

these survey response labels are to depress self-reported political activity, calling into question the extent to which previously reported findings from observational data about Muslims have been affected by response bias.

This quartet of experiments is rounded off by Youssef Chouhoud's insightful list experiment (chapter 10), which focuses on what, among all the negative experiences that Muslims have encountered, influences their levels of political tolerance. Challenging both academic and popular discourse about the supposed connection between Islam and indiscriminate intolerance toward non-Muslims, Chouhoud convincingly illustrates that "intolerance is targeted rather than invariable" (p. 197). This suggests that any political intolerance that Muslim Americans may hold is distinctly directed at Islamophobic groups rather than at groups that generally oppose religion.

The volume then concludes with two wide shots offering perspectives from Barreto and Dana (chapter 11) on the challenges, opportunities, and productive approaches to surveying Muslim Americans. In the concluding chapter, Calfano and Lajevardi walk the reader through a series of ideas about how scholars can build on various insights from the earlier chapters in moving the research agenda on American Muslims forward.

This is an ambitious book that has certainly succeeded in achieving many of its intended objectives. If there is one area for improvement worth highlighting, it is that of a minor disconnect between Calfano and Lajevardi's valid critiques of existing research designs and data collection methods and a lack of detailed attention paid to these same issues by some of the studies in the volume. Overall, however, by giving voice to a diverse and impressive group of social scientists, the book excels both at shedding light on some of the most pressing questions of Muslim political life in the United States, and in charting a new frontier for future scholarship. In addition to its theoretical, practical, and methodological contributions, this book also serves as a model of successful collaboration.

### **Pork Barrel Politics: How Government Spending Determines Elections in a Polarized Era.** By

Andrew H. Sidman. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019.

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There is a significant disconnect between the common wisdom surrounding pork barrel spending and what the evidence shows. The conventional wisdom among journalists and politicians is that pork barrel spending—money that members of Congress (and other politicians) divert to their districts for local spending projects—helps all Congress members win reelection. This belief also

shows up in academic treatments of the subject: the classic distributive spending model is rooted in the twin assumptions that pork helps all members get reelected, which leads all members to pursue spending for their districts equally. However, the conventional wisdom is at odds with the evidence coming out of decades of studies that examine how pork barrel spending influences members' reelection prospects. When studies examine Democratic and Republican Congress members separately, they universally find that pork helps Democratic members win reelection, but does not help Republicans (e.g., Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*, 1987; Patrick Sellers, "Fiscal Consistency and Federal District Spending in Congressional Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 41, 1997; Jeffrey Lazarus and Shauna Reilly, "The Electoral Benefits of Distributive Spending," *Political Research Quarterly* 63, 2010). Andrew Sidman's recent book on pork barrel spending offers the fullest exploration of this partisan asymmetry to date.

Following these earlier studies, Sidman argues that the pork barrel is inherently ideological. Liberal voters are typically proponents of government spending in general and support the government's role as an equalizing agent across society. Thus most liberals are inclined to rate their members of Congress more highly if they bring federal spending back to the district. In contrast, conservative voters tend to support fewer specific government programs and prefer lower levels of government spending overall. These voters are less likely to see government spending on local projects as a good thing, and on the whole, they do not reward members for procuring such projects.

Yet conservative voters do favor one form of government spending: the contingent liability (Kenneth N. Bickers and Robert M. Stein, "The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era," *Journal of Politics* 62, 2000). Contingent liabilities are government guarantees of risk, typically in the form of guaranteeing a bank loan or backing an insurance policy. For example, the government guarantees certain small business loans, which makes them less risky for banks and results in more small businesses being supported by these loans. This type of spending program is more in line with the conservative political outlook than traditional distributive spending on two counts. First, the business taking out the loan still succeeds or fails on its own merits (echoing conservative calls for "equality of opportunity," rather than "equality of outcome"). Second, contingent liabilities square with conservative preferences for lower spending, because the government only spends money for loans that default. Thus public outlays on these programs are limited. As a result, contingent liabilities are sometimes called "Republican pork."

The heart of Sidman's argument is that these ideological distinctions have significant partisan effects. Liberal voters

reward their members for procuring federal spending; since most liberal voters are represented by Democrats, this results in higher vote shares for Democratic members. As for Republicans, on the one hand, conservative voters do not reward their Congress members for the spending they bring home; indeed, some Republican members actually pay an electoral penalty for procuring federal spending. On the other hand, Republican members are rewarded electorally for procuring contingent liabilities for their districts, and those programs are less likely to help Democrats.

A consideration that Sidman adds, and the theoretical concept that is most original to the book, is that these ideological cues produce more consistent electoral effects when political polarization is high. When polarization is low, the existence of conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans attenuates the partisan effect that pork barrel spending has on elections: some part of the Democratic electorate prefers low spending, and some part of the Republican electorate prefers high spending. Thus, the ideological nature of pork barrel spending is somewhat obscured. However, during times of high polarization, conservative voters are more or less all Republicans, and liberals are more or less all Democrats. This means the ideological cues voters respond to—including cues coming from government spending projects—map almost perfectly onto party, which gives these cues their maximum impact on electoral outcomes.

Sidman tests this theory with a variety of data, starting with dividing pork barrel spending into ideologically significant categories. He begins with three categories: public works projects, such as spending on road and bridges (the prototypical, historically original, pork barrel spending), contingent liabilities, and military spending. An initial examination confirms that members' pursuit of each type of project is conditional on party, ideology, and polarization in the ways suggested by the earlier discussion: Democratic members are more likely to pursue public works spending, and Republican members are more likely to pursue contingent liabilities. The ideology of military spending is less clear than the other two categories, so throughout the rest of the book Sidman focuses on contingent liabilities and public works spending. A separate individual-level examination of voter attitudes also confirms that conservative voters are less receptive to spending than are liberal voters, and they also are more likely to hold this view when they live in a district with high levels of distributive spending.

The bulk of the empirical examination focuses on public works projects' and contingent liabilities' separate effects on a wide variety of electorally related outcomes. These outcomes include Congress members' election returns, individual-level vote choice, likelihood of drawing opponents in primary elections and quality challengers in general elections, and campaign fundraising. As with all

wide-ranging empirical investigations, results are messy, and not all hypotheses are supported by the data. But in general the results are consistent: high levels of traditional distributive spending (i.e., public works spending) are associated with liberal voters being more likely to vote for their incumbent representative and Democratic members doing well when seeking reelection. Conversely, high levels of spending are associated with conservative voters being slightly less likely to vote for their incumbent member than when spending is lower; as a result, Republican members do not receive the same benefit from distributive spending. Indeed, such spending can actually hurt Republicans; for example, in chapter 5 Sidman finds that high pork barrel Republicans are more likely to draw a primary election challenger. Conversely, over the course of Sidman's investigations, he finds that contingent liabilities tend not to affect Democrats' reelection prospects but do significantly help Republicans by increasing their levels of campaign spending (chapter 6). And all of these trends are accentuated when polarization is high.

All told, this book is a significant addition to the study of pork barrel politics. Many of the theoretical concepts that Sidman discusses originate elsewhere in the literature, but the book brings them all together in one place for the first time and adds the novel insight that polarization conditions the partisan response to pork barrel spending. As well, this book provides by far the broadest empirical examination of pork barrel spending's influence on electoral outcomes to date. This empirical work both confirms previous findings and provides us with new insights into the role that pork barrel spending plays in congressional elections. Thus, the book is an important new resource for all who wish to understand how pork barrel spending works.

#### **After Reagan: Bush, Dukakis, and the 1988 Election.**

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I was in my senior year of college as the presidential election heated up in the summer and fall of 1988. I watched the primaries, the conventions, and the general election with great interest as I prepared to cast only my second vote in a presidential contest, and I vividly recall how presidential politics, never for the soft-hearted, seemed to be particularly negative. Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis, the Democratic nominee, had to fend off the accusations in the Willie Horton ad that he was soft on crime, as well as the unflattering film of him riding a tank against the backdrop that he was soft on defense—at the same time that then-vice president and