia. She spent the next three and a half years being shuttled among various forced labor camps and prisons, returning eventually in 1945 to a camp in Germany (Stutthof); by the time the war ended, Ilse was in Bergen Belsen. Since her father and mother were both living in the United States, she was then able to immigrate there. After living briefly with her mother, Ilse moved to New York, married, and had children. At the time of her oral history, she was a sculptor.

I turn in the next two sections to analysis of Ilse's mother/daughter discourse and friendship discourse. Both analyses follow roughly the same format: After an overview of the discourse about the character(s), including an extended example of a characteristic text, I use quantitative and qualitative analyses to demonstrate patterns of reference and action, drawing on narrative analysis and contextualization cues when relevant.

MOTHER/DAUGHTER DISCOURSE

Ilse's mother appears in her story in prewar Germany and the early years of the war, when she leaves Ilse in children's homes and goes to America with her new husband, and again after the war is over, when Ilse briefly lives with her in the United States. In her talk about her mother, Ilse portrays a relationship fraught with ambivalence and indirection: She strikes a balance between blaming and absolving her mother of responsibility for her actions; she impersonalizes and generalizes many of their feelings, actions, and interactions, leading to a portrayal of interpersonal distance.

Although we will examine how referring terms and constructed dialogue both help create these patterns independently, it is helpful first to examine a narrative in which these linguistic devices are used together. The narrative in ex. 1 tells how and why Ilse's mother left Germany for the United States.

(1)

82   And, in the meantime, (typical of course/a few details) that I forgot to tell,
83   my mother um did not go to Belgium,
84   but met a gentleman, a J– a Jewish man, then,
85   and, she married him,
86   and, came in 1939 to the United States.
87   Immigrated to the United States.
88   And the reason that I– was given to me,
89   there were eh two reasons most likely, that I could not come along was because her second husband was born in Strasbourg.
90   And Strasbourg is considered French.
91   And, so she– the wife can go on the French quota,
92   but a child, that was born in Germany and is not *his* child, cannot, go on that same quota.
93   And the German quota was very high, eh to enter the United States,
94   so, my mother and her husband decided to go uh to um the United States,
95   and the American consul said, "Well you only have– you have only two alternatives. Either you stay here with your child, and let your husband go ahead, or you go with your husband, and *try* to get your child over on children quota which might be a little bit lower. But you have to work that when you *get* to the United States."
96   And that was their choice.
97   And that was what [acc] they did.
98   My mother visited me in Munich and told me the whole story,
99   and again, there was nothing I could object to,
100   and, she left me . . . in Munich.

The abstract provided in lines 83–87 precedes Ilse's story explaining her mother's departure. Although Ilse and her mother interact with each other (*My mother visited me in Munich and told me the whole story* (98), the story that Ilse tells us about the story that she hears from her mother is impersonalized in several ways.

The entire explanation for the mother's departure is framed as constructed dialogue both at its inception (*the reason that was given to me*, 88) and conclusion (*My mother . . . told me the whole story*, 98). But Ilse does not provide her mother with the "aliveness" possible through a direct report of either the REASON or the STORY. In 88, for example, the agentless passive *given to me* does not even mention the mother at all. Moreover, the means of representing speech is nothing but a verb phrase ("give the reason"), which merely categorizes an act of speech (e.g., "explain") without displaying any of its content. Near the close of the narrative (98), Ilse reports that her mother told her *the whole story*. Notice, however, that whatever the story was, it could not have been a story that allowed Ilse much of an interactive role: the mother's decision to immigrate had actually preceded (*my mother and her husband decided to go uh to um the United States*, 94) the completion of the story explaining that decision (98).

Ilse does represent a verbal interaction with her mother in the body of her story: It is her mother who tells her *the whole story* (98). But whatever dialogue

occurred is available only from a distance: it is presented through speech act verbs ("give reason," 88; "tell story," 98), reanimated as the voice of the American consul (95) or summarized as bureaucratic rules (89–92).

Consider, first, the direct quotation from the American consul, whose extended quote presents the mother with *only two choices: either stay here with your child or* (…) *you go with your husband* (95). Deixis and referring terms in this quote distance Ilse from her mother: *go* indexes the consul's addressees (Ilse's *mother and her husband*) as the people departing Germany for the US; Ilse is represented not by her personal name but by a familial label, *your child*. Thus, even though the options are animated by Ilse's mother, they are authored by the American consul (Goffman 1981).

Despite the lack of mention of an "author" or quoted "source," what is said in lines 91–93 can be attributed to a bureaucratic authority who is being revoiced by Ilse's mother. Notice the referring terms in this section. An earlier sequence of referring terms in lines 83 to 87, followed a typical pattern of full noun (*my mother*, 83) as first mention, and pronouns (zero or 3rd person, 84–87) as next mentions. The typicality of this referring sequence maintains continuity within the complicating action and reinforces the story frame. But Ilse's repair *she– the wife* in 91 is atypical:

89   there were eh two reasons most likely, that I could not come along was because her second husband was born in Strasbourg.
90   And Strasbourg is considered French.
91   And, so she– the wife can go on the French quota,
92   but a child, that was born in Germany and is not *his* child, cannot, go on that same quota.

In 91, Ilse switches from a sequentially expected term that assumes specific identifiability (*she*) to a term that assumes only generic identifiability (*the wife*). Whereas *she* (91) would have continued both the expected referring sequence and the story frame, the shift to *the wife* does not. What *the wife* does instead is pair with *husband*, evoking a member of a generic pair (husband/wife) and shifting both Ilse's mother and her new husband from specific, individuated characters to the membership categories (Sacks 1992) typical of bureaucratically invoked identities and frames. Ilse's reference to herself – *a child* (92) rather than *I* – continues this frame. Thus, what marks this segment as only animated (but not authored; Goffman 1981) by Ilse's mother are the referring terms.

Referring terms continue to distance Ilse and her mother throughout the story in ex. 1. Although it was a bureaucratically identified *wife* that defined Ilse's mother as part of a collectivity in the segment discussed above, Ilse's mother remains a member of a "we" later in the story. Ilse represents her mother as a member of a married couple "with" (Goffman 1971c) when speaking about the decision made by *my mother and her husband* (94), *their* choice (96), and what *they* did (97). Thus, regardless of the position of the mother in the story (Is she spoken about? Is she doing something?), Ilse represents her mother by including her in a collectivity from which Ilse herself is excluded.

TABLE 1. *Referring terms for mother.*

	First mention	Next mention	Total
Full noun phrase including *mother*			
my mother	8	1	9
my mother and her husband	1	0	1
Full noun phrase other than *mother*			
my parents	2	0	2
the wife	0	1	1
Pronoun			
she	0	9	9
'zero'	0	6	6
we	0	0	0
they	0	9	9
you	0	2	2
Total	11	28	39

The other discourses portraying Ilse and her mother – explanatory narratives, a performative narrative, and elicited and volunteered assessments – also reveal indirection and distance in some of the same ways. Although Ilse's mother takes many actions that have clear consequences in Ilse's life, Ilse never directly attributes blame to her mother. When Ilse is reunited with her parents in the United States after liberation, for example, there is no direct contact with her mother and no accusations: although Ilse's father speaks, her mother is silent and is mentioned only as an overhearer (Goffman 1981). And even when Ilse openly assesses her mother's behavior, she maintains distance by using impersonal pronouns (*you*) and indirect speech representation of hypothetical utterances (e.g., *you better not say "I– I'm sorry," because then you admit that you're guilty*).

The distribution of both referring terms and constructed dialogue in Ilse's mother/daughter discourse reveal the interpersonal distance suggested in the detailed discussion thus far. Examine, first, the referring terms in Table 1.[7]

Table 1 reveals a typical sequential distribution: 85% (11/13) of the full nouns are first-mentions; 100% (26/26) of the pronouns are next-mentions. Although this distribution is not surprising, there are several interesting pronominal patterns within the general trend. Before turning to these, however, I consider the two full nouns – *the wife, my mother* – occupying an unexpected sequential position as next-mentions.[8] *The wife* is straightforward: As discussed above under ex. 1, it is a bureaucratic recategorization of Ilse's mother. *My mother* is a bit more complicated.

When we examine the section in ex. 2 in which Ilse mentions *my mother* twice in close succession, we can find two possible explanations for the use of a noun that is more informative than referentially necessary. The section in ex. 2 follows

immediately after Ilse's performative reunion story: After a humorous coda to her story, Ilse restates her arrival in the United States (776) and then quickly begins to evaluate that period of time.

(2)

776   [high pitch, unsteady, weepy] And uh then I came to the United States
777   and uh that was very difficult for me.
778   [voice back to normal] I found it very difficult to find myself.
779   And I lived for a little while, in Wilmington Delaware with my mother,
780   and I was very very unhappy
781   because I . . . I really didn't let go of my feelings or of my thoughts and,
782   and then I had . . . spent such little time with my mother that I couldn't start,
783   and I thought– I– I so desperately wanted to . . . start where I let off,
784   but it just didn't work.
785   So I moved to New York, where there were a lot of, people like me
786   and I– I found myself much happier.

Ilse first mentions *my mother* in 779 and then, rather than evoking her as *she*, mentions her again in 782 as *my mother*. There are two ways of explaining this repetition of *my mother* – the first in terms of emotion, and the second in terms of discourse structure.

First, this section is very emotional for Ilse. *And uh then I came to the United States* (776) repeats an already stated arrival (758). But rather than cast the arrival as light and humorous (as in the reunion narrative), Ilse characterizes it as *very difficult*, an evaluation supported by prosody and paralanguage (as noted in the transcript). As I discuss elsewhere (Schiffrin 2000), it is when Ilse talks about reuniting with her mother and trying to *start where [she] let off* (783) that her composure momentarily breaks down. Because Ilse's mother is directly related to Ilse's trauma in the time period being reported, then, repetition of the mother AS *my mother* highlights the key emotional role that she played in Ilse's hope for her future and in the failure of those hopes.

The second explanation for repetition of *my mother* focuses on discourse structure. Ex. 3 shows the textual roles played by clauses in ex. 2 and their relationships:

(3) Chronicle

event 1	(776)	
and evaluation of event 1	(777) (778)	
event 2	(779)	*my mother*
and evaluation of event 2	(780)	
Because list of reasons [EXPL]	(781) to (783)	
reason a	(781)	
and then reason b	(782)	*my mother*
and reason c	(783)	
but evaluation of event 2	(784)	
so event 3	(785)	
and evaluation of event 3	(786)	

This display shows an argument structure (cf. Schiffrin 1987:54–58) with a symmetric frame (the "event *and* evaluation" pairs in lines 779–780 and 785–6) that helps to locate ex. 3 as a contribution to the temporal chronicle of Ilse's life story.

Embedded within the frame is a short list of reasons (781–783) that explain why Ilse evaluates her life with her mother (*And I lived for a little while, in Wilmington Delaware with my mother*, 779) as *very very unhappy* (780).

Notice that *my mother* occurs in two very different parts of this structure. First is the event (embedded in the larger chronicle) that provides an outer frame for the argument (779). Next is the second reason in the list, explaining the evaluation of that event: *and then I had . . . spent such little time with my mother that I couldn't start* (782). Thus, the clauses in which *my mother* is mentioned are very different: One is an event in a chronicle; the other is a reason in a list that serves as an explanation for the evaluation of the event. The first and second mentions of *my mother*, then, are separated by structural and functional boundaries of exactly the sort that have been found to define different environments for reference. Although these two explanations for repetition of *my mother* seem quite different, one could argue for a connection between structure and emotion: Perhaps the logical and informative structure revealed in ex. 3 helped Ilse regain public composure after her display of sadness and disappointment at the dashed hopes for the future with her mother.

Let us turn now to the pronouns displayed in Table 1. Although all the pronouns were next-mentions, there was considerable variation among them: 9 cases of *she*, 6 of zero, 9 of *they*, and 2 of *you*.

She and zero alternate in unsurprising ways. For example, zero occurs when actions are clustered into larger, more encompassing episodes, as in ex. 4:

(4)

27   my, mother, thought that she might have a chance to, get to Belgium,
28   and hopefully would find a job there,
29   and then maybe let me come,
30   so she placed me in a children home, in . . . Munich

The events in lines 27 through 29 are linked together as part of what the mother *thought*. The three events join together to form the mother's plan: both *and* and zero anaphora help establish this unity. Once the plan ends, *so* and *she* both work as contrastive markers to contrast the mother's plan (27–29) with its outcome (30), or in other words, the mother's thoughts with her action.

The two cases of *you* and nine cases of *they* – as well as the total absence of *we* to represent Ilse and her mother together – can be explained in terms of the interpersonal distance between Ilse and her mother. *You* and *they* both establish distance by reducing the mother's individuality: *you* (as in Ilse's line about her mother, *because then you admit you're guilty*, 808) attributes actions not to the mother per se, but to a general indefinite group; *they* locates the mother in a dyad (with either *her second husband* or as *my parents*) that excludes Ilse. Consistent with this pronominal representation of distance by *you* and *they* is the striking absence of *we* to evoke Ilse and her mother together. This absence is especially marked in grammatical contexts in which *we* would be possible. Recall Ilse's reasons, in ex. 2, for being disappointed about her life with her mother after the

TABLE 2. *Constructed dialogue: mother.*

	Direct	Indirect	SA Verb	Total
Actual ("said") speech				
from mother to Ilse	0	0	2	2
from Ilse to mother	0	0	0	0
from others to mother	3	0	0	3
"Unsaid" speech				
from mother to Ilse	1	1	0	2
from Ilse to mother	0	0	3	3
from others to mother	0	0	0	0
Total	3	1	5	10

war. All of Ilse's reasons include first person references to Ilse herself: It is not Ilse's mother (*she*) or Ilse and her mother together (*we*), but Ilse (*I*) who *spent such little time*, who *couldn't start*, who *let off*. Likewise, it is Ilse who wants a relationship: *I so desperately wanted to . . . start where I let off* (783). Particularly striking is the use of the singular *I* with the symmetric predicate "spend time with": *I had spent such little time with my mother* (782) rather than "we had spent such little time together."

We have noted that although the use of referring terms for Ilse's mother follow well-known structural constraints (e.g., order of mention, textual boundaries), they also reveal (and help construct) a more subjective portrait of their relationship as one fraught with interpersonal distance. A similar portrait appears when we turn to representations of their verbal interactions through the use of constructed dialogue. In Table 2, I differentiate what is actually "said" from what is "unsaid." My categories of direct, indirect, and SA (speech act) verb represent a continuum from the most to the least demonstrative form of reported speech: the deictic and prosodic shifts of direct speech create an "aliveness" that adds a tone of authenticity, veracity, and animation – hence the term (adapted from Clark) DEMONSTRATIVE.

Table 2 is a striking display of how distance between Ilse and her mother is reflected in their verbal interactions. Ilse's only construction of her mother's voice is through two speech act verbs: *the reason given to me* (88), *told me the whole story* (98) in ex. 1. These verbs summarize the goal and/or outcome of what was said; they do not provide, or perform, any of its content. Ilse does use three direct quotes, the most performed and elaborated means of reporting speech, in relation to her mother. Notice, however, that these three direct quotes are used only when someone else is telling Ilse's mother ABOUT Ilse. Strikingly, these all occur during the three pivotal, and most potentially emotional, points in Ilse's relationship with her mother: When Ilse's mother is ready to leave for America, it is the Amer-

ican consul who explains the decision (lines 89–95); when Ilse's mother learns that Ilse has survived the war, it is through *some people who said to my mother, "Did you hear uh your daughter was mentioned on the radio?"* (742; see Schiffrin 2000); when Ilse is reunited with her parents, her father's ironic remark to her mother about Ilse's ability to speak English (*And he says to my mother, "She speaks better English than we do! hhh"*, 773) is the only verbal testament to their reunion.

When we turn to the five cases of unsaid speech, we see that Ilse provides both her mother and herself with more expressive and demonstrative latitude when constructing what they do not say. In contrast to the ABSENCE of direct and indirect speech for Ilse's mother's "said" speech, we find both direct speech (*she was not – never able to say "I'm sorry*," 807) and indirect speech (*my, mother, thought that she might have a chance to, get to Belgium*, 27) for the mother's "unsaid" speech. A similar shift to a more demonstrative form (albeit still to a very low level) appears in Ilse's own contributions to verbal interactions with her mother. Although we found no "said speech" at all from Ilse to her mother, we do find the least demonstrative form of "unsaid" speech: the speech act verbs *question* (*I didn't question her*, 50), and *object* (*there was nothing I could object to*, 99). Thus, Ilse more vividly enacts both her mother and herself when constructing what she and her mother do NOT say than what they do say.

The five cases of unsaid speech also reveal an important distinction between Ilse's construction of her own voice and that of her mother's. What Ilse's mother leaves unsaid concerns her abandonment. We find a reason for the abandonment (*my, mother, thought that she might have a chance to, get to Belgium*, 27) and an unexpressed apology for the abandonment (*she was not – never able to say "I'm sorry,"* 807). Whereas the mother's unsaid speech positions her as an initiator of action, Ilse's unsaid speech positions her as a passive recipient: What Ilse did not do is use speech acts that would have challenged her mother's decisions (*I didn't question her*, 50; *there was nothing I could object to*, 99). Thus, what was UNSAID by both Ilse's mother (admitting, apologizing) and by Ilse herself (asking questions and objecting) are the very acts that would have implicated the mother's agency and her responsibility for having abandoned her daughter.

We have seen that Ilse portrays a relationship with her mother devoid of direct contact and direct expression of feeling. Corroborating the portrayal of distance are two explicit evaluations, an explanation, and contextualization cues. A meta-message suggested by these linguistic and performative aspects of Ilse's life story is the submersion of her relationship with her mother in what Langer (1991:113) calls "humiliated memory" – memory of events that "float in a void because they cannot be connected to a conception of behavior that might establish meaning through analogy."

Consider, first, the two explicit evaluations. One concerns Ilse's wartime experience; the other, her postwar life and her own role as a mother. We see that both evaluations position Ilse as a daughter: first, a daughter who had an uncaring

mother; second, a daughter whose own parental role and attachment to her children differed dramatically from the model provided by her own mother.

In the first evaluation, Ilse conveyed sympathy for the wartime experience of women older than herself: *I always felt much much more sorry for the women that were like twenty years older than me* (825). Ilse explains this by positioning herself as both subject and object of "worry." Unlike older women, who had someone to worry about, *I only had to worry about myself* (827). On the other hand, because she was young, she did not worry anyone: *I had nobody to* worry *about it* (830). These statements implicate not only that some mothers do worry about their children (i.e., 825, 827), but, crucially, that Ilse's own mother did not worry about her (830).

During the second evaluation – of her postwar life and her own role as a mother – Ilse comments on the suicide of one of her own children as *much harder than anything, than it was before* (819). The intensity of her own reaction to the loss of her child renders her own mother's voluntary leave-taking – certainly a potential loss of a child, from the mother's point of view – emotionally incomprehensible. Likewise, Ilse later provides an implicit contrast between her own maternal strategy and that of her mother's: *I thought I could protect them by not inundating them* with *all my misery* (848). Ilse's effort to PROTECT her own children differs from her mother's actions in two ways: Not only does Ilse try to protect her children's emotional wellbeing, but she does so at potential sacrifice to herself, by containing her misery.

The distance between mother and daughter also appears during an explanation for Ilse's difficult transition to American life. After reporting her arrival in the United States, Ilse characterizes it as *very difficult for me* (775; see ex. 3). When I first heard the high pitch and quavering voice in Ilse's assessment, I was transcribing what was said and not looking at the video; I momentarily thought that someone else, such as a young child, had suddenly begun speaking, and I quickly looked back at the video to find that it was still Ilse. As Ilse begins explaining the difficulty, her "adult" voice returns. Yet the content of what Ilse says – *I had spent such little time with my mother that I couldn't start . . . where I let off* (778–779) – is reminiscent of Langer's "humiliated memory." One of the legacies recorded by humiliated memory is "the unresolvable conflict between shifting identities" (Langer 1991:111), including the shift between child and adult. The sudden shift back to a childhood role that can accompany a postwar reunion with one's parents can turn a prototypically joyful occasion into "a traumatic meeting that . . . afflicts consciousness with an overpowering sense of the *im*possibility of restoring interrupted family unity" (p. 111, emphasis in original).

Humiliated memory enters Ilse's mother/daughter discourse through a range of contextualization cues – not only pitch and voice quality, but also silence and changes in tempo. Consider, for example, *and* (line 119 in ex. 4), the part of Ilse's chronicle in which she recounts her return to Frankfurt after her mother's departure for America:

(5)

113   An:d so, I had to return to Frankfurt,
114   but since I had *no*body,
115   because my father had, in the meantime, *also* left.
116   He left, for Belgium the night the war broke out in Poland,
117   and from there, he worked his way to England,
118   and was then interned in England.
119   And . . . .[shakes head, looks down, sighs]
120   So, I came to Frankfurt,
121   and, the home, got in touch with the Jewish agency in Frankfurt,
122   and they placed me–
123   since I don't– didn't even have a place to live, nothing.

After describing why she could no longer stay in school in Munich (Jewish children were prohibited from going to school after age 14), Ilse marks her return to Frankfurt with a transitional, episode-marking *and* (113), followed by *so* to show the causal link between the policy against education for Jews and her move to Frankfurt. Following an explanation (114–118) of why she has to contact *the Jewish agency* (121) and was then *placed* (122) in a children's home to work, Ilse partially repeats *An:d so, I had to return to Frankfurt* (113) as *And . . . .[shakes head, looks down, sighs] So, I came to Frankfurt* (119, 120).

Note, however, critical changes in the onset of the paraphrase. Several contextualization cues mark the difficulty of reporting the move to Frankfurt: the trailing off intonation (*and . . . .*), the nonvocal expression of negativity (head shake), visual withdrawal (looking down), and the failure to find words with which to continue after the continuative marker *and* (the sigh). When Ilse does return to speech, the pitch and volume of her initial *So* mark this as the onset of a new utterance, not a continuation of the prior incomplete utterance. Thus, the brief dissolution of speech after *and* frames Ilse's return to Frankfurt as a moment that "float[s] in a void" (Langer 1991:113) not just of memory, but of speech.

Rapid speech (marked by [acc] for acceleration in my transcript) differs from silence because it does allow meanings from the privacy of one's own memory to be realized and heard by others. But because it diminishes the audible/textual space, it not only metaphorically implies reduced importance; it can also hinder others' ability to hear and absorb information.[9] Rapid speech in Ilse's discourse marks the interpersonal distance between mother and daughter at critical junctures in their separation. The first is when Ilse does not object to her mother's plans to go to Belgium to seek work in 1936. In line 49, Ilse presents her most direct criticism of her mother:

48   Years back you don't ask too many questions
49   [acc] and I had a very disciplinary . . . mother,
50   so, I didn't question her.

The next is when Ilse's mother leaves for America in 1939. In line 106, Ilse's coda summarizes the finality – and actual realization – of her mother's decision to leave with her new husband for America:

105   And that was their choice.
106   [acc] And that was what they did.

Acceleration also appears in two other segments that do not directly concern Ilse's relationship with her mother per se, but the more general, wrenching apart of the parent/child relationship. We see rapid speech, first, during Ilse's description of the children's home in which her mother placed her when she left for Belgium:

35   they call it in sch– in- in German, Manschenschuller,
36   which is where you learn how to sew and cook and [acc] take care of little children . . . who aren't . . .

Notice that in addition to acceleration, we find silence: Ilse does not complete her characterization of *little children . . . who aren't . . . .*, a referent that includes herself.

We also find rapid speech and silence during a narrative about the efforts of two sisters who turned out to be two of Ilse's friends (see ex. 5, below) to avoid the placement of their parents in a different line. In line 297, the rapid repetition of *no* shows the intensity of the sisters' desire to stay with their parents:

296   and they of course run over
297   and they said "[acc] No no no no no."
298   I mean they wouldn't– they wouldn't allow it.

The use of rapid speech when conveying other parent/child schisms suggests that they form part of Ilse's intertextual evaluation of her own relationship with her mother. Later in the same segment, when the guards (*they* in 305) refuse to unite the children with their parents, we find the same *and . . .* and sigh that marked Ilse's own disconnect from her parents:

305   They left the girls on this side, and . . . [waves her hand, sighs]

Again, the separation between Ilse and her mother is located in the broader intertextual theme in which parent and child are not only wrenched apart in the events of the text, but also abandoned to "float in a void" of both memory and speech.

In sum, we have seen in this section that Ilse's mother appears primarily in explanatory narratives whose function – to explain spatial, temporal and personal transitions – create a subordinate, "in-between" status in contrast to other, more thoroughly described experiences. During interactions that Ilse reports with her mother, Ilse and her mother never relate to each other at personal levels of action and reaction. Rather, interaction is either mediated through others (bureaucrats, Ilse's father) or marked as absent or hypothetical. These qualities contribute to a generally low level of agency for both Ilse and her mother. And although Ilse and her mother are represented as parts of collectivities, they are never together as a dyad: They engage in no activities together, nor do they interact in unison vis-à-vis someone else. Thus, Ilse portrays a relationship with her mother that is devoid not only of direct contact but also of direct expression of feeling; likewise, char-

acters, actions, and interactions are both general and impersonal. As we see in the next section, Ilse's discursive representation of her friends presents a stark contrast to the textual portrait of her mother.

FRIENDS

Ilse talks about her friends primarily through narratives that illustrate salient aspects of her wartime experiences. The plots of the narratives clearly unite Ilse with her friends as an "us" vs. a "them" of the camp guards and commandants. The friends are consistently portrayed as helpers and in the highly agentive role of rescuers. Ilse personalizes her interactions with her friends through direct speech and multiple joint references that evoke them as a collective of FRIENDS whose interactions span different time periods both within and outside the temporally defined story worlds of her narratives.

Ilse told six illustrative narratives about her friends. The first mention of a subgroup of the four friends is within the orientation to a story illustrating the cruelty of Estonian guards who were sorting people into lines during the last phase of Ilse's deportation from Germany. Although this story does not directly concern Ilse's friendship, my point in using this narrative is to show that, even in a story in which the friends are NOT actively displaying their identity as friends toward Ilse, they reveal the same qualities that later make them into friends (e.g., loyalty, collective orientation) through parallel linguistic devices.

(6)

297	And, . . . we were– we were standing five people in a line and,
298	what they did, is they, cut it off, like, three people, were going to the left, and two, stood still.
299	And, there were– the three people to the left, they put on buses.
300	And of course very often it was a– a daughter and a mother, or, or– a brother and a sister,
301	and they of course run over and they said "No no no no no [acc]"
302	I mean they wouldn't– they wouldn't allow it.
303	In fact I became later, very good friends there was a– two young girls,
304	and they ran after their parents because their parents were deaf and dumb.
305	They left the girls on this side, and . . . [waves her hand, sighs]
306	And– and– and they said, "Don't worry! Don't worry! You shall see them later on! And em we– they're being driven and we– but we don't have enough buses and you're gonna walk."

After explaining the details of the sorting process (297–299), Ilse illustrates and evaluates the cruelty of that process through details about the families who were separated into different lines (300–302). One specific example is of *two young girls* (303) and the response of the guards (306) to their plea.

Although the two young girls are only part of Ilse's group of four friends, their introduction here prefigures four features that reappear in Ilse's later discourse about her friends. First, Ilse adds more information about the girls than is referentially required, specifically, information that anchors them to herself as friends: *I became later, very good friends* (303). Second, the temporal periods in which

the friends are situated are not static: although the story world events are anchored to a specific time, Ilse moves to a time after that story world to mention her friendship. Third, Ilse's narrative uses internal evaluation (e.g., prosody, constructed dialogue) to illustrate the personal texture of an experience. Fourth, the experience that Ilse's friends help enact is one in which they are clearly pitted as an "us" against a "them": this adversarial context provides an arena in which Ilse's friends demonstrate their collectivity as "us" and their loyalty to those included in "us."

The other five illustrative narratives in which Ilse enacts her friends situate Ilse and her friends in two somewhat different ways: together as "us" acting collectively against "them," or as protectors of Ilse, who is in immediate danger from "them." Although space prohibits detailed discussion and complete transcripts of the stories, I briefly illustrate both types (and some of the recurrent features noted above) with key excerpts.

The first is a performative story (opened by *there's many little stories of course*, 496) illustrating the five friends' efforts to stay together during a transport. After the abstract *they decided to pick out two hundred of the prisoners and send them away* (497), Ilse evokes her friends for the first time after the partial mention in ex. 6, again anchoring them to herself across different time frames: *And I was very close with four other women, from the day that we met to the day that we were liberated* (498). The girls *always made sure we would stay in one line* (499), but one of the group was picked for a different line. Although it was one of the two sisters (*it was two sisters, y'know, the one sister was picked*, 505), it was the entire group that protested: *And we four step out and say "We go too"* (506). Despite the German commandant's response ("*Are you insane? I can maybe get* one *out of this. How do you expect me now to get five out of – five of you out of this?*" (513), the story closes with *But he did*. (514) *So, again we had – we were lucky. We made it* (515).

The second theme of the stories in which Ilse and her friends appear is when Ilse herself is in danger. Here the four friends take up the position of rescuer, protecting Ilse and bringing her back into the group. In one story, Ilse is picked for a transport out of Stutthof where *every couple days, they would pick 100 people and ship them out* (584). Although she is sixteen, Ilse is put into the children's line *and that usually meant somewhere, somehow, death* (593). Ilse's friends plead that she be moved from the line, and after the commandant's initial refusal, Ilse is put into the other line and incorporated back into the group. Although Ilse concludes this story with *And so I got out of this* (608), she also switches reference from *I* to *we* when she generalizes the point of the story in *So several times we escaped death by just y'know one step* (609).

The referring terms in Ilse's stories about her friends are clearly related to the "us" vs. "them" themes of the stories, and in fact, they help reinforce those themes. Table 3 shows the distribution of referring terms for friends. Notice, first, the level of detail in Ilse's references to her friends. Ilse uses ten different noun

TABLE 3. *Referring terms for friends.*

	First mention	Next mention	Total
PLURAL REFERENCES			
Full noun phrase including *friends*			
adj + *friends*	1	0	1
my friends/buddies	4	2	6
my buddies with me	1	0	1
four friends	2	0	2
my four friends	2	0	2
[number] *of my friends*	3	0	3
[no.] *friends* + rel clause	1	0	1
Full noun phrase other than *friends*			
[number] *of the girls/sisters*	4	0	4
[number] *sisters/women/girls*	0	3	3
the five of us	0	1	1
Pronouns			
we	0	23	23
we + [number]	1	0	1
we all five	1	1	2
they	1	13	14
those that are still alive	0	1	1
SINGULAR REFERENCES			
Nouns			
my friend	2	0	2
one of my friends	2	0	2
one of the five/girls	2	0	2
Pronouns			
she	0	3	3
Total	27	47	74

phrases (based on different combinations of modifiers with the main noun) that are locally occasioned by the details of the illustrative narratives in which the friends appear. The detailed referring terms thus work in concert with the illustrative role of these stories in the larger life story: They instantiate not just an experience, but the specific contingencies of an experience.

In addition to providing detailed information about her friends, Ilse's referring terms overwhelmingly reveal their status as a COLLECTIVE of friends: 88% (65/74) of the references are plural nouns. The identity of the group is lexically specified. Within the 24 plural full nouns, 66% (16) actually include the lexical items *friends* or *buddies*. Likewise, within the six singular nominal mentions, 66% (4) include "friend." Ilse's inclusion within the group appears more with pronominal

references. Although only 8% (2/25) of the nominal collective references include Ilse (*my buddies with me*, *the five of us*), 66% (27/41) of the pronominal collective references include Ilse, i.e. *we* rather than *they*. The skewing of this distribution toward inclusive pronouns reflects a typical sequential pattern: Ilse first mentions her friends with a noninclusive full noun (75%, 18/24, of the plural nouns are first-mentions) and then mentions them again with an inclusive pronoun (93%, 38/41, of the pronouns are next-mentions). In other words, Ilse usually begins with a noninclusive term like *my friends* and then continues as either *they* or *we*, the latter expanding the membership of the group to include Ilse in the referent.

Although Ilse's typical sequences are FULL NOUN → PRONOUN, deviations from such sequences also show group inclusiveness that is both locally and globally occasioned. Ex. 6 contains a referring sequence in which Ilse uses the same informative term (*we all five*) for both first and next mentions:

(7)

> 617   And um . . . one day was again people picked for– for a transport.
> 618   And we all five stood together,
> 619   and we all five got on the transport,
> 620   and we were sent to Hamburg.

We all five (618) is redundant and overly informative: since we already know the group comprises five people, *all* (or *five*) is redundant. This violation of a quantity maxim continues with *we all five* in (619), which itself, produces a sequential violation. Not only does *we all five* establish the unity of the group in this episode, but it also contrasts (at a more macro textual level) the successful resolution of this threat to survival with the danger reported in the earlier story (marked by *again*, 617) about the transport in which Ilse had been temporarily separated from the group. *We all five* thus has an evaluative function within its own story and across stories, thereby contributing to a thematic and intertextual connection between Ilse's different narratives.

Finally, the salience of inclusion within the group is shown by Ilse's use of *we* in referential environments where it is not referentially appropriate. In ex. 8 below, Ilse narrows the scope of the group from *we* to *me* for referential accuracy; in exx. 9 and 10, Ilse broadens the scope of the group to incorporate herself into a collective evaluation of an experience.

In ex. 8, during a story about working in a shipyard with her friends, Ilse begins to claim the quality *street wise* for her whole group (*we* in line 428), but she then self-repairs (429) to exclude herself from the collective:

(8)

> 428   And, we became also, a little bit uh, s–
> 429   not *me*, but my friends thank God,
> 430   a little bit s– what you would call here street wise.

Since it was Ilse's friends (*not me, but my friends*) who managed to get extra food for the whole group, the attribute *street wise* actually characterizes only Ilse's friends. But the identity of the group as a group – as *we* – is what was first highlighted.

In exx. 9 and 10, Ilse participates in a collective evaluation. Ex. 9 is from a story about how Ilse was often the tenth person to be counted by guards for a lineup for the bathroom (and thus was whipped). Here Ilse recounts the retrospective humor of the situation through collective *we*:

(9)

> 570 For instance, if you–, you were allowed to go to the bathroom, let's say, in– at a certain hour, a certain time.
> 571 And they would count out ten people.
> 572 Sometimes, now, those that are still alive, sometimes we would make a joke of me.
> 573 It *never* failed!

Because the first mention here of Ilse's friends (*those that are still alive*) includes the distal demonstrative *those*, it excludes Ilse from the referent. Nevertheless, Ilse reports the joke as an action of the inclusive *we*, thus creating a collective act that builds (rather than threatens) solidarity.

Ex. 10 is an excerpt from the story in which Ilse's friends plead that she be removed from a transport out of Stutthof. Although the resolution to the complicating action (608) focuses on Ilse's rescue, *we* in the evaluative coda (609) generalizes the significance of this singular rescue for overall success of the group:

(10)

> 608 And so I got out of this
> 609 So several times we escaped death by just y'know one step

By showing that Ilse's collective *we* need not be referentially motivated or appropriate, then, these examples highlight its evaluative meaning.

We have seen how an abundance of detail in Ilse's references to her friends highlights their role as a collectivity. When we examine Ilse's representation of her friends through constructed dialogue in Table 4, we find that the friends interact with a variety of "others" in a range of animated and accessible voices.

We see in Table 4 that five times as much dialogue with Ilse's friends is actual speech (15 "said" vs. 3 "unsaid"). Likewise, 66% (12/18) of the speech involving Ilse's friends is direct speech – the highest end of the continuum from least to most demonstrative construction of dialogue. As noted earlier, direct speech requires grammatical transformations that establish the QUOTED person (not the QUOTING person) as the deictic center, and it also allows a wider range of expressive devices (intonation, prosody) than does indirect speech. These deictic and prosodic shifts create an "aliveness" that provides a more detailed and descriptive portrait of the "author" whose speech is being animated.

It is not only HOW verbal acts are performed that indexes relationships; also indicative is WHAT acts are performed. The verbal acts between Ilse and her

TABLE 4. *Constructed dialogue: Friends.*

	Direct	Indirect	SA verb	Total
Actual ("said") speech from friends				
to perpetrators	2	0	2	4
to other victims	1	0	0	1
to Ilse	3	0	0	3
to friends (within group)	1	0	1	2
Actual ("said") speech to friends				
from Ilse	1	0	0	1
from perpetrators	3	0	0	3
from other victims	1	0	0	1
from friends (= to friends)	0	0	0	0
"Unsaid" speech from friends	0	2	1	3
"Unsaid" speech to friends	0	0	0	0
Total	12	2	4	18

friends are surprisingly consistent. All of them reflect solidarity: Their goal is protection either of Ilse herself or of the group. Here we find, for example, inclusive directives among the friends that seek a mutual advantage, such as food (*Let's go and get some* [potatoes], 429) or a better place to sleep (*Let's get out of this barrack*, 716). Directives addressed to camp guards and commandants also seek advantage, such as a place in the same line (*We go too*, 506). Verbal actions addressed to the friends from those guards and commandants present challenges to the group's efforts to protect Ilse: *Are you insane?* (513) and *We don't need her!* (604) dramatize the obstacles faced by the friends and thereby highlight their success.

Even the unrealized speech is supportive. In addition to speech that could have been – but was not – directed to camp commandants (e.g., *Nobody wanted to report that I was so sick because they – that would've been the end*, 697) was speech that her friends left unrealized to Ilse herself. Consider the unrealized speech (612) in ex. 11, an interchange between Ilse and her friends many years after she had been saved from the wrong selection:

(11)

611   The story that I was pregnant I only learned here in America from my friends!
612   I never knew the story– they never even told me
613   because they figured that most probably that I'd be terribly upset if I would hear that
       . . .
614   So em they never– I never knew it until years and years later here.
615   One of– one of the girls says "Do you really *know* why they put you there?"
616   "No! Because I was so young looking!"
617   "No. That wasn't why!" [laughs]

335

What is "unsaid' is directed to Ilse herself to protect her feelings; that is, Ilse's friends never told her how they managed to return Ilse to their transport line. Not only does Ilse first report the story as something that her friends never *told* her but she also provides a reason (*because they figured* that she would be upset (613)), and she then restates the time and place of the revelation (*years and years later here* (614)). Although the unrealized speech could referentially exhaust Ilse's description of their encounter, Ilse then replays the speech event through direct speech. Notice, in the replay, the animation through prosody, the performance of characters (such that explicitly identifying the authors is unnecessary – there is no quotative frame), the teasing tone, and the laughter. Also important is the opening question, *Do you really know why . . .* (615). Like other *y'know* questions (see Schiffrin 1987), this question opens a three-part interaction in which the addressee is mutually engaged in constructing information. Ilse's response *"No! Because I was so young looking!"* is the only time Ilse reports her own speech to her friends. Like the question to which it responds, however, what it accomplishes is the continuation of the interaction. Thus even the way Ilse reports her more recent interactions with her friends shows a supportive ethic. And even the use of "unsaid speech" is embedded in animated interaction that highlights their agency, their solidarity, and their role as protector.

In sum, Ilse's friendship discourse unites Ilse and her friends as "us" vs. "them." The friends are consistently portrayed as a collectivity of helpers or rescuers with whom interactions are animated and with whom relationships continue during different time periods both within and outside the temporally defined story worlds of the narratives.

LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY IN ILSE'S LIFE STORY

My analysis has focused on the discursive construction of identity in the mother/daughter and friendship discourse of one Holocaust survivor's life story as told during an oral history. In this section, I compare the language used in Ilse's mother/daughter and friendship discourses, noting the linguistic lessons provided and then turning to more complex aspects of Ilse's portrayal of people and identity.

Mother/daughter and friendship discourses

Holocaust life stories are texts in which both chronology and intertextual themes provide overarching frameworks within which information is organized and conveyed. Within the shorter segments embedded within those frameworks, speakers exploit both linguistic similarities and differences to locally ground the meanings of their lives and their relationships.

The short segments in which Ilse's mother and friends both appear are primarily narratives. Whereas Ilse's mother appears "between" experiences in explanatory narratives, however, Ilse's friends appear "within" experiences in illustrative narratives. Regardless of narrative type, the roles of both mother and friends within the complicating action enact their identities – distant vs. close, silent vs.

animated, neglectful vs. attentive. Even when merely mentioned in narratives, the background presence of mother and friends provides descriptive information consistent with their more active roles. Mother and friends also appear in performative narratives (a subtype defined by means of production, mode of reception, and theme); here, mother and friends behave in ways emblematic of their roles – distance between mother and daughter, loyalty among friends. We can thus supplement macro-level analysis of life stories with micro-level attention to how speakers embed characters – and thus their relationships – through their stories.

Also contributing at both micro and macro levels is the analysis of nonnarrative discourse (e.g., evaluations, explanations) and contextualization cues. Both of these are locally situated in Ilse's life story, but they also link nonadjacent segments into an intertextual narrative. Statements about parent/child relationships, and their means of presentation (e.g., through rapid speech, high pitch, silence), connect nonadjacent talk into a thematic macro structure in which the discursive construction of interpersonal distance is simultaneously a marker of humiliated memory.

In addition to being linked by their joint presence in a life story, characters initially differentiated by time, place, and experience become formally connected simply because they are textually represented by a fixed set of linguistic options. Speakers face similar sequential choices for different referents (e.g., when to use full nouns instead of pronouns for next-mentions). Likewise, personal pronouns form a closed set of referential possibilities. Thus, referential options can be deployed strategically to create contrasts between different characters, people, or identities.

Consider, for example, the choice between singular and plural pronouns. As noted earlier, the pronouns through which Ilse's friends appeared are overwhelmingly plural: 95% (41/43) are *we* and *they*. References to Ilse's mother are more evenly distributed: 58% (15/26)) are plural pronouns. If we assumed that referrals are exact correspondences to entities in the world, then this would hardly be surprising: Ilse's mother is one person, whereas her friends comprise a group. Referring terms, however, are not exactly matched with, or mapped to, referents in the world; rather, they are speakers' perspectives on, and therefore constructions of, entities in the world. As I suggest in Schiffrin 2001c (see also deFina forthcoming), singularity vs. plurality in reference can be motivated by numerous factors (personal, social, cultural, ideological) that may have little to do with actual "number" of people. Thus, referring terms arise from a set of possibilities that allow a storyteller either to differentiate individuals within a group or to consolidate initially separate individuals into groups.

Ilse's referring terms for mother and friends, then, tell us a great deal about the evaluative possibilities she does – or does not – pursue. Ilse does highlight her mother's membership in a collectivity, but only as *they* (with her husband) or *you* (within an impersonal group), never as *we* with Ilse. Although Ilse could have individuated her friends from one another, she almost never does. From this per-

spective, then, the singularity of Ilse's mother is not only a stark contrast with the collective identity of Ilse's friends, but also a sharp reminder that although Ilse was embedded within a group of friends, the family that she could also have called *we* was absent from her life story.

Ilse's portrayal of her friends also appears through her choice of lexical items such as *friends* and *buddies*. Here what is significant, again, is not just what Ilse says but what she could have said. Clearly, another referential option would have been for Ilse to refer to her friends by their names. Names are intended to convey a unique – one and only one – referent. Even though there may be more than one person named "John Smith," when we use that name with a referential intention, we intend to evoke one person and one person only (an attributive use would be for anyone whose name happened to be "John Smith," even if nobody with that name actually did exist). This attachment between word and world makes names a more personal and individuating means of reference than other nouns, an effect that has not gone unnoticed in memory culture. Just as oral histories focus on one person's memories and life, so too, the inclusion of names, rather than descriptive nouns or numbers, in a list of Holocaust victims from a particular village in a Holocaust exhibit (New York Times 7/13/01: B29) or in memorial books (Ballinger 1999, Hartman 1996) increases the individuality of otherwise undifferentiated people. Not mentioning the names of her four friends, then, is yet another way that Ilse reduces their individuality in order instead to highlight their identity as a group.

Also shown in my analysis are sequential referring patterns that conform with prior research. We see not only the use of regular sequential patterns, but also the (again, quite expected) evaluative meanings of deviations from those patterns. Repeated use of *my mother* and *all five* [friends], for example, appears at breaks in textual structure and to convey thematic emphasis (Ilse's disappointment at not renewing a relationship with her mother) and contrast (the five friends stayed together despite obstacles).

Finally, understanding referring terms in life stories demands not just a comparison across characters and among linguistic options, but also consideration of the overall structures and meanings across different life stories. Although *we* vs. *she* portrays a close group of friends vs. a distant mother in Ilse's life story, the same contrastive pair portrays something different in the life story of a woman who met a to-be-famous parachutist in a Gestapo prison (Schiffrin 2001c). Whereas *we* repeatedly evokes the narrator, her family, and friends (all caught by a Nazi scheme to entrap them), the parachutist is repeatedly evoked as *she*: although she was not part of the narrator's entrapped group, the mission in which the parachutist had participated and during which she was captured was actually a GROUP mission. Here what *she* suggests is the preference for "one hero at a time" in collective memory (Baumel 1996). Thus, by learning more about the distribution of referring terms not only across characters and within life stories, but also across life stories, we can learn more about the informational and evaluative

resources made available through referring terms and the texts in which they are contained.

Like the analysis of referring terms, my analysis of constructed dialogue began by defining a set of options: the distinction between realized ("said) and unrealized ("unsaid") speech, and within that dichotomy, direct speech, indirect speech, and speech act verb. The distribution of these options showed the same distance/closeness contrast that appears through Ilse's use of referring terms.

Whereas direct speech constitutes 66% (12/18) of the verbal interactions involving friends, it is only 33% (3/9) of the interactions involving Ilse's mother. Even more critical than this difference in animation is a difference in authorship: the three cases of direct mother/daughter speech are not interactions between Ilse and her mother, but speech ABOUT Ilse to her mother from someone else. The lack of animated contact is also reflected through a comparison of what is left unsaid: 54% (6/11) of the constructed dialogue with Ilse's mother is unrealized speech, compared to 17% (3/18) with friends.

Reporting what someone does NOT say – like the use of negatives in general – is inherently contrastive: It presupposes a prior expectation that something could or should have happened. The construction of unrealized speech, then, not only increases one's expressive possibilities; it also provides an opportunity to convey one's moral sensibilities. One's hopes and expectations, including those embedded in a sense of what is right and wrong, can appear through constructions of what another could or should have said.

The unrealized speech between mother and daughter concerns an issue fraught with moral ambivalence, the mother's emigration to America in 1939. Recall what Ilse and her mother do not say: Whereas Ilse does not challenge her mother's actions, her mother does not apologize for those actions. By implicating the possibility of (if not need for) challenge and apology, then, these unsaid speech actions evoke the moral dilemma that underlies the mother's emigration: Should Ilse's mother have secured safety for herself but not for Ilse? What Ilse and her friends leave unsaid also reacts to a problem, but it is not one that pits them against one another; rather it is a problem – their own potential death – to which they are jointly reacting. Rather than evoking a need for morally implicative remedial work in relation to one another, then, Ilse's friends' unrealized speech is mutually supportive on both emotional and physical levels (see Goffman 1971a,b on the supportive/remedial difference). Even the reasons for the absence of speech reveal a supportive ethos. Ilse's friends never told her, until many years later, the reason the German commandants were about to select her for the line headed for death. The reason was that Ilse looked pregnant; the reason Ilse's friends didn't initially tell her this is *because they figured that most probably that I'd be terribly upset if I would hear that*.

In sum, analyses of variation in constructed dialogue should extend the continuum between the typical direct and indirect means of reporting speech to include not only speech act verbs but also a crosscutting distinction between realized

and unrealized speech. Such analyses can provide a valuable means for differentiating characters, people, and identities both by the speech actions they actually take and by those that they would be expected, desired, or obligated to take.

Identity in Ilse's life story

The analyses in the preceding two sections concentrated on mother and friends as identities in a relatively specific sense: how characters in Ilse's life story created people who occupied the roles of "mother" and "friends." In this subsection, I relate these identities to more general archetypal constructs of mother and friends in the Holocaust, and then shift to a broader level of analysis that, first, positions them as "us" and "them" within a morally implicative trilogy of historical identities (perpetrators, victims, bystanders), and second, examines their construction as "survivors."

Ilse's life story locates her mother and her friends in an interrelated network of characters linked together by Ilse herself. One link between mother and friends revealed throughout the analysis is a contrast between Ilse's mother and friends on an axis of interpersonal closeness: whereas Ilse's mother was distant both materially and emotionally, Ilse's friends provided both physical and emotional support. Research on parent/child relationships during the Holocaust suggests that the steadfastness of a mother/daughter relationship can have psychological benefits: "By refusing to be separated, mothers and daughters or sisters resisted the isolation that was the first step in the dehumanization process. By taking risks for each other they fought the system and their own despair" (Gurewitsch 1998:xv).

Ilse's mother did not refuse to be separated from Ilse and certainly took no risks for her; yet such seemingly harsh and cold-hearted behavior was not unknown among mothers during the Holocaust. The behavior reconstructed through Ilse's discourse recalls an archetype that Plank (1994:28–30) calls the "surrendering mother." In contrast to the other maternal archetypes (e.g. martyr, comforter, merciful; Plank 1994, chap. 1), the surrendering mother arises from two very different circumstances: The mother's presence may jeopardize the child, or the presence of children may endanger the mother. Plank's description of the latter circumstance presupposes that the mother is still caring and loving at an underlying level: "A mother's separation may take the form of more overt abandonment, an act that, although cruel, testifies more to the desperation of the situation than to the hardness of the mother" (1994:29–30). Through abandonment, the child is surrendered "not to the safe keeping of another, but simply to his or her own fate" (p. 30).

Ilse's friendship discourse constructs an antidote to the portrayal of maternal abandonment in that Ilse's four friends appear as a collective "other" that provides "safe keeping." The friends appear in the first selection after deportation, at liberation, and even now when *we're only three left*; they help during transports, in camps, in sickness, during selections; they provide food, they help with work assignments, they hold Ilse up in line; they worry together, they laugh together,

they tell stories that celebrate their collective memories of how they protected one another. They provide so strong a "we" that, during her description of her wartime experiences (the bulk of her oral history), Ilse mentions herself alone, as *I*, primarily when speaking (e.g., with epistemic or metalinguistic comments) from a current life world perspective or when describing her own bodily states (e.g., sickness).

   Also embedded in the protective shield that Ilse's friends provided is a model for her own role, as seen in a brief comparison among three instances of unrealized speech. Verbal silence from Ilse's mother (807) is portrayed as motivated by self-protection (806), albeit a self immersed in an indefinite *you*:

    806   And um in order to protect yourself,
    807   you better not say "I– I'm sorry,"

But silence from Ilse's friends (612) is portrayed as motivated by other-protection (613) of the one who might have heard the untold *story*:

    611   The story that I was pregnant I only learned here in America from my friends!
    612   I never knew the story– they never even told me
    613   because they figured that most probably that I'd be terribly upset if I would hear that …

When we turn to Ilse's silence toward her own children, we see that it is motivated by her *thought* (850) that her children could be protected by her own silence:

    848   And I said "You can't say that I poured on you all my misery?"
    849   "You didn't need to talk. We know it."
    850   I thought I could protect them.

Protecting others' feelings by withholding speech is more compatible with the comforting model provided by Ilse's friends than with the surrender model (and its possible entailment of protecting oneself) provided by her mother.

   The close supportive relationships between Ilse and her friends fit a construct of women's relationships that has come to be known as "camp sisters." Gurewitsch (1998:xviii) suggests that the term *Lager Schwestern* ('camp sisters') was coined by women in concentration camps to describe the "tendency of women to form close and long-lasting relationships that become a source of mutual assistance and strength." Like Ilse's group with its nucleus of two sisters, the basic "mutual-aid cell" (Karay 1998:295) was often initiated by members of a family. Survivors' memoirs from other women report exactly the same kinds of behavior noted by Ilse: "accepting responsibility for each others' survival, by sharing food, risking punishments, encouraging each other, and providing physical care, even to the extent of keeping each other from going to the infirmary" (Goldenberg 1998:331; see also Neiberger 1998). And, also like Ilse and her friends, many camp sisters "sustained the relationships throughout their camp experiences and often after liberation and until today" (Gurewitsch 1998:xix).

   Relationships with mother and friends are central to one's own personal identity; they can provide the locus of close and ongoing interactions within which

conceptions of a coherent and continuous self are built and reinforced. Yet, as I have began to indicate – by relating Ilse's mother to the surrendering mother archetype and Ilse's friends to the camp sisters construct – these relationships can also figure in still broader matrices of identities. As we see next, the characters in Ilse's life story can also be positioned in a trilogy of historical identities that locate people, groups, institutions, and countries on a moral axis of wrong (perpetrators), right (victims), and uncommitted (bystanders).

The three positions noted above are defined and instantiated in great detail by Hilberg 1992. Hilberg's definition of *perpetrator* is quite clear: "people who played a specific role in the formulation or implementation of anti-Jewish measures" (p. ix). *Victims* include refugees (people who fled Germany and occupied countries from 1933 to 1941) as well as survivors (including people from communities that had been spared, those who hid or adopted false identities, and those who had been incarcerated in camps). The bystander role is more complicated. It is defined in relatively vague terms – those who were "not 'involved,' not willing to hurt the victims and not wishing to be hurt by the perpetrators" (p. xi) – and it contains a surprising assortment of subtypes, such as *Nations in Adolf Hitler's Europe*, *the Churches*, *Messengers*. Even within those subtypes, there is variation among the actions of different people, institutions, and countries: Did they help the perpetrators? Help the victims? Or try to ignore both?

Ilse and her friends are clearly victims: They were segregated from public life, transported from one camp to another, and persecuted within the camps. The five friends thus form an alignment that is unambiguously opposed to the actions of clearly defined "others." Although there is variation in the exact composition of *them* (e.g., *Estonian guards*, *prison guards*, *German guards*) in an *us/them* opposition, the distinction remains clear: Persecutors were acting adversely toward victims. Ilse's stories about friends not only differentiate *us* from *them*, but, consistent with classic sociological analyses of conflict (e.g., Coser 1956), they build solidarity among *us*. Thus, the unity among *us* provides emotional and material support for Ilse's everyday existence at the same time as it embeds Ilse in a community that could maintain and reinforce her own sense of being.

The position of Ilse's mother on an *us/them* opposition is more complex and ambiguous. Although Ilse's mother was certainly not directly responsible for Ilse's fate under the Nazis, she WAS responsible for leaving Ilse in prewar Germany. Earlier we noted that one motivation for the "surrendering mother" was endangerment of the mother by the presence of her child. Endangerment could then lead to abandonment due "more to the desperation of the situation than to the hardness of the mother" (Plank 1994:29–30).

Because Ilse is vague about when her mother actually left Germany – we know only that it was 1939 – it is difficult to assess the desperateness of her situation, a factor that certainly figures in deciding on her status as victim or bystander. 1939 was a pivotal year. Events in 1938 (the annexation of Austria, Kristallnacht) had led to an increase in refugees. In January 1939, plans were proposed to re-

move all Jews from Germany by emigration. Yet, in the same month, Hitler also delivered a speech predicting that all Jews in Europe would be annihilated. In March, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia; in September, after Germany's invasion of Poland, Britain and France declared war on Germany.

Historical research on emigrations during the 1930s suggests that the behavior of Ilse's mother was not typical. Although many German Jews did try to leave Germany, many parents made a choice dramatically different from that of Ilse's mother; many were so worried about the effects of the increasing severity of Nazi restrictions on their children's futures that they chose to send their children (through programs known as *Kindertransport*) out of Germany even if they themselves were unable to leave (Kaplan 1998:116–118). By the time Ilse's mother immigrated to America in 1939, the process of leaving Germany had become even more difficult, stymied by Nazi bureaucratic obstacles (such as those outlined by Ilse's mother in ex. 1), including "officials who could arbitrarily add to the red tape at whim" (Kaplan 1998:130). But, again, many women remained in Germany until they could guarantee comparable safety for their husbands and children (Kaplan 1998:62–73, 138–144) – so many women, in fact, that a disproportionate number of people left behind in Germany were elderly women (Kaplan 1998:143).

Ilse's mother/daughter discourse reflects the complexity of her mother's choice, and, depending on the social structural level from which we view her behavior, it allows different resolutions of its ambiguity. A "victim" classification for Ilse's mother arises from a broadly based national, religious, and historical classification in which Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany are considered Holocaust victims (Hilberg 1992:118–25). Indeed, Ilse herself defines her mother's work for a Jewish veterans' organization as evidence that *she was there* and that she and her father (who was in Buchenwald) *experienced many sad parts of themselves*.

A view of Holocaust roles from a relatively narrow lens, however, would focus solely on the mother's interpersonal family role and thus would classify her as a bystander because she was "not 'involved'" in helping her daughter avoid the Nazis. Ilse discursively avoids this categorization. By reducing her mother's personal accountability for her actions, Ilse presents her mother as one who lacked power and was not given the opportunity to protect her family. Indeed, the total lack of speech from the mother – not just between Ilse and her mother, but from the mother at all – could be seen as reinforcing her victim role by indicating her total inability to act, her lack of agency. By enhancing the victim role at the expense of the bystander role, Ilse avoids facing questions that are perplexing even to scholars (e.g., Why did some people try to rescue victims?) and troublesome to Ilse herself (e.g., Why didn't my mother try to rescue me?).

I have now moved from specific mother/daughter and friendship discourse in which people in Ilse's life are positioned as characters in her life story, to archetypal constructs of identity, and to historical positioning as *us* and *them* within the morally implicative trilogy of historical identities: perpetrators/*them* (wrong), victims/*us* (right), and bystanders (uncommitted). Included with the victims/*us*

group are survivors, who are also diverse, differentiated largely by the gravity of the circumstances ("exposure to risk and depth of suffering"; Hilberg 1992:187) in which they survived.

Whereas victims, perpetrators, and bystanders are identities that emerged both during and after the war, the survivor identity was actually not crystallized until many years later. When people like Ilse first arrived in America, they were identified as *refugees*, *immigrants*, *displaced persons*, or even *the ones who were there* (Greenspan 1999:50). It was not until almost 30 years after the war had ended that changes in memory culture (including events as different as the Eichmann trial and the television drama *Holocaust*) led to the cultural and social construction of a survivor identity.

Included in the survivor identity are two widely different archetypes accompanied by equally different rhetorics. On the one hand, survivors are ghosts, shells of their former selves, silent, estranged; they appear through a psychiatric rhetoric of displacement and trauma. On the other hand, survivors are heroes, symbols of hope, recovery and redemption; here they appear through a rhetoric celebrating their strength and resilience (Greenspan 1999; see also Langer 1991:163–171 on the "grammar of heroism and martyrdom"). Although the representation of survivors' lives in oral histories falls somewhere between these prevailing modes of discourse, Greenspan observes that "so self-sufficient have these discourses become that they are increasingly detached not only from each other but also from remembering the Holocaust itself" (1999:59).

Since Ilse's friends take a highly agentive role in resisting the fate being imposed upon them, they fit not only the camp sisters identity discussed above but also the archetype of the survivor as hero. Earlier we saw speech acts such as inclusive directives seeking a mutual advantage (*Let's go and get some* [potatoes], *Let's get out of this barrack*), statements of willfulness (*We go too*), or refusals (*No no no no no*). Also presented were challenges from others (*Are you insane?*, *We don't need her!*) that were overcome.

Like her friends, Ilse presents moments of great individual will and determination. In exx. 12 and 13, constructed dialogue both reports and demonstrates Ilse's agentive stance. In (153) below, Ilse enacts her defiance toward the guardians at a children's home where she is living when the group is facing nighttime airstrikes:

(12)
```
149   I slept on the fifth floor,
150   it was a pretty big building at that time
151   and eh sometimes I wouldn't hide
152   I just didn't want to go in bunkers.
153   I'd say, "I don't care!"[smiles, while covering her head]
154   And uh so eh eh I had a pretty– I had a pretty independent attitude . . .
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Rather than *hide* (151) *in bunkers* (152) with the others, Ilse separates herself from the group (through stress on *I*) and makes fun of the extent to which hiding

is necessary by covering her head. The *independent attitude* of self-sufficiency realized through this action appears again when Ilse refuses the offer of a Gentile friend to hide her in a village:

(13)

    249   And I said, "No I can't do that.
    250   Because if they catch us, then it will be your death and mine.
    251   And I'm young.
    252   And I know I will survive."

Ilse explains (250–252) her straightforward refusal of the friend's offer (249) through statements that protect her friend (250), appeal to her youth (251) and claim knowledge that she *will survive* (252). In both examples above, Ilse's will-fulness and agentive stance appears through her overt refusals (153, 249) to follow a directive (go into the bunkers) or accept an offer (allow someone to hide her) that may help her survive. Ilse's refusals portray a belief in her self-sufficiency and a lack of fear of the dangers that she may face – bravado typical of heroes who remain defiant in the face of danger (cf. Plank 1994:21–23 on the maternal martyr; Schiffrin 2001c).

Other sections in Ilse's life story, however, reveal striking decreases in agency that are consistent with Greenspan's (1999) observation that self-portraits in oral histories do not respect the artificially imposed dichotomy between survivor as agentive "hero" or passive "ghost." We find overt expressions of dismay and defeat (*And honest, we prayed that this factory would be bombed. Because we just – it was enough. We wanted to be finished one way or the other. Y'know let this war be over*; 650–653). We also find a mix of agency and passivity in the descriptions of forced labor assignments in camps. In describing both a coveted reassignment to the kitchen at a forced labor camp, and an unwanted job assignment at Bergen-Belsen (carrying dead bodies), for example, Ilse draws on a mixture of highly agentive accomplishment verbs and passives.

Like those telling other life stories, then, Ilse positions herself and her friends as vacillating between the different archetypes of "survivor" that have entered public discourse, combining and recombining them when recounting different times, places, and experiences. When we turn briefly to Ilse's mother, however, we see that her construction as a survivor does not easily fit either the "hero" or "ghost" archetype; nor does it vacillate between them. Rather, Ilse portrays for her mother a *modus operandi* that places "self" ahead of the "others" that would include Ilse: Ilse's mother plans to leave alone for Belgium to seek work; she ends up remarrying and leaving for America. Although she has implied to Ilse that she will try to get Ilse to America with her – once she gets there the *children quota . . . might be a little bit lower* and she will *work that when* [she gets] *to the United States* (ex. 1, 95) – Ilse never mentions this possibility again. Like the linguistic devices that obfuscate her mother's potential "by-stander" identity, Ilse's silence in her oral history about the outcome of her

mother's predictions helps protect her from the unwelcome inference that her mother abandoned her.

Whereas analysis and discussion of Ilse's mother and friends has focused almost entirely on the life story function of oral histories, discussion of larger and more abstract identities can also lead to the role of oral histories as data for historians. Although Hartman cautions that "survivor testimonies recorded long after the event do not excel in providing *vérités de fait* or positivistic history" he adds that "they CAN be a source for historical information or confirmation" (1996:142; emphasis in original). Linguistic analyses of who did what, how, and in what situations can supplement survivors' overt reflections (e.g., in response to questions posed by interviewers) on what facilitated their survival. They can also complement scholarly studies of survival and resistance.

The discursive vacillation between agency and passivity noted above, for example, is consistent with the contingencies of survival itself. Although Hilberg suggests three traits associated with survival – "realism, rapid decision making, and tenacious holding on to life" (1992:188) – he also readily acknowledges the role of less controllable attributes (physical health, youth), and perhaps most important, the role of luck (p. 190). As Langer (1996:8) observes, there are few "special characteristics" of Holocaust survivors that differentiate them from other victims. Similarly, the role of agency is belied by "the exemplary voice of the witness who vowed that in Auschwitz 'you didn't do; it was done to you.' " Likewise, the belief that survivors had abilities to endure suggests that those who did not survive were somehow at fault; the basic fact is that "no simple rules for survival apply; any effort to design them is futile." [10]

Unlike survival, resistance does entail agency, the ability to make choices and to carry out actions based on those choices. The depth of persecution and dehumanization beyond all expectations of normality in the Holocaust drastically limited the degree to which individuals and groups could make choices, let alone act on them. Yet the very pervasiveness of those measures – reaching far into both the minutiae of everyday life (eating, working, listening to the radio, going to school) and into the very basis of life (the right to exist) – had the ironic effect of providing small choices that could themselves constitute acts of resistance. Thus, it is not only underground groups and use of arms that have come to be seen as Holocaust resistance; it is individual daily acts (keeping a diary, getting food, engaging in a religious practice, staying with one's family) as well as life-preserving acts (escaping from a transport, hiding in a forest) that are so construed (Rohrlich 1998). In this broadened sense of resistance, then, the self/other-protective acts that Ilse and her friends initiated and pursued are acts of resistance. And again, stories about such acts reveal individuals' perceptions of how and why they survived – more particularly, their perceptions of the choices that were open to them and their ability to act on them.

At the outset of this article, I suggested that analysis of the discursive construction of mother and friends might offer some insight into two facets of iden-

tity: the continuity and coherence of personal identity over time, and the historically contingent identities that intersect with broad domains of social, cultural, and moral meanings.

On the personal level, Ilse's mother and friends remain consistent within the specific narratives that Ilse constructs about them. The link between narrative and self I have assumed suggests that this consistency adds coherence not only to Ilse's life story but also to Ilse's self. As we recall the more public roles of oral histories, however, a more nuanced possibility arises. Perhaps the anticipation that one's life story will be heard by a large, heterogeneous, and anonymous audience leads toward MORE coherence (avoiding the tricky question of how that would be measured; cf. Baerger and McAdams 1999) than would appear in more private retellings. If the self displayed in life stories in oral histories emerges in partial response to this demand for public performance (cf. Kacandes 1994), then rather than integrating the destruction of the Holocaust per se into coherent stories/lives/selves, what survivors have integrated – and why – may be quite different. To build on Greenspan (1999:fn. 19), perhaps survivors have integrated the LACK of integration imposed by the Holocaust into their stories/lives/selves as a way to balance two things: the different worlds within which their survival took (and still takes) form, and also – as I suggest here – the different worlds in which they now talk about that survival.

Discussion in this section has also pondered the relationship between personal and historical identities. People who coexist within one's own life world end up reflecting and fitting into historically contingent identities within worlds that extend beyond one's own immediate realm of experience. Such extensions reflect the different time frames, and the different levels, in which identities are embedded. Whereas Ilse's mother/daughter relationship predated the war, the friendships that she recounts began during it. Victim, perpetrator, and bystander identities were enacted during the war, but further modified and refined after the war; the survivor identity did not become socially recognized until nearly 30 years later. Moreover, whereas mother and friends are concrete identities filled by specific people who are known to a narrator, more abstract identities (victims, bystanders, survivors, and especially the construct "camp sisters" and the archetypal "surrendering mother") are not necessarily familiar categories to a narrator, and likewise, they can be filled by many people, not all of whom can be known to a narrator.

Although personal and historical identities can be realized at different times and in different ways, they can also become salient at one time, in one manner, in one text, through the same language. Telling a life story during a Holocaust oral history interview is one such occasion: the construction of "self" and "others" on both personal and historical levels in Ilse's story sit together at the intersection of past/present and concrete/abstract meaning. Thus, just as texts about the people in one's own life can reflect the larger social and cultural reformulations necessary to the attribution of historical identities, so too, they can contribute to them.

The discursive representation of personal relationships in texts helps create the larger social, cultural, and historical matrices within which more abstract categories such as surrendering mother, camp sisters, bystanders, victims and survivors emerge.

LINGUISTICS AND STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST

Holocaust oral histories are ostensibly about the past experience of one person, told to one interviewer, in one setting, but this one-dimensional view is an over-simplification at all levels. The life stories told during oral history interviews are products of a chorus of different voices whose reformulations of the past are directed to hearers whose identities and locales are quite varied – high school students in a classroom, casual visitors to a museum, and an ever-growing array of scholars in universities and research institutes. Like all representations of the Holocaust, and indeed of the "past" in general, oral histories are thus mediated both by time itself – they are "concerned less with a past than with a sense of that past in the present" (Langer 1991:40) – and by other parameters of context. Survivors who choose to share their experiences with an interviewer do so knowing that what they say may well be heard again and again in a variety of contexts that become increasingly distant from the site of the interview, and by a variety of listeners who know and care in different ways about the Holocaust.

Just as the means of producing Holocaust oral histories is mediated, so too are the ways of interpreting Holocaust oral histories. Different modes of listening can stem not only from the variety of academic disciplines (e.g. history, psychology/psychiatry, sociology, literary theory, theology) that use Holocaust oral histories as data, but also from one's own personal expectations, concerns, and interests. Indeed, the incorporation of individual survivors' experiences into memory culture encourages a reciprocity of highly personal responses.

Although many academic disciplines have contributed different perspectives and methodologies to study of the Holocaust, linguistics has been relatively inactive in this enterprise. This neglect is somewhat ironic, given the frequent observation that it is difficult to find language through which to speak of the Holocaust: recall the discussion of trauma above, or consider the trope of silence that pervades Holocaust literature (e.g., Horowitz 1997), and the growing interest in studying the Holocaust as a "representation" (e.g., Friedlander 1992a, LaCapra 1994, Patraka 1999, Reiter 2000, van Alphen 1997, Young 1988) in addition to (or instead of) studying it as a period in history.

The three functions of oral histories – public commemoration, historical data, and survivors' life stories – make them an excellent site in which to add linguistics to the analytic synergy that can develop when various disciplines collaborate to analyze the same texts. As linguists, we are used to finding patterns in what may appear initially to be a chaos of words, or even in occasions wherein words fail to appear at all. By delving deeper and deeper until we can discover the

systematicity of what may have appeared, on one level, to be random variation, we can discover regularities in the use of many forms, meanings, strategies and practices. My point is not that speakers are always able to rely on language to create or represent a coherent experience; rather, I believe that it is helpful to investigate the degree to which, and the manner in which, language does the work that its users need, want, or can enable it to do, and I believe that linguistics can help us discover how they do so.

In addition to providing another perspective from which to study the Holocaust, and thus enriching already existent links from linguistics to history, psychology, and literary theory, studies such as this one can also contribute to linguistics itself. The analysis of life stories and oral histories offers multiple opportunities for learning how language reflects a complex interplay among psychological, social, cultural, and historical meanings. Although we are familiar with stories about the routine contingencies of everyday lives, we know much less about the linguistic transformation of the extraordinary political, social, economic, and military conditions that can so drastically alter everyday private lives. Thus, I hope that my analysis has made concrete contributions in two areas of inquiry: first, to our general understanding of representations in life stories and oral histories of communally catastrophic pasts (including, but not limited to the Holocaust); and, second, to our understanding of how individual linguistic practices intersect with broader domains of psychological, social, cultural, historical, and moral meanings.

NOTES

[1] Although the notion of "self" is said to be undergoing changes due to social and cultural changes accompanying modernity and postmodernity (e.g., Giddens 1991), I will assume that the paradigmatic self nevertheless maintains properties of continuity and integration.

[2] The earliest archives in the Unites States were initiated in the mid-1970s by Yaffa Eliach (at the Center for Holocaust Studies in New York City), who approached the interviews as "the raw material of historical documentation" (Gurewitsch 1998:xi). Several years later, a small group of survivors who had viewed the 1978 *Holocaust* drama on television were so angered by what they viewed as a trivialization of their experience (Miller 1991:237) that they formed an organization to facilitate the preservation and the use of their own stories as a resource for cultural memory. Their efforts became the Fortunoff Archives at Yale University, currently housing more than 4100 interviews. Another large collection of oral histories was developed in conjunction with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in 1989 (four years before museum opened. By 1999, the USHMM had collected more than a thousand interviews and had become a repository for almost six thousand interviews collected by other organizations. An even more recent and extensive archive is the Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation, a major educational/research foundation spearheaded by the American filmmaker Stephen Spielberg. Since its inception in 1994, the Shoah Foundation has collected more than fifty thousand interviews.

[3] This is not to say, of course, that all Holocaust life stories are coherent (Hartman 1996, LaCapra 2001, Langer 1991). But as Wieviorka notes, "Victims are certainly beyond words, and yet, dispossessed of everything, words are all they have left. Words which will be the sole trace of an existence" (1994:25).

[4] Despite the obvious value of collecting life stories over one's lifespan, most studies of life stories are only samples – told at specific times and places to specific interviewers – of the much larger longitudinal discourse. See, for example, Mishler 1999, Stromberg 1993.

[5] The study of narrative and identity is a rapidly expanding interdisciplinary endeavor; see, e.g., many articles in the journal *Narrative Inquiry*, as well as the new collection edited by Brockmeier and Carbaugh 2001. In my previous work on identity in Holocaust discourse, I have taken two different approaches. On the micro level, I provided a detailed portrait of one relationship: how Ilse created intertextual connections and coherence across noncontiguous discourse segments to create a thematically coherent textual portrait of her mother in her life story (Schiffrin 2000). On a more macro level, I provided snapshots of changing representations of identity in collective memory by examining the public presentation of identity of two different groups (American Jews and Japanese Americans) through reference to their World War II experiences (Schiffrin 20001a) and the places in which they occurred (Schiffrin 2001b). Finally, I explored the intertwining of micro and macro levels within Holocaust life stories by tracing a small part of the discursive path from a story of one person's experience in an oral history to its representation on a web site (Schiffrin 2001c).

[6] Constructed dialogue is a less direct means of displaying identity than are referring terms. To attribute a "mother" identity to someone through action (verbal or otherwise), for example, is a less direct means of displaying someone as a "mother" than just referring to her as "Mom," simply because it requires normative knowledge of what mothers typically do (or say), and inference of an identity based on interpretation of a (verbal) action in conjunction with that knowledge (see Schiffrin 1996).

[7] Referring terms were considered to be first-mentions if they occurred in the beginning of a new narrative or of a new episode within a narrative, or after a digression within a narrative.

[8] *The wife* is a next-mention because of its metonymic relation with the first-mention *my mother and her husband*.

[9] Of course, rapid speech and silence (Tannen & Saville-Troike 1985) may have a variety of meanings, depending on context.

[10] Two points. First, the sort of systematic research to which we are accustomed cannot answer the question of why some people survived and others did not. Although it is possible to learn the demographics of survivors (e.g., that more people from one country, town, of one age or gender, survived), comparison of psychological factors is impossible simply because of the lack of a control group; we have very little information on the adaptive strategies used by those who did not survive. For example, although survivors often insist that they survived because they had a family member about whom they were worried (Langer 1996) and anticipated reunion with (Greenspan 2001), we should not assume that those who did not survive did not have the same sentiments.

Second, supplementing the balance between controllable and uncontrollable factors contributing to survival is a distinction between physical and psychological survival. Whereas the presence of family or friends within the camps may have contributed to both realms of survival (e.g., providing food and protection, as well as a sense of identity; Bartrop 2000, Neiberger 1998), the hope that one's family was still alive (Greenspan 2001) may well have provided psychological more than physical strength.

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