

## POLITICAL THEORY

**Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since *Brown v. Board of Education*.** By Danielle S. Allen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. 254p. \$25.00 cloth.

— Joel Olson, *Northern Arizona University*

It may seem odd, given its title, but this is a book about friendship. The central problem of American democracy, according to Danielle Allen, is a lack of trust among citizens. For democracy to be stable, its citizens must feel confident that the obligations and opportunities of society are shared equitably. Yet majority rule is a breeding ground for distrust, particularly in a polity marked by race. Without trust, there is nothing to bind the minority and the majority together. The task of this book is to find ways for citizens to trust one another in these unsettled times. Doing so, Allen argues, requires developing habits of political friendship. The challenge of democratic politics, ironically, is to turn strangers into friends.

Allen's argument begins with a striking point: Sacrifice is an omnipresent part of democracy. This is because democracy promises all citizens independent political power, but few experience it. The result of this paradox of democratic sovereignty is a collective neurosis that must be constantly managed: "Democratic citizens are by definition empowered only to be disempowered. As a result, democratic citizenship requires rituals to manage the psychological tension that arises from being a nearly powerless sovereign" (p. 41). Prior to *Brown v. Board of Education*, this tension was resolved through *Herrenvolk* democracy, which provided whites with a sense of equality (among fellow white citizens) and power (over all those who were not white). After *Brown*, Allen argues, the challenge is to develop habits of citizenship that can empower citizens without resorting to exclusion and subordination.

Democracy, then, implies loss, given that one lacks the promised power. Loss, in turn, implies sacrifice. Those who lose a decision yet assent to it have in a way sacrificed, and "their sacrifice makes a collective democratic action possible" (p. 29). Through an excellent interpretation of the fiction and criticism of Ralph Ellison, Allen persuasively argues that sacrifice is a ubiquitous, inconspicuous, almost rudimentary part of democratic life.

The only way to deal with sacrifice effectively is to build relations of trust among citizens so that we can be confident that our sacrifices will be reciprocated. This requires that we find ways to talk to strangers. Developing habits of trust allows citizens to see strangers as friends. Following Aristotle, Ellison, and Hannah Arendt, Allen maintains that political friendship is the essence of democratic citizenship. Such friendship does not require citizens to come to know each other intimately or even that they know each other at all. All it demands is that citizens feel

that they share an equitable amount of the benefits and burdens of citizenship. By asking ourselves "Would I treat a friend this way?" in encounters with fellow citizens, we convert "rivalrous self-interest" into "equitable self-interest" (pp. 140, 126). By making strangers into friends, we share sacrifice equitably, and in so doing generate the relations of trust upon which democracy depends.

*Talking to Strangers* is engaging, well written, and tightly argued. Its interpretations of texts are excellent. Part I of the book sets up the problem of sacrifice and citizenship by means of a fascinating interpretation of several of the most famous photographs of the struggle to integrate Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957. The photographs, Allen shows, reveal the "deep rules" of public interaction among American citizens at the time: white women cursing black women, white men kicking black men, black people stoically enduring abuse from white mobs. These rules are learned through intuition and habit rather than education in the explicit rights and duties of citizenship. The analysis is followed by a keen comparison of Ellison's and Arendt's interpretations of Little Rock. Through original critiques of Jürgen Habermas and Thomas Hobbes, Part II examines the "bad habits" of contemporary democratic practice. Part III begins with a careful reading of *Invisible Man* as a text on democratic sacrifice. It goes on to imagine what a trust-generating citizenship might look like and, using Aristotle, defends rhetoric as a crucial tool in developing trust.

One of the book's most essential points is made quietly. Allen suggests that the black experience of sacrifice during slavery and segregation makes it a deep spring from which to draw in developing a post-*Brown*, trust-generating democratic citizenship. "Something in the African American experience of sacrifice," she writes, commenting on Ellison, "has brought extra knowledge about the nature of democracy. . . . This knowledge could be the basis of a new approach to citizenship" (p. 114). Black people's exquisite experience with the paradox of democratic sovereignty makes their particular history universal, or as Allen nicely puts it, "as democratic citizens, we are all Negroes" (p. 116). Placing black life at the center of American citizenship enables Allen to think radically despite her avowed liberalism. How many liberals today, for example, are willing to publicly state, "In my utopia universities would have no police" (p. 181)?

Yet this radicalism also exposes strains in Allen's political theory. Her emphasis on trust downplays the structural nature of some political conflicts. As a result, her effort to turn strangers into friends does not pay enough attention to contradictions among citizens that perhaps no amount of trustful talk can resolve. This is evident in her otherwise fine defense of rhetoric as a valuable part of democratic discourse. Through Aristotle, Allen defines rhetoric as a form of "trust production" and provides a persuasive defense of it against charges made by Habermasians

that rhetoric and emotions distort deliberation. Yet her argument does not take into account forms of rhetoric that do not seek to generate trust but to draw lines in the sand. One thinks of Frederick Douglass, Wendell Phillips, and Malcolm X, three of the greatest orators in American history, all of whom sought not to make friends but to “break up the crust of an ignorant prejudice,” as the abolitionist Phillips put it. These rhetoricians did not ask themselves “Would I treat a friend this way?” when they engaged others. Instead, they drew lines on the issues of slavery and white supremacy and dared their audience to choose the right side. If we grant that both Douglass’s desire to “pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule” toward his pro-slavery opponents and Malcolm’s warning to the American government that it is “the ballot or the bullet” contribute to the struggle for democracy, then theories of citizenship need to account for such rhetoric without dismissing it as distorted or distrustful.

Allen convincingly argues that one way to tone down the supercharged rhetoric of political discourse today is to treat strangers as friends. But perhaps this is not quite sufficient. As I was driving to work to write this review, I heard a caller on Bill O’Reilly’s conservative radio talk show ask how Christian social conservatives could find common ground with secular liberals. O’Reilly bluntly stated, “You can’t. It’s really more a matter of who wins the game.” This statement is anathema to Allen’s argument, of course, yet it raises a problem: How can one make a stranger a friend when he or she has already determined that you are an enemy? *Talking to Strangers* is an important contribution to democratic theory. Recognizing that some conflicts are not amenable to the habits of political friendship, however, might require that democratic theory also address those conflicts in which it might be necessary to confront, rather than befriend, the stranger.

### The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and

**Citizens.** By Seyla Benhabib. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 251p. \$65.00 cloth, \$23.99 paper.

— Catherine A. Holland, University of Missouri-Columbia

Between 1910 and 2000, the world’s population more than tripled, from 1.6 to 5.3 billion. The number of persons who live as migrants in countries other than those in which they were born increased nearly sixfold, from 33 million to 175 million, and more than half of this increase has occurred since 1965. Almost 20 million of these are refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons. In her book, Seyla Benhabib grapples with both the political and moral implications of this rapid increase in transnational migration, arguing that the central principles that shape our thinking about political membership and state sovereignty are in tension, if not outright contradiction, with one another. “From a

philosophical point of view,” she writes, “transnational migrations bring to the fore the constitutive dilemma at the heart of liberal democracies: between sovereign self-determination claims on the one hand and adherence to universal human rights principles on the other” (p. 2). She argues for an internal reconstruction of both, underscoring the significance of membership in bounded communities, while at the same time promoting the cultivation of democratic loyalties that exceed the national state, supporting political participation on the part of citizens and noncitizen residents alike.

International human rights treaties and conventions that guarantee the minimal well-being of noncitizens, Benhabib points out, contribute to the erosion of national states’ prerogative over their inhabitants. Yet even as these instruments prohibit signatories from stripping individuals of national citizenship or refusing them the right to emigrate, among other things, they offer no safeguards to ensure that emigrants will be accepted by second- or third-party states. Paradoxically, then, treaties like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights simultaneously extend their reach into what was once the exclusive jurisdiction of national states while also upholding the state’s sovereign right to refuse entry or permanent residence to migrants, in effect contributing to the dilemma of the stateless. “Thus,” Benhabib argues, “a series of internal contradictions between universal human rights and territorial sovereignty are built into the logic of the most comprehensive international law documents in our world” (p. 11).

States tend to respond to the intensification of global interdependency by working to contain the transborder migration of peoples; by contrast, Benhabib argues for enhancing the responsiveness of political institutions to migrants and refugees. However, while concerned with remaking democratic citizenship in light of migration, she by no means advocates neglecting local forms of political identification in favor of a rootless and detached cosmopolitanism. To the contrary, she insists that local engagements provide us with some of the most meaningful forms of democratic attachment and political action. She envisions new forms of cosmopolitan citizenship that privilege neither the local and particular nor the global and universal, but tack between and among these creatively and productively, offering new forms and opportunities for politics by “reclaiming and repositioning . . . the universal . . . within the framework of the local, the regional, or other sites of democratic activism and engagement” (pp. 23–24).

This “disaggregation of citizenship claims,” in which the rights, responsibilities, activities, benefits, privileges, and entitlements of national citizenship are first unbundled, sometimes deterritorialized, and then recombined variously according to place, jurisdiction, and circumstance, is already taking place. For example, citizens of

European Union nations who are resident in other EU member states can vote in both local and EU-wide elections, and local jurisdictions sometimes allow these noncitizen residents to hold local office in the cities where they live and work. Even, and perhaps especially, conflicts between migrants' cultural-political practices and the conventions of their adopted lands, as in the various "headscarf affairs" in France and Germany, offer opportunities for the productive redefinition of citizenship through what Benhabib characterizes as democratic iterations, "complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, through-out legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society" (p. 179). Such engagements are occasions to rethink and refigure democratic practices and institutions in light of global migration. They are not indications of a decline of citizenship so much as its resignification and reinvigoration, bringing people who may or may not be citizens in the legal sense into democratic deliberation about the proper bounds of politics itself. They effect the transformation of the populations of democratic nations from an *ethnos*, a "community of shared fate, memories, and moral sympathies," to a *demos*, "the democratically enfranchised totality of all citizens, who may or may not belong to the same *ethnos*" (p. 211).

However much the exclusive power of national states over the populations that reside within them has been attenuated, Benhabib argues, this does not mean that state sovereignty's "hold upon our political imagination and its normative force in guiding our institutions are obsolete" (pp. 178–79). Thus, it bears asking about the consequences for national states of such democratic iterations. What sorts of adjustments, alterations, and even transformations of the national state are occasioned by these developments? How might the transfiguration of a citizenry from *ethnos* to *demos* alter the terms in which nations and national peoples—once mythologized as springing full-grown from an immemorial past—are imagined, and what transformations of both national and global political vision might be generated? In short, what sort of future is portended here for the national state in a global and thus newly historicized world, and how will that future alter the ways in which nations imagine their pasts and organize the present? Benhabib does not approach questions like these, concerned as she is with making a normative case for the regeneration of moral universalism and the development of cosmopolitan federalism. Yet these questions inevitably flow from *The Rights of Others*. If we are left with them, this is testament to the importance of Benhabib's meditation as the ground upon which subsequent work might build.

**Workable Sisterhood: The Political Journey of Stigmatized Women with HIV/AIDS.** By Michele Tracy Berger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 248p. \$32.50.

— Nancy A. Naples, *University of Connecticut*

How do women who face the multiple stigmas associated with drug use, sex work, and HIV-positive status engage as political actors in the wider environment that shapes their lives? This question is at the heart of *Workable Sisterhood*. Michele Tracy Berger offers one of the first studies of the development of critical consciousness and political participation of women of color who are HIV positive. All of the women she interviewed for her study have also struggled with drug abuse and engaged in sex work, and all have found a way to translate their experiences into a range of political actions designed to empower themselves and other women who face similar challenges. These activities include contesting the stigma associated with HIV-positive status, working "face-to-face" with other HIV-positive women, designing events and cultural projects to educate the wider community about HIV and about those living with HIV and AIDS, and advocating for social and economic changes that would help improve the lives of HIV-positive people (p. 12).

Drawing on the powerful analytic frames of "intersectional stigma" and "life reconstruction," Berger rightly argues that "the process by which these women have transformed themselves and exerted their rights in a democratic society deserves scholarly attention" (p. 2). She makes powerful use of the construct "life reconstruction" to forge a link between the women's experiences and events that contributed to their development as political actors. She describes a twofold process: first, the development of a "public voice" as an HIV-positive woman, and second, the recognition of resources that could facilitate their political participation (p. 12). These resources rarely included those most associated with political participation, such as professional status, higher education, or access to significant financial assets. In contrast, the women drew on recovery programs, therapeutic work, spirituality, and peer support as resources that fostered their engagement as HIV/AIDS advocates and political activists (p. 4). The women come to view their political work as a "*community mandate*" that resulted from their efforts to foster change in people's attitudes and treatment of stigmatized women with HIV/AIDS (p. 184).

Berger's study is based on a focused sample of 16 interviewed women who were diagnosed with the HIV/AIDS virus from 1986 to 1996. Through participation in the Street Outreach Program of Females in Trouble, a non-profit agency that sponsors community development and self-empowerment programs for girls and women in Detroit, Berger formally and informally interviewed a large sample of women who had a problem with crack cocaine. She decided to focus her study on the women who were

negotiating the stigma of HIV-positive status, along with the stigmas of drug abuse and sex work, to foreground the complex process of intersectional stigma. As Berger explains, the concept of intersectional stigma helps reveal “why the history and trajectory of their participation looks different when compared to other groups who organized around HIV/AIDS issue” (p. 25). She further explains that “the ‘piling up’ of stigmas does not result just in a negative effect; it changes and transmutes the relationship between other aspects of identity and HIV/AIDS” (p. 30).

The first chapter lays out the analytic framework. Berger links her analysis to scholarship on women’s central role as community workers and further argues that the concept of *blended and overlapping roles* best captures “the ways in which they articulated the work they did in their communities and the meanings they made from it” (p. 5). In Chapter 2, she presents brief “bio-sketches” of the women she interviewed. The bio-sketches are organized around the three overlapping roles of advocate, activist, and helper. It is unclear from the bio-sketches what distinguishes these categories, one from the other. It would have been useful for the reader to have the discussion of the rationale for these different categories included in this chapter, rather than wait until Chapter 7 for an expanded discussion.

Chapter 3 outlines the methodology for the study and includes a thoughtful discussion of the dilemmas the author faced as she carried out her study. Berger’s methodology includes close attention to the construction of what she terms “narratives of injustice.” She carefully explores how the women describe their coming to terms with their diagnosis and coming to consciousness about the societal factors that contribute to the marginalization of women like them. Chapter 4 details the narratives of injustice presented by the respondents and highlights the discrimination they faced when they were told about their HIV/AIDS diagnosis. Most of her respondents described experiences with insensitive medical staff who emphasized “an inevitability of death” and did not offer any follow-up support (p. 91). The women reported that they received biased treatment due to their history of drug use. For many, the recognition of the discriminatory treatment served as a catalyst for their political activism.

Chapters 5 and 6 delve into the life reconstruction process and examine how the women drew on nontraditional resources for their political participation. These resources include recovery programs and therapy through which they explored how sexual trauma affected their later life choices. As Berger explains, “therapy around sexual abuse trauma began to provide a language and vocabulary by which women could start to understand the concept of women as a category, and also helped them to see that other women very much like them (women of color, drug users, lower income) also experienced similar phenomena” (p. 111). In Chapter 6, Berger analyzes two main processes that contribute to “reconstructing gender iden-

tity”: first, “redirecting HIV stigma related to sex work,” and second, “sexual self (re)education and empowerment,—that is, ways in which women sought to empower themselves around: (1) safe sex and (2) renegotiation of sexual boundaries” (p. 119). Central to these interrelated processes is the “development of a public voice: what it means to be a woman with HIV” (p. 133). Claiming the identity of “a woman with HIV” provided “the bridge to political activity” (p. 133). Chapter 7 focuses on “the multiple expressions of political participation” (p. 143). Berger analyzes the political work of her sample as “black female-centered” and argues that many of the women demonstrate familiarity with the “basic concepts espoused in multiracial feminist or womanist thought,” such as “sharing of power and empowerment issues for women of color” (p. 182).

Berger’s study effectively demonstrates the limits of “notions about the route to political socialization and about what is possible for people labeled deviant” (p. 197). Her study is one of the first that I have read that centers on the experiences and political practice of women of color who are HIV-positive and who also face other challenges, such as recovery from drug abuse and sexual trauma. The concepts of “intersectional stigma” and “life reconstruction” have value beyond her study and can provide useful frameworks for researchers working with marginalized populations. Her accessible writing style combined with the rich analytic framework contribute to the value of *Workable Sisterhood* for multiple audiences.

**Isaiah Berlin: Liberty, Pluralism, and Liberalism.** By George Crowder. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. 256p. \$59.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— David Archard, *Lancaster University*

The conventional recent history of Anglophone normative political philosophy, which credits John Rawls’s publication of *A Theory of Justice* (1971) with its rebirth, is unfair to those important figures who came before Rawls—chiefly Karl Popper, Michael Oakeshott, F.A. Hayek, and—the subject of this critical introduction—Isaiah Berlin. There is a further irony in that what can be clearly identified as the major theme of Berlin’s lifework—moral pluralism—also dominates the late writings of John Rawls and those influenced by him. Indeed, it is arguable that the intense interest displayed in Berlin’s account of pluralism owes much to the importance of this topic in contemporary moral and political philosophy. To some extent, even the Berlin of the classic and influential lecture “Two Concepts of Liberty”—which has for long constituted the inescapable starting point for any serious analysis of this ideal—is overshadowed by the Berlin who insists that the goods human beings pursue are inescapably plural, conflicting, and incommensurable.

Berlin has been well served by the indefatigable and diligent efforts of his editor, Henry Hardy. He is well

served here in this excellent book by his commentator, George Crowder. Crowder does a marvelous job of identifying the principal themes in Berlin's work, explaining Berlin's motivations, correcting prevalent misunderstandings, and responding on his subject's behalf to important criticisms. Even where Crowder identifies indictable silences on Berlin's part—his saying little or nothing, for instance, about social justice and cultural pluralism—he suggests what Berlin could, and should, have said about matters.

Crowder's achievement is remarkable when one considers a number of salient facts. First, Berlin was chiefly an essayist. His command of his material was impressive and he wrote—as he spoke—at an exhilarating gallop, covering huge tracts of intellectual territory with verve and swagger. Yet he penned no single magnum opus, no defining text to encapsulate his political vision. Second, Berlin's distinctive approach combines both analysis and the history of ideas. Yet his analysis disappoints those who detect lack of clarity and imprecision, and his history irritates exegetes who accuse him of oversimplification. Third, he is accounted a liberal yet, as Crowder notes, he rarely identified or specified his liberal views. Fourth, he is accounted a political philosopher, yet he wrote little on the topics that preoccupy his contemporaries and engaged little with the views of his fellow philosophers, most notably John Rawls. Fifth, he had little positive to say. His was rather a vision of what could go wrong when one listened to the siren call of monism. He was happier exposing the shortcomings of his enemies than he was making clear what he shared with those on the side of the angels.

Why then is Berlin regarded as so important, and why should we continue to take him seriously? Because, as Crowder makes clear, his work is animated by the passionate conviction, persistently restated, that there is no single right answer to the moral question of how we should lead our lives, and that the political evils of the last few hundred years can be laid at the doors of those—monists—who believe otherwise. That conviction is tenaciously pursued in Berlin's attempts to understand the writings of those who can be identified as the intellectual friends and enemies of liberty. That conviction resonates with all those who can look to the real present-day world of extensive moral disagreement, the many ways humans choose to live fulfilling lives, and who can, further, now look back at the barren landscape occupied by failed attempts to build single-vision utopias.

However, what nags at Berlin's critics is a doubt as to whether his pluralism can indeed serve the cause of a liberalism that gives priority to the freedom of individuals from state coercion and social pressure to lead their lives as they, and not others, see fit. In the first place, there have been monists who espouse the cause of liberty. The utilitarian John Stuart Mill is an obvious example. Second, there is the worry—ably exploited by John Gray—that a thoroughgoing pluralism should not sustain but in fact

undercut liberalism. If there are indeed many morally incomparable ways to arrange matters, why is liberalism especially privileged? Third, it is unclear why liberalism needs Berlin's meta-ethical pluralism—the view that the good is irreducibly plural—rather than simply the observable, and predictable, fact to which Rawls appeals, namely, that the citizens of a liberal democratic society will disagree fundamentally and enduringly about conceptions of the good. Fourth, it needs showing, rather than simply assuming, that freedom to choose the good life is valuable when there is no single right answer to the question of what that life is.

Crowder offers suggestions of exemplary clarity as to how one might respond on Berlin's behalf. They will persuade Berlin's critics to varying degrees. An appeal to the phenomenology of our moral experience, for instance, does not evidently speak in favor of pluralism. Indeed, the meta-ethical realist can reasonably argue that human beings dispute moral matters in the belief—if not confident expectation—that one should settle on a single right answer. Crowder is also an honest enough commentator to indicate where Berlin's views cannot easily be saved. He pulls off the trick of being a deeply sympathetic but dispassionate critic, someone attracted to the overarching vision but unprepared to serve as a naive acolyte.

The measure of Crowder's not inconsiderable achievement is thus that in respect of Berlin's writings, we can now be much clearer about what is at stake, where we are in need of further good arguments, and what lines of thinking we might profitably pursue. Berlin's vision is clearer to us both in its strengths and in its weaknesses.

**A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics.** By Jill Frank. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 208p. \$49.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.

— Susan D. Collins, *University of Houston*

Jill Frank's book seeks to make Aristotle's political philosophy "available for democratic political practice" (p. 8). Her use of Aristotle in this regard resembles most closely that of Hannah Arendt, to whom she refers in her opening paragraph and whose treatment of work, action, and the *vita activa* would appear to have influenced Frank's discussion of the "work" of politics referred to in her subtitle. But in bringing out the Aristotle who "harbors democratic possibilities," the author also draws support, as well as distinguishes herself, from scholars such as Martha Nussbaum, Stephen Salkever, Fred Miller, Arlene Saxonhouse, Mary Nichols, and Alastair MacIntyre, who have, in very different ways, sought the aid of Aristotle to inform contemporary political life. *A Democracy of Distinction* thus engages a student of the ancient Academy in a serious conversation with the modern Academy. As Frank rightly says in closing, "Aristotle's ethical and political lessons are no less timely for us than they were for fourth century

Athens” (p. 180). By her own admission, the lessons she draws may not represent the view of the “definitive Aristotle,” but they do represent, she suggests, his effort both to reform fourth-century Athens and to lay the ground for a timeless possibility: a “democracy of distinction” that she sincerely and earnestly seeks to promote (pp. 8, 139–42).

As support for this possibility, Frank offers a reading of Aristotle, especially his *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, that begins from complex interpretations of his views of human activity (*energeia*), action (*praxis*), work (*ergon*), and capacity (*dunamis*). Her interpretations entail close textual analyses, and although she relies on translations of Aristotle’s texts, she sometimes modifies these translations to be more precise, though in a crucial instance with a puzzling result (*NE* 1098b31–1099a3 on pp. 34–35 and again on p. 70). The general thrust of her discussion is the important claim that “prohairesis” (lit. “choosing”) activity is “characteristically human activity insofar as it discloses the character, the soul, and therefore the nature of the one who acts, specifically by revealing the degree to which, in the actions he undertakes, the actor is using the capacity for logos he possesses by virtue of being human” (p. 34).

Why is this account of human activity so important? As the book proceeds, it becomes clear that the politics Frank’s Aristotle recommends presupposes that there is “nothing immutable or necessary about human nature,” and therefore that human activity is “nonessentialist and internally plural” (p. 15). Frank’s first chapter is thus devoted to unpacking Aristotle’s treatment of nature to show, first, that “claims about the identity of natural beings will . . . be claims about their activities” and, second, that these activities themselves develop out of the individual’s own “self-making” and the “making” or shaping that results from social and political institutions (pp. 40, 46–52). The very mutability and plurality of the human soul, then, as well as the “self-sovereignty” characterized by prohairesis activity, are mirrored in and supported by a democratic and pluralistic politics: “A unity in difference exemplifies Aristotle’s understanding of the harmonious whole that is the soul and of the harmonious whole that is the polity as well” (p. 52).

If Frank’s consideration of the relation between the soul and the polity is circular at times—they both shape and are shaped by one another—it is a circularity she seeks to exploit. For ruling and being ruled is the essential activity of a citizen, and “the work of each citizen (individual prohairesis activity) and the work of citizens together (collective prohairesis activity) is to unify the polity in a way that preserves its essential plurality” (p. 52). In the relation between the individual and the political order, that is, the causal arrow “points in both directions” (p. 11).

Frank’s effort to find in Aristotle’s thought support for a democratic and pluralistic order leads to accounts of

property (Chapter 2), justice (Chapter 3), and law (Chapter 4), about which I can raise but a few points. In general, in sketching a nonessentialist politics that nonetheless can constitute a “democracy of distinction,” Frank acknowledges that she walks a fine line between constructivism or positivism and absolutism or natural standards. But can she keep to this line? She struggles to do so at several points in her discussion, most obviously in her treatment of justice and the law. For she rejects legal positivism only then to disavow natural law. She argues that “the source of justice is not a transcendent and apolitical moral code.” Rather, justice is “the good judgment of citizens that decides which laws to follow and thereby produces and preserves the rule of law,” and this judgment is “political practice” (p. 116). Good judgment develops from “proper practice” or, in the case of property, “proper use” (pp. 69–74), and the moral and intellectual virtues on which judgment depends arise from the repeated actions of a self-sovereign individual in community with other self-sovereign individuals (pp. 49–52). Judgments and institutions are constructed, therefore, from proper practice and use, and Frank’s account of justice, especially her emphasis on reciprocity as the core of both corrective and distributive justice, suggests that the standard that rightly informs practice is fundamentally democratic (see especially pp. 103–11). Her protests to the contrary, in other words, there is a natural standard for Frank, namely, the “harmonious whole” and “unity in difference” constituted by a democratic and pluralistic soul and political order (see also her discussion of the “good polity” on p. 143).

In her final chapter, “The Polity of Friendship,” Frank seeks to show that a community of individuals can cohere through “enlarged self-interest” and “mutual advantage” (pp. 147–63, 172–78). Here she offers interpretations of Aristotle’s treatment of “use friendships” and the best regime that culminate in the claim that the truly best polity is a “mixed” constitution in which the prohairesis activity of each individual citizen both expresses his or her individual virtue and contributes to the common good of all. Such a constitution is democratic and pluralistic but also, it turns out, aristocratic and exclusive—only those willing to take on the responsibility of this “work” of politics are deserving of ruling and being ruled in turn (p. 178, see also pp. 174–75). Indeed, Frank’s democracy of distinction seems, at times, all work and no play, and one wonders how many of us would choose its responsibilities when even voting feels like a chore.

Frank’s democratic reading of Aristotle possesses many virtues, especially in combating formulaic or formalistic accounts of Aristotle, in showing his freedom from conventional Greek prejudices, and in drawing attention to the dialectical nature of his treatises. But her Aristotle also often sounds like a good member of the modern Academy, and a reader might wonder what necessity there is to return to his *Ethics* and *Politics* to support the pluralism

we already love. Nevertheless, if we accept Frank's denial that she presents the definitive Aristotle—a denial that retreats to the background as the democratic Aristotle asserts himself—we should then ask if something of distinct value is not also lost or cut off by her reading. One need not say with Pascal that writing the *Politics* was the least serious part of Aristotle's life, or that Aristotle approached politics as if trying to bring order to a madhouse, to ask whether there is a more serious, and more radical, side to his thought than a democratic reading can uncover. In Frank's account especially, it is difficult to see how Aristotle's political philosophy could culminate, as it does, in the demotion rather than the elevation of politics and the active life; her reading thus makes it hard to understand the nature and status of the alternative that emerges as best—philosophy and the contemplative life. From her democratic Aristotle, there may be lessons to be learned, but Aristotle himself has things to say that we modern academics urgently need to hear. It is possible, however, that the use of Aristotle to defend the reigning orthodoxy, even by such well-intentioned works as this one, may render us ever more deaf not only to the answers he might teach us but even to the very questions he thought fundamental.

**Margins of Disorder: New Liberalism and the Crisis of European Consciousness.** By Gal Gerson. Albany: State

University of New York Press, 2004. 239p. \$45.00.

— David Boucher, *Cardiff University*

This is a book whose title does not adequately convey its content. On the one hand, it is admirably broad in its scope relating issues in the philosophy of mind, psychology, sociology and of evolutionary biology to politics and ideology. On the other, the anticipation of relating the new liberalism in England (nothing is said of Scotland and Wales) to European liberalism is not fulfilled. Instead, the crisis of European consciousness relates to quite different considerations. The period between 1870 and 1930, it is claimed, saw an unprecedented questioning of the cohesion between reason and enlightenment, especially in three fields of knowledge that provide the focus for *Margins of Disorder*, social psychology, biology, and classical studies. The revolt against the enlightenment was manifest in the proliferation of fields of knowledge developing their own vocabularies and procedural rules, rendering them incommensurable with one another. Encyclopedic reason was undermined by self-interrogation and increasing specialization. In social studies, for example, there were doubts about the existence, or alternatively the apprehension, of a universal set of standards for social good. Max Weber saw rationality as relational and historical, and Emile Durkheim, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto formulated issue-specific terminologies allowing systems of social behavior to be analyzed without reference to their truth values or moral functions. Such arguments, Gal Gerson

contends, justified the exercise of power by elites for its own sake (p. 17).

There are three deficiencies of significance in this work. First, once again an opportunity has been missed to view the new liberalism as part of a much wider liberal phenomenon. Guido de Ruggiero, whose name is mentioned, but whose ideas are not discussed, had his *History of European Liberalism* translated into English in 1927 by R. G. Collingwood. Collingwood, himself a disciple of de Ruggiero, was an exponent of the liberal theory of the state that renounced the error of imposing a blueprint upon the individual for which he or she was not inwardly prepared, and promoted the idea that the state is the organ through which a people expresses whatever political acumen it may possess, reproduce, and foster within itself. De Ruggiero's magisterial sweep across Europe acknowledges the importance of L. T. Hobhouse, the most important of new liberal thinkers in England, and applauds his emphasis upon free scope for personal development, not in the name of equal rights before the law but of equality of opportunity, which linked him to the French democrats. European liberalism in general, and not just in England, effected a synthesis between revolutionary socialism and laissez-faire economics in the form of social liberalism. Hobhouse himself recognized that ideas of social progress transcend borders. The liberal revival, he said, "was not confined to Great Britain. . . . [T]he deeper movements of social opinion can no longer be isolated" (Leonard Hobhouse, *Democracy and Reaction*, ed P. F. Clarke, 1972, p. 253).

Second, the author overstates the distance between the philosophical idealists and the new liberals, and in this I fear that he has been somewhat seduced by Hobhouse's and J.A. Hobson's own mischaracterizations in largely taking Bernard Bosanquet to represent the School. Bosanquet was far from typical of the idealists, and even his fellow idealists accused him of being too obtuse for his own good. Take, for example, one substantive issue. T. H. Huxley differentiated himself from Darwin in arguing that the evolutionary, or cosmic, process of nature red in tooth and claw was a different process from the evolution of ethics. Gerson points out that the new liberals rejected this bifurcation of the evolutionary process: "Morality and nature were mutually continuous" (p. 101). Here as in many other respects on substantive issues, the idealists and the new liberals were at one. Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison puts forward a persuasive case for the continuity of nature and spirit, arguing that the former can only be made intelligible in terms of the latter (see *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, 1897). On other occasions, Gerson is simply wrong in what he attributes to idealism. He asserts, quite erroneously, that "for the British idealists, human nature was constant and universal" (p. 147).

Third, although the author acknowledges that he largely ignores the international theory of the new liberalism, he

gives no reason for doing so (p. 5). The period covered encompasses what Eric Hobsbawm calls the Age of Imperialism: the Boer War, the Russian Revolution and the crisis of capitalism, the rise of German militarism and the First World War, the rise and fall of liberal internationalism, the creation of the League of Nations, and much more. These were the substantive international political matters that the new liberalism addressed in great detail. Hobhouse and Hobson were wrong in suggesting that the British followers of Hegel acknowledged no obligations outside of the state. Idealists differed in the extent to which they acknowledged the actual achievement of a wider international community, but nevertheless thought it desirable and possible. The issue in question was how international society could be extended. The starting point had to be actual moral communities out of which broader principles of humanity arise. This is what Hobson suggests (*Imperialism*, 1902, p. 11) and also Hobhouse when he says: "All virtues are like charity in one respect—they begin at home" (Leonard Hobhouse, "The Foreign Policy of Collectivism," *Economic Review*, 9 [1899]: 212). On the issue of imperialism, for example, despite the vehement denunciation of social liberalism, it has gone little noticed that Hobhouse and Hobson agreed with many of the British idealists that there is a right kind of imperialism, one which is not exploitative, but which prepares countries for self-government.

Despite the deficiencies highlighted, the book is distinctive in its focus and does much to set the new liberals in a wider intellectual context than is usual. In seeing the new liberalism as largely a reaction against antientlightenment sentiment on the continent, steering a path between Fabianism and British idealism, Gerson gives much food for thought.

#### Adoption Matters: Philosophical and Feminist

**Essays.** Edited by Sally Haslanger and Charlotte Witt. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. 336p. \$49.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Sandra Patton-Imani, *Drake University*

This is a fruitful collection of essays focusing on adoption in order to explore "deeply held but often tacit assumptions about what in human life is natural and what is social" (p. 1). The editors rightly recognize that adoption is a social practice through which family and identity are explicitly shaped and regulated by social institutions. They explore this notion in contrast to the ideological view of family and identity as "natural," "genetic," and "biological." They argue that "[w]e need to ask of families: how have the institutions shaped our understandings of family, and how might critical reflection on these understandings help us reshape the institutions to be more just?" (p. 8). The anthology is organized around three general areas of

concern: "'Natural' and 'Unnatural' Families," "Familial Relationships and Personal Identities," and "Constructions of Race and Constructions of Family." While some contributions are stronger than others, overall the anthology achieves the authors' goal of creating a "context for rethinking family and adoption, and the norms and rules that govern them, in a more humane and just fashion" (p. 15).

One goal of the editors was "to bring together an interdisciplinary group of scholars to explore and critique how adoption is situated within mainstream conceptual frameworks" (p. 1). Interdisciplinarity, here, is defined as bringing together multiple disciplinary perspectives to explore a common subject. One limitation of the book is the lack of breadth in the range of disciplines represented. The authors primarily draw on philosophy, political science, and the law, alongside feminist theory, to consider the complexities of adoption and family. The particularities of philosophical discourse have especially influenced the collection; several essays speak most directly to philosophers. The collection would have been enriched by the inclusion of essays by anthropologists, sociologists, and interdisciplinary scholars. Another tactic that could have strengthened the anthology would have been broadening the range of disciplines drawn on *within* the essays themselves.

Sally Haslanger's essay "You Mixed? Racial Identity Without Racial Biology" is a good example of a strong chapter that could have been made stronger by the considerable insights of African American studies, anthropology, sociology, and American studies. Haslanger's discussion of the meaning of "mixed" in the context of her transracially adoptive family contributes a great deal to our understandings of the complex interactions of race, family, adoption, and identity construction. She draws primarily on the insights of philosophy and psychology to theorize beyond the static categories of racial identity popularly understood as available to blacks and whites in the contemporary United States. Her discussion of the ways in which bodies are connected and the way traditionally defined categories of racial identity are blurred through the daily practices of parenting across the transgressive boundaries of race is insightful. She does a fine job of thinking critically through her own experiences as the white mother of black children, and of using those experiences to reflexively move our understandings of racial identity beyond static categories. Her reliance on philosophy and psychology, however, leaves her on the edge of a theoretical boundary that could be traversed by the consideration of anthropological perspectives on culture and cultural meaning systems. She struggles to find a way of conceptualizing the changes in racial identity she has experienced through the practices of mothering her children. She is no longer white in the sense that she once was, but at the same time, as she makes clear, she is



not physically marked as a person of African descent, nor does she “have” a black identity. She concludes, somewhat reluctantly, that her identity “should count as mixed” (p. 285). These insights are important and speak beyond the specificity of adoption. Anthropologists and interdisciplinary scholars have written about the individual versions of identity that we each both internalize and construct throughout our lives using the language of cultural meaning systems. In this view, Haslanger could recognize that while she does not “have” a black identity, she does draw on African American cultural meaning systems to make sense of who she is and to navigate through her life.

A number of authors contribute insights about adoption through self-reflexive accounts of their life experiences as members of adoption “triads.” The editors frame the anthology with a discussion of feminist standpoint theory and situated knowledge (p. 9): “Many of the authors in our collection, including ourselves, believe that knowers are situated; more specifically, that those in the adoption triad typically have available to them a different perspective on family, love, race, and knowledge than those who are not.”

They settle on this understanding of situated knowledge as a “weaker commitment” (p. 8) than feminist standpoint epistemology. What is lost in this move is attention to power relations and the ways particular perspectives are shaped by them. I agree with their view that members of the adoption triad typically learn to see things in particular ways. What I would like to see is a more fine-tuned analysis of the ways in which the power relations involved in the social practice of adoption shape the perspectives of adoptive parents, birth parents, and adoptees. While the anthology includes work by a number of adoptees, it is distinctly heavy on adoptive parents. There are no birth parents represented among the contributors, at least none that acknowledge that identity. This itself is reflective of the power relations that shape adoption. This imbalance is not unique to this collection; it is, in fact, a common occurrence in research on adoption. A number of contributors use their embeddedness in adoption in productive, insightful ways. When the writer’s identity and location in the politics of adoption are not used in a self-reflective way and the stakes in the argument remain unexamined, it often appears that the author’s argument is self-serving. Both Anita L. Allen and Elizabeth Bartholet are adoptive parents whose own location goes unexamined in these essays, which seem obviously shaped by both their position as adoptive parents and a desire to justify and celebrate their positionality.

Several of the authors address the politics of relinquishment (Drucilla Cornell and Jacqueline Stevens) and removal (Dorothy Roberts) in progressive, insightful ways. Cornell’s and Stevens’ essays were fascinating explorations of family and adoption in relation to the law and social insti-

tutions. While they did not fully agree with each other, the tensions between them were fruitful. Both essays analyze legal perspectives on family in useful, thought-provoking, and challenging ways. I do, however, disagree with both of their “solutions,” to reformulate family law in such a way that would require *all* parents to “contract” to be the parents of their children. I do not see more government regulation of families as a viable answer. In fact, Roberts’s essay brilliantly analyzes the problems with such an approach through an exploration of the role of race in the child welfare system’s removal of children from birth parents. Her research demonstrates that in this country, “universal” policies—such as those endorsed by Cornell and Stevens—rarely remain universal in their application. The politics of race and poverty inevitably shape the implementation of policies designed to address the needs of all citizens. More attention to the inequalities that shape the experience of adoption would have strengthened the anthology. Yet, overall, *Adoption Matters* furthers academic understandings of adoption, family, and race.

**Machiavelli and Empire.** By Mikael Hörnqvist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 320p. \$75.00.

— Robert Eden, *Hillsdale College*

This study of the formation of Machiavelli’s republican imperialism concludes with great political questions: “Machiavelli had created a power destined to put an end to centuries of backwardness, obscurantism, and oppression. By tearing asunder veils of political and religious illusion, uprooting and devouring all that comes in its way or opposes its principles and interests, [Machiavelli’s modernity] has transformed, and is in the process of transforming, the lives of millions of people. Is it a destructive or benevolent force? A new form of imperialism, disguised as democracy and globalization, while in reality relying on naked, shameless, and brutal exploitation? Or is it a liberator that will bring justice and benefit to mankind? Perhaps it is too early to say. What is beyond doubt, though, is that the aim of this power is to conquer the world, and to do so in the name of liberty” (p. 290).

Surprisingly, Mikael Hörnqvist does not think his painstaking mastery of Machiavelli’s writings in their historical context can shed light on these vital questions. Hence, he raises them only at the end. His paradoxical thesis is that these tremendous, world-shaping consequences of Machiavelli’s thought were essentially invisible to Machiavelli because he was in the grip of a noble political passion, a great but unrequited love for his native city. His thoughts were dedicated exclusively to the aggrandizement and strengthening of Florence; insofar as he sensed the universal “creative” potential of his political science, he was apprehensive that another prince or people might use it to keep Florence down.

Hörnqvist invites us, by compelling himself, to interpret all of Machiavelli's writings from an exclusively Florentine republican perspective. A brief review cannot do justice to the comprehensive erudition, the remarkable finesse, and collegial civility of his work. Instead, let me highlight the deep ambivalence about republican empire that informs Hörnqvist's account of Machiavelli as political man and as scientist.

Hörnqvist's Machiavelli is a serious citizen in Aristotle's sense, a Florentine republican citizen. The author reads Machiavelli's major writings as rhetorical artifacts, showing how they reflect Machiavelli's solicitude for Florence, his desire to succour, nurture, and form his city. Machiavelli the political man is for Hörnqvist the *homo rhetoricus*: everything he writes is thus a persuasive speech-deed meant to serve Florence. Hörnqvist's primary task is to demonstrate that this holds for *The Prince*, through a sustained reading of Chapters 15 through 19. To appreciate the teaching of these crucial chapters, he contends, we must read them dramatically, in their original historical context, very narrowly conceived. We must become *the* reader to whom *The Prince* was dedicated, the Medici prince for whom it was designed, to gauge the effect of its rhetoric upon this one recipient. Because Machiavelli intended it to be read from this perspective, we must adopt the same perspective to understand Machiavelli's intention.

That intention becomes fully clear only in Chapter 19. Read properly, Hörnqvist finds, it teaches what Aristotle taught tyrants in his *Politics*: the only way for the Medici to secure their place in Florence is to convert the city from a tyranny into a republic in which the king, the few, and the many share authority. Aristotle's classical republican framework is the effectual truth of Machiavelli's serious citizenship: His intention as an author was to accomplish what a serious (Aristotelian) citizen would intend under Florence's circumstances. Hörnqvist thus distinguishes categorically between Machiavelli's original *intention* (Florentine, political, republican) and his original *thinking*: He holds that Machiavelli's doctrines were radically anti-Aristotelian and modern, but they became consequential only later, when cut loose from their anchor in Machiavelli's concern for "his beloved Florence."

*The Prince* is merely the preface to the *Discourses on Livy*, according to Hörnqvist. Yet even were he persuaded to convert his tyranny into a Machiavellian mixed republic, the Medici prince who first received *The Prince* might well ask whether such a republic is truly superior to tyranny. Is it not merely the self-aggrandizing tyranny of many, rather than one? Hörnqvist's strong emphasis on the anti-Aristotelian thrust of Machiavelli's revolutionary teaching must thus lead one to ask how the republican empire he seeks for Florence differs from a classical or Christian mixed regime. How is Machiavelli's revolt against Aristotle's *Politics* and *Ethics* exhibited in the new Floren-

tine Rome, his imperial, world-acquiring republic? Is his dynamic new Florentine order less repugnant than the principalities discussed in *The Prince*, or more? Hörnqvist does not say, but his reasons foreshadow the querulous conclusion quoted here.

The "effectual truth" of republican imperialism, as Hörnqvist understands it, is a combination of cruel oppressions and real benefits. Since the mix must vary according to circumstances, he cannot be sure of the proportion of each. However, judging from Machiavelli's account, we may say they are mixed in Machiavellian "death benefits." Your father is killed by the tyrant or conquering republic; if you cooperate with those who killed him, you get his estate. Thus, the modern mode of acquiring makes you a party to your father's execution. Hörnqvist does not explore how this pathos of monstrous self-incrimination transforms men into moderns, nor the part it plays in Machiavelli's effort to diminish the hold of Aristotelian ethics, and of Christian "illusions," on free peoples who seek empire on his novel terms. Reading Hörnqvist, one might think that Machiavelli's beloved Florence had nothing to lose by becoming a world-acquiring republic, whereas his conclusion strongly implies that Florence had much to lose—as do we all.

*Machiavelli and Empire* consists chiefly of close readings of six chapters of *The Prince*. This interpretation is meant, however, to advance an argument about Machiavelli's account of liberty and (republican) empire in his *Discourses*. Here Hörnqvist's ambition outruns his subject. One can learn much from his study of *The Prince* because he develops an account of that book as a whole centered on the Medici prince to whom Machiavelli dedicated it; and he treats chapters that illuminate the architecture of the whole book. In his treatment of the *Discourses*, by contrast, the few chapters he has chosen bear on Florence, but they do not afford a comparable account of that book as an intelligible whole. Hörnqvist does not supply the guidance readers will require to understand what Machiavelli teaches about liberty and empire in the *Discourses*, perhaps his most difficult book.

Thus, the connection is problematic between Hörnqvist's study and his conclusion, quoted here. He gives us no idea how he reached that conclusion, how the *Discourses* could create such a prodigious "power," or what part *The Prince* played in the unfolding of the Machiavellian modes and orders of modernity. Above all, the author leaves us in no position to assess whether (or to what degree) Machiavelli's feelings for Florence clouded his vision of the imperious modern world that he contends Machiavelli's thought created.

Hörnqvist has given the most searching attention to Chapters III, V, XVI–XIX, and XXV of *The Prince*, as they bear on Florence; every student of Machiavelli should find this engaging and careful study of Machiavelli's most widely read book highly thought provoking and worthwhile.

**Democracy Growing Up: Authority, Autonomy, and Passion in Tocqueville's Democracy in America.** By

Laura Janara. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. 256p. \$75.50 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

— Leslie D. Feldman, *Hofstra University*

A professor used to remark that “you can say that Hobbes is about dairy farming if you back it up.” Laura Janara writes that Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* is about embryology, the feminine and masculine, gestation, birth, and gender relations, and she backs it up.

It is easy to state the obvious—that *Democracy in America* is about the dangers of tyranny, social and political control, and a “big brother” paternalistic state that takes on the quality of a parent, but, in Tocqueville’s own words “none but attentive and clear-sighted” persons see the subconscious themes of gender and gestation undulating below the surface of his social science treatise. Janara treats us to the revelation that *Democracy in America* is really about passion and power, not only a battle between the sexes but a web of relations between parent and child, mother and offspring, male and female, that demonstrates the interplay not only between the “birth” of states and political cultures and their progenitors but also within the state in its various aspects and manifestations.

While we might hear neutral social science observations, Janara hears the cries of labor, those of birth and the voice of the mother (Europe) and child (America.) Aristocracy is female, while democracy is childlike, the so-called infant democracy (p. 39). She outlines Tocqueville’s gendering of the concepts of equality and liberty and explores the idea that “liberty is a fragile female” (p. 82) while equality is a robust one and a “symbolically female replacement for maternal aristocracy” (p. 82).

Janara takes us, chapter by chapter, through “Birth and Growth” (chap. 2, including embryo, gestation, orphan), “Adolescence and Maturity” (chap. 3), “Money, Marriage and Manly Citizenship” (chap. 4) to “Impotence and Infantilism” (chap. 5, including hypermasculine individualism and female administration) and “Democracy’s Family Values” (chap. 6) concluding with “Family, Gender and Democratic Maturity.” If Europe and the ancien regime are representations of motherhood and the feminine order (Janara cites Marianne as the symbol of the French republic on p. 13), democracy in America represents the unruly child, full of chaos and immaturity.

This is a new approach. Why have we not noticed it before? Why have we not noticed that behind Tocqueville’s discussions of “Tyranny of the Majority” and the mild, bureaucratic despotic tyranny he fears will overtake the Americans are a wealth of images of male–female, parent–child, gender relations, the passions, and sex roles?

According to Janara, it is because “the gendered and familial imagery that undergirds the text is part of the intimate relationship we have with this book; we accept

the images so readily that we have not noticed them” (p. 7). She suggests that even Tocqueville is unaware of this subconscious Freudian undercurrent, saying that “Tocqueville, like all of us, inescapably says more than he intends to say in his text” (p. 34) and that “Tocqueville performs consciously as a kind of psychologist” but his gender images and metaphors are “largely unconsciously rendered” (p. 33). Using Dorothy Dinnerstein’s work (*The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise*, 1976) to explore *Democracy in America* is useful because, according to Janara, it “enables a fresh view of the social structures that permeate modern democracy” (p. 27) and because “[d]eploying psychoanalytic theory to grasp the psychic energies at play in the gender economy of Tocqueville’s text is valuable for what it illuminates broadly about power, authority, and submission” (p. 27). Janara also relies on “object-relations theory,” noting that “Tocqueville is very much a theorist of relations himself” (p. 23), and so “[t]he object-relations approach thus impresses as a particularly appropriate interpretative framework for *Democracy in America*” (p. 23).

Janara’s analysis sets us on a different track that leads to a parallel or cognate reading to the traditional one. The author understands this and frequently refers back to Tocqueville’s theories of aristocracy, mild despotism, religion, atomization, and the importance of associations in explicating her thesis. This is particularly useful as it gives us another layer of interpretation and another level of understanding that complements conventional readings. Thus, she provides us with a key to Tocqueville’s subconscious thoughts based on his language, which is rich in the imagery of familial and gender relationships. She does this in a nuanced, original and convincing way.

So you can say *Democracy in America* is about gender, gestation, birth, and the passions if you back it up. Laura Janara backs it up. More important, she gets it right. These are underlying themes that elucidate the more obvious and well-worn ones of aristocracy versus democracy, the great chain of traditional society including the web of obligations that was feudal Europe, the importance of associations in America, the love of equality as a watchword of the age, and the mild bureaucratic “road to servitude.” In short, Freud would applaud Janara’s approach in *Democracy Growing Up* and Tocqueville would appreciate the meticulous textual reading that inspires it.

**Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism.** By Graham Long. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2004. 250p. \$59.00.

— Nasser Behnegar, *Boston College*

A work that treats relativism without mentioning Nietzsche, the foundations of liberalism without mentioning Locke, and universalism without discussing any of the great philosophers from Plato to Hegel is apt to be defective. Yet Graham Long’s book proves that such a work can

still merit serious attention. Through his taste for rigorous arguments, his seriousness of purpose, and his knowledge of the literature written in the spirit of English analytical philosophy and academic liberalism more generally, he has succeeded in producing a book that is both thoughtful and thought-provoking.

Long is a defender of relativism of a particular kind. He defends moral relativism—the thesis that morality is relative to different frameworks or cultures—without defending the relativity of human thought in general. The moral relativism that he defends is not normative but “meta-ethical”: He is concerned with relativism as a position about the nature of morality and not as an endorsement of tolerance, though he is at pains to show that “meta-ethical relativism” plays an important part in the liberal argument for tolerance. In short, he defends the view that there is no single, true morality and that there are a number of moralities, some of which cannot be found objectively superior or inferior (p. 17).

That Long believes relativism needs a defense sets him apart from many contemporaries who simply accept relativism as self-evident truth or as the opinion of all right-thinking human beings. His openness is perhaps partly due to his background in analytic philosophy, which has prominent adherents who are critics of relativism, but ultimately it is due to his own sense that adherents of relativism have not yet given an adequate account of our moral life, an account which is in accord “with the way we use moral language” and which presumably preserves the moral character of that life (p. 41).

The first and the longer part of the book is an attempt to remedy this failure. Long focuses on three difficulties for relativism: that it seems unable to give an adequate account 1) of moral disagreements, that is, an account that does not reduce them to mere misunderstandings; 2) of our sense that our moral views are true and therefore can be applied to others; and 3) of our sense that some moralities are abhorrent. In each case, he tries to show that relativism properly understood both explains and preserves the phenomenon. His treatment of contemporary defenders of relativism and universalism is generally intelligent and insightful, but his own position for all its merits is ultimately unsatisfactory. I will limit myself to two key difficulties.

Long maintains that his version of relativism can reject abhorrent moralities. Although his relativism insists that there is no single universal morality, it does not accept all moralities as equal because some moralities are inconsistent or incoherent in various ways. For instance, he argues that fascism can be rejected because it is based on a racial theory that is contradicted by scientific evidence. Yet even if we assume that all abhorrent moralities are inconsistent, this criticism is not a sufficient account of our abhorrence. What most people find abhorrent about fascism is not its inconsistencies but its cruelty. In fact, as we learn from

Plato, people often accept a contradiction because they want to avoid a view that seems abhorrent to them. Moreover, as Long himself admits, it is possible for an abhorrent morality to be consistent. Indeed, there is no reason to think that attractive views are more likely to be consistent than unattractive views. Is Martin Heidegger, who spoke of the inner truth and greatness of national socialism without embracing any racial theories, more incoherent than the average man?

According to Long, one can legitimately criticize an action that is based on a system that is coherent and thus as justified as one’s own (he calls this evaluative criticism, as opposed to compelling criticism, the kind that can compel others to change their position), because as universalists admit, the application of a theory can extend beyond its justification: A theory can apply to all men, even though it can only persuade reasonable men. But one may object that what is true for universalists may not be true for relativists. Long argues that a Christian can legitimately criticize the Confucian belief that one should not repay injury with kindness, even though he cannot show the Confucian convincing reasons to follow the teaching of Jesus (p. 164). But it seems to me the Christian can make this criticism because he believes in the objective reality of Jesus as the son or prophet of God. Yet earlier in the book, Long rejects this kind of objectivity in favor of objectivity as “intersubjective agreement” or “community of reasons” (pp. 146–47). This rejection was necessary to defend relativism from the “self-contradiction in affirming that there is no single justified morality, but that this view should be taken as universally correct” (p. 147). His account of evaluative criticism is also in tension, if not in contradiction, with his argument for toleration, part of which rests on the premise that “it is wrong to take action to impose our views on others unless ours are better justified” (p. 183).

Whereas Part I of Long’s work is an attempt to explain morality on the basis of relativism; Part II is an attempt to defend relativism as the basis of liberalism through a sympathetic criticism of contemporary liberals, especially Rawls. Rawlsian liberalism attempts to avoid a political system based on notions of the good because of the controversial character of such notions. Instead, it seeks a neutral basis; Long argues that it fails to find such a basis, because the arguments that Rawls and others use for neutrality are themselves controversial. For instance, Rawls’s contention that evidence regarding the merit of a moral view is conflicting and complex is in sharp tension with a religious doctrine that presents itself as “universally accessible to clear minds and open hearts” (p. 209). As Long argues, the mere existence of disagreement about the good is not a sufficient basis for Rawls’s position: One must show that the disagreement is not based on an error. In other words, Rawls’s theory needs relativism, and Long convincingly shows certain relativist tendencies in Rawls’s thought.

At first, one gets the impression that for Long, relativism provides the neutral basis sought by Rawls. He is certainly concerned with the possibility of communication between relativists and religious believers (pp. 151–52). But in the final analysis, he admits that relativism is not neutral and that no neutral basis is possible (pp. 241–42). His hope for consensus rests not on a relativistic justification of liberalism but on the possibility that liberal principles could be supported on a variety of grounds. While nonrelativists could agree to liberal principles for their own reasons, the establishment of “liberal institutions would encourage a ‘liberal culture’ of views which saw moral justifications and truth as relative, the eventual result being a society which affirmed liberalism for largely relativistic reasons” (p. 249). This is a puzzling position. Relativism, which is not universally persuasive, can hope to be universally accepted with the help of institutions that it was meant to justify. Long may be right about the relativistic effect of liberal institutions, but it seems to me that one can be satisfied with this position only if one regards liberalism and relativism as objectively true in the old sense of the term, something which he does not even attempt to show in this defense of relativism.

Thus, in the end, Long’s attempt to isolate moral relativism from the question of general relativity of human thought fails. His treatment of relativism would have benefited from a thematic consideration of the complex relation between our concern for morality and our concern for truth. A good place to begin such a reflection is by studying the confrontation between Heideggerian relativism or existentialism and the twentieth-century revival of Platonism—two contemporary developments that are largely absent in *Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism*.

**Reconstructing Public Reason.** By Eric MacGilvray.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 266p. \$45.00.

— Robert Westbrook, *University of Rochester*

Eric MacGilvray imaginatively puts philosophical pragmatism to work on the problems of “political justification”—that is, questions about “how we decide, or ought to decide, which ends to pursue as a political community” (p. 2). Above all, he seeks to make pragmatism a part of the engagement of contemporary political theorists with a familiar, vexing question posed in its most well known form by John Rawls: “How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (*Political Liberalism* 1993, p. 4).

Rawls’s solution to this apparent dilemma was “political liberalism”—a polity grounded in an “overlapping consensus” on a set of liberal principles that could be comfortably nested within a variety of “reasonable,” com-

peting “comprehensive doctrines” of the good life and that would guide public, if not private, judgment. These liberal principles would thus govern the exercise of “public reason,” the discourse of debate over political fundamentals, and citizens qua citizens would confine themselves to this reasonable discourse and leave the remainder of their particularistic comprehensive doctrines at home when they did. A president might pray all he wanted in the private quarters of the White House on his own time, but he would not publicly advocate the reform of Social Security as an act of Christian charity, rather than a requirement of secular justice.

MacGilvray shares Rawls’s hope, if not his method. He too is after “a theory of political justification that would allow us to admit controversial social and political ideals as going concerns within a liberal polity without undermining the norms of fairness and respect for persons that define such a polity” (p. 5). But MacGilvray has a quarrel with the manner in which Rawls and other political liberals have gone about constructing such a theory, and he thinks pragmatism can help build a better political liberalism.

MacGilvray’s objection to much of political liberalism is twofold. On the one hand, in order to limit conflict, it pursues a “minimalism” that seeks out a set of largely procedural moral commitments that will command widespread assent and, hence, tends to reinforce the status quo in order to avoid disagreement. On the other hand, despite this minimalism, it injects more than enough substantive ethical commitments into the “reasonableness” of its overlapping consensus to belie any claim to neutrality.

MacGilvray argues that minimalism and neutrality are fruitless pursuits, yet he nonetheless appreciates the impulse that underlies them. Like Rawls, he wants a public sphere governed by public reason, that is, arguments that are couched in terms that all citizens can acknowledge to be reasonable. By reconstructing public reason along pragmatist lines, he contends that liberals might forge a more robust and adventuresome conception of political justification that nonetheless promises greater consensus with less controversy.

Like most pragmatists, MacGilvray begins with “an appeal to the scientific method of experimental inquiry as a particularly reliable and effective means of resolving doubt,” including moral and political doubt (p. 117). For a pragmatist, as he says, “a belief in the validity of a moral norm or principle, like any belief, is justified on pragmatic grounds if and to the extent that no further doubts arise from acting upon it” (p. 12). Experimental inquiry of this sort, pragmatists contend, has proven far more successful than any other method we have designed for fixing belief, and they draw on “a historical narrative within which the enormous success of scientific modes of inquiry in achieving human ends sheds light on the proper aims of a democratic society” (pp. 237–38). Moreover, “because this

narrative appeals to the authority of a set of practices to which the citizens of modern societies are all in some sense committed, it provides a point of orientation for discourses of political justification that we can reasonably expect them to share” (p. 238). For MacGilvray, who conceives of public reason as experimental inquiry, political liberalism requires that the proponents of various comprehensive doctrines consent only to deliberate as pragmatists in the public sphere. Here, “reasonableness” appears to require no controversial moral commitments, only a less controversial epistemological one: “Taken in itself, pragmatism does not provide a comprehensive set of moral commitments; it merely offers a particular way of orienting ourselves toward whatever commitments we do in fact adopt” (p. 13).

Nonetheless, this epistemological commitment does come bearing moral baggage, which MacGilvray, like many pragmatists, is quick to observe: “The pragmatic theory of inquiry carries as a corollary the claim that the experimental intelligence of each citizen should, all other things being equal, be developed and expressed, and that to be engaged as a pragmatist in normative political inquiry is therefore to be concerned with the problem of extending the exercise of this faculty in public life whenever possible” (p. 15). Because “the pragmatic theory of inquiry requires as its complement a moral commitment to explore the possibilities of human association in a way that respects the experimental intelligence of each citizen,” pragmatists end up in service of this commitment with a justification of many of the same principles of liberty and equality that Rawls embeds in his overlapping consensus (p. 15).

I am myself too much the pragmatist to find fault with much of MacGilvray’s argument, though I am sure it will, as pragmatism usually does, raise the hackles of Platonists and postmodernists alike. But I do think (alas) that he considerably overestimates the prospects for wide assent to an overlapping consensus for the “pragmatizing” of public reason, even among the citizens of modern societies who have accepted the authority of science. For there are many such citizens, including pragmatists from Charles Peirce to Richard Posner, who look to science to settle doubts about the natural world but do not think that experimental inquiry can settle moral doubts or fix political beliefs. And although neopragmatists such as Hilary Putnam and Cheryl Misak have considerably improved on John Dewey’s efforts to make the case that it can, this pivotal claim in what Putnam has called the pragmatist “epistemological justification of democracy” remains hotly contested, even among pragmatists.

I lack the space to salute adequately the other particulars of MacGilvray’s neopragmatism, which include an admirable defense of William James’s much derided “will to believe” and a judicious dissent from the naturalized Hegelianism that afflicted Dewey’s political thought. Suffice it to say that there is much to chew on in *Reconstruct-*

*ing Public Reason*, even for those inclined to share rather than contend with MacGilvray’s high estimate of the rewards of pragmatism.

**Just Work.** By Russell Muirhead. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 224p. \$24.95.

— Katherine Fierlbeck, *Dalhousie University*

“Once at the center of political and social theory,” writes Russell Muirhead, “work now stands at the margins” (p. 13). A simple observation, but an astute one. While the constitution of “identity” has become a focal point for contemporary political theorists, few go beyond discussions of cultural affiliation. Yet most of us spend the majority of our waking hours at some form of work. That our relationship with our productive activity was a crucial component of our identity was a key theme of Marx’s writings, while Hegel, among others, noted how our need to work also shaped our social maturity. Why, then, do we now spend so little effort at thinking about whether our work is well suited for us or not? And how ought one go about evaluating the justice of “work” in the first place?

While *Just Work* focuses directly upon the latter question, it gives a more thorough answer to the former. The strength of the book is more exegetical than argumentative, but it is an exegesis of the highest order: reflective, informed, and provocative. The classical conception of justice as proper fit between the individual and his or her place in the social order, notes the author, was overturned by the liberal ideals of freedom and equality; thus, the just nature of work for modern society became less an issue of “fit” and more a question of whether one had consented to the work. Yet, as Muirhead notes, the “obligatory character of work is in tension with the liberal ideal that citizens should be free (not only formally but effectively) to form and act from their own conception of the good” (p. 27). Consent, in other words, is never “perfectly free,” and, given the exigencies of the modern economy, it fails by itself to show that the work we agree to do is necessarily just.

Muirhead suggests that we revisit the Aristotelian conception of “work as fit,” but to go beyond “imputing social purposes to persons regardless of what they would choose or endorse” to a more modern conceptualization that “asserts that *each* person, by the particular nature he or she bears, has a claim that justice cannot overlook” (p. 50). This “fit” must be a balance between “social fit,” or the way in which our particular abilities meet the needs of our societies, and “personal fit,” or the way in which a particular job can develop our specific character and potential. In this way, we can think about the “fittingness” of work without holding to the idea that individuals have a fixed natural identity.

But why should we worry about fit at all? Why could we not simply argue that as long as the conditions of work

are not grossly inhumane (by modern standards), as long as there is some choice in the selection of employment, and as long as there is some degree of “equality of opportunity” in the workforce, the distribution of work (like, say, the choice of hobbies) is independent of issues of fit? The answer, replies the author, is that just as our allegiance to democratic values “rejects the idea that anyone could entirely *belong* to another,” so too does it hold that justice “cannot tolerate arrangements where some are used simply for the sake of others” (p. 71). And, at a minimum, this requires that work be limited or bounded, even if this means constraining the role of consent.

Because liberal democracy affirms the equal right to a minimal level of human dignity, and because work is a central locus for the development (or denial) of dignity, justice requires us to think about how, or whether, we can achieve dignity through our work. One way of so doing, Muirhead suggests, is by looking at the idea of a “calling.” The Protestant work ethic, as Max Weber explained, was a way of life that underscored one’s recognition of one’s moral duty and devotion to God. But modern work ethics are driven more by other values—such as competition or consumerism—as well as by necessity or simple habit. And in these cases, the fulfillment one derives from hard work (committing the aptitudes given to us by God to His service) is largely lacking; we fail to find meaning and purpose simply in working hard for work’s sake. How, then, can we find a secular form of fulfillment for all individuals (and not just those at the top of the social or intellectual hierarchy)?

One response is that liberal democracy simply ought not to go beyond protecting negative liberties in order to concern itself with quality-of-life issues. On this account, democracy is an effective means for permitting individuals to choose for themselves what they want to do with their lives: how they decide to achieve fulfillment or, as even Mill realized, whether they wish to seek a deep sense of fulfillment at all. If a thoroughgoing consumerism were all that some should desire, then who is to say that they really *ought* to be seeking a more authentic form of fulfillment? Liberal democracy has never really reconciled itself to Mill’s rejection of swinish pleasures, nor, argue many, is it the proper role of liberal democracy to do so.

Yet many others will find Muirhead’s position quite sensible. Much depends on the conception of democracy that one brings to the reading of the book. Many will agree with the author that to the extent that liberal democracy is grounded upon an equal baseline of dignity, and to the extent that our workplace is a vital aspect of our daily life, we should think about the former within the confines of the latter. But even if he is correct, many vexatious problems still arise from his account. If, for example, a well-paid assembly-line job supports a fulfilling hobby, what are the demands of justice then? How much of the dignity one finds (or fails to find) in the workplace is due to the interpersonal relationships between managers and

employees, or among employees themselves, rather than inherent in the type of job itself? And if justice demands that one have a good fit with one’s work, who exactly owes what to whom? What, beyond sensible limits on working conditions (such as no obligatory unpaid overtime), are the policy measures that follow? And who must pay for them? Employers? Well-paid employees with fulfilling jobs? Finally, how is it possible to accommodate the immense subjectivity that governs the evaluation of “fulfillment”?

Yet the questions that arise do so because the author asks a provocative question in a clear and thoughtful manner. Consent remains the overriding criterion of justice in employment, even as the conditions within which consent is given have, for many, worsened. It is time for liberal democrats to reevaluate the way in which they make sense of our relationship with the structure of productive employment, and Muirhead’s account is a reasonable place to begin.

**The Abolition of White Democracy.** By Joel Olson.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004. 248p. \$59.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Cynthia Willett, *Emory University*

Joel Olson’s book is a provocative argument for the elimination of white power in the United States. He argues that whiteness is, unlike blackness, not an identity but an illegitimate source of political privilege. Whites have constructed U.S. democracy around conceptions of freedom, equality, and citizenship that shore up their political privilege in a fundamentally bipolar racial system. This racial system admits immigrants and other persons of color only by consistently and ever more surreptitiously subordinating blacks and furthering white empowerment. Olson directs his argument against the assumption that white racism lurks in the application of liberal principles, and not in the principles themselves. He argues that a prejudicial politics is built into U.S. democracy and concludes that ridding the system of racial politics requires altering our basic principles.

The liberal principles of negative freedom, citizenship as standing, and equality as economic opportunity protect a realm of private choice from state interference. Not incidentally, these principles also set in motion a democracy founded in slavery and designed to conceal under the banner of free choice a system of economic, social, and cultural power that is anything but democratic. Negative freedom, understood as freedom from government interference, blocks from political discussion a full understanding of a positive linkage of freedom with responsibility and social obligation. Citizenship as standing turns more viable conceptions of citizenship, such as empowerment and participatory effectiveness in the democratic process, into another form of property or privilege to be exercised primarily in the private realm. Privileged citizens use their

rights for the sake of private gain and at the cost of contributing to a democracy based on participation in public decision making. Finally, social equality is reduced to a formal, market-friendly policy that fails to question the rules of an economic game that perpetuates massive inequality. The result is an unreasonable avoidance of any substantial public debate on the principles that sustain democracy as white.

The system of white racial privilege emerged from Bacon's rebellion some hundred years before the American Revolution. The rebellion alarmed wealthy colonists as to the threat of Christian and non-Christian serfs, slaves, and the poor to unite and thereby challenge the system of privileges. The colonists' clever strategy was to introduce what today we understand as the norms of race through a system of unequal rights. This newly racialized system included redistributing property of blacks to poor whites. The emerging cross-class alliance of whites against blacks would preempt strong and effective labor movements, and silence more radical discussions of equality. Scientific racism and Jim Crow continued the process of racial supremacy that had already been set in motion before the Revolution. The Civil Rights movement challenged the Jim Crow system of second-class citizenship, but it left in place the norms of white privilege and the weak conception of democracy deep in the roots of our founding principles. If whiteness once translated into official standing in a formal system of legal privilege, it remains active today in a privatized system of racial norms.

These racialized norms warp principles of fairness, moral worth, and judgments of merit. The contemporary appeal among liberals and conservatives for a racially blind remedy to racism may have had its point in the days of legalized apartheid, but it fails to catch in its net of abstract concepts the concrete matrix of distorted judgments, prejudicial images, and unequal distribution of resources in the private realm. The effect of these heinous racial norms is clear in the rates of incarceration, poverty, and political participation of African Americans compared to whites. Similarly, the multicultural emphasis in education may counter images of white superiority that perpetuated Jim Crow, but liberal multiculturalism does not transform the tracking system in the public schools that set up a large number of black children to fail. Middle-class African Americans with the incomes but not the wealth of whites can be one paycheck away from the ghetto and ghetto schools, thus demonstrating that race underlies and undermines class as a basis for privilege in the United States.

*The Abolition of White Democracy* presents a clearly written, well-documented, history-based argument for altering the meaning of democracy. The fact that the argument is based in history is no small matter. The liberal definitions of democracy that continually fall short of locating remedies to the deeper racial makeup of our system are doomed to fail unless they can anchor their abstractions

in concrete discussions of the nature of freedom in America. The history-blind approach to democratic theory in this country is just one more factor in the construction of our liberal principles through a hubristic racial system that undermines our stability, threatening eventually and tragically to bring us all down. Each chapter offers rich insights regardless of the conclusions one may draw. The book advances beyond other examinations of the impact of racism on liberal political principles by demonstrating more radically the way in which those principles were constructed through the bipolar racial matrix.

The only chapter that falters a bit is the last. This is no doubt as well the most difficult chapter to write. The last chapter promises what it admits can only be a sketch of a vision for a more radical democracy. Olson argues that this more radical vision requires the abolition of whiteness but not of African American, Native American, or Asian identities. The latter identities contain a valid cultural content, whereas the label of whiteness is nothing more than a claim to superiority. Whiteness contains no cultural content. This claim is perhaps the most controversial even among those who otherwise agree to a radical restatement of democracy beyond liberalism's various blindspots. It is also a point left more as a provocation than a full-fledged argument. In part, this is because it is not clear what the abolition of whiteness means. If it means that those who were formerly known as white take on more authentic identities, such as Irish American, Latina American, or Anglo-Protestant, the more simpleminded white-black dichotomy might yield to a more nuanced system of racial or ethnic norms and social expectations. The reclaiming among whites of their formerly obscure mixed-race or ethnically distinct origins has in fact been one of the effects of the liberal multicultural movement of the past couple of decades. But this liberal multiculturalism does not accompany any radical democracy. Quite to the contrary, it seems to leave intact the systems of privilege that neoliberalism proliferates.

Olson seems to mean something more like the elimination of the various economic, cultural, and social sources of white privilege, rather than whiteness per se. This interpretation would challenge not only white privilege but also the relative privileges of Irish American, Italian, and so forth that the mere abolition of a white identity threatens to leave intact. One of Olson's examples is the tracking system in the public school system. The tracking system clearly favors whites over blacks. In the information age, the challenge to unfair white advantage in the educational system would go a long ways toward correcting inequalities. The question is how to alter such a devastating system of privilege. While he clearly asks the right questions, there will be disagreement with his proposed draft of a solution. The rhetoric and policy of leveling whites to the standing of blacks may be a just if tragic revenge, but it is also not likely to take power from whites, and may have



disastrous implications for children generally. Wealthier families would be even more likely to educate their children in private schools, leaving the public school system deeper in crisis. More positive programs might focus instead on the need for resources for urban public schools, in part funded through reparations for slavery. Of course, any idea for increased resources for the public realm is not likely to do well in a climate of increased privatization. Privatization itself has become the new code word for white. This returns us to the need to change the basic meaning of freedom in the United States, a task that no doubt requires the kind of racial analysis that Olson goes a long way toward providing. The way out of the tragic hubris of white democracy is sadly not clear.

**Eric Voegelin's Dialogue with the Postmoderns: Searching for Foundations.** Edited by Peter A. Petrakis and Cecil L. Eubanks. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004. 200p. \$37.50.

— Michael P. Federici, *Mercyhurst College*

This book is a collection of five essays placed between an introduction and an epilogue that are helpful in pulling such an eclectic group together. The epilogue includes material not covered in the essays that points the reader to possible ways in which the Voegelin-postmodern connection can be developed. An index is helpful in locating the various postmodern thinkers and ideas spread throughout the essays. The editors' intent is to offer an invitation to scholars interested in either Eric Voegelin or postmodernism to explore the common ground shared by a major twentieth-century political theorist and a fashionable school of thought. The implication is that Voegelin's work will be more widely considered if postmoderns see its merits, and likewise, postmodernism will benefit from Voegelin's rejection of modernity without abandoning ethical foundations. The primary postmodern thinkers discussed in the essays include Paul Ricoeur, Gilles Deleuze, Emmanuel Levinas, Edmund Husserl, and Jan Patočka.

The title is somewhat misleading because Voegelin did not engage in a dialogue with the postmoderns. He paid some attention to their work and occasionally commented on it. The dialogue, then, is not so much between Voegelin and the postmoderns as it is between contemporary scholars who recognize that the contributions of Voegelin and the postmoderns can be, in some ways, synthesized to provide insights into the postmodern world. Consequently, the book is a rare combination of scholarship on Voegelin's political theory and postmodernism. The nexus is not self-evident and requires some thought. Voegelin was not a postmodernist in the sense that the term is commonly used. He was, rather, a critic of much of what passes for postmodernism. For example, in *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism* (1968), he classifies Martin Heidegger as a "gnostic" along with Hegel, Marx, and

Nietzsche. He comments that "Heidegger's speculation occupies a significant place in the history of Western Gnosticism" (p. 33). This comment is significant because Voegelin's central criticism of modernity is its rejection of transcendent reality, what he sometimes referred to as "the murder of God." Heidegger is part of the gnostic movement that destroys what Voegelin wants to restore: the balance of consciousness that embraces transcendence without falling into reified notions of universality. This is not to say that Voegelin's work does not share common ground with aspects of postmodernism but that such commonality has to be carefully qualified.

There is also the question of why a dialogue between Voegelin and the postmoderns is desirable. Voegelin was firm about the conditions for rational discussion (see his essays "On Readiness to Rational Discussion" and "On Debate and Existence"), and they included openness to the full range of human experience. He was critical of any ideology that was existentially closed to transcendent reality. Few postmoderns share Voegelin's willingness to search for historical experiences with transcendence. For the dialogue to be fruitful, one side or both have to give ground. Voegelin was not inclined to move in a postmodern direction, but the book is evidence that at least some Voegelinians are willing to push the two schools of thought closer together.

So how do the authors make the connection between Voegelin and postmodernism? The basis for their argument is that both reject metaphysical foundations. Once this ground is established, the authors search for ethical limits that are acceptable to Voegelinians and postmoderns. Peter Petrakis notes that the book's objective is to establish "moral and political foundations without resorting to foundationalism or metaphysical thinking" (p. 23). He believes that Voegelin and Ricoeur have accomplished this objective in part by relying on myths, symbols, and narratives to ground politics and ethics experientially. The danger of metaphysical thinking is that it leads to ideological mass movements and the horrors of twentieth-century totalitarianism. The objective is to be concrete, that is, to ground thinking on experience and to recognize that the symbolic articulation of experience is not itself what is real.

Murray Jardine's essay considers Voegelin a philosopher of speech and, like Petrakis, Jardine argues that ethical foundations can be constructed and foundationalism avoided if, like Voegelin, philosophers ground their work in experience and reject literalism. Because the modern world is so visually oriented, it makes sense that oral traditions help to avoid the problems that accompany reified symbols. Oral traditions require repeated telling of stories of experiences of order that are less prone to derailment; the focus is on the engendering experience, not the symbols that articulate the experience. Literate societies are prone to "take symbols of transcendent

experience ‘literally,’ as referring to objects in three-dimensional space, and thus misunderstand them” (p. 77). The preservation of experiences of order has been plagued by ideological derailments that Jardine believes would be less common if traditions/experiences were orally preserved. Doing so avoids the subjectivism of modernity and restores ethical limits on human action without derailing into foundationalism.

Jeffrey A. Bell argues that Deleuze’s critique of traditional metaphysics is superior to Voegelin’s because it avoids foundational metaphysics where Voegelin does not. Deleuze avoids subjectivism because he accepts the existence of a fundamental reality. Bell attempts to pull Voegelinians in a more postmodern direction. The argument, however, is abstract and ahistorical. Its intellectual texture is precisely akin to the very metaphysics that Bell aims to refute. One wonders what the experiential basis for the argument is. There are no historical or political references that serve as illustrations for the argument. Voegelin is criticized by Bell because he admits to the discovery of a hierarchy of being that includes transcendence. The argument comes across as ideological opposition to the very notion of transcendence. His “theory at the edge of chaos” provides little theoretical substance from which one can conceive of a historical order.

William Simmons’s essay draws on the work of Aristotle to clarify what Voegelin means by “the ontology of ethics” and what Levinas means by “the Other.” Voegelin reaffirms Aristotle’s notion that ethics is experiential and not abstract; we know the good or justice by participating in experiences of order, not by affirming abstract principles. Both Voegelin and Levinas describe a “route to transcendence” that requires a response to something that is and is not beyond the individual. Voegelin tends to use the language “attunement to the divine ground of being” to refer to man’s movement toward the attraction of grace or *helkein*. In either case, the response requires an ethical act that subordinates the will to something higher that has a transcendent quality. Simmons’s argument is ethically abstract. Take for instance his quotation from Adriaan Peperzak: “My responsibility for you extends itself necessarily to all human others; it implies my responsibility for social justice and worldwide peace” (p. 140). The connection between the transcendent and concrete historical life needs to be made for political theory to avoid ahistorical abstraction, but claiming that individuals are responsible to all humans, rather than to those they actually confront in everyday life, smacks of Rousseauistic humanitarianism. Distinctions need to be made between true and false notions of transcendence and ethics. Appeals to justice remain largely abstract if they take the form of social justice rather than, as one possibility, the Christian idea of loving one’s neighbor.

The final essay is by Edward Findlay, who draws on Patočkas’s work. He continues the theme of creating a

theory that “offers the possibility of foundational order without foundationalism” (p. 148). Transcendence exists but it is not a “thing.” It is, rather, part of the realm of human experience, not something beyond it. Consequently, ethical foundations can only relate to human experience, not some Archimedean point outside of it. Here is the key dividing line between Voegelin and the post-moderns: Voegelin does not believe that Plato or Christians like Augustine claim the existence of a separate realm of being that serves as the foundation for moral action. Postmoderns argue that thinkers like Plato and the Christians are guilty of metaphysical foundationalism.

The epilogue draws conclusions about the search for foundations without foundationalism. It makes the case for a Voegelinian-inspired postmodernism that embraces the classical perspective. Included in this argument is an appeal to the works of Albert Camus, ground covered in greater depth by David Walsh’s *After Ideology* (1990).

**What’s Wrong with Democracy? From Athenian Practice to American Worship.** By Loren J. Samons II. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. 327p. \$27.50.

— Jill Frank, *University of South Carolina, Columbia*

Loren Samons’s book is a nuanced and perceptive history of classical Athenian democracy. Well organized and lucidly and convincingly written, the chapters of this book, devoted to elections and voting (Chapter 2), public finance (Chapter 3), foreign policy before and during the Peloponnesian War (Chapters 4–5), and national defense (Chapter 6), bring to light underappreciated aspects of Athens’s democratic development. To offer only a few examples: Samons traces the roots of Athens’s fifth- and fourth-century democracy to its sixth-century tyrannies, underscoring the important respects in which Athenian democracy came to resemble more egregious forms of tyranny. He tracks the emergence of a public treasury at Athens during the fifth century and shows how this shift in the practices and institution of property expanded both Athens’s citizenry and its imperialistic tendencies over the course of the Peloponnesian War. He explores the effects of Athens’s quest for empire on its domestic policies and, by way of a sustained but largely implicit contrast with Athenian militarism and foreign policy, he offers an unconventional and persuasive picture of fifth-century Sparta as less pathologically warlike than Athens.

*What’s Wrong with Democracy?* aims to offer more than a history of Athenian democracy, however. Samons subjects to scrutiny fifth- and fourth-century Athenian institutions and policies—domestic and foreign—in order to bring to light “the dangers of democratic practices” and “the perils of democratic faith” (p. xiv) for modern America. In the author’s view, contemporary Americans, like classical Athenians, have fallen prey to their democratic practices. The Athenians largely avoided the perils of

democratic faith, however, because of what Samons describes as the subordination of Greek politics to society and religion (pp. 168–75). Undergirded by the “innate desire” of human beings to live in communities “in which religious practices, politics, social activities, and even economic affairs all relate to one another through their connection or subordination to a set of fundamental beliefs or principles” (p. 166), the Athenians’ fifth-century self-understanding was, he maintains, largely independent of their democratic practices and institutions (pp. 92–95). Modern democracy, by contrast, is itself “a new American religion.” And what is wrong with modern democracy in America is that it enshrines “ideals like freedom, choice, and diversity as values or establishes them as goals without any other social framework of moral obligation” (p. 181).

If, as Samons writes, his overarching purposes are to foster criticism of and change individuals’ minds about modern American democracy (pp. 1, xiv), then *What’s Wrong with Democracy?* fails. In the 20 pages he devotes to the perils of democracy in the contemporary United States, Samons offers not sustained argument and constructive criticism but rather a polemic, punctuated by irate italics (pp. 178, 180, 181, 186) and disturbing stories from the news (p. 181), and anticipated but not justified by three “Digressions” interpolated into earlier sections (pp. 92–95, 119–24, and 166–67). The book also suffers, both theoretically and methodologically, as an account of classical Athens. Although the author makes a convincing case that Athens exploited its allies before and during the Peloponnesian War, was excessively punitive toward its citizens and rivals, and experienced crises of leadership in the aftermath of the war, and although these practices were, to be sure, coincidental with Athens’s democratization, his claim that democracy was the *cause* of these practices and of Athens’s defeat at the hands of the Macedonians is insufficiently demonstrated. This claim is, moreover, in conflict with another position he takes, namely, that democracy is best seen as an *effect* or “a *product* of Athenian society, the Athenian character, and the actions of certain Athenians at particular historical moments, rather than as a fundamental or defining principle of that society” (p. 171, italics in the original). While the case can be made that collective political institutions and individual ethical practices mutually affect, produce, and reproduce one another (and that this was true at Athens), this is not a position taken by Samons. Committed to a fundamental divide between politics and morality and insistent on subordinating the former to the latter, he cannot attribute to democratic politics the dual role of cause and effect of individual morality without falling into a contradiction.

A second flaw lies in the author’s method. Samons writes what he calls “practical history” (pp. xvi, 9–10), which focuses on “important events and practices in the history of Athens” to ask “*what happened*” (p. 9, italics in the original). Insisting that only a “direct confrontation with

these events will cause us to question the popular view that democratic practices tend to result in good government” (p. 10), Samons uses this method to criticize and correct the “history of ideologies” (p. 8, also pp. 119–24) that he maintains has produced an unwarranted and misleading bias in contemporary classics scholarship celebrating Athenian democracy. Unlike that scholarship that examines opinions, rhetoric, and interpretation, practical history requires relegating “ancient and modern opinions about the Athenian regime and rhetorical stances employed within the regime to secondary status” (p. 10).

Historical events and practices do not, of course, speak for themselves. As Samons notes: “Our best sources of information about Athenian history and government derive from contemporary historians (especially Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon), Athenian orators and intellectuals (especially Andocides, Plato, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and the anonymous author known as Pseudo-Xenophon), and Aristotle’s works analyzing Athenian and Greek political life (especially the *Politics* and the *Constitution of the Athenians*, the latter possibly but not certainly written by Aristotle)” (p. 19). These historians, orators, and philosophers, as they themselves explicitly acknowledge, confront what happened not by cataloging “brute” facts, however, but by providing their own accounts and interpretations of events and practices via speeches (Thucydides and the orators), dialogues (Plato, Xenophon), and opinion (Aristotle). Samons’s source materials thus belie his method.

Finally, while Samons is to be applauded for exposing in perceptive detail the undersides of democracy and for taking seriously concerns about that mode of governance set forth by classical authors, he would have done well to have taken equally seriously a further concern expressed by many of these same critics. For all of Athenian democracy’s flaws, many of the classical authors treat democracy, especially in view of its realistic and possible alternatives, as the least bad regime. From this perspective, they wrote with a view not only to criticizing the democracy Athens had become but to helping Athens become a better democracy. To these authors, improving democracy required not subordinating politics to ethics or separating fact from value and institutions from character, but seeing and elaborating the ways in which these aspects of human life can and should work together.

#### **Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics.**

Edited by Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 432p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

— James E. Hanley, *Adrian College*

The volume is the product of a 2002 conference at Yale hosted by Ian Shapiro and Rogers Smith, in which they challenged the discipline to become more problem focused and

less method focused. However, as John Mearsheimer notes in the concluding chapter, the contributors “have barely addressed the issue that [the editors] laid out” (p. 389). The result is a collection that is almost entirely method focused, becoming an inadvertent but stimulating addition to the discipline’s methodological/epistemological debate.

The first section concerns the challenge to become more problem focused, reflecting the editors’ belief that the discipline’s fundamental dichotomy is between problem-driven and method-driven research. This claim is dubious, at best. The problem-method dichotomy, if it is one, certainly does not subsume the epistemological aspects of the methodological debate, nor can it be more fundamental than the debate about the very nature (constructed vs. biologically based) of humans. Several of the contributors explicitly dispute the reality of the problem-method dichotomy, suggesting that the discipline cannot be so neatly divided (William Connolly, p. 332), that the dichotomy is “not quite usefully posed” (John Ferejohn, p. 144), or that it is simply a “false dichotomy” (Margaret Levi, p. 201). Gary Cox argues that there is no conflict between method and problem so long as the discipline remains both methodologically eclectic and collaborative (p. 182).

Smith also defines the particular problem upon which we should be focused, claiming that we “should give high (although certainly not exclusive) priority” to understanding identity formation (p. 42). This challenge, like the first, is disputed by the contributors. Anne Norton is particularly critical, calling the problem-driven scholar “the tamed domestic form of the ‘scholar activist’” (p. 68), a creature, she argues, with a dismal history. She pointedly notes that problem-driven research “serves established interests best” (p. 73), as they have the power to define what (and who) are problems, and she asks if Smith means that “each political scientist [is] to be chained to an oar in the ship of state” (p. 78).

Oddly, Shapiro and Smith themselves drift off-topic into methodological arguments. While Shapiro briefly suggests that any method is subject to dogmatic application, his only sustained critique is of rational choice theory, even though he never shows that rational choice theorists are more prone to this problem than any other methodologically committed scholars. Likewise, Smith devotes substantial space to explaining why rational choice theorists are not welcome to participate in the identity-formation research program, claiming that they have little to contribute, another dubious proposition. Despite their stated intentions, Shapiro and Smith engage in a perverse form of method drivenness, focusing not on the one method they insist on using but the one method they insist on excluding.

The second section focuses solely on rational choice methodology, but the title, “Redeeming Rational Choice Theory?” seems a disingenuous effort to plant preemptive doubt in readers’ minds. These contributors clearly do not

feel the need for redemption, but provide an impressive range of explanation of rational choice theory. Gary Cox helps to make sense of the approach by identifying various strains within the rational choice “paradigm,” while Bruce Bueno de Mesquita argues for using any method (including rational choice) that is amenable to mathematical modeling, because models are especially useful “for ensuring logical consistency or for uncovering inconsistencies in complex arguments” (p. 227). Ferejohn (whose chapter actually concludes the previous section, but fits as well here) considers rational choice a form of internal explanation, as it assumes that rational agents make choices that best “fit their beliefs and desires” (p. 158). Alan Ryan agrees that all human action is based on such beliefs and desires; therefore, he says, all explanation “is *prima facie* rational actor explanation” (p. 187). But he concludes that full explanation demands substantially more, since the really interesting questions are “*why* people have the weird beliefs they do . . . and how they come by the strange values they seem to hold” (pp. 196–97). While this section contributes little to the problem versus method debate, its breadth of explanation about rational choice theory—which is only hinted at here—makes it useful reading for anyone following the rational choice debate. Perhaps it is because Shapiro has been such a leading figure in the critique of rational choice that so many of the contributors seem to be responding to his prior arguments, rather than to the challenge he poses here.

The third section is a broad methodological discussion, aptly titled “Possibilities of Pluralism and Convergence.” The first two chapters are not sympathetic to pluralism. Alan Gerber, Donald Green, and Edward Kaplan—rejecting the call to be problem focused—suggest “a new research program for methodologists” (p. 269) that promotes the superiority of experimental research over observational studies. Observation, they argue, gives only an “illusion” of learning. Lisa Wedeen follows them with a sharp critique of the large-*n* methods they advocate. She identifies what large-*n* studies cannot tell us—such as how different identity groups within a society invest terms such as “democracy” with substantively different meanings—and argues the superiority of interpretive methods. But she fails to point out that interpretivism is also limited and cannot reveal the kind of information that large-*n* methods can show us. Wedeen would have done well to heed Shapiro’s warning that “[o]ne of the worst features of methodological disagreement . . . is the propensity . . . to compare the inadequacies of one method with the adequacies of a second, and then declare the first to be wanting” (p. 35).

Fortunately, respect for methodological pluralism and some degree of convergence characterizes the succeeding three chapters by Rudra Sil, William Connolly, and Elisabeth Ellis. Connolly describes both methodological and substantive commitments as a type of existential faith,

and he criticizes those who “feel in their bones that if only their method were triumphant they would be more secure in their faith and politics would become more explicable” (p. 345). Although we should continue to engage in efforts to convince each other, we should also “remain open to the probability that many will resist conversion” (p. 347), an attitude which he suggests will incline us toward an ecumenical generosity of spirit.

So far as we are content with pure pluralism, Connolly’s advice is well taken. Ellis and Sil go farther, however, and encourage real methodological convergence. Ellis recommends a “provisional, rather than a conclusive, perspective [that makes use of] the historical, rational, and empirical modes” (p. 351), while Sil asks for a self-conscious methodological eclecticism that can produce a “constrained pluralism,” a goal “not likely to be met either by those who insist on the universality of a particular set of methodological principles and standards or by those who simply reject the very idea of discipline or rigor” (p. 327). Although purists on all sides are likely to disagree, there may be a substantial middle ground of scholars who find satisfaction in these arguments. Margaret Levi (whose chapter is actually in the second section) provides a case study of such convergence. Her approach, which she calls “rational choice analytic narratives,” employs the self-conscious eclecticism urged by Sil and seems to combine historical, rational, and empirical methods within one project, as Ellis urges.

It is ironic that despite the editors’ plea for less focus on methods and more on problems, this volume is almost wholly focused on method. But the editors clearly cannot sustain their argument that the most basic disciplinary division is between method and problem. As a discipline we are most seriously divided by epistemic differences, and methodological debates, at their best, are really epistemological debates. Inadvertent or not, *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics* is a useful addition to that discussion.

**In Pursuit of Justice: Christian-Democratic Explorations.** By James W. Skillen. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004. 192p. \$65.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Mary M. Keys, *University of Notre Dame*

This is a timely book about the relation of theory to practice and of Christian faith to politics. Its author first crafts a case for a Christian-democratic understanding of person, polity, and justice, and then explores possible implications of this worldview for various U.S. policy issues. The book is brief but thought provoking, written in clear and engaging prose and surveying an impressive range of scholarly literature. Among the chief merits of *In Pursuit of Justice* are its interdisciplinary character and its breadth. The arguments advanced should interest practitioners of many fields within political science, including political

theory, American politics, policy studies, constitutional law, and religion and politics.

James Skillen argues convincingly that one’s theoretical or normative foundations cannot help but influence one’s concrete judgments on myriad social and civic policy options, and so it is critical that those foundations be laid as solidly as possible. To this end, the book’s argument comprises an implicit case for what William Galston (*Liberal Pluralism*, 2002, pp. 8–9) terms a “comprehensive” (rather than “freestanding”) theory of politics and justice: These cannot be well conceived without reference to other sciences and disciplines, specifically, in Skillen’s view, without philosophical-theological anthropology. To probe the nature of politics as a profoundly human activity, art, and science, one cannot abstract from the critical and vexed question of *what it means to be human*. This question further cannot be resolved, or even properly explored, without some reference to religion and to God.

The book comprises eight chapters. The first three form a unity in their theoretical, foundational emphases, exploring the definition of a “Christian-Democratic Point of View,” the issue of “Civil Society and Human Development,” and the “Question of Being Human.” The following five chapters argue for practical implications of the author’s particular Christian-democratic theory for U.S. welfare policy, racial justice, educational equality, environmental protection, and electoral reform. All these are assessed in terms of Skillen’s overall goal of advancing the cause of justice within a modern, democratic, differentiated, and diverse political society. Again analogous to Galston’s theory (2002), Skillen’s is a comprehensive *pluralist* political perspective. The pluralism of his book revolves around diverse sources and spheres of human responsibility, authority, and association. The role of political life and government is to create a civic “unum” out of this “e pluri-bus” through a just public ordering of society, not by reducing all associations to parts or extensions of an omnivore political organism.

In contrast to Galston, Skillen presents his pluralist theory of political justice as only tangentially *liberal*, if indeed it is liberal at all. He is one with liberalism in affirming its central insight “that the mature adult should be recognized as a responsible person and not reduced to a mere pawn of the state or to some other role or relationship”; “[a] just state . . . recognizes and protects the rights of individual persons as such” (p. 10). But a Christian-democratic perspective parts company with liberalism when it insists that the political community recognize that the human persons who form part of it are *created in the image of God* and naturally or spontaneously form societies that differentiate greatly over time. These diverse social forms, from friendships to marriages, families to trade associations, businesses to churches and other religious congregations, from towns to political communities, do not originate in and exist for the individual’s autonomous

choice alone or for the state as such. Rather, they and their members have diverse, virtually inalienable roles and responsibilities for the flourishing of human life.

Skillen takes issue with American liberalism (together with its Lockean theoretical antecedent) for its privatized, compartmentalized conception of religion, and for its attempts to do justice to persons only or primarily as property-owning *individuals*, or as *citizens* qua contracted members of the polity. Within this bipolar paradigm, however, it *cannot* do them justice. From the Christian-democratic, biblically based vantage point of *In Pursuit of Justice*, government must do justice to its citizens as individual persons *and* as family members, church members, students, professionals, minorities, or members of particular ethnic communities, and (as Skillen often stresses) as “much more.” This further involves doing justice to the various social groups and associations themselves, facilitating rather than usurping or obstructing their various abilities and social functions. The author employs aspects of Calvinist “sphere-sovereignty” and Catholic “subsidiarity” theory to argue for a broader pluralism of providers, both religious and nonreligious, of publicly supported services within a truly pluralist democratic polity. Representation likewise should be conceived in a simultaneously more holistic and more differentiated, pluralist manner. Chapter 4’s exploration of “Charitable Choice” and “Faith-Based and Community Initiatives” for social welfare and Chapter 6 on American public education strike me as his strongest case studies in this regard.

Skillen sensibly cautions against taking the term “Christian democracy” to imply an “identification of the fallible political efforts of Christians with God’s will” (p. 3), and yet still contends that a *Christian*-democratic perspective on politics is a critical component of the American public square and its deliberation concerning social justice. By recognizing the human person as an inherently dignified, social, civic, and religious being made in God’s image and likeness and called ultimately to communion with God, this worldview opens up “the only way to do justice simultaneously to (1) individual freedom, (2) multiple spheres of social responsibility, and (3) civic responsibility in the political community” (p. 11). From this perspective, “equal justice for all finds its firmest basis in the creation-sustaining grace of the Creator-Redeemer, not in human reason, altruism, autonomy, or interest group power balances” (p. 12).

This last quotation raises perhaps the most pressing question in the book’s argument as a whole. Skillen notes that his foundational, normative theory is a Christian one that builds often from biblical premises, and always from “a particular set of assumptions and . . . presuppositions” (p. 54). Those with different foundational assumptions may well differ from him in their conclusions about persons, politics, and social justice, but it is also possible that their theories may overlap or converge (p. 54). It is not

clear to me whether Skillen is here embracing a form of political-theoretical perspectivism, or whether there is implicit in his foundations something like a natural law that can ground reflections on justice for citizens of varying religious persuasions and nonbelievers as well. He clearly rejects majoritarianism as an ultimate rule in democratic public policy formation (see pp. 66–68), so cannot wish his own “perspective” to be so imposed; and yet if his Christian-democratic paradigm is needed as more than one voice in a wilderness, if he sees it as in some sense an indispensable foundation for a better public order, then a deeper account of the relation between faith and reason in his normative political theory is also necessary. Skillen himself notes the need for “[a] more expansive historical and *philosophical justification* for the arguments developed” in the book, indicating that one may indeed be forthcoming (p. 7; emphasis added).

**Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism.** By Kok-Chor Tan. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2004. 234p. \$70.00 cloth, \$25.99 paper.

— Rebecca E. Kingston, *University of Toronto*

This is an excellent book. Not only does Kok-Chor Tan provide a strong argument for cosmopolitan justice in the face of various defenders of nationalism and patriotism who see their claims at odds with cosmopolitanism, but in doing so he offers a cogent overview of the relevant literature and provides order to discussions surrounding cosmopolitanism where there has been a great deal of confusion.

Tan’s overall purpose is to argue for a specific form of cosmopolitanism, that is, cosmopolitan justice, which he sees as compatible with nationalist and patriotic commitments, though not unreservedly so. In order to do this, he follows three major lines of argument. First, he develops a version of Rawlsian-inspired cosmopolitanism that, he argues, provides a solid basis for global justice. Second, he explores the arguments in defense of nationalism and shows how liberal nationalism rightly understood should be considered compatible with his version of cosmopolitanism. In a final section of the text, he shows how one can be a committed cosmopolitan on his terms and still acknowledge the independent value of patriotic commitments.

So what is the form of cosmopolitanism defended by Tan that seems on the surface to do the impossible? As he exposes through an extremely helpful overview of the forms of cosmopolitanism, his goal is to propose a “strong” (i.e., not just positing a minimal material threshold as a measurement of equality and a policy of humanitarian assistance, but a global redistributive framework that provides a new set of rules to correct structural inequalities) but “moderate” (i.e., recognizing the value of commitments independent of cosmopolitan morality) moral cosmopolitanism about justice (p. 12). In its most basic form,

cosmopolitanism is defined by Tan as a framework committed to defending the individual as the ultimate unit of moral worth (p. 35), and he rejects the notion that this necessitates any defense of a world state. Indeed, he is emphatic that a commitment to the basic rights and liberties of individuals and the expression of basic concern for individuals requires first and foremost a reassessment of the global economic order where evidence of injustice and inequality are most clearly evident. How the resolution of these priorities of economic justice plays out in political and institutional terms is clearly of secondary importance to the author.

Tan places himself in a line of attempts (e.g., Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge) to harness the principles of Rawlsian justice to the global arena in ways that Rawls was reticent to do. What is particularly significant and novel about Tan's argument is that he provides this defense of cosmopolitan justice at the same time as he takes into account the objections to cosmopolitanism raised by defenders of nationalism and patriotism. He is able not only to circumvent these objections but indeed to argue that those committed to liberal nationalism must consider themselves to be defenders of his version of cosmopolitanism. He does so thoughtfully by considering the scope of the different claims. As a defense of a global basic structure relevant to matters of distributive justice, not only is his idea of cosmopolitanism rightfully recognized to be compatible with the liberal nationalist project of cultivating community for the purpose of promoting social justice; but by its goal of mitigating forces of economic oppression and injustice at the global level, his cosmopolitanism is also considered a precondition for a commitment to the principles and universal practice of cultural autonomy and self-determination that are central to liberal nationalism.

But what about a thicker view of local attachments in the form of patriotism? Tan seeks to do justice to the strength of those arguments that acknowledge the independent moral force of patriotic attachments by rejecting those who defend these attachments solely as means to cosmopolitan ends. He argues that the defenders of cosmopolitanism have been misguided in their focus on assessing the moral grounds for patriotic commitments, and instead he suggests that what should really be of concern to committed cosmopolitans is the practical upshot of those commitments. In other words, cosmopolitanism flowing from a moral commitment to an impartial idea of justice should be seen as informing an economic framework and basic rules of interaction that provide a set of limits on what patriotic commitments, however justified, can demand or require. By carefully considering and differentiating spheres of cultural identity and more basic moral obligation, Tan is able to provide a cogent defense of cosmopolitanism that does not have to unduly jettison some of the literature's more convincing claims about our

need for cultural attachments and community, despite our commitments to universal principles. Still, as he recognizes, the principles of justice will always set boundaries or limits on what these local attachments can legitimately demand of us: "The task for cosmopolitans is not to show that patriotic commitments per se are rationally indefensible, but to show that defensible forms of patriotism do not violate the demands of cosmopolitan justice. . . . The crucial question for global justice is how the rules of the global structure are to be determined" (p. 197).

While this overview shows the broad contours of Tan's argument, it is important to note that in a masterful coverage of the existing literature, the author is able to lay out and defend his position in the face of multiple variants of the positions with which he engages. Furthermore, he is able to represent this complexity with admirable clarity, which makes the book an extremely useful one for anyone with an interest in cosmopolitanism and global justice.

Still, precisely because of his sympathy (though within limits) for a more "thick" understanding of patriotism, it is surprising that Tan does not acknowledge in this work what could be seen as a central objection to the idea of the primacy of an impartial idea of justice. Indeed, in his attempt to address Rawls's objections to the idea of a global basic structure for basic reasons of liberal tolerance, Tan suggests that while liberal principles of civil and political rights may be objectionable to nonliberal societies, there is no reason to believe that these same societies will reject liberal principles relating to economic and social rights (p. 77). Furthermore, if nonliberal societies can regard themselves as benefiting in material terms in a global system of distributive justice, then there is no reason, according to Tan, for them not to espouse the principles of distributive justice that he advocates at the global level (p. 78). While clearly in practice he does not expect a global consensus on his principles for his understanding of justice to be operative (and he clearly goes to great pains to distinguish between what he calls "conventional" moral convictions that reflect existing points of view and "commonsense" morality that stands up to the rigor of critical reason and a sense of the prior force of independent moral requirements), there is clearly something problematic with an idea of justice that sidesteps the moral positions articulated by those who are regarded as the clearest victims of injustice. It is not obvious that those who have been oppressed by a global system of economic inequality will be trusting or will acquiesce in a project of economic justice that derives from the same traditions that had oppressed them. Is it not incumbent on any solid project of cosmopolitan justice not to justify its integrity through an appeal to abstract impartiality, but rather to show on the ground and in the trenches that it is a philosophical commitment that is compatible with a diversity of global traditions previously marginalized in philosophical discourse? Without such work, such

a project risks falling largely on suspicious if not deaf ears.

Still, for most of those who feel that the project of cosmopolitanism can be sufficiently defended within the boundaries of the Western philosophical tradition, *Justice Without Borders* offers much food for thought and is extremely helpful in clarifying and ordering a vast array of relevant literature on the topic. It should be a recommended text in any upper-division and graduate course devoted to the study of cosmopolitanism.

**Citizenship and Democratic Doubt: The Legacy of Progressive Thought.** By Bob Pepperman Taylor. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 240p. \$29.95.

— Jason A. Scorza, *Fairleigh Dickinson University*

Spanning the 1890s to World War I, the Progressive era was characterized by optimism, faith in science and reason, and a commitment to broad social reform. It is remembered, today, mainly for its achievements in combating the social ills associated with new patterns of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration, among them poverty, prostitution, and political corruption.

Bob Pepperman Taylor's new book, *Citizenship and Democratic Doubt*, reevaluates the legacy of the Progressive movement, which he argues embodied two dangerous ideas: first, that democratic politics should be guided entirely by modern science; and second, that the democratic social order (so guided) creates harmoniousness and dissolves conflicts within communities (p. 1). These ideas are dangerous, Taylor explains, not only because they arrogantly dismiss political commitments arising from tradition or religious faith but also because they are themselves self-righteous, utopian, and highly ideological.

In particular, Taylor takes to task three major Progressive intellectuals, John Dewey, Walter Lippmann, and Herbert Croly, who, he contends, succumb to these two errors. According to Taylor, Lippmann is not sufficiently concerned with either political or economic inequality, convinced as he is that mastery of the material world could overcome these (and all other) social ills. And yet, Taylor argues, "the very aspiration of mastery is itself a fantastic dream" (p. 32). Croly idealized public administrators, viewing them as disinterested and self-sacrificing guardians of the public good. However, Taylor questions Croly's apparent commitment to a vision of politics in which individual interests would not be merely sacrificed but actually dissolved "completely into public interests" (p. 43). Of Dewey, Taylor writes, the "specter of an arrogant utopianism haunts even this most humane and pragmatic of American philosophers" (p. 44). In particular, Taylor concludes that there is no hope that Dewey's secular humanism could ever replace conventional religious beliefs in American society and doubts that this would even be desirable (p. 54).

Taylor does praise three more marginal Progressive figures, namely, historian Carl Becker, activist Jane Addams, and conservationist Aldo Leopold. While the Progressive heroes of Taylor's book cannot match the villains as great thinkers, he persuasively shows that they represent an appealing alternative approach to mainstream Progressive social thought. Specifically, he argues that Becker, Addams, and Leopold all practice a model of democratic politics characterized by civic humility and democratic doubt—which Taylor defines as the "suspicion that others may be both as morally good and as morally compromised as yourself" (p. 10). Addams clearly is an exemplar of a civic life that is both noble and humble. Practicing democratic humility, as Taylor defines it, she seems to have generally avoided "the kind of dogmatism and abstraction that infects much contemporary political life" (p. 83). According to Taylor, Becker differed from many of his fellow Progressives in viewing doubt to be "a kind of democratic virtue" (p. 105), while Leopold breaks with the mainstream of Progressivism in general by rejecting "the seductions of building his arguments on moral claims about scientific truth" and avoiding "undemocratic polemicism and dogmatism" (p. 132).

Although many fine works exist on each of these six figures, and on the Progressive era as a whole, Taylor's approach helps identify an important fissure within the Progressive movement, which one would not detect even in classics such as Richard Hofstadter's *The Age of Reform* (1955). Consequently, the book provides a valuable supplement to the existing literature and is worth reading by anyone with a serious interest in the history of American political ideas or in the Progressives in particular.

Unfortunately, Taylor's book is strangely decontextualized and makes no significant mention of Populism, the coterminous rural reform movement. It is worth noting that Progressives would champion (some would say appropriate) numerous Populist issues, including tariff and trust legislation. This suggests that the struggles of the agrarian working class were of more than academic interest to the Progressives and, indeed, that the Progressive movement as a whole might have been reasonably responsive to the concerns of people of faith and the traditional value of agrarian life. However, Taylor seems generally uninterested in the practical reforms accomplished by the Progressive movement, or their concrete effects on the lives of both rural and urban communities. Consideration of these reforms would have provided a helpful context for the reevaluation of the ideas of the movement's intellectual leaders, as well as for analysis of the significance of Progressivism for contemporary politics.

There is no denying that this book is quite timely or that the author's arguments represent an important warning to contemporary American secular humanists, liberals, and progressives who might be more inclined to follow the arrogant politics of Dewey, Lippmann, and Croly than



they are the humble politics of Addams, Leopold, and Becker (p. 18). If Taylor is to be believed, the challenge for contemporary liberals and progressives is learning to speak to people of religious conviction and traditional values without being either patronizing or dismissive. He cautions, “When their visions become too grand, the Progressives can lose their democratic sympathy with the real citizens found in American society, citizens with religious beliefs, whose own motives are a mixture of interest and principle, and who experience tensions between their private and public concerns” (p. 141).

Beyond civic humility and democratic doubt, however, is the very real risk of capitulation to religious extremism, nativism, or anti-intellectualism. Indeed, some readers might be inclined to think that more—not less—science is needed in contemporary political discourse and that practical problems require solutions that are informed by facts, not faith. This is not to say that the deepest moral commitments (be they religious or secular) of citizens are in any sense irrelevant to democratic politics. Indeed, as Taylor reminds us, the challenge for us today, as it was for the Progressives, is to negotiate an imperfect and ever-shifting equilibrium between these two very different ways of making sense of the world.

**The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America.** By Lee Ward. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 470p. \$90.00.

— Eldon J. Eisenach, *University of Tulsa*

This is a study of the origins and development of Whig political thought in England and America. James Tyrrell, Algernon Sidney, and John Locke all wrote during the Exclusion Crisis in England that ended in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Their common enemy was divine right absolutism and its chief spokesman, Sir Robert Filmer. Their common starting point was the premise of man’s “natural liberty” as requiring political orders to be grounded in some form of consent creating constitutional limitations on power and justifying resistance to tyranny. The core of the study is an analysis of Tyrrell’s *Patriarcha, Non Monarcha*, Sidney’s *Discourse Concerning Government*, and Locke’s *Two Treatises of Government*. Lee Ward asks us to “imagine [these] foundational works . . . to be intellectual and philosophical genetic markers placed in the bloodstream of the tradition” of Whig political and constitutional thought in England and America (p. 325).

Ward’s study is much more complex and interesting than this summary might suggest. First, each of the three iterations of Whig thought represents a distinct way of conceiving political life, even though all are grounded in the “natural liberty” tradition. Tyrrell’s ideas represent a conservative and even “Cavalier” understanding of government, one in which original liberty is profoundly mediated and transformed through secondary institutions and

multiple compacts that become the immediate sources of reciprocal obligations binding subjects and rulers. Tyrrell’s was the voice that dominated Whig constitutional thought from 1688 through the Augustan Age and was celebrated in the writings of Baron de Montesquieu, David Hume, and Sir William Blackstone. Sidney represents the radical republican and classical strain in Whig thought. To Sidney, natural liberty and human rationality preclude hereditary monarchy and require direct constitutional defense in broadly representative institutions, a vibrant and contentious political life, and popular militias. Sidney was executed for treason in 1683, but his thought gained new life in America through *Cato’s Letters* by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. Locke represents the voice of liberalism and property rights in Whig political thought. He, like Sidney, faded from view after the Glorious Revolution, only to reemerge as a commanding figure in the American Revolution.

Secondly, the study places these seminal texts in the broader European context of early modern natural law and natural rights thinking. Tyrrell’s writings are directly and convincingly connected to those of Samuel Pufendorf and Sidney’s, in a less developed way, to Benedict Spinoza. Even before these connections are made, however, the author asks why both Filmer and his three opponents did not draw upon modern Catholic natural law writers, such as Francisco Suarez and Roberto Bellarmine, or derive many ideas from Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes. While these latter connections and rejections are too summary and too sweeping to be convincing, they have the merit of seeing both Filmer and the founders of Whig thought as thoroughly conversant with the larger body of modern natural law argument, Continental and British, Catholic and Protestant.

A third complicating and interesting feature of this book is its interpretation of Tyrrell, Sidney, and Locke from within disputes in contemporary political theory regarding the tensions between “republicanism” and “liberalism” in early modern political thought. While Sidney and Locke are, respectively, most obviously representative of these two modes, Ward extends the logic of republicanism and liberalism into the broader patterns found in natural law and natural liberty writings, especially as they found voice in American critiques of British constitutional and imperial ideas. Two bodies of literature carry this American analysis, the pamphlets of James Otis, John Dickinson, Tom Paine, and Thomas Jefferson and early state bills of rights and frames of government. Especially interesting in this regard is the contrast Ward draws between the first and second waves of state constitution writing in the American revolutionary period as tensions between “constitutional authority” and “legislative will” emerged with increasing force.

Combining as he does a close analysis of selected texts with broadly conceived philosophical and political

contexts, Ward implicitly rests the plausibility of his readings of those texts on their relationships to these contexts. While this connection of selected texts and context is most directly established when the context itself consists of many other texts, even here a difficulty arises. When the other texts are written on another level of discourse or constitute another genre of discourse, it is difficult to see what is carried over when the selected text is said to incorporate or reject these other texts. A case in point is Filmer, who, Ward argues, uses Luther as a positive model for ideas on scriptural authority and political absolutism while rejecting both Calvin and Catholic natural law theorists on the same grounds. While this is an interesting conjecture, there is little attempt to examine any larger political theology or biblical hermeneutic that might be found in Filmer's writings to solidify the connection to Luther or his rejections of Calvin, Suarez, and Bellarmine.

And while religion is an important part of Ward's political context—especially antipopery—its status as an artic-

ulate set of discourses with many philosophical and rhetorical resonances in Whig political thought is ignored. Symptomatic of this avoidance is his extensive discussion of early American state constitutional bills of rights without any consideration of one of the most foundational: "a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences" (verbatim, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, 1776; Vermont, 1777; New Hampshire, 1784).

*The Language of Liberty 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World* (1994) by J. C. D. Clark is an almost exact parallel to this book in time frame, subjects, and persons, but its political and philosophical texts and contexts are infused with religion in all of its institutional, theological, and political dimensions. Reading the two books together leads to the disconcerting conclusion that political theory and political history have yet to find a language that provides common access to a shared political culture.

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## AMERICAN POLITICS

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### **America's Crisis of Values: Reality and Perception.**

By Wayne Baker. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005. 312p. \$35.00

— James A. McCann, *Purdue University*

Is the United States losing its moral compass? Are Americans today less committed than in the past to traditional values? Is the country becoming ever more deeply divided between traditionalists and secularists?

The conventional wisdom in many conservative circles is that, yes, fewer American citizens are committed to traditional values, and that the country is much worse off because of this. Violent outbursts in public schools, climbing divorce rates, scandals in high places—all are frequently said to stem from sinking moral standards. More generally, commentators across the ideological spectrum often characterize the United States as fundamentally split between two warring tribes, progressive versus orthodox, liberal versus conservative, red state versus blue state, and so on. Indeed, for people who follow public affairs, the term "culture war" needs no explaining. American politics and society have become so polarized, we hear repeatedly, that there is little room in the middle.

Wayne Baker's timely *America's Crisis of Values* offers a scholarly response to these social critics and commentators. In the first half of the book, Baker explores three questions: First, are Americans in fact turning their back on traditional moral values? Second, in a comparative sense, are American beliefs about politics, religion, and morality

becoming less "exceptional" and more like those in most other industrialized Western societies, such as Britain, Canada, and Australia? And third, is the United States as sharply divided as popular commentators argue?

Drawing on data from the *World Values Surveys, 1981–2000*, the author responds to all three questions with a clear *no*. In the first analytical chapter, Baker identifies two value dimensions on which citizens and nations can be positioned: a "Traditional–Secular/Rational" dimension and a "Survival–Self-Expression" dimension. Readers familiar with prior research based on the *World Values Surveys* (e.g., Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 1997) will recognize these value axes. Factor scores indicate that with respect to the first dimension, Americans tend to be more traditional than secular, and that contrary to cultural critics, the degree of traditionalism has not wavered over the last 20 years. This stability is even more remarkable in a cross-national context, the author writes: "America has retained its traditional values while virtually *all* of its peers are losing their traditional values" (p. 36). This holds even for younger generations in the United States.

At the same time, however, Americans are moving along the second dimension, becoming more supportive of "self-expressive" values. This value configuration makes the United States nearly unique among all the industrialized democracies. Only in Ireland does Baker find a similar coupling of traditional values and a growing desire to realize one's "true potential." (Figure 2.4 on p. 37 nicely illustrates the persistence of American "exceptionalism.")

In the third chapter, "Culture War," the author assesses the distribution of values within the country. Although

Americans generally tilt toward the traditional side of the Traditional–Secular/Rational axis, there is a great deal of variation around this central tendency. Citizens do not appear to be split into two potentially hostile blocs. Rather, the distribution of scores looks remarkably bell-like. (Using other surveys and focusing on different kinds of attitudes, Morris Fiorina's *Culture War?*, which also came out in 2005, makes a similar point about public opinion in the United States.) Baker further shows that positions on this value dimension and the Survival–Self-Expression dimension correlate only loosely with social attitudes (e.g., beliefs about ethics in business) and what he terms “moral visions” (views on whether there are God-given moral absolutes or whether moral standards are relative and flexible). These low correlations are taken as additional support for the claim that Americans are not tightly grouped into two sides, girded for battle over the future of the culture.

In these opening chapters, Baker marshals a considerable amount of survey evidence. The statistical findings reported in an appendix span approximately 50 pages. Even so, more discussion of the measurement of the two key value axes would have been helpful. The questionnaire items used to capture traditional versus secular/rational dispositions seem reasonable (views on obedience to authority, nationalism, the importance of God and religion in one's life, attitudes on abortion, divorce, and euthanasia, to mention only a few). But the Survival–Self-Expression dimension is identified through a curious assortment of questions having to do with, for example, whether the survey respondent feels happy, trusts other people, believes that men make better political leaders than women, wishes to send boys rather than girls to a university, and can justify homosexuality (p. 21; see also pp. 197–200 and note 6 on p. 257). On the face of it, I would have expected any items on gender roles and homosexuality to be associated more with the traditionalism factor.

In the second part of the book, Baker considers why political observers are panicking over the supposed decline of traditional moral values and the polarization of American society, given that the empirical record offers scant evidence. This discussion relies much less on survey findings and is more speculative, as the author acknowledges. Citing the literatures on political realignments and cycles in American history, he suggests that concerns about “values crises” may surface at regular intervals, due perhaps to shifting “moral visions.” In some historical eras, the public leans toward absolutism; in others, relativism is the norm. When there is more disagreement over moral visions, as there apparently is today, commentators are more likely to believe that the country is drifting away from its historic moral roots. This is a subtle argument: Public support for traditional values can be stable across decades and generations, even as popular reasoning about the nature of morality changes.

Wayne Baker has produced a thoughtful and engaging work. Scholars interested in public opinion, values, and the discourse surrounding the culture wars in the United States should read *America's Crisis of Values*.

**Doing the Right Thing: Collective Action and Procedural Choice in the New Legislative Process.**

By Lawrence Becker. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2005. 164p. \$39.95.

— John D. Wilkerson, *University of Washington*

Lawrence Becker remarks that “it is no wonder that the American Congress is among the most reviled of American institutions,” and casts partial blame on political scientists who depict Congress as “gridlocked, impotent, overly influenced by special interests, and even corrupt (p. ix).” Becker has a point, and his investigation of several issue areas (base closings, free trade, nuclear waste disposal, and tax reform) where Congress has enacted legislation that “imposes direct costs on localities or particular economic sectors in favor of some general diffuse benefit such as deficit reduction” is refreshing (p. 1). The book is a nice complement to graduate-level readings that typically emphasize the particularistic, local emphasis of congressional policymaking. The well-written case studies and Becker's propositions concerning when such change is most likely to occur and how, though not ironclad, provide plenty of food for thought and discussion.

The main focus of the book is on better understanding congressional procedures “that grant formal power to craft the specifics of particularistic costs to ad hoc institutions outside of Congress, and in some cases, to impose those costs without explicit congressional approval (p. 2).” Other scholars have drawn attention to procedural tactics designed to reduce the visibility or traceability of unpopular decisions (e.g., R. Kent Weaver, *Automatic Government: The Politics of Indexation*, 1988; or R. Douglas Arnold in *The Logic of Congressional Action*, 1990). *Doing the Right Thing's* contribution is to ask the obvious follow-up—why are such tactics not used more frequently?

Each of the cases examined shares the common characteristic of requiring that specific, often geographically concentrated, interests bear the costs of advancing a policy having more general benefits. The leverage for Becker's theorizing comes from the differences among the cases. He advances five propositions to explain when Congress is likely to resort to “extracongressional” blame-avoiding procedures. Congress is more likely to delegate when the costs of a policy change are so geographically concentrated and the number of affected groups so large that enacting change within Congress is politically infeasible; when events conspire to build consensus within Congress that change is needed; when no powerful champion in Congress emerges to take on the unpopular issue; and

when the scope of the issue is defined sufficiently narrowly to mitigate concerns about agency loss through delegation to nonlegislative actors.

The most innovative of these propositions is that delegation is more likely for issues of narrow scope. This is where the detailed case studies bear fruit. Becker demonstrates, contrary to conventional wisdom, that Congress does not abdicate control in its pursuit of blame avoidance. In two of the cases, Congress chose not to delegate, while in the other two, it carefully limited the scope of its delegation. Base-closing commissions operate under constraints imposed by Congress to limit the range of the commission's recommendations (the 1988 commission could only recommend closures that would yield savings within six years, thus preventing the closure of any large installations). In addition, Congress retains ultimate authority to reject all or none of the commission's recommendations. These procedures reflect the issue's long history, where legislators have perceived that administrations were playing politics with the issue, as well as the recognition that members experiencing the pain of a proposed closure are compelled to do everything in their power to prevent it. The solution was to tie Congress's hands through delegation while limiting agency loss.

Congress similarly limits the scope of the president's fast-track authority to negotiating reciprocal trade-barrier reductions (rather than trade agreements in general) and is "very careful to ensure that the trade actions taken by the President are in line with legislators' preferences" by requiring positive approval of any agreement (pp. 90–91). The best explanation for these arrangements also seems to be that legislators recognize that Congress is unlikely to avoid the temptation to enact restrictive trade policies, but that there are also risks associated with delegating too much control to the president.

In contrast, Congress did not delegate the decision of where to site the nation's nuclear waste repository. It turned to an expert commission to make recommendations, but provided criteria that all but ensured that the commission would recommend what most legislators already preferred. In contrast to base closures and free trade, the costs of this issue were predominately located in a single state, so that the need to delegate in order to advance reform was less pressing. Finally, powerful champions emerged to take on the issues of tax reform and nuclear waste disposal in the 1980s, not only because there was credit to be claimed but also because there were costs to be avoided. No such leaders emerged to champion base closings. Although the costs associated with tax reform were widespread, it was also the issue of broadest scope and, as a result, the least likely to be delegated.

The limitations of this book are also the sources of its strengths. Becker derives five propositions from four selected case studies involving issues with many distinguishing characteristics. The cases are carefully researched

and revealing. But one can also ask whether the propositions will withstand additional scrutiny if applied to other issues where extracongressional procedures have also been used, such as Social Security and Medicare reform, and perhaps even congressional pay raises. The pay raise issue seems especially interesting due to the many variations in extracongressional procedures employed since the early 1960s (see Roger Davidson, "The Politics of Executive, Legislative and Judicial Compensation," in Robert Hartman and Arnold Weber, eds., *The Rewards of Public Service: Compensating Top Federal Officials*, 1980). In addition, one might also want to ask whether there are other deserving issues that have not received similar attention and responses. If not, why not?

The book's normative conclusion—that legislators sometimes seek to promote general benefits—is also less novel than the author seems to suggest. A prominent line of congressional research does indeed argue that the reelection concerns motivate members to place particular interests ahead of the general. But many members of Congress and prominent scholars see things differently. Steven Kelman has built a career out of documenting examples of "public spirit" in government, including in Congress (e.g., see his "'Public Choice' and Public Spirit," *Public Interest* [Spring 1987]: 93–94). Other prominent scholars portray members' goals as multifaceted (e.g., Richard Fenno, *Congressman in Committees*, 1973; David Mayhew, *America's Congress: Actions in the Public Sphere from James Madison Through Newt Gingrich*, 2000), and find patterns in member activity that suggest that reelection is a primary consideration, but not all-consuming (e.g., Glenn Parker, *Congress and the Rent Seeking Society*, 1996; John Hibbing, *Congressional Careers: Contours of Life in the U.S. House of Representatives*, 1994). Reviewed in the light of prior research, *Doing the Right Thing* offers additional evidence for a perspective on Congress that appreciates electoral pressures, but recognizes that reelection is not the be-all and end-all of representation for many, if not most, legislators.

**The Policy Partnership: Presidential Elections and American Democracy.** By Bruce Buchanan. New York:

Routledge, 2004. 160p. \$90.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Matthew R. Kerbel, *Villanova University*

Imagine that George W. Bush had run for reelection on a detailed program of Social Security reform that he could point to after his inauguration as a plan that had been considered and endorsed by the American people. Jittery Republican members of Congress, wary of making substantial changes to a popular program, could take comfort in the political shelter afforded them by voters who had, through the vehicle of the presidential election, already ratified the broad blueprints of the Bush plan, and opposition Democrats would feel pressure to come to the table

to address the people's will. Similarly, imagine that John Kerry had opposed President Bush with a detailed plan of his own for making Social Security solvent, which, had he been elected, would have for the same set of reasons facilitated broad bipartisan support and congressional action.

Such is the world Bruce Buchanan envisions in his provocative book, *The Policy Partnership*. Combining political theory and practice around the important issue of democratic leadership, he offers a perceptive analysis of the disjuncture between voter policy preferences and official actions, which supports an institutional solution that is as creative as it is problematic.

Buchanan contends that the fundamental premise of democratic politics—that voters should influence public policy—is undermined by election campaigns devoid of substantive debate and a public content to defer to, rather than direct, the choices of elected officials who, all too often, are able to avoid accountability for their actions. He believes a remedy for this dilemma may be found in presidential elections, if only election campaigns could be referenda for intractable problems during cycles when such problems arise. He focuses on presidential elections as a forum for establishing what he calls “policy partnerships” between voters and officials because of what he regards as “a special reciprocal relationship between citizens and presidents” (p. viii), which at times over the past half century has produced presidential responsiveness to the public's policy desires.

However, such instances are rare. The deeper one gets into Buchanan's three-part typology of ways voters influence policy, the more it becomes clear that anticipatory influence, whereby presidents try to gauge and head off potential negative public response to their actions, has been a near-constant condition over the past two generations. Only twice in the 10 election cycles since 1960 does the author find evidence for direct influence, where presidents respond to clear voter demands, and only once does he find evidence for legitimizing influence, where newly elected presidents feel the need to go back to the public for ratification of their policy actions. This is hardly the strong link between voter and official that he correctly identifies as being at the core of a healthy democracy.

Buchanan devotes the final one-third of his book to outlining a possible solution to this problem, and he is to be commended for seeking a practical resolution to an important theoretical dilemma. His answer is the establishment of what he calls the American Citizens' Foundation (ACF), a bipartisan institute composed of leading policy experts and strategists from both parties charged with drafting and publicizing solutions to overriding policy questions that presidential candidates might be tempted to sidestep. By weighing in on an issue already on the minds of many voters, the ACF would work to build a voter consensus around finding a solution to the problem

through the electoral process, educate voters on the solutions proposed by experts in both parties, pressure presidential candidates to endorse the solutions advanced by their party's experts, and make the election a referendum on the two competing approaches. Direct influence in the form of voter pressure would be applied to get the candidates to agree to solutions in advance of election day, coaxing them into a dialogue with voters that “gives the newly elected president a real (as opposed to an unverified) mandate. That, in turn, increases the likelihood that Congress will actually pass the legislation” (p. 80).

Implementing this blueprint would be an impressive task, and to his credit, Buchanan demonstrates a sober awareness of some of the obstacles his proposal would face. In two hypothetical examples of how it might work—one involving President (Jeb) Bush's embrace of a tax increase and optional private investment accounts for Social Security in his 2008 race against Democrat Howard Dean, the other involving President (Hillary) Clinton's successful second attempt at national health-care reform following her victory over Jeb Bush in 2012—Buchanan acknowledges that the efforts of the ACF would face resistance. Even so, he assumes that his organization would be taken seriously by the media and the candidates, even before it had time to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the press and even though its work would have to be superimposed on the horserace-oriented, candidate-centered media circus that is a national presidential campaign.

History suggests that candidates and the media might not cooperate. His discussion of the issue environment in past elections is filled with references to reporters ignoring complicated stories, such as the Savings and Loan crisis in 1988, or downplaying positive economic data that contradicted the 1992 storyline of an economy in crisis, not to mention candidates manipulating the news agenda to create false impressions, like John Kennedy's reference to a mythical missile gap in 1960. Buchanan is optimistic that an independent organization acting as a policy entrepreneur can cut through the fog of media coverage, but implicit in his faith are unspoken assumptions about elite and mass behavior.

At the elite level, the author assumes that policy advisors will buy into the idea of programmatic solutions to obstinate problems, leaving little room for, say, analysts whose interest in the Social Security debate rests not so much with fixing the program as in having a broader discussion about the proper role of the social safety net or, to those who see sinister motives in the Bush agenda, in finding a way to secretly undermine the program in the guise of fixing it. In this regard, the idea that there could be singular “Republican” and “Democratic” policy alternatives overlooks the potential difficulty of arriving at these positions without alienating and angering those with alternative goals or perspectives.

At the mass level, Buchanan needs to simplify the meaning of the vote choice in order for his plan to work. What would become of a Bush voter who strongly disliked the Republican plan for Social Security but believed that Bush was better able than his opponent to keep America safe, or a voter whose choice of a president is a symbolic rather than substantive act? The possibility for a false mandate remains, and we already live with that possibility without the additional complexity of adding a new institutional layer to the electoral process.

**Southern Political Party Activists: Patterns of Conflict and Change, 1991–2001.** Edited by John A. Clark and Charles L. Prysby. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004. 254p. \$65.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Christian R. Grose, *Vanderbilt University*

John Clark and Charles Prysby have written an outstanding book on southern politics and political parties. The edited volume is not unusual in this field, and this particular edition is one of the strongest I have read. Clark and Prysby and their contributors chart the rising polarization of party activists within the Democratic and Republican Parties in the U.S. South. They empirically demonstrate, with an impressive 11-state survey of more than 7,000 local party activists, that the distinctive South in partisan activist politics is falling to the wayside.

In a novel research design, the volume compares surveys of southern party activists in 1991 and in 2001. Another novel aspect is the organization by subject (e.g., race, religion, party organization), and not state by state, as is often the case with volumes on southern politics. The result is a highly readable, easily digestible, and coherent book where the reader is left with a solid understanding of the partisan change that has occurred in the South. This coherence is particularly commendable for an edited volume.

There are three subject areas. After an excellent introductory chapter, the first section examines factors hypothesized to cause party conflict (chap. 2 on religion by John Clark; chap. 3 on race by Jay Barth; and chap. 4 on population migration by Laurence Moreland and Robert Steed). The second section of the book investigates attitudes of southern party activists (chap. 5 on activist issue opinions by Patrick Cotter and Samuel Fisher; chap. 6 on partisan attachments by Jonathan Knuckey; chap. 7 on factionalism by John McGlennon; and chap. 8 on issue proximity between activists and voters by Barbara Patrick, Steven Shaffer, Patrick Cotter, and Samuel Fisher). The final section examines organizational changes in southern parties (chap. 9 on whether southern activists are “purists” or “pragmatists” by Charles Prysby; chap. 10 on joining party organizations by James Newman, Steven Shaffer, and David Breaux; chap. 11 on the electoral activities of party activists by Robert Hogan; chap. 12 on activists’

incorporation into the overall party structure by John Bruce and Clark; and a concluding chapter, chap. 13, by Prysby and Clark).

There are many new insights to be gained from this book, including the role of the Christian Right in party politics. It is interesting that in 2001, Republican Party activists were split “down the middle” (p. 25) regarding the Christian Right. About half of southern Republican activists favored the Christian Right, and the other half did not. Clark points out that these divisions may lead to fights for control of the state parties in the next few years. In terms of race and religion, we learn that African American Democratic activists who identify with the Christian Right and those that do not have very similar policy preferences on some issues (p. 23). Additional findings suggest that Republican hopes to bring evangelical African Americans into the party may not be realized, given the policy differences found between black Christian Right activists and white Christian Right activists.

One conclusion to be drawn generally from the book is that southern political party activists have come to resemble their nonsouthern counterparts. Knuckey notes that the partisan attachments among both Republican and Democratic activists are stronger now than in the early 1990s. The “weakest links” (p. 88) among Democratic Party activists in 1991 have left the party. The result is a somewhat more strongly partisan Democratic Party. However, even in 2001, a large 46.4% of Democratic county chairs had partisan attachments that were “mixed” (between strong and weak). Thus, the trend suggests increased partisanship within southern Democratic activists, though vestiges of the older, nonpartisan Democratic Party of the South are still retained.

The volume also offers extensive evidence about ideological changes, divisions, and the motivations of party elites. Cotter and Fisher find that Democrats have become more liberal over the last 10 years, and have also become more unified than Republican activists. However, McGlennon reports that factionalism within both parties’ organizations has declined. One of the most interesting aspects of the book is an examination of party activists’ motivations. More African American Democratic activists are motivated by purposive incentives related to pursuing public policy than are white Democratic activists. White Democrats, in contrast, are more likely to be motivated by solidary incentives (chap. 3). Also, Republicans are “somewhat more likely” to mention purposive incentives, compared to Democrats (p. 154).

Differences between the parties suggest the rise of a competitive two-party South. Hogan shows that Democrats have increased the extent of their “campaign activities” between 1991 and 2001, presumably because of this increased partisan competition. However, Bruce and Clark show that “Republican contact with elected officials increased over the decade of the 1990s, while Democratic

contact decreased” (p. 195). These findings, and others, suggest that the Democrats are not to be counted out in the electoral realm, yet are also potentially on the ropes.

I have one minor quibble with the book. While the authors do an excellent job of making connections across states and time in the analysis, I would have liked a bit more integration on the points that are somewhat contradictory. (For instance, why have Democratic activists become only somewhat more partisan relative to Republicans [chap. 6], while Republican activists have become much more ideologically diverse than Democratic activists [chap. 5]?) Some chapters (when considered together) present puzzles for scholars to examine, and the authors could have focused more on these interesting puzzles. Still, though, the fact that these puzzles emerge from this book upon reading it is evidence of its high quality.

In sum, *Southern Political Party Activists* is an excellent piece of political science research, and it is particularly strong for an edited volume. This book is recommended to scholars of parties, public opinion, mass and elite behavior, minority politics, and partisan change. Perhaps it goes without saying, but it should be required reading for scholars and observers of southern politics.

#### **Seeking Justices: The Judging of Supreme Court**

**Nominees.** By Michael Comiskey. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2004. 287p. \$40.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Timothy R. Johnson, *University of Minnesota, Twin Cities*

The Supreme Court nomination and confirmation process has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. In particular, scholars and the public alike view it as broken because it has become too political, too ideological, and therefore overly contentious. While some conclude that these circumstances have led presidents to choose second-rate nominees, the more dangerous effect of this process is that it may seriously undermine the legitimacy of the nation’s highest court of justice. A great deal of evidence has been wielded to support these claims. However, Michael Comiskey lays out a case that the conclusions drawn—from both the legalist and the political schools of thought—do not mean that the process is broken. Comiskey’s book argues that the process actually works very well, not despite but because of its political, ideological, and contentious nature. It is a cogently argued book and merits attention from scholars who want to better understand the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation processes.

Comiskey begins by analyzing the conventional view that the Senate does not have the power to analyze Supreme Court nominees on ideological grounds. To support this argument, he first examines the debate over the nomination and confirmation clauses, as well as Alexander Hamilton’s writings in the *Federalist*. He argues that the Framers of the Constitution knew the process would

be political, and that nothing in the language of the document suggests they thought otherwise. Additionally, he suggests that the political and ideological nature of the process checks both the executive and the legislative branches from dominating the judiciary.

After focusing on the historical argument, Comiskey turns to the modern day, and addresses the question of whether the process has become too politicized and focused on ideology. He concludes that it has not. In drawing this conclusion, he critiques the legalist school by arguing that they generally focus on only the confirmation battles of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas. He views these two battles as exceptional cases; whereas they were highly publicized and political, the bulk of recent confirmations have not involved much controversy. The ultimate criticism of the political process, according to the legal school, is that it has resulted in nominees who are less qualified than were nominees from the early twentieth century and before.

Comiskey empirically analyzes the claim that the process today has led presidents to choose inferior nominees to fill vacancies on the Court. To do so, he surveyed a sample of law school professors as well as political scientists. This survey asked the respondents to rate all twentieth-century Supreme Court justices on a four-point scale (from failure to excellent). The key findings he draws from his data is that justices nominated most recently stand up quite well to those nominated early on who were considered “great” justices. This is an important finding because it suggests that the nomination and confirmation process may not be broken to the extent that it produces poor nominees.

I am not fully convinced, however, of the conclusions Comiskey draws. Indeed, he explicitly did not ask the respondents for any information about their own political views or ideology. While this makes some sense given that he wanted a high response rate and given that he did not want to bias his results, it is problematic. Specifically, by his taking this tack, it is impossible to tell whether a respondent’s ideology affected his or her evaluation of a particular justice. For instance, it could be that respondents rate justices more highly if they agree with that justice’s decisions ideologically. So, while the results are compelling in the way they are presented, readers should heed them with caution because Comiskey does not control for factors that might affect the responses. Thus, while the setup in the first half of the book leads him to test whether justices are less qualified today, the test is not adequate for drawing any specific conclusions.

The remainder of the book begins by tracing the proceedings of the Clarence Thomas confirmation battle and then turns to an analysis of whether nominees can truly be “stealth candidates,” like Justice David Souter. Finally, Comiskey analyzes whether presidents can pack the Court with nominees who share their ideology. The analysis of the Thomas hearings is first rate. It presents insights about

the process in a way that brings the proceedings to life 14 years after they took place, and melds them together in a way that intuitively demonstrates why Thomas won confirmation despite the political and ideological battle surrounding him. Comiskey's argument comports with recent empirical work on the confirmation process, including my own. Indeed, the coalition of forces that came together was able to bring Thomas through the process in the face of major ideological opposition and a charge of sexual harassment. Thus, the strong case study provides additional, and exceptional, insight into why Thomas was able to win.

In the concluding chapter, Comiskey focuses on four reforms proposed to fix the nomination and confirmation process. These include greater prenomination consultation between the president and the Senate, using special counsel to interview nominees, making confirmation hinge on a supermajority of senators rather than a simple majority, and placing the burden of proof on the president for demonstrating the efficacy of his nominee. He argues that none of these reforms is tenable, nor would any of them have a great effect on the process. His evidence is good, but thin. In other words, the reforms he discusses are theoretically (if not empirically) testable hypotheses using game theoretic tools, or by focusing on similar battles in a comparative framework (at the state level, for instance). So, while I think the analysis in this final chapter is good, it needs to be pushed just a bit further to fully convince readers.

Overall, Comiskey provides a very good critique of the arguments forwarded by the legal and political schools about a possible broken confirmation process. His analysis of historical documents and the inner workings of the current process are quite good. While I think there are some empirical shortcomings with the analysis in Chapter 4, as well as in Chapter 8, I commend *Seeking Justice* to anyone interested in learning about the ins and outs of the confirmation process.

#### **Muted Voices: Latinos and the 2000 Elections.**

Edited by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005. 288p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Kim Geron, *California State University East Bay*

The 2000 presidential race was one of the closest and most controversial elections in the nation's history. Throughout the election, both parties courted the Latino vote and sought to win the majority of its votes using extensive campaigning in Spanish. The central thesis of *Muted Voices* is that despite the expectation that Latino population growth would result in Latino voters having a pivotal role in national electoral influence, they remained marginalized as they had in previous elections.

The book begins with an introductory chapter by Robert Y. Shapiro, who briefly reviews the study of Latinos and presidential contests since 1988 and highlights how contemporary electoral rules, political structure, and demographics of the Latino population have combined to limit the Latino vote. Coeditors Louis DeSipio and Rodolfo de la Garza contribute an overview to the 2000 election. They highlight that this was the first election in which both major national parties campaigned earnestly for Latino votes and both candidates campaigned using Spanish. This campaign heralded the coming of age of Latinos as a significant component of the electorate. Even though Latino voters were estimated to have increased 20% from 1996, the effects of demographics, weak outreach by the parties to nontraditional voters, and selective mobilization efforts by Latino organizations resulted in Latino voter turnout having a limited effect on the national elections.

Robert G. Marbut contributes a chapter on Republican Party outreach to the Latino community in the 2000 election. Governor George Bush's campaign recognized from the beginning the importance of the Hispanic vote and actively pursued it, unlike previous Republican presidential candidates. Built into the Bush campaign infrastructure and message was a welcoming approach that addressed issues of importance to Hispanics, and a disciplined advertising message focusing on Bush as an individual and de-emphasizing his Republican Party connection. The results of this more aggressive Hispanic outreach were mixed. While Bush increased his share of Hispanic voters, his estimated Latino vote total based on the average of national exit polls was only 33%.

Harry P. Pachon, Matt A. Barreto, and Frances Marquez examine Latino political fortunes in California and find that Latinos are no longer merely a large demographic group in the Golden State but are now an important political influence in statewide politics. Latino voting has increased in the 1990s and has become more partisan, in part because of conservative statewide ballot measures supported by the Republican Party. Also, Latino elected officials have achieved a critical mass in the state legislature due to term limits and geographic dispersion of the Latino population.

The eight state-level studies of Latino political involvement include states ranging from small to large in population, with a few states having played a decisive role in the Electoral College vote, while others were noncompetitive in both party's campaigns. New Mexico's Hispanics gave a substantial boost to Al Gore with 66% of their votes, while 58% of non-Hispanic whites backed Bush. Garcia notes that with a final count that enabled Gore to win the state by fewer than 500 votes, the effort to turn out Hispanic voters, who represent 36% of the electorate, proved decisive.

Rodney Hero and Patricia Jaramillo report that in Colorado, Latinos did not play a key role in Bush's victory in



the state, although they constitute a growing percentage of the population. Cohesive Latino voting was more evident in helping to defeat an antibilingual education measure and giving control of the state Senate to the Democrats. Arizona's growing Latino electorate totaled 15% in 2000; nevertheless, a controversial antibilingual education ballot did not produce the anticipated significant increase in Latino turnout. Manuel Avalos cautions that unless there are greater efforts to help Latino noncitizens become naturalized and turn out to vote, their voices will continue to be muted in the state.

According to Lisa J. Montoya, in Texas, both parties largely ignored Latinos because of Bush's presumed electoral victory. Without a serious challenge by the Democrats, Bush cruised to an easy victory and Latino votes were not seriously contested nor sufficiently mobilized. Still, it is estimated that Gore won more than 54% of Latino votes in the state. Luis Ricardo Fraga, Ricardo Ramirez, and Gary M. Segura argue that the rapid growth of Latino political clout in California has helped place the state out of reach to the GOP for statewide contests (the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger in the 2003 recall election notwithstanding). They note that Latinos are the largest block of nonwhite voters in a state that is now majority nonwhite. With white voters tilting toward the Republicans, Latino voters help ensure Democratic dominance at the congressional and state legislative level. Angelo Falcon's chapter on New York State politics discusses the Hillary Clinton and Rick Lazio race for the U.S. Senate and city-level politics in New York City to reveal how local politics provides the sustenance to sustain Latino electoral politics in America. Illinois Latinos were largely ignored again, according to DeSipio, as a Gore victory was highly anticipated from the outset because of strong Democratic Party strength.

In Florida, the controversy over a Cuban boy, Elián Gonzalez, found drifting at sea in November 1999 later erupted into a mobilization of the Cuban expatriot community against the Clinton administration's handling of the case. In the November 2000 election, in Miami Dade County, home to the majority of Cuban Americans in the state, 67% of Hispanics voted for Bush, including 75% of Cuban Americans. As Kevin A. Hill and Dario Moreno note, Cuban Americans are a critical part of the winning Republican electoral coalition in Florida, "representing only 8 percent of the state's electorate and practicing bloc voting" (p. 226).

The results of the research conducted by the authors in *Muted Voices* present a frustrating view of both parties' efforts to court Latino voters. Despite initial visible efforts at outreach and advertising, this outreach was reduced to a focus on small pockets of Latino voters in a few key states. The inescapable reality is that exploding Latino population growth has produced only limited national voting strength, and this will continue in the future until

more Latinos become voters. Even then, the potential for a change in unified ethnic voting patterns may mitigate against cohesive Latino voting strength. The real growth in Latino political fortunes remains at the state and local level, where Latino population numbers and growing electoral strength have increased the number of seats held by Latinos in Congress and in state and local government. This area of research should be more fully explored and incorporated into future research. Also, the growing numbers of nonvoters cries out for further analysis than is addressed in this volume. What has been tried to increase the number of Latino voters and what were the results? Avalos explores the problem of nonvoting in Arizona, and it would be useful to track this problem across state lines. Meanwhile, until greater Latino voting power can be achieved, Latinos would do better to strengthen their influence in key states and to use this clout to influence national politics in strategic and opportune ways.

**The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics.** By Kevin M.

Esterling. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 304p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Stuart Hill, *University of California, Davis*

Congress's use of expertise represents a paradox. The legislative branch spends hundreds of millions of dollars every year acquiring policy-relevant knowledge. Standing committees hire scores of experts and regularly ask outside specialists to testify. Entire research agencies have been created to generate expert assessments on complex issues. Making specialized knowledge available to legislators is justified as a necessary expense if they are to produce laws that will do a good job in fulfilling the nation's goals.

The textbook account of Congress, however, holds that these prodigious efforts to acquire policy knowledge are mere window dressing. Policy expertise does not significantly shape the laws Congress passes. Members of the House and the Senate do not require specialized knowledge to respond to simple demands from their constituents for federal resources. Why then would Congress pay the high cost of gaining access to expertise if that knowledge is largely ignored? Kevin Esterling's new book moves us closer to resolving this paradox by making a convincing argument that Congress periodically uses specialized expertise to identify and adopt socially efficient policies.

Esterling develops his theory from the premise that citizens and other political actors are instrumentally rational. Their rationality is "bounded" because their ability to gather and evaluate information about the means to fulfill their wants is limited. He argues that citizens recognize their ignorance and give legislators discretion to draw on expertise to craft public policies that serve a wide range of

interests. Public debate among interest groups in congressional hearings provides legislators a means to learn whether the promised benefits from reforms will be realized.

The principal obstacle to devising good policy, according to Esterling, is not from the clash of interests but results from the lack of convincing evidence about a policy's likely outcomes. A persuasive argument in favor of a policy requires that proponents make credible causal claims: If we do  $x$  then  $y$  benefits will occur. The author argues that members of Congress often discover from public hearings that uncertainty about proposed reforms is unacceptably high. Even when empirical evidence is available, the findings are frequently too ambiguous to justify action due to methodological or analytical differences in past research.

The first half of this book carefully lays out this theoretical argument. Separate chapters address the roles that citizens, pressure groups, and Congress play. In the second half, an empirical investigation gathers data on the positions that interest groups took in public hearings on emissions trading, school vouchers, and health maintenance organizations (HMOs).

Emissions trading, for example, was an innovative policy proposed to reduce acid rain at a far lower cost than traditional command-and-control regulations. The challenge was to convince Congress to endorse a new approach to environmental protection. Esterling maintains that his theory explains why proponents were successful: Strong empirical support from several studies by the Environmental Protection Agency minimized expectations about this policy's uncertainty and generated little ambiguity. He measured the balance of interest group support and opposition by coding the content of their testimony in congressional hearings. Uncertainty over this reform was low because many groups endorsed the belief that emissions trading would work and no pressure group disagreed.

Esterling's research offers an important and persuasive contribution to the enduring debate over the role of expertise in legislative policymaking. His analysis defends strong propositions within well-defined analytic boundaries. He agrees that the conventional wisdom may be correct that specialized knowledge has little impact in many of the policy decisions Congress makes. He focuses on those rare cases in which policy expertise is well developed and offers pressure groups a rationale for backing policies that serve both their welfare and the interests of most citizens.

Because Esterling seeks to explain a narrow portion of a complex policymaking process, questions immediately arise about what lies just beyond the analytic boundaries of his study. How rare, for example, are his research-driven policies? His theory does not address this question and his empirical investigation examines only two cases. He restricts his focus to *social science* research. Since the social sciences are seen as less mature and credible than the natural sciences, would his expertise-driven process occur more often

or unfold more expeditiously when pressured by research from the natural sciences?

Some explanatory factors that others have identified fall within the scope of Esterling's analysis and, if addressed, could have improved the final product. The agenda-setting literature (e.g., see John Kingdon's *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy*, 2d ed., 1995) agrees with Esterling on the importance of identifying credible policy solutions, but finding answers may not be sufficient to produce new policy. Decision makers must also be persuaded that the problem is severe enough to require action. Problem recognition receives little or no attention in Esterling's theory, even though experts' claims about the scope of emerging problems may be decisive in attracting congressional attention. The key role he attributes to congressional committees in identifying effective policies naturally calls to mind Keith Krehbiel's argument in *Information and Legislative Organization* (1992). Krehbiel maintained that the ideological heterogeneity of standing committees determines which policy solutions are politically feasible and, by implication, the type of research that committee members would seriously consider. Stepping back, Esterling is concerned with improvements in the quality of technical knowledge that is available to interest groups and congressional committees on particular policies. Certainly his work would have benefited from engaging Paul Sabatier's impressive work (e.g., see *Policy Change and Learning*, 1993) on this very topic.

One final issue is Esterling's decision to ground his analysis in theories of bounded rationality. This choice is puzzling because the concepts he uses are more consistent with a standard rational choice account. (The principal exception was his brief use of prospect theory.) He would have tightened an already strong argument if he had justified his selection of bounded rationality more fully or decided to build his argument on a rational choice foundation.

Despite these quibbles, *The Political Economy of Expertise* represents a significant contribution to our understanding of the role that specialized knowledge plays in legislative policymaking. Kevin Esterling's work helps to explain and at least partially resolve the paradox of Congress's enduring investment in policy knowledge.

### **The Politics of Air Pollution: Urban Growth, Ecological Modernization, and Symbolic Inclusion.**

By George A. Gonzalez. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. 144p. \$55.00.

— Matt Lindstrom, *St. John's University, Minnesota*

The question of how public policy *is* and *should* be made is among the most important questions political scientists research. From David Easton's systems theory to the competing pluralist schools (Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, 1953; Dahl, 1956, 1961) to elite (G. William

Domhoff, 1974), feminist (Amy Mazur, 2002; Nancy Fraser, 1997; Deborah Stone, 1997), postpositivist (Pushkala Prasad, 2005; Dvora Yanow, 2000), policy learning (Sabatier, 1987, 1999), and other theories of public policy, political scientists continue to wrestle with the causes and consequences of public policy.

In his third book, *The Politics of Air Pollution*, George Gonzalez challenges several prevailing notions regarding the promulgation of air pollution and environmental policy. His central argument is the idea that significant gains in air pollution reduction are not the result of the political efficacy of large mainstream environmental groups who effectively lobby federal officials and top-level bureaucrats.

Instead, Gonzalez argues that regional business elites and, following Harvey Molotch (1976, 1979), “growth machines” pursue air pollution reductions purely in response to capital accumulation and wealth maximization. Cleaner air equals higher profits and growth potential. A relatively healthy environment is a valued commodity. Conversely, Gonzalez identifies numerous cases wherein dirty air, or the perception thereof, becomes an investment liability.

Unlike the command and control modes of the 1970s, Gonzalez successfully illustrates how regional growth coalitions seek technology-based solutions. Turning to private markets to generate new and improved pollution-reducing technologies effectively mitigates any calls for reducing industrial production and economic output of automobiles and other elements of large-scale manufacturing and development. In fact, Gonzalez identifies how technological solutions have spillover effects and can stimulate latent elements of a regional or national economy. Perhaps most importantly, a market-centered approach “places industry at the center of the formulation and implementation processes” (p. 15). While some environmental groups collaborate with industry on environmental alternatives (e.g., Environment Defense and McDonald’s use of paper instead of Styrofoam containers), organized green groups play a largely symbolic role in the political chimera of interest-group bargaining pluralism (John Dryzek, 1996). Because the policy agenda and alternatives are constrained to largely technological solutions, environmental groups operate within Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz’s notion of the “second-face of power” (1962).

The middle portion of the book addresses two policy-making models to determine which more accurately describes the techno-fix hegemony in air pollution policy. While perhaps helpful for political science students, this review of state autonomy/issue networks and economic elite theories is a good start but does not comprehensively address the environmental policy applications. The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3, 4, and 5 is at times compelling, but overall, Gonzalez relies too much on historical examples to support applicability of

the book’s thesis for contemporary air pollution and urban growth management. Due to the burgeoning literature and local success stories regarding “smart growth,” his coverage of this interrelated area was surprisingly minimal. From Maine to Minnesota to Texas and Arizona, myriad political coalitions, including bipartisan state and local leaders, activists, and business elites, have pushed for mixed-use infill development, mass transit systems, conservation easements, and other smart growth measures. In some cases, such as the state of Maryland, smart growth measures were most clearly implemented (and retracted) by political elites—primarily Governors Parris Glendening (D-MD, 1995–2003), Jennifer Granholm (D-MI, 2002–current), Jesse Ventura (I-MN, 1998–2002).

As a result of the technology “fixes” and fairly anemic success by national environmental groups, Gonzalez calls for environmentalists to “withdraw from the polity and seek to mobilize the public on both local air quality and global warming issues” (p. 107). According to the author, this would remove legitimacy on the policy process and thereby make the formation, implementation, and execution of environmental policy more difficult. By focusing on public education as a political solution, he states that environmental groups could “contribute to sparking a social movement on these issues” (p. 107). Furthermore, he advocates a “confrontational social movement” to challenge the dominance of local growth machines. While this may be true in certain local contexts, the “calls for public education” are nothing new.

As environmentalists continue to struggle for national policy achievements, grassroots and national leaders alike are rightly debating the most effective political strategies. Gonzalez’s push for environmentalists to refocus and energize the public follows, in some ways, the widely discussed speech and paper “The Death of Environmentalism” (Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, 2004). Gonzalez’s call for “strong ecological modernization” (p. 102), albeit insufficiently explained, is directly in line with Shellenberger and Nordhaus’s challenge of the rhetoric and politics of national environmental groups and foundations. By discussing air pollution in the context of urban livability, rather than pitching the debate as environmental quality or economic growth, environmental groups can contest and supplement the technology-only solutions for clean air, transportation, and other related policy matters. By removing issues from their policy silos and talking instead about energy alternatives, livability, and job creation, the political discourse and widespread conceptual support for environmentalism can materialize as smart growth solutions created by both the public and private sectors.

Due to its accessibility and contributions to an understanding of environmental policy in a federalist context, this book is recommended for all readers.

**Presidential Candidate Images.** Edited by Kenneth L. Hacker. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004. 288p. \$80.00 cloth, \$32.95 paper.

— Darrell M. West, *Brown University*

In an era of personalistic politics and saturation media coverage, candidate image is an especially important topic. Presidential contenders go to great lengths to generate particular images of themselves. They devote a substantial portion of their budget to campaign advertising, and use public opinion surveys and focus groups to figure how best to position themselves for electoral advantage.

For these reasons, it is very timely that Kenneth Hacker has assembled a fine group of scholars to investigate how images are formed and what impact they have on voters. Among the contributions of this book are clarification of key concepts linked to image formation, discussion of new methodologies for undertaking image research, and new empirical results based on advances in theory and methodology.

In his introductory chapter, Hacker presents a useful conceptual road map to varying constructs of image. He cites the wide variation in use of this approach, but says that most communications scholars define it as “clusters of voter perceptions of candidates” (p. 4). These images are important for elections because they affect voter assessments of the candidates and the overall dynamics of the election. Susan Hellweg meanwhile distinguishes “unitary” from “nonunitary” models of voter decision making. In the former, voters employ a consistent set of standards to judge all the candidates, while in the latter, citizens use different factors to assess each candidate.

Other chapters focus more on methodology and new approaches to investigating image formation. For example, William Benoit and John McHale apply a computer content analysis to campaign spots and debates that allows them to chart the frequency of appeals to sincerity, morality, empathy, and drive from 1952 to 2000. Morality was the most common appeal in the 1960s and 1970s, but has dropped precipitously since that time. Susan Hellweg and Brian Spitzberg undertake a meta-analysis of presidential candidate images. Lynda Lee Kaid, meanwhile, studies semantic differentials (such as bipolar adjectives) as part of candidate images. There are promising techniques that go beyond standard content analysis or survey approaches to political communications.

The rest of the volume presents new empirical results on topics related to image. Carolyn Funk presents a very engaging case study of the impact of scandal on presidential campaigns. Focusing on Gary Hart and Bill Clinton, she shows that despite all the attention to the negative consequences of scandal for candidate fortunes (especially following the Hart scandal), politicians such as Ronald Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush have shown amazing resilience in the face of investigations into their

character. In many cases, there is little evidence that scandal hurts candidates, even though it may damage perceptions of particular character traits. The major exception to this conclusion is for candidates who are not well known. They are the individuals for whom scandals can be most devastating.

Allan Louden and Kristen McCauliff look at a particular type of image formation that they call the “authentic candidate.” These are individuals who come across as “genuine, real, valid, [or] bona fide” (p. 93). While these qualities are hard to define, voters seem to know those traits when they see them. In an era of extensive citizen cynicism, authenticity looms as an important characteristic for successful candidates.

Other scholars focus on ads, debates, and interpersonal communication. For example, Lynda Lee Kaid and Mike Chanslor examine the effects of advertising on candidate images in elections from 1988 to 2000. Using experimental treatments on undergraduates at 19 universities around the country, they find a significant link between ad exposure and candidate image assessments. According to them, “the more optimistic, confident, excited, secure, and patriotic the spots made voters feel, the higher their evaluations of the candidate images” (p. 142).

Walter Zakahi looks at presidential debates and image formation in 1992, 1996, and 2000. Although debates in 1992 and 2000 appeared to affect candidate images, there is not much evidence they did so in 1996 (the year of Clinton’s reelection). When they are effective, it typically is due to “defining moments” that crystallize public and media sentiments about the particular candidates.

Timothy Stephen, Terea Harrison, William Husson, and David Albert investigate the effects of interpersonal communications on candidate images. Looking at several presidential elections, they find that patterns of interpersonal communication distinguish between winners and losers. Winners came across as “self-contained, secure, relaxed, and interpersonally functional,” while losers appear “overbearing, tense, contentious, histrionic, and serious” (p. 185).

In his conclusion, Hacker outlines future directions for research in this area. He suggests that there is a need to link image perspectives to broader analysis of cognitive constructs, such as attitudes and schemata. In addition, the manner in which images are affected by the dynamics of electoral competition deserves more scrutiny. And in a topic that sometimes is overlooked, he argues that there needs to be considerably more attention to the ethics of image formation. To what extent are candidates manipulating and deceiving the electorate, or pandering to voters? Hacker argues that scholars should devote far more attention to the ramifications of these strategies of democratic governance.

For scholars interested in image formation, political communications, and voter decision making, *Presidential Candidate Images* this is an important book. The contributors

present careful and thoughtful ideas on the theory and methodology of image formation. They are serious about their craft and creative in how they address controversies in this area. Graduate students, in particular, should pay attention to this volume because the discussions of unmet research provide a valuable source of future research projects in the field of political communications.

**Authorizing Policy.** By Thad Hall. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2004. 147p. \$41.95.

— Lance T. LeLoup, *Washington State University*

In the complex and multilayered world of congressional budgeting, the authorization process attracts less attention than dramatic battles over taxes and deficits or spending bills. The literature on public policymaking rarely puts much emphasis on how and when Congress authorizes programs. Thad Hall's book fills an important gap in these literatures with his insightful analysis of the strategic use of short-term authorizations. He looks at many dimensions of authorizations, including their ability to induce stability by enforcing policy agreements, their relationship to congressional institutions and instrumental behavior by members, and their effect on the policy environment, policy implementation, and congressional oversight.

When George W. Bush's No Child Left Behind Act was passed in 2001, the education reforms did not include desired changes in Head Start. Why? According to Hall, it was because Head Start was not due for reauthorization for two more years, thus demonstrating how influential short-term authorizations are in structuring timing in the policy process. He argues that through short-term authorizations, "Congress and its committees can gain the benefits that accrue from planning when legislative activity will occur, and ensuring that a given policy issue is taken off of the legislative agenda for a fixed period of time between authorizations" (p. 3). Authorizations serve a gatekeeping function, inducing stability and preventing difficult policy agreements from unraveling over time. Short-term authorizations also affect the policy environment by fostering member reelection goals and strengthening committees. He argues that short-term authorizations are important to include when studying how policies change, adding an important timing dimension to the work of scholars such as John Kingdon, Bryan D. Jones and Frank Baumgartner, and Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith.

Short-term authorizations have been used by Congress only since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and were first employed to give members tighter control of the Marshall Plan. In the 1950s, they became an important tool for tightening congressional control over military procurement. Under House and Senate rules, no appropriation may be made for a program that does not have an enacted authorization. Authorizations create a program but also have a fiscal component that signals appropriators

about appropriate levels of funding. Despite these requirements, one of the surprising revelations of this book is how often the rules are waived and how many programs operate on expired authorizations. Today, short-term authorizations remain particularly important in the areas of transportation, education, agriculture, commerce, defense, and international relations.

After providing a history of authorizations and his theoretical overview, Hall begins the empirical analysis of a set of related research questions. Chapter 4 considers the signaling process by measuring the authorization/appropriation gap. On average, since 1977, appropriators have approved 5.6% less in spending than authorized. But since 1989, the gap has grown to 30.5% (p. 47). Hall's analysis suggests that new budget rules adopted in the 1980s and 1990s constrained discretionary spending and weakened authorizing committees. That weakness is also suggested by the increasing number of programs operating on expired authorizations, now approximately 30%.

In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, Hall turns to the questions of oversight, steering agencies through reauthorization, and policy control. He concludes that reauthorizations are a critical part of "police patrol" oversight, whose importance may have been underestimated in comparison to "fire alarm" oversight. He finds that hearings are no more frequent during a reauthorization year and occur regularly over time. He also finds that programs with expired authorizations continue to receive scrutiny. Examining the reauthorization of Head Start, transportation programs, and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, he concludes that interested parties are able to achieve favorable outcomes. In terms of policy control, by examining the introduction of new legislation, he finds that reauthorizations are more important sources of changes in legislative activity than enhanced media coverage or congressional hearings.

Chapter 8 looks more closely at expired authorizations, which increased by 110% between 1990 and 1995, from 49 to 137 programs. His explanation is a combination of high transaction costs, growing partisan polarization, supermajority institutions, and the influx of inexperienced politicians after the 1994 elections. The consequences are poorer oversight, complications in the appropriations process, and weaker standing committees.

In his conclusion, Hall restates the importance of short-term authorizations for Congress in gaining predictability and stability and ensuring that difficult compromises do not come unraveled for a period of years. Normatively, he argues that short-term authorizations prevent wild swings in policy and level the playing field for interest groups.

There are relatively few problems with this concise and valuable analysis of what might seem to be an arcane topic. It would have been useful to put the phenomena of multi-year authorizations in some larger context in terms of the

federal budget and totality of national programs. Although there are hundreds of important programs with short-term authorizations, they still represent a relatively small proportion of budget dollars and all programs. It would be helpful to see some overall comparisons over time. In terms of the policy process, certainly short-term authorizations are regular and predictable, but I remain unconvinced that they are the most important factor in opening a “policy window,” particularly for major, nonroutine policy change.

Overall, *Authorizing Policy* is an excellent contribution to our understanding of budgeting, legislative behavior, and national policymaking. Thad Hall combines the experience of a congressional insider with a scholarly appreciation of the congressional and public policy literatures. This work fills a real gap in the literature, and for those who commonly ignore the congressional authorization process, it provides both rich description and rigorous analysis of how consequential it can be.

**Brave New Neighborhoods: The Privatization of Public Space.** By Margaret Kohn. New York: Routledge, 2004. 256p. \$85.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Warren Magnusson, *University of Victoria*

In her first book, *Radical Space: Building the House of the People* (2003), Margaret Kohn analyzed the spatiality of early working-class activism in Italy and developed a sophisticated argument about the conditions for democratic empowerment. In this book, she shifts her attention to the United States. Aside from one chapter on the Wobblies, the focus is on the present. In both books, her emphasis is on the way in which the space for political engagement—“public space”—is constructed, sustained, controlled, or foreclosed. Her overarching theme is that theorists of democracy have paid far too little attention to the spatial conditions for democratic interaction. As she attempts to show in the present book, the privatization of public space—that is, the transformation of once-open downtowns into privately governed business improvement districts, the creation of privately governed gated communities in the suburbs and elsewhere, and the colonization of once-public space by private businesses—tends to insulate people from direct, physical encounters with people who are “different” or who may be attempting to persuade them to think otherwise about political issues. The trend toward privatization is particularly pronounced in the United States, and Kohn’s concern here is to show us why we should be concerned about it, as democrats.

Kohn’s argument is generally convincing. She walks us through the relevant jurisprudence in the United States, exposing its inner tensions. On the one hand, there is a line of authority dating back to the early twentieth century, in which the courts have affirmed the people’s right

to use “traditional public spaces” like sidewalks and public squares to leaflet, demonstrate, and make speeches. On the other hand, there is a line of authority that suggests that governments have the right to treat many of their facilities like private property and that any sort of land under private authority (such as a shopping mall) can be subjected to regulations that make free political activity virtually impossible. These days, many Americans have little or no exposure to traditional public spaces and so are unlikely to encounter people who have views or lifestyles radically different from their own. The courts might have used their authority to open up shopping malls and airports to allow for the free distribution of political and religious propaganda. They might also have insisted that political campaigners be allowed to go door-to-door in apartment complexes and gated communities. The trend of judicial decisions since the 1970s has been the opposite, however. The courts have been protecting Americans’ rights to seal themselves off from one another.

In the final chapter of *Brave New Neighborhoods*, Kohn confronts the question of whether a new, more open, and more inclusive public space is being created by the electronic media. Do we still need to have physical contact with one another to develop mutual awareness or to come to an understanding of the wider world? The author thinks that we do, and in any case, she senses that the Web is being privatized on the model of shopping malls, gated communities, and business improvement districts. Whether the space of connection between us is physical or electronic, there clearly is a problem when it becomes commercialized. Commercialism encourages privatism and thus fosters the disconnection that inhibits healthy democratic engagement.

Kohn is particularly strong on the value of encountering homeless people, religious zealots, or political activists whose message or very presence may make us uncomfortable. She tries to reassure conservatives that the openings she seeks are for them, as well as for progressives like her. She also stresses that ongoing engagement with “the other” can be as stimulating and invigorating as it is disquieting. This is a line of analysis that we can trace back from Richard Sennett and Hannah Arendt to John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith. Many have found this line of analysis persuasive, but, as Mill himself noted, there nonetheless is widespread resistance (even among those who seem to have been persuaded) to arrangements that would thrust us out into public space, against our will. As Kohn freely acknowledges, the privatization of public space follows commercial imperatives that tap into our desire to be with our own and to be protected from disquieting encounters.

Kohn’s arguments connect with liberal jurisprudence and political theory, but not with the social and political struggles that might actually expand public space. This is curious, because her earlier book pays close attention to the struggles that generated cooperatives, “houses of the

people,” chambers of labor, and radical municipalism in early twentieth-century Italy. In that book, the author situates herself theoretically within the traditions of radical critique in Europe, from Antonio Gramsci and Walter Benjamin to Michel Foucault and Lefebvre and beyond. In the present book, she retreats into American liberalism, and takes John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, et al. as her interlocutors (when she is not speaking to justices of the Supreme Court). In so situating her work, she distances herself from the richer critical tradition to which she was responding in her first book, apparently in the hope of finding a wider audience in America. This may be a vain hope, however, since legalistic liberalism seems to have less and less purchase on the American political consciousness. Kohn senses this: hence, her emphasis on the *democratic* value of public space. What her argument lacks is an obvious connection with the democratic struggles that might expand public space. To make that connection theoretically and politically, one must tap into the traditions that she explored in her first book, and connect them with the ongoing practices of ordinary Americans. The privatization of public space is being contested, even in the United States. To understand where that contest might lead, we need another book to complete the trilogy that Kohn has begun—a book that this talented and eloquent young theorist is well prepared to write.

**A Seat of Popular Leadership: The Presidency, Political Parties, and Democratic Government.**

By Michael J. Korzi. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2004. 292p. \$80.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— David K. Nichols, *Baylor University*

Through an examination of the political biographies and annual messages of selected presidents, Michael Korzi provides a rich description of the rise and decline of party government in the nineteenth century. He persuasively argues that nineteenth-century parties were not mere spoils machines but parties of principles and policies. Moreover, he claims that the model of nineteenth-century party presidents presents an attractive alternative to the detached statesmanship championed by the Founders, as well as the unrestrained popular leadership practiced by twentieth-century presidents.

In approach and substance, Korzi's work closely resembles Jeffrey Tulis's *Rhetorical Presidency* (1988). Like Tulis, Korzi takes seriously what nineteenth-century presidents said, how they said it, and the relationship between their rhetoric and the political system as a whole. But Korzi argues that Tulis mistakenly identifies the origins of the modern rhetorical presidency and the decline of political parties with the Progressive reforms of the early twentieth century. Following "revisionist interpretations" of nineteenth-century party politics, Korzi claims that the decline of parties began decades before the Progressive

movement: "[T]he Progressive reforms helped to solidify trends that were already well under way" (p. 82). Thus, Korzi argues: "A more system-oriented approach, rather than a presidency-centered one, is needed to understand the development of the modern, rhetorical presidency" (p. 82). Korzi would like us to place both the study and practice of presidential power in a broader institutional framework.

But what if the American political system is itself "presidency-centered"? Korzi himself recognizes this possibility, concluding that "[p]aradoxically, a moderation of presidential leadership may be possible only with the aid of bold and strong presidential leadership" (p. 224). Perhaps this paradox explains why Korzi's "more system-oriented approach" is centered on a study of presidential biographies and addresses. But even if the American system is presidency-centered, Korzi asks us to consider whether the president should be a detached statesman, party leader, or unrestrained popular leader.

Korzi is a partisan of the party leadership model, but his own work raises serious questions about the viability and virtues of that model. He examines five representative nineteenth-century presidencies, those of James Polk, Zachary Taylor, Ulysses Grant, Benjamin Harrison, and Grover Cleveland. But of these five, only Polk could arguably be described as a successful party leader. Korzi says that "[a]lthough there is no evidence that either Taylor or Grant understood the major tenets of the so-called party constitution and the role of the presidency therein (as James Polk clearly did), they adapted to the party system and became implicated in the collective leadership of their party" (162–63). The phrase "guilt by association" comes to mind. Taylor and Grant exercised little leadership of any kind, partisan or otherwise, and it is difficult to imagine on what grounds one would argue that the period of these two presidencies could be held up as a model of desirable democratic politics. On the other hand, Harrison and Cleveland are already moving away from the party leadership constitution in the direction of independent popular leadership. Indeed, other than Polk, the only example of a successful party leader president Korzi cites is the twentieth-century progressive Woodrow Wilson. We are left to wonder how good were the good old days.

We might also ask if the contemporary presidency and parties are as defective as Korzi suggests. He argues that in 1984, Ronald Reagan had the opportunity to wage a party campaign aimed at Republican control of Congress, but instead chose to play it safe and run an issueless personal campaign, thereby wasting an opportunity to revitalize party government. However, from the perspective of the last 25 years, it appears that Reagan did lay the foundation for a revitalized Republican Party and a revitalized party system. From 1936 until 1980, the Republican Party was what Samuel Lubell described as a "moon party." It either succeeded as a pale reflection of the Democratic

majority or failed as a party of wholesale opposition. Reagan gave the party a new positive definition, and that new definition became the basis of a revitalized party and the eventual Republican control of the Congress and the presidency. The 1994 congressional victories would not have been possible without Reagan, anymore than the Democratic or Republican Parties could have come into being in the nineteenth century without the leadership of Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln. Parties have never been created from the bottom up in American politics; they have formed around presidential candidates.

Korzi neglects this fact in part because he accepts a distorted view of the Founders' Constitution. Korzi follows conventional scholarly opinion in arguing that the Founders' system eschewed popular presidential leadership in favor of elevated statesmanship. But like so many other scholars, Korzi relies almost exclusively on Hamilton's account of the presidency and the presidential selection system in *The Federalist*. Hamilton did represent one strain of thought on presidential leadership at the Constitutional Convention, but he had little influence on the debates over presidential selection and was, in fact, absent for a good deal of the convention. It was James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, supporters of popular election, who shaped the selection system, based upon the theory that the president would represent the people of the nation as a whole. Morris even went so far as to predict that political parties would inevitably form in support of and in opposition to the president. Neither Hamilton nor Jefferson fully appreciated the possibility of a popular, independent, constitutional presidency, and that in all likelihood contributed to the transient character of the Federalist and the Jeffersonian Republican Parties. Jackson and Martin Van Buren did not so much create a new constitution as recognize the potentials of the old one.

Korzi makes a powerful case for the institutional restraints of party government, but in the spirit of healthy partisanship, it must be challenged in the name of popular, independent, and constitutional presidential leadership. Nonetheless, he has made a major contribution to this important debate.

**The Making of Environmental Law.** By Richard J. Lazarus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. 312p. \$35.00.

— Craig W. Thomas, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

Richard Lazarus brings rich experience to this book. In the 1980s, he served as a litigator in the Environment and Natural Resources Division, and as an assistant to the solicitor general, in the Department of Justice. He has represented environmental groups and local, state, and federal governments in numerous cases before the Supreme Court. Given this extensive legal background, one might expect the book to be a dense treatise on environmental law. Yet it is written for a much broader audience, with an

engaging narrative style that is accessible for those not trained as lawyers. It is also interdisciplinary, covering everything from ecological theory in the opening chapters to the historical, economic, and political contexts of environmental law in the United States. While this interdisciplinary effort is admirable, the strength of the book clearly lies in the author's legal interpretations. Political scientists will be less impressed with his discussion of topics like public opinion and interest group behavior. Yet what matters more than relatively minor shortcomings with respect to any one discipline is that Lazarus has produced an engaging and articulate book that strives to reach a broad audience beyond law schools. For this reason, *The Making of Environmental Law* would make a wonderful addition to upper-division and masters level environmental policy courses. It is not sufficiently theoretical for most doctoral seminars, but it certainly deserves a central location on the shelves of environmental policy scholars.

Lazarus draws on numerous theories, but does not build his work around any one theory. Nor does he test hypotheses in a social scientific way. Rather, he brings a point of view to environmental law that is informed by theory. Part I, for example, draws heavily on ecological theory to frame the purpose and challenges of environmental law. Chapters 1 and 2 are devoted to the ecological context of environmental law, while Chapter 3 analyzes how the U.S. Constitution is inconsistent with principles from ecological theory. These opening chapters provide the theoretical structure for the book, which focuses on the challenges of developing environmental law that is consistent with scientific understandings of the environment while operating within the constitutional framework. The author's normative view is also guided by ecological theory. Rather than argue, for example, that most human impacts on the environment should be impeded, he argues that "ecological transformation is both unavoidable and very often desirable" (p. 1). Strict preservationists in the tradition of John Muir, David Brower, and Dave Foreman would likely be discomfited, if not appalled, by this argument. But Lazarus is a pragmatist who builds his argument from a scientific understanding of dynamic ecosystems, the causal uncertainties associated with understanding ecosystems, and the potential risks to humans of transforming ecosystems in particular ways. Hence, environmental law is not merely a means to specific ends, such as preserving wilderness or biodiversity. Instead, environmental law should change with changing scientific knowledge, while leaning on the precautionary principle as scientists learn more about how ecosystems actually function. This places him in the tradition of Aldo Leopold, albeit with a contemporary understanding of dynamic—rather than static—ecosystems.

Lazarus then picks up the historical trail in Part II, with chapters devoted to each of the last four decades of the twentieth century. Given that he begins in the 1960s,



he primarily focuses on the development of pollution laws, not resource protection laws. Yet he notes at several points how pollution laws followed from preceding resource protection laws. For the most part, the four chapters in Part II are fairly standard histories of the development of environmental law since the 1960s, with each chapter underscored by the author's faith that environmental law is becoming increasingly established, even as the antienvironmental movement has gathered steam. His positive tone might seem excessive, were it not for the book's deep history of the antienvironmental movement. Rather than starting in the early 1980s, as is standard, Lazarus traces the antienvironmental movement back to the early 1970s, pointing not only to Richard Nixon's mercurial policies regarding the environment but also to the nonprofit sector, where he notes the efforts of William Simon (Olin Foundation) and Richard Scaife (Mellon Foundation) to change public attitudes toward the environment. Throughout Part II, Lazarus carefully demonstrates the ways in which the antienvironmental movement has been successful, unsuccessful, and counterproductive, thereby lending credence to his positive view that environmental law has become increasingly solidified, even when confronted by individuals and organizations seeking to reverse the tide.

In Part III, the author takes stock of the current status and likely trajectory of environmental law in the United States, providing readers with some intriguing and fresh arguments. In Chapter 8, for example, he argues that environmental laws have become increasingly similar, as policymakers learn from the strengths and weaknesses of each law. Not only are pollution laws, such as the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, becoming increasingly similar, he argues, but resource protection laws and pollution laws are also borrowing from one another. While making a strong case that significant convergence is indeed occurring, his explanation for this occurrence is not entirely satisfying, because it is based on claims about lessons learned, rather than a research design that can actually demonstrate the causal significance of these lessons.

Overall, the book is strongest when it leans on the author's legal talents, and weakens as it strays into other disciplines. This is one of the hazards of interdisciplinary research. Political scientists, for example, will likely be less than satisfied with his discussion of public opinion. For example, in the introduction to the historical chapters of Part II, Lazarus writes: "The sheer depth and tenacity of the public's views, which are most often rooted in concerns about potential threats to human health and the dangers of exceeding ecological limits, explain why environmental law has been so persistent and inexorably expansive and why its repeatedly proclaimed demise has proven, on each occasion, to be premature" (p. 44). This is a strong statement, albeit one with which many might agree. The problem is that the subsequent chapters rou-

tinely repeat similar statements without supporting data or appropriate citations. Empirically, Lazarus may not be far off the mark, but methodologically, his argument about public opinion is not compelling. But this is to quibble with a book that is otherwise well argued, well written, and well researched. Readers focusing on the legal scholarship will find much to like here, particularly the breezy way he renders what might otherwise be arcane jargon into engaging narratives about the past, present, and future of environmental law.

### **Government Matters: Welfare Reform in Wisconsin.**

By Lawrence M. Mead. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 368p. \$35.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Laura S. Jensen, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

One of the most challenging aspects of welfare reform was that it made policy evaluation more difficult, especially after the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 allowed states to shift from operating federal public assistance programs (or variants under waiver authority) to implementing programs of their own design. Analysts accustomed to studying a relatively stable set of nationally comparable social programs had to begin asking new, and sometimes startlingly basic, questions about the kinds of benefits that state and local governments were providing, to whom they were providing them, and on what basis. As a result, research on U.S. poverty and welfare reliance suffered a major setback at precisely the time when the need to track policy outcomes became especially critical.

Although many excellent studies now exist, relatively few have investigated policy and program development within a single state in depth—a curious gap given the devolutionary thrust of recent reforms. Lawrence Mead's new book is thus an especially welcome addition to the literature on contemporary welfare policy. It provides a highly detailed yet very readable analysis of the transformation of public assistance in Wisconsin, concentrating on developments within the last 20 years. Importantly, it goes beyond agenda setting and legislation to stress implementation, showing how institutions figured in translating the politics and policy of welfare reform into actual street-level, operational routines. Radical reform was a triumph in Wisconsin, Mead contends, because widespread agreement on policy goals developed where vital preconditions for policy success existed: a moralistic political culture, trust in state government, a tradition of state leadership in social policy, a legislative process focused upon problem solving rather than partisan rivalry, and, perhaps above all, administrative capacity.

Mead's chronicle begins in the 1960s and 1970s, when liberal-minded decisions about antipoverty policy in Wisconsin caused benefit levels to rise and welfare rolls to swell. The national economy could temporarily be blamed for rising client numbers, but as the recession eased, the state

“somehow woke up to its welfare problem more fully than before” (p. 23). The belief that Wisconsin had become a magnet attracting poor families in search of generous public assistance helped to shatter the liberal welfare consensus and to reorient the state toward experiments with welfare-to-work strategies. These in turn paved the way for the more dramatic initiatives of Governor Tommy Thompson, who moved immediately after taking office in 1987 to cut benefits, expand work requirements, and jail absent fathers who failed to pay child support. Thompson also aggressively pursued waivers of federal rules governing the administration of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and negotiated a financial agreement allowing the state to retain the savings from roll reductions, enabling Wisconsin to tinker with AFDC without directly denying aid or conditioning it upon work. As Congress and President Clinton argued over how to end welfare “as we’d known it,” the state had the necessary authority and resources to adopt increasingly stringent rules that variously diverted citizens from receiving public assistance or granted aid subject to family caps, time limits, work requirements, monitoring, and sanctions for noncompliance.

The Wisconsin Works (W-2) program was enacted in early 1996 in an effort to return welfare in the state “to first principles”: no entitlement, and work as a condition of aid for all but the completely incapacitated. Its implementation was not without problems. Counties varied in their approaches and achievements; needy citizens were often confused, deterred, or denied aid they were eligible for; child care was uncoordinated and insufficient; and many families were sanctioned. However, these problems were gradually ironed out, and W-2 won awards for its structural innovations and its generation of large caseload reductions. In Mead’s view, the program proved that traditional welfare could virtually be abolished. By supplying work supports such as health care in exchange for strict compliance with work requirements and by transforming caseworkers into “authority figures as well as helpmates,” W-2 provided a combination of “help and hassle” that enabled welfare clients to learn about mainstream values and rise above the defeatism governing their lives (p. 158). This was a triumph for both paternalism and the statecraft that lay behind it.

Mead thoroughly demonstrates that the quality and capacity of government influenced the design and implementation of Wisconsin’s welfare policies. However, he is less persuasive in arguing that welfare reform was a success in Wisconsin, because that assessment is inadequately substantiated by the argument and evidence presented in the book. This is unfortunate, particularly since other accounts covering the same time period are less sanguine about the effects of the Wisconsin reforms.

Much of the analysis in *Government Matters* hinges upon the definition of the welfare “problem” as dependence upon public aid. Accepting that definition logically implies that

policy success should be measured in terms of the elimination of dependency. Yet, as even Mead admits, there is scant proof that reform policies drove down the rolls, eliminated hardship, or significantly improved the lives of the poor. Work levels increased, but data revealed the persistence of very low incomes among welfare leavers, rendering public benefits necessary in addition to earnings “to assure the poor a decent life” (p. 213). What, then, did Wisconsin’s “masterful regime” achieve? Not the elimination of dependency—the goal often invoked in Mead’s narrative—but, rather, the near obliteration of cash welfare coupled with the restoration of social order, defined as the enforcement of wage work and the imposition of “structure” on poor mothers and children.

One might argue that the book was written before a sufficiently large body of research existed to indicate the success of Wisconsin’s reforms. Even if that were the case, however, there would still be a remarkable correlation between the author’s assertion of policy success and the normative underpinnings of his earlier scholarship. There, he argued that the primary challenge of the American welfare state is not to protect workers from the vicissitudes of market capitalism, but rather to make workers out of the poor. Because welfare recipients lack the motivation or ability to accept responsibility for themselves and their dependents, public policy must mandate compliance with work as the foremost duty of citizenship.

Ideas influence the direction of public policy just as surely as institutional legacies and capacities do. The book would have benefited from the inclusion of a more candid and expansive discussion of the ideational shifts that have occurred over time between individual and structural explanations of poverty, and the connections between those shifts and the changing shape of welfare policy. Mead frames work enforcement as an obvious structural compromise between entitlements and the elimination of welfare. Yet work enforcement proposals no more surfaced naturally or inevitably during the 1980s than did Wisconsin’s sudden concern about burgeoning welfare rolls. The rise of dependency on the governmental agenda was driven powerfully by a conservative turn in American politics; by public rhetoric about welfare queens that revived old, deeply gendered and racialized stereotypes and resentments; and by new calls to use state authority to impose behavioral standards upon the poor. So, too, was Wisconsin’s decision to eschew the advice of its own administrators and university experts in favor of welfare policy advice from external think tanks and consultants, Mead included. These developments were not merely the product of institutional muddling through.

Nor was Wisconsin’s embrace of privatization in the form of contracting out simply the result of institutional or even economic dynamics. The state’s adoption of this mode of service delivery was also ideologically driven, part of a much broader push to reinvent government in the United States and abroad. Mead asserts that contracting

did not prevent welfare in Wisconsin from “remain[ing] a public enterprise, with public officials firmly in control” (p. 133), but the failure to monitor contractors through active and effective public oversight and management is a well-documented problem from which W-2 and many other privatized programs suffered. This further calls into question the conclusion that welfare reform in Wisconsin was an exercise in good “government.”

Despite these shortcomings, *Government Matters* provides a valuable portrait of the political and administrative dimensions of putting policy into practice over time. It is an important book that raises vitally important questions about the contemporary American welfare state, governance, and the meaning of citizenship. Even those who disagree with the author’s normative stance will find it enlightening.

**Self-Policing in Politics: The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians.** By Glenn R. Parker. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 192p. \$35.00.

— Gary W. Copeland, *University of Oklahoma*

With his latest book, Glenn Parker continues to take us along on his personal odyssey exploring the motivations of political officials and their consequences for our institutions and the quality of representation found in the American political system. Following his work that assumes legislators seek to maximize discretion and that explores how they structure their institutions to achieve that goal (*Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of the Modern Congress*, 1992) and his analysis of Congress in a rent-seeking environment (*Congress and the Rent-Seeking Society*, 1996), Parker, in this work, explores his concern for constraining the behavior of members of Congress who are increasingly “seeking material gain” (p. 12).

The brief argument Parker offers is that elected officials have a stake in preserving their personal reputations and, therefore, “self-police” when it comes to matters of integrity and of being faithful agents for their constituents. The value of their reputation to them comes in being rewarded at the ballot box and with prestigious postelectoral career opportunities. The question he explores is whether the desire to preserve one’s reputation is enough to prevent politicians from acting opportunistically, that is, in an unethical or quasi-ethical manner.

The approach he uses to address this set of hypotheses is vintage Parker. He borrows heavily from economic theories, applies them creatively to politics, and is even more inventive when it comes to testing his hypotheses. Specifically, his theory is derived from branding theory, which has been extensively studied by economists. Both voters and politicians (or consumers and producers) operate in a rational environment whereby voters seek information shortcuts and politicians seek to provide each such shortcut by earning and preserving a positive reputation.

Parker demonstrates some connection between reputation and more objective evaluations of integrity before exploring why and how politicians might achieve a positive reputation. There are good theoretical reasons for reputations to be important to both voters and politicians, but he also carefully explores how the marketplace might fail when it comes to legislators. Few would deny that many individuals with less than sterling reputations get elected or reelected to public office.

Two key empirical tests of the author’s theory are whether there is a relationship between reputation and acts of opportunism and whether reputational capital is an electoral asset. He is at his best in designing tests for hypotheses that might seem untestable by developing creative indicators and models that are varied and clever. As with his previous work, the reader may raise an eyebrow when Parker describes some of his tests, but after reading the argument and seeing the reasonableness of the results, that same reader may find some satisfaction in the test. Without elaborating on the multiple sources of data and models, it is worth mentioning that Parker uses survey data (including some for the state of Florida only) and election results, as well as examples of check kiting, honoraria, and foreign travel by members of Congress.

Parker also pays particular attention to postelective employment for two important theoretical reasons. First, knowing that the electoral accountability of one’s reputation has shortcomings (in that it is *ex ante* and not overly effective), he argues that politicians will also want to protect their reputations so they can land attractive careers when they leave electoral office. Additionally, concern about postelective careers provides a way to address the last-period problem that we would otherwise experience once our politicians opt to no longer seek reelection.

Parker’s exploration of postelective careers is, in my view, the most problematic part of the analysis. He argues that retiring members of Congress are not motivated by salaries and other material benefits but, rather, by the prestige of the opportunity. A member might prefer to become the U.S. ambassador to Switzerland rather than a \$1 million-a-year director of an interest group. As the author points out, the number of such attractive opportunities is limited and, therefore, limits the effectiveness of this incentive. Even more problematic is imagining that a member who might be motivated to take a questionable \$2,000 honorarium or an overseas junket would not find a high-paid position quite attractive. Further, there is no reason to believe that such lucrative opportunities are related to a positive reputation. Indeed, Parker suggests that the opposite relationship might be found (as an interest group might prefer someone willing to stretch the rules).

The second issue is whether the basis for a “good reputation” is the same for those whose opinion counts when making prestigious appointments as it is for voters. The president of the United States might evaluate the reputation

of a member of Congress differently than would a constituent looking for his or her Social Security check. (And, certainly, an empirical assessment of one's reputation would seem to need to be different.)

I mention the postcareer aspect of Parker's analysis without meaning to quibble. (Nevertheless, some readers will quibble with every part of his analysis; others, though, will applaud his creativity and sound analysis.) But, if the model can be refined to bring into clearer focus the successes and shortcomings of reputations as a method of controlling opportunism, then that part of the analysis might be a fruitful starting point.

This brief review skates over a number of important issues that are carefully explored in this rich and important analysis. The findings are not particularly surprising: Positive reputations are an electoral advantage, they provide opportunities for prestigious jobs after electoral politics, and they deter unethical behavior; but, most of the effects seem limited and dominated by other factors. The strength of *Self-Policing in Politics* is in its careful theoretical application of branding theory to politicians and the thoughtful tests of interesting and important hypotheses.

**Saving Open Space: The Politics of Local Preservation in California.** By Daniel Press. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 197p. \$49.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

— Robert V. Bartlett, *Purdue University*

This book poses two questions: "Why do some communities preserve more open space than others? More specifically, what are the conditions for creating innovative, effective land preservation institutions at the local level?" (p. 1). Daniel Press systematically answers these questions with respect to a single state, California, arguing that its experience offers lessons for all states, inasmuch as "California's experience with rapid growth and land preservation resembles that of the rest of the nation" (p. 50).

Press uses a fairly simple model to direct his investigation of combined government and civil society capacity to preserve open space. External constraints and resources (such as development pressures, landscape features, or mandates from state or federal governments) or internal constraints and resources (fiscal resources or administrative expertise) establish the context for political interaction between a community and its local leaders. The level of policy capacity also depends on the level of civic resources, such as attitudes, expectations, norms, and the amount of civic engagement, as well as the quality of leadership with respect to policy entrepreneurship (networking, mobilization, fund-raising, and technical expertise). This model leads to the less-than-surprising expectation that policy capacity, and consequently policy outputs, will be highest where conditions and problems are visible, administrative and economic resources are available, environmental protection preferences are strong, and local leaders are com-

mitted to environmental protection. The policy output that Press mainly focuses on is land acquisition by local organizations or agencies, with the primary unit of analysis being the 47 California counties that are not almost entirely under federal ownership.

The author analyzes the politics of open space preservation using an impressive variety of methods, both qualitative and quantitative, and multiple data sources, including newspaper archives, agency files, a telephone survey of 4,100 Californians, referenda election returns, state and federal databases, and five years' worth of interviews with planners, activists, officials, and agency staff. A historical review in Chapter 2 distinguishes three historical periods, with the third, beginning in the mid-1980s, characterized by planned growth, ballot initiatives, and expanded leadership by local officials and nongovernmental organizations. Most of the rest of the book applies Press's policy capacity model to California counties. He examines the ways that development pressures, landscape features, fiscal resources, administrative resources, and variations in civic environmentalism combine to create different contexts for open space politics in each county. He then explores how local policy entrepreneurs, who come from backgrounds in elected office, activism, business, or appointments to boards and advisory commissions, take advantage of or are stymied by these contexts as they bring to bear an assortment of their own resources, such as networking connections and skills, technical expertise, fund-raising skills, and mobilization skills.

Press finds, again not surprisingly, that his policy capacity model is strongly supported by his analysis. Local attitudes matter, the types of landscapes make a difference, and counties with greater capacity are more likely to protect open space successfully. Moreover, there is no one formula for success, as the mixtures of capacity components differ even among successful counties. Communities vary widely in their emphasis on private versus public open space preservation, in the sources of leadership for preservation efforts, and in the relative public support for spending versus greater regulation of private development in order to protect open space. He concludes with a brief look at emerging issues and trends and three types of policy reforms that might increase policy capacity.

This is not a book that is likely to be of interest to most political scientists. Its narrow focus is a strength that also limits its impact and relevance, even to environmental politics scholarship generally for which it has only a few implications. It presents a research project that was not theoretically inspired or inspiring or driven, and consequently it has little to contribute to our deeper understanding of political phenomena. The results are not the slightest bit surprising or provocative and thus do not suggest an amplifying agenda of urgently needed further research.

But the merits of *Saving Open Space* do make it of significant value to those political scientists specifically interested in local California politics, local environmental

policymaking, or land use politics. Press's ambitious and diverse collection of data and observations, and his comprehensive use of them in an integrated analysis of land preservation politics in California, is truly impressive and most laudable, a model for multimethod, multivariate research. For anyone needing data on this topic, the book is also a useful reference resource, with considerable data packed into 30 pages of appendices, 10 tables, and more than 20 graphs, maps, and scatterplots (including, bizarrely, several graphs printed almost entirely upside down). And, finally, it is clearly written and accessible to a student and general readership, who might not find it exciting reading but who will come away with a solid grounding in the politics of local open space preservation in California.

**Democrats, Republicans, and the Politics of Women's Place.** By Kira Sanbonmatsu. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 328 pages. \$50.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Janet M. Martin, *Bowdoin College*

In her book, Kira Sanbonmatsu provides a compelling and evenhanded analysis of how political parties have come to embrace issues of gender. She provides a penetrating longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis of this response of political parties against a backdrop of the women's movement. With elections since 1992 focusing on women as voters and candidates, and with a growth of interest in parties due to their apparent polarization on issues and their newfound ways around campaign finances laws, her timely study contributes to a broader understanding of party realignment and adds to recent scholarship (e.g., see Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*, 1997).

Sanbonmatsu's starting point is interesting in that it reflects the generational shift in scholarship that looks at the dominant issues of the women's movement through a post-Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) lens. Abortion is the preeminent polarizing gender issue for parties beginning in the 1980s, but her study also broadens discussion of gender issues pre-1980 beyond the usual focus on the ERA or suffrage. She brings to her analysis no preconceived list of "gender issues" but focuses on those issues defined or "framed" as gender-related by party leaders. It is the context in which a party official discusses an issue that determines whether it is included in the analysis. This is an important conceptual contribution and makes political parties an appropriate institution in explaining the "politics of women's place" since the 1970s.

According to Sanbonmatsu: "Issues that I would not classify as primarily about gender roles can be framed in that way. For example, party leaders may discuss . . . abortion as an issue of privacy or as an issue of women's liberation from their traditional roles. . . . [I]ssues that might not ordinarily be thought of as gender-related—the minimum wage, for example—can become debates about

women's place if political leaders frame the issue that way. Because gender issues such as abortion and child care, as well as issues that are not usually considered to be gender-related, can become debates about gender roles, my analysis examines how party leaders have framed issues" (p. 13).

The author's focus is on the two major political parties, and her multimethod approach includes a case study of the 1996 election, with elite interviews of party officials, delegates, and strategists at the 1996 Republican and Democratic national conventions, as well as public opinion data from the National Election Studies and General Social Surveys that looked at the attitudes of Democratic and Republican identifiers in the electorate. It also includes the positions of party leaders, with a focus on the public response of the parties using the Convention Delegate Studies, content analysis of presidential party nominee acceptance speeches, party platforms, and State of the Union addresses, archival research of the records of the Republican and Democratic National Party Committees, especially regarding platform writing proceedings, and the role of organizations in this process. Data on the appointment of women are also included. The focus includes the parties' nominees and the president in light of a candidate-centered party during the time period of this study.

In Part I, the focus is on the role of interest groups in responding to women; Part II examines the parties' response to groups and the public by looking at the role of delegates, at a case study of the strategies used by both parties in responding to gender issues in the 1996 election, and at a more general electoral strategy of the parties' response to women that has emerged in recent years.

Concerning women's place, the role of women in organizations and in government is often viewed as separate and distinct from activity in political parties. Yet all of these aspects of political involvement clearly enable women to share in the framing or defining of issues as gender-related. Sanbonmatsu focuses on the work of scholars who look primarily at the influence of groups beginning in the 1970s, although the framing of issues by women can easily be dated to earlier periods. For example, women's groups were active during and following World War I when newly formed women's organizations were chartered and the parties added women's divisions. In the early years of World War II, women in these organizations were involved in the planning for a GI Bill that would allow women to stay in the workforce while returning troops had opportunities to attend college (e.g., see Janet M. Martin, *The Presidency and Women*, 2003).

Sanbonmatsu notes the role of Representatives Edith Green (D-OR) and Martha Griffiths (D-MI), who gained power through work within the party and committee assignments, respectively, to influence the policy agenda with gender-related items. More could be made of this point by noting how widows elected to the House of Representatives to succeed husbands who had died while serving

were often appointed to such committees as Post Office and Civil Service. Their gains in seniority and numbers played an important role in defining issues affecting federal-sector employees as gender-related (e.g., pay, pensions). The influence of Barbara Mikulski on the Senate Appropriations Committee or Pat Schroeder on the House Armed Services Committee illustrates that women with seniority (particularly in the majority party), could, for example, prioritize National Institutes of Health funding to include women in clinical trials, or insist on child care for armed services personnel, or use defense funds for mammogram research, redefining these agenda items as gender-related.

Sanbonmatsu has carefully crafted a research agenda for others to follow, including a far deeper exploration of party realignment from the perspective of those defining the policy agenda of a party. She notes the bipartisan support in Congress for gender issues, especially in regard to women's equality in the early 1970s. Realignment seen within Congress, but not in the electorate, adds dimensionality to the parties, and in the area of gender policy also illustrates the complexity captured in this study of the interparty agreement over gender-equality issues. Although there is a good deal of scholarship on women in Congress, which is noted by Sanbonmatsu, a more focused discussion of these women and their party roles could help illustrate her points. Both parties' platforms evolved to address "enforcement of sex discrimination laws, recognition of the problems of child care and child support enforcement, increased funding for women's health issues, and strengthening the traditional family" (p. 112). But when the focus is on the respective parties' activists, the platforms clearly part ways on abortion, the ERA, and affirmative action.

Sanbonmatsu's case study of the 1996 election is most useful in illustrating how framing can determine whether gender is truly on a candidate's agenda. She notes the work of Thomas E. Nelson, Rosalee A. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley in defining framing ("Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance," *American Political Science Review* 91 [September 1997]: 567–83): "Political actors give meaning to political issues and attempt to shape public opinion through framing. . . . Issues that are not usually considered gender issues may become gender issues, and gender issues may become less gendered depending on the framing. . . . [P]arty leaders may frame child care as a government spending issue, a family issue, or a women's rights issue" (p. 116).

One shortcoming of research in the field, as noted by Sanbonmatsu, is the absence of panel data with questions on gender roles and policy that could provide information for the type of longitudinal studies needed to sort out the relationship between party identifiers and their attitudes on issues, candidate evaluation, and the vote (pp. 74–79). Reference to traditional family values and children may imply different policy items on the party's agenda. Her case study of the 1996 election illustrates the value of such panel data.

In 1996, to mobilize women voters, Bill Clinton and Al Gore emphasized "pro-family values," but not gender-equality issues (p. 151). This was a return to the classic pro-labor, protective stance historically taken by Democrats pre-1970, who for much of the twentieth century had avoided support for the ERA. Their emphasis in 1996 was on protecting social programs for children, education, crime prevention, the environment, and health care. The Republicans in 1996 also focused on family and children, but their emphasis was on a conservative "family values" agenda, previewing the 2000 and 2004 Bush administration's emphasis on a conservative moral agenda. The same words were used, but with different meanings and different policy outcomes, and different expectations for women's place. Sanbonmatsu's discussion of "moral values" was a foreshadowing of what was to come in the 2004 election on an issue that divided the parties for both men and women (p. 86).

Given the author's focus on gender equality and political parties, *Democrats, Republicans, and the Politics of Woman's Place* is a valuable addition to scholarly collections and accessible to wider audiences as well. Scholars studying the origins of public policy will profit from her analysis of gender issues by more fully understanding the nuances of the debate over women's issues, the agenda-defining role played by political leaders, and ways in which the public engages in these debates. There is much to be learned from each chapter. Sanbonmatsu's analysis and argument remain sophisticated throughout.

**Deserving and Entitled: Social Constructions and Public Policy.** Edited by Anne L. Schneider and Helen M. Ingram.

Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. 416p. \$89.50 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Greg M. Shaw, *Illinois Wesleyan University*

Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram have assembled 11 essays by scholars who examine how Americans' understandings of social groups shape both the process and substantive outcomes of policymaking. Explaining how such meanings are made and what they imply proves to be a challenge for the contributors to this edited volume. Because the central concepts here are rather amorphous—group entitlement and deservingness—much room remains for argument about how much of either quality the target groups enjoy. The stated purpose of the book, "to explain, examine, and criticize the social construction of deservedness and entitlement in public policy," is useful and ambitious (p. 2). Though rich in descriptive content on topics such as Revolutionary War pensions, policies toward Japanese-Americans, housing discrimination law, welfare, and microenterprise development, most of the essays raise many more questions than they answer regarding how socially constructed meanings come to be, how they matter for policy development, and the conditions under which such understandings significantly matter. Examining how

public policies enhance or hinder the development of full citizenship is the central question running through these thought-provoking chapters.

The editors' earlier work (*Policy Design for Democracy*, 1997) on the social construction of target groups provides a common starting point for the authors of this collection. There, Schneider and Ingram presented an analytical framework incorporating the insight that different groups receive different treatment under various public policies based on broadly held understandings of the social worth of groups. This different treatment serves as both an endogenous and exogenous variable. It not only signifies the imputed relative worth of target groups but also contributes to group members' sense of self. Hence, as Joe Soss's chapter relates, welfare recipients develop a lower sense of political efficacy apparently as a result of being on welfare. The collection includes numerous interesting accounts of groups' difficulties as they labor under unequal treatment at the hands of federal policies.

Because the contributing authors explicitly link their essays to the editors' theoretical approach, the chapters cohere more tightly than those in some other edited volumes. Most of the authors structure their narratives around the editors' typology of social groups: advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants. While remaining somewhat unclear, this categorization may offer some intuitive appeal.

Most of the accounts here involve what are called "degenerative" policies (p. 11). These involve policymakers creating negative images of disfavored groups and, in turn, creating policies that undermine the citizenship claims that members of those groups might make. This dynamic weakens not only the members of the target group but also democracy itself. The claim, stated this way, is certainly provocative and provides much grist for those concerned about social and economic inequality, but it leaves substantially unanswered the question of elite versus mass moral agency. Do presidents and Congress members substantially determine who will be considered a "welfare queen" or some other undeserving type, as discussed in Dionne Benson-Smith's chapter (p. 243), or is elite use of epithets little more than a reflection of extant popular sentiment? While *Deserving and Entitled* is not intended to offer a close examination of the autonomy of mass opinion, the clear implication here is that elite agency and rhetoric typically play leading roles. The editors close their introductory chapter by writing, in part, that "the larger message of this book [is] that social constructions are manipulated to build support for the state and to continue the prevailing social structure" (p. 33). In light of what political scientists know about opportunistic political pandering, this story line seems incomplete.

Despite these shortcomings, several of the essays offer well-crafted narratives of policy areas that are likely of interest to a broad range of students of American public policy. Illustrative of the collection's descriptive thickness

but somewhat underdeveloped theoretical approach are chapters on Revolutionary War pensions and twentieth-century federal crime legislation. Laura Jensen's writing on Revolutionary War veterans provides an interesting account of how Congress provided pensions long before the Civil War pensions chronicled in Theda Skocpol's *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers* (1992). The congressional debate over those early pensions turned on arguments about gratitude, fiscal ability, and impulses to provide for individuals (usually officers, but not always enlisted men) who served under arms. This debate certainly lent itself to rhetorical gamesmanship, as veterans were portrayed through numerous heroic tropes. It remains somewhat uncertain why the timing of Congress's generosity ebbed and flowed as it did, though perhaps the best explanation involved federal fiscal capacity and the number of surviving veterans at any given time.

Sean Nicholson-Crotty and Kenneth Meier's chapter on anticrime legislation examines the 1909 ban on smoking opium, an essentially anti-Chinese prohibition, and the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which critics labeled as a solution in search of a problem and one that disproportionately targeted racial minorities. The authors frankly acknowledge the complexity of variables that created these policies, and they articulate conditions under which policy entrepreneurs can advance innovation. Briefly, the presence of value-laden stereotypes attached to an identifiable target group, an activist moral entrepreneur, and the likelihood of political profit attached to successful legislation make such policy changes more likely. They find these three factors operative in both their cases, though one is left to wonder if more varied case selection might produce different results.

Joe Soss's concluding chapter accomplishes two objectives. It surveys recent changes in the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program, and it critiques the editors' target social group theory. Soss executes well on both counts. First, the narrative argues that increasingly paternalistic approaches to welfare provision undermine citizenship rather than advancing it. Of course, this stands in contrast to the argument offered by conservatives, such as Larry Mead, that imposing reciprocal obligations on welfare recipients actually makes them better citizens (see Mead's *The New Paternalism*, 1997, and *Beyond Entitlement*, 1986). Soss offers interesting data on the ill effects of welfare receivership on one's sense of political efficacy. This is an intriguing account.

Soss concludes his essay with a seven-point critique of target group theory in an effort to challenge its thin spots and to suggest ways to bolster its promising aspects. An especially salient comment in his essay with which this reviewer heartily agrees is the need for target group theory to specify expectations as to *how* and *why* political institutions might act and react in the political environment. Surely these contextually rich accounts provide fertile

ground for hypothesis generation and testing. More of that would seem in order.

**Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity.** By Mary E. Stuckey. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 404p. \$35.00.

—Lyn Ragsdale, *University of Illinois at Chicago*

This is a powerful, ambitious book on the connection between American presidents and American identity. Mary Stuckey argues that through their rhetoric, American presidents reduce an often contradictory and always complex set of national identities into a single overarching one. Presidents present this idealized universal in attempts to unify and preserve existing political structures and beliefs and to minimize differences in the national debate. They offer this national identity while also attempting to maintain their political coalitions and address certain pressing policy problems.

Stuckey focuses on three themes she finds evident in varying degrees in selected presidential speeches and writings. First, she examines the theme of balance in which presidents weigh competing interests and claims, attempting to articulate a shared national interest or vision. This balance theme is seen, for instance, in President Jackson's balancing farmers, slave owners, commercial interests, and the new westerners in his vision of America. Second, she studies the theme of citizenship as the idea of belonging to the United States less as a matter of birthright and more as a matter of achievement. Third, she considers the theme of visibility. She focuses on how presidents treat groups, such as Native Americans, African Americans, and ethnic immigrants, as visible and invisible at various points in history. Group visibility/invisibility also involves matters of inclusion in or exclusion from the body politic.

Stuckey then moves through history in a sweeping fashion, focusing on Presidents Jackson, Fillmore, Pierce, Buchanan, Cleveland, Wilson, F. Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and George H.W. Bush. Her intent is not to exhaustively examine all presidents but, instead, to offer snapshots at select moments in presidential history. For Jackson, the key to national identity was land—landowners and farmers were the true citizens, the true Americans. Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan (whom Stuckey treats as a group) presented an inherently conservative view of national identity pegged to stability and a focus on the past. The national identity rested on the Union as it had been conceived by the founders—one which balanced North and South, slave and free states. For Grover Cleveland, the national identity rested on calculations of wealth and emerging images of the American dream. National identity during Wilson's tenure placed the United States in the world by claiming American political and cultural superiority in the international sphere. For Franklin Roosevelt, national identity was based on economic relationships, recognizing the com-

mon man on the bottom of the economic hierarchy while leaving the hierarchy itself intact. Eisenhower, by contrast, advanced an identity of containment both within the country and internationally. Finally, George H. W. Bush offered a view of civility in an increasingly fragmented polity. Stuckey convincingly demonstrates how much the national identity has changed over this history but also how the core elements of Union, wealth, and homogeneity remain in spite of the change (or perhaps because of it).

As intriguing as the book is, it could have been made even stronger. Stuckey has a tendency to write above the presidents, offering her own views of national identity, development, and change more as a cultural historian and less as a student of the presidents themselves. To be sure, she offers evidence from presidents' writings and speeches, but not to the same degree or in the same depth as other scholars who have analyzed presidential communication in history. The evidence presented seems carefully chosen to support Stuckey's points, rather than having the presidents' words make their own points. In this vein, she offers her own assessment of what *should* have been the national identity—brimming with equality and the full-fledged inclusion of all groups. She never discusses how this ideal could have been reached in America or whether this ideal has ever been reached in any country during any time period. Although Stuckey acknowledges that presidents put politics first in their espousal of national identity, she does not fully analyze how their political agendas and coalitions shape the identities they offer. It is thus never made clear how presidents or other American politicians could actually espouse an all-encompassing, highly egalitarian identity and actually construct a winning political coalition, which by its very nature is often built on us versus them.

The most provocative, and yet problematic, contribution of *Defining Americans* involves the tracing of the inclusion and exclusion of groups in the national identity. Stuckey maintains that certain groups are more (less) visible in national politics and that this leads them to be more (less) included in the construction of national identity. In this assertion, she makes an underlying assumption that visibility and inclusion run in tandem. This assumption seems to be extrapolated from her excellent treatment of presidents' discussions of Native Americans. But the assumption seems on shakier ground when other groups are considered. For example, discussing African Americans in the 1850s, Stuckey writes of the "price of exclusion and the pain of invisibility" (p. 61). But, arguably, while African American slaves were excluded from the body politic and national identity, they were hardly invisible as the emancipation movement grew. Indeed, their growing visibility and the visibility of slavery was central not only to the Civil War but also to the reshaping of the national identity after the war. Unhappily, because Stuckey



does not consider Lincoln, the clash between visibility and exclusion is missed.

In all, this is a very good cultural history of the American presidency as it is presented in key moments in time. Stuckey is to be commended for her intriguing analysis, her provocative commentary, and thoughtful insights into the presidential office and the nation's identity.

**Interstate Economic Relations.** By Joseph F. Zimmerman. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 308p. \$60.00.

— Sarah F. Liebschutz, *State University of New York, Brockport and University of Rochester*

Scholars of American federalism have focused much more attention on relations between federal and state governments than they have on those among states. Joseph F. Zimmerman is the exception. Although this book is replete with an impressive number of citations, it is Zimmerman himself who has almost single-handedly rectified this state of affairs. His earlier publications on national–state relations, including federal preemption, federal mandates, and federal–state commissions, were the precursors to two comprehensive examinations of interstate relations. In *Interstate Relations: The Neglected Dimension of Federalism* (1996), Zimmerman laid out basic premises of interstate relations within the American federal system. In *Interstate Economic Relations*, he expands considerably those premises, illustrates them with case studies of economic competition and cooperation among the states, and presents impressive evidence of the critical role of the U.S. Supreme Court as parameter-setting referee.

The American states have long been a laboratory for the interplay between government and economics. Since the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, state governments have intervened in many ways to promote economic development. The by-product of such activism has frequently been interstate competition for economic advantage. During the last 50 years, the pace of intervention has accelerated and the context for economic activism has become more complicated and more competitive. Many political scientists have examined such state activism through different lenses. Paul Peterson (*The Price of Federalism*, 1995), for example, uses functional and legislative theories to explain state spending for developmental and redistributive purposes. Paul Brace (*State Government and Economic Performance*, 1993) invokes the separate influences of national–state cycles of primacy (national context) and state governmental and political resources (state capacity) to elucidate the roles that states choose to play at different points in time.

Zimmerman's analysis of interstate relations, in general, and interstate economic relations, more particularly, also starts with the assumption that a federal system is inherently complex and competitive. His approach, however, diverges from that of others in its deep grounding in

the historical development of pertinent constitutional provisions, congressional legislation, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions. To set the stage for understanding state economic choices, Zimmerman draws on eighteenth-century arguments for and against the major constructs of the federal Constitution and, particularly, those provisions pertinent to state economic activities. His analysis of the role of the Supreme Court in adjudicating interstate disputes is noteworthy. He states that the Supreme Court has fashioned “an interstate common law combining elements of the common law and international law” (p. 71). He asserts that the Court developed its “dormant interstate commerce clause doctrine” (p. 86) not only because of its own constitutional prerogatives but also because the Congress has been silent in regulating the free flow of commerce among the states.

The book is replete with examples and case studies of interstate trade barriers, revenue taxes to advantage the enacting states, and incentives to attract business firms and sports franchises. From sales taxes to alcoholic beverage and tobacco excise taxes, to commuter income taxes and lotteries, to taxing and financing incentives, they constitute an extensive description of interstate competitive mechanisms. In contrast, a single chapter on interstate economic cooperation contains brief descriptions, at times approaching lists, of interstate compacts. The book concludes with recommendations for “an improved economic union” that range from encouragement of state legislatures to adopt uniform state laws drafted by the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws, to a mixture of congressional incentives (consent in advance to interstate compacts) and disincentives (threatened congressional preemption of state regulatory powers if states fail to adopt uniform state laws). In the end, however, Zimmerman—cognizant of the inherently competitive nature of interstate relations—is not sanguine that either state or national actors will expend more energy on interstate cooperation than they have in the past.

This is, without question, a definitive reference book. It is a densely written, packed exposition of information on the topic. The discussions of the role of the U.S. Supreme Court as constitutional arbiter in interstate disputes and in particular cases, for example, state restraint of free flow of commerce, are convincing and authoritative. The role of state courts, in contrast, is given much less attention. Zimmerman acknowledges that state courts are forums where alleged state restraints can be adjudicated, but he does not much press the point. Perhaps this is because state constitutions and state judges are not neglected in the political science literature. See, for example, Alan Tarr, *Understanding State Constitutions*, 1998.

The amount of information in *Interstate Economic Relations* is noteworthy. However, Zimmerman sometimes references a seemingly important point in the chapter summary that he failed to develop fully in the chapter

itself. For example, he notes that “Congress for the first time recognized in 1911 that it could enact a statute to encourage interstate cooperation by granting consent in advance to states to enter into specific interstate compacts” (p. 62) (an action Zimmerman endorses in his recommendations). Yet he mentions such congressional recognition in the chapter only in passing. He anticipates rapid growth in formal and informal interstate agree-

ments, and slow growth in interstate compacts, but fails to explain why. The book, in my judgment, would have benefited from closer editing. Zimmerman’s chapter summaries and conclusions would have served the reader better as introductions. These points, however, do not detract from the remarkable contribution that the author makes to our understanding of interstate relations in the federal system.

## COMPARATIVE POLITICS

**The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence.** Edited by Beverley Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 356p. \$75.00 cloth, \$34.99 paper.

— Dorothy E. McBride, *Florida Atlantic University*

Comparative law remains a small and relatively isolated area of inquiry. There are two barriers to development of the field. First, with the exception of taxation law and, possibly, divorce, comparative analysis of law is of little use to practicing lawyers. Second, as I discovered in a project on comparative rape law, it is difficult to gain access to the primary data sources, especially outside North America and Western Europe. In addition, there are few opportunities for interdisciplinary study—despite the attention of the Law and Society Association. Those who are not legal scholars need guides to the technical aspects of legal research to make the work of specialists more accessible.

Thus, the publication of *The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence* is especially welcome. Although the editors address their work to the small community of comparative law scholars, they bring together detailed case studies of constitutions and constitutional interpretation in 12 countries in a form that should be useful to a much wider audience, particularly in political science. In the first place, the study of different constitutional forms is a foundational element of every introductory comparative politics course; this book provides basic information on constitutions in countries usually not covered in basic texts, such as Costa Rica, Turkey, and Israel. In the second place, an examination of the policy implications of judicial decisions is an important component of public policy analysis. Here, each case study covers a wide range of policies relating to women and gender equality. Finally, the editors join a growing number of feminist scholars examining the cross-national variations in state response to women’s movements for equality. They issue an invitation to interested scholars to start thinking about constitutions in a gendered way.

Despite the editors’ intent to reach other comparative law specialists, it is highly likely that the main audience for this work will be not be comparative legal scholars but students of feminist comparative policy, another group

that seeks to use conventional methods to study feminist questions. Most of the authors are law faculty, although some, such as Martha Nussbaum and Ran Hirschel, have interdisciplinary credentials. Overall, their approach is descriptive with appropriate legal citations. To enhance comparability, the editors set forth a framework—a feminist constitutional agenda—to guide the contributing scholars in organizing their chapters. The introductory chapter elaborates on each of seven components of this framework and previews some patterns that appear across the cases. The first item on the agenda is *constitutional agency*, which pertains to the ways in which women—in movements and as individuals—seek to have influence over constitutional forms and practices. The second topic, *women and constitutional rights*, examines the various means available to women in the different systems to address state action in the courts. The structural variations in constitutional forms—termed *constitutional structured diversity*—is the third category. Of special interest is the authors’ treatment of ways in which constitutions and judges define *constitutional equality*, the fourth topic, contrasting discourses on formal equality, separate but equal statuses, and substantive equality. Three policy areas—*reproductive rights, rights in the family, and socio-economic/democratic rights*—complete the agenda.

The editors selected the countries to encompass differences rather than similarities: Australia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Germany, India, Israel, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, the United States. Each case study offers a window through which to explore the development of a national system of constitutional jurisprudence; at the same time, none of the chapters includes complete information on all parts of the agenda. The mix of formal common law and civil law regimes, along with the remains of legal traditions grounded in Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, and Catholicism, offers many interesting questions for comparative inquiry. One involves the effect on women’s legal status of various legal instruments. Citizens in common law systems (United States, Canada) may not use constitutional law to challenge private action; judicial review is limited to the review of state action. In Spain, Costa Rica, and Colombia, however, practices of *amparo* and *tutela* give individual women redress against violation of fundamental rights in the family, schools, and workplace. (It

would have been helpful to have a fuller discussion in the introduction of these different instruments and their effects.) Another area for possible comparative inquiry is the extent to which international conventions and other legal instruments from the European Union, European Court of Justice, United Nations, and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) limit choices in constitutional decision making.

A challenge for most of the courts in the countries included in the book involves coping with the conflict between international standards of gender equality and the dictates of religious, indigenous, and other traditions regulating the family, sexuality, and reproductive rights. Of particular interest to me is the range of responses to this conflict in constitutional jurisprudence about abortion. The eight cases where the authors included information on abortion laws show significant variation in the legal conceptions of the issue. Explanations for these patterns are not immediately evident. In Canada and South Africa, courts have asserted a constitutional right of women to make decisions about reproductive matters in the first trimester of pregnancy. German, Spanish, Israeli, and U.S. courts balance the rights and interests of women against the fetus with conditional abortion laws. Colombia defines abortion as an attack on human life and asserts that women have no rights over the fetus. India, as the result of an older policy stream motivated by worries about population growth, has a liberal abortion law. In India, in fact, feminists criticize their abortion law for its use for sex selection. Despite the differences among these constitutional systems on abortion, they are similar in that none of them integrates abortion rights with ideas of gender equality.

*The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence* is a “must have” addition to libraries in comparative policy and especially feminist policy. However, it remains primarily a reference book of descriptive case studies. The editors did not choose to offer a concluding chapter that would summarize and develop comparative themes; instead they leave it to the readers to make their own comparisons, a task hampered by the lack of uniformity of topics and methods across the cases.

**Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe.** By Giovanni Capoccia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 352p. \$49.95.

— Gerard Alexander, *University of Virginia*

This study elaborates a central aspect of Juan Linz’s (1978) *Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-equilibration*: a focus on choices made by democratic incumbents facing extremist challengers aiming to install nondemocratic rule. To put it in Linzian terms, Giovanni Capoccia seeks to develop Linz’s “mentality” on that subject into a more systematic state-

ment. Linz claimed that these leaders’ choices are crucial, and he illustrated with examples; Capoccia rightly proposes that such a claim deserves monographic treatment in its own right. His effort is illuminating on several counts but falls short of full persuasiveness on others.

Linz, Alfred Stepan, and others argue that democratic incumbents have played decisive roles in “crafting” regime outcomes when democracies encounter strain: Vigorous resistance to would-be authoritarian leaders and their messages can, they argue, retain public support for inclusive politics. In contrast, their indecisiveness and short-term electoral opportunism can spur a democracy’s breakdown. This emphasis on leadership and contingency proved to be a highly influential response to social-structural regime research associated with—among others—Seymour Martin Lipset, Barrington Moore, David and Ruth Collier, and John Stephens, Evelyn Huber, and Dietrich Rueschmeyer. But like many other accounts claiming agency and indeterminacy, and unlike their structuralist rivals, these claims were undertheorized and lacked rigorous testing against evidence, often (but not exclusively) because of selection on the dependent variable.

Capoccia argues that careful comparisons can generate more elaborate inductive theorizing of this kind and better support it empirically. He calls for consideration of interwar West European countries in which democracy was jeopardized by significant extremist movements but nonetheless survived. These include three cases he treats at length (Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Finland) and one he does not (France). He argues that these regimes survived because democratic incumbents responded robustly and wisely to serious antidemocratic threats. In particular, heads of state and/or senior party leaders pursued one of several strategies: repression of extremists (including bans on parties and party militias, states of emergency, and questionably legal denials of access to state-run media), cooptation of extremists (in coalitions or through policy concessions), or a mixture of the two. There is, he concludes, no single “recipe” for success: Accommodation predominated in Belgium, repression in Finland, and a combination in Czechoslovakia. He also warns that the repressive strategy navigates a fine line between legitimately protecting democracy and menacing it from above.

This core argument serves at least two very useful purposes. It develops what remained only partially formed claims in Linz’s hands, resulting in a much more textured idea of the options available to besieged democrats. And it inspires Capoccia’s investigation of several badly understudied cases, producing interesting empirics for wider consideration and use. Moreover, this is all written accessibly and at times dramatically, befitting the high-stakes nature of the topic.

If this study has a flaw, it concerns research design. Whereas Linz and Stepan’s (1978) *The Breakdown of*

*Democratic Regimes* famously treated only democracies that collapsed, Capoccia systematically treats only ones that survive. He periodically uses interwar Italy and Germany as foils, but discussion of them is not detailed enough to permit something badly needed: systematic comparison of the behavior of leaders in democracies that did and did not survive. At one point (p. 194), Capoccia offers readers a table classifying the pattern of intervention in politics by heads of state in his three cases, as well as Germany and Italy. But he does not rigorously do the same for the full range of actors and possible strategies that form the core of his discussion of Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Finland. This is especially important given the very wide range of these strategies and their highly qualitative nature. For example, it is exceedingly difficult to measure the relative severity of specific antiextremist laws, the relative strictness of their enforcement, and the degree of determination that lay behind public campaigns against authoritarian ideologies. This ensures that it is equally difficult to judge whether incumbents really did, in fact, pursue a more ambitious strategy of accommodation in Czechoslovakia than in Germany or Italy, without more systematic, side-by-side comparison of strategies in *both* successes and failures.

This undermines the definitiveness of the conclusions reached. In the absence of more rigorous coding and comparison, Capoccia's core argument—that democratic leaders' strategies were causally very important—remains vulnerable to structuralist claims that various contextual factors instead determined either which choices leaders made or whether their choices had the desired effects. The sidelining of most contextual factors in this study leaves unclear exactly how much influence should ultimately be attributed to the inherent features of leaders' strategies. For example, when Capoccia emphasizes the importance in Belgium of "public appeals to win back to the democratic cause those voters who had gone over" to extremist parties (p. 137), how can one judge whether such appeals were better crafted in Belgium than in Weimar or whether, instead, some contextual factor (e.g., political culture or structures of social conflict) determined that such appeals were simply likely to find a more receptive audience in one country than in the other. In other words, does Capoccia use strategies to explain why some democracies survived where others did not, or is he instead labeling strategies pursued in surviving democracies as successful and those pursued in breakdowns as failures?

Given current scholarly fashions, the arguments that leaders' choices matter and that contingent events shape even large-scale outcomes are eminently plausible. This study admirably seeks to lend greater comprehensiveness to these claims as they apply to regime outcomes. And the historical evidence it generates serves to retrieve intriguing data on lesser-known cases. For both reasons, *Defending Democracy* is likely to spark fruitful discussion.

**Popular Political Support in Urban China.** By Jie Chen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 246p. \$55.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

— Steven W. Lewis, *Rice University*

What is the matter with Beijing? China's capital is overcrowded and heavily polluted. Beijing's elderly face shrinking government pensions and health-care services. Its middle aged try to reinvent themselves out of unemployment. Its youth strive for jobs, with tens of millions of upwardly mobile rural Chinese flocking to the cities, and at the same time try to distinguish themselves from the hundreds of millions of other future middle-class urbanites struggling to enter the upper end of the global economy. Despite protests in city and countryside, the Chinese government continues to privatize and liberalize its economy, and the Chinese Communist Party still punishes all forms of organized political opposition.

And yet Beijingers seem to support their political system. Unlike Thomas Frank's Kansans, however, Beijingers do not have effective democratic opportunities to vote against their individual economic and social interests. But their support for a government whose policies harm them in so many ways is just as difficult to explain as the voting behavior of the apparently similarly bewildered people of America's hypothetical heartland.

Jie Chen helps us understand the persistence and yet tenuousness of general support for governments whose specific policies and official faces are often not at all popular. By means of unique surveys of Beijing residents in 1995, 1997, and 1999, Chen shows that there is strong, albeit declining, support for the general institutions and values of the Chinese political system. At the same time, Beijingers reveal a significant and growing dissatisfaction with government policies and the performance of leaders. Moreover, these trends are correlated: As people become less enamored of the traditional, nonrepresentative political system, they tend to become more dissatisfied with the performance of the government and its leaders.

So why do the Chinese people continue to support the Chinese political system? Chen's major contribution to answering this question is to suggest the influence of seemingly irrelevant collective identifications, and their increasingly important strategic value for regimes gradually facing an inevitable crisis of legitimacy. The Chinese Communist Party enjoys more support from Beijingers who believe that they are most likely to benefit from its continued monopoly on political control and the continued unequal distribution of resources in the context of economic liberalization: older, less educated, male party members and government officials who have a high self-assessed economic status. And while younger, more educated and more democratically oriented Beijingers are more likely to engage in potentially confrontational political activities, those who might believe they are benefiting from reforms voluntarily

participate in elections for the people's congresses, an act of support for the government. Tellingly, Chen's surveys suggest that regime supporters are more likely to have nationalistic beliefs, and that nationalism is not associated with an interest in local affairs or in local government performance. Beijingers may continue to support the Chinese government because their identification with the nation-state does not let them associate their views on reforming the political system with the individual costs of China's economic policies. According to this explanation, nationalistic rhetoric and values, especially in the state-controlled media and in educational institutions, may serve to distract the Chinese populace by creating disconnections in the perceived linkages among the global and the national, the national and the local.

This review focuses on the implications for the study of popular support and the contradictions of democratization in particular. Chen's broad theoretical framework and comprehensive discussion of the surveys, however, make *Popular Political Support in Urban China* a very useful text for the comparative quantitative study of political participation, collective action, civil society, nationalism, economic liberalization, and institutional reform in general. He uses here an Eastonian approach that distinguishes between sources of general or "diffuse" popular support and performance or "specific" popular support, but it is part of a larger collective enterprise of using sophisticated survey research and statistical analysis to explore the views of the Chinese public, notably those of Melanie Manion, Andrew Nathan, Tianjian Shi, and Wenfang Tang in the United States, and China-based scholar and pollster Yue Yuan of Horizon Survey Research. As such, it is also a very neat introduction to the range of methodological problems and limitations to the study of politics in China, and of societies in economic transition in general. Comparativists will find this book useful for many research and pedagogical goals.

Because of its implications for the study of nationalism and collective identity, more discussion of both the domestic and international context of these subjects in Beijing in the late 1990s would help those not so familiar with China's history. In 1995, many urban Chinese were still protected by the "iron rice bowl" of a planned economy, but by 1999, urbanites, and Beijing's large population of government officials in particular, were facing government privatization programs that halved the bureaucracy and created a new population of entrepreneurial officials. At the same time, an abandonment of sunset manufacturing industries and support for information technology sectors and entrepreneurship created a boom in land and infrastructure development in the capital. Its exposure to the global economy also meant a transformation from an old industrial city fiscally dependent on large central government-owned enterprises to one competing for new sources of revenue with China's other, emerging global cities. "Bei-

jing" began to become a brand of location for business development. More broadly, in 1995, undoubtedly few Beijingers thought of China as an emerging economic power, but by 1999, after surviving the economic collapse of many of its Asian neighbors, Chinese nationalism and the perceived legitimacy of the government must have received a substantial boost. Here, Chen's research presents a very useful and informative baseline study of the political views of people undergoing such radical transformations in their political, economic, and social environments.

### **Contesting the Iron Fist: Advocacy Networks and Police Violence in Democratic Argentina and Chile.**

By Claudio A. Fuentes. New York: Routledge, 2004. 256p. \$75.00.

— David Pion-Berlin, *University of California, Riverside*

Police violence has become an all too common reality in Latin America. Most scholars have chalked up the problem to authoritarian legacies, ones inherited from colonialism, from nineteenth- and twentieth-century caudillo's or more recently from military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s. Most of these studies fail to explain why police violence can vary so widely from country to country or from one time period to another, nor can they account for genuine reform efforts. Fortunately, Claudio Fuentes's book departs from these formulas and offers a more plausible theory of police abuse in Latin America.

The author situates the causes of police violence and reform not in the distant past but within contemporary democratic settings. Citizens of these democracies want to be safe from crime, but police are often themselves the perpetrators of violence against innocent citizens who want to be free from that as well. Thus, when crime levels escalate, the pressures to overhaul the police forces generally subside, and when crime declines, there are renewed calls for police reform to curtail abuses. Even so, genuine reform rarely succeeds, and to explain why, the author offers a sophisticated analysis about organization, power, and opportunity.

Because citizens can be mobilized in either the direction of greater police reform or a tougher crackdown on crime, there are, unsurprisingly, two coalitions that have developed around these positions. A conservative, pro-order coalition is comprised of politicians, interest groups, citizens, and the police themselves intent on strengthening the police force without subjecting them to heightened scrutiny. And there is a pro-reform or civil rights coalition comprised of lawyers, human rights organizations, and politicians to the left of center determined to protect citizens' inalienable rights to be free from threats to their personal security. In this contest, the pro-order coalition has the advantage because of built-in organizational strengths within the security forces, ties to the centers of political power, and a public yearning for safer

streets. By contrast, the pro-reform coalition has the challenging task of convincing politicians and the public that a cleansing of corrupt, abusive elements within the police forces will not also handicap the one agency that can and must reduce crime. This is a tough sell, and the police themselves make it tougher by pulling cops off the beat when they come under assault for alleged abuses. As the author puts it, the structure of incentives favors the status quo forces.

But the balance of power between these two coalitions is only part of the scenario. In addition, much depends on the kinds of opportunity structures that exist in a given society. In this two-nation study, the author found that Chile offered fewer opportunities for reform than did Argentina. In Chile, a transition dominated by the outgoing military, a political system that allows for easier access for conservative groups, a less pluralistic media with ownership concentrated in a few hands, and a highly unified police force combine to stymie reform. This political system is governed by the 1980 constitution written by Augusto Pinochet, which favors right-wing political forces sympathetic to the pro-order position. And it is a system in which the president cannot remove his police chief without approval from the National Security Council, and where police crimes are prosecuted in military courts only. In Argentina, the transition strengthened the hand of civilians while weakening the security forces. There, police crimes are tried in civilian courts, reform groups gain access to the corridors of power, and the press is more pluralistic.

The easy presumption would be that advocacy groups in Argentina should be stronger and more successful than those in Chile. But if opportunities exist, they must still be seized by strategic actors. Coalitional leaders must coordinate among themselves, articulate and frame their positions in a persuasive way, and show up for the policy debates. It turns out that the Chilean reform movement fell short in this regard, while the Argentine reformers performed better. Still, the devil's advocate may claim that the task of reform was easier in Argentina where levels of police violence were higher than in Chile. The puzzle is that in the capital of Buenos Aires where police violence was especially high and advocacy groups well organized, the pro-reform movement could not claim much success. To resolve the puzzle, the author explains that the capital police force, which is controlled by the federal government, is highly corporate in nature, much like its Chilean counterpart. There is a heavy top-to-bottom-structured hierarchy where the leadership cultivates loyalty and enforces a disciplined silence within the ranks, reducing the chances for informational leaks and exposure of misdeeds.

The one difficulty here is that corporateness cuts both ways. Highly corporate police forces are also more educated and better trained. Conceivably with the right leadership in place, those organizations should be less abusive

and more professional. By contrast, less corporatist institutions are, by the author's admission, ones where "discipline and training systems are poor, internal systems of accountability are weak, and police officers observe relatively low levels of loyalty toward hierarchical authorities" (p. 37). Consequently, there is a greater chance for exposure of misdeeds in less corporate police forces, but a greater chance for misdeeds themselves. So what is the upshot? Would reformers have a better chance of lowering overall levels of police violence when faced with a hierarchically weaker or stronger police force? The book never resolves that issue.

There is much to commend here. *Contesting the Iron Fist* is the best piece of comparative social science I have seen on the topic of police violence and reform within Latin American studies. Fuentes has convincingly laid bare all of the underlying opportunities, motives, and strategies within the ongoing conflict over police behavior. Although his analysis yields a largely pessimistic assessment—namely, that pro-order coalitions tend to prevail, thus limiting the chances for police reform—it is also thoroughly convincing. It is based on exhaustive, careful, and systematic empirical research, and it is guided by a firm understanding of theories of coalitions, social movements, and opportunity structures. It is well written and will undoubtedly serve as a valuable text in countless undergraduate and graduate courses on Latin America and the politics of internal security, crime, and violence.

#### **Domestic Budgets in a United Europe: Fiscal Governance from the End of Bretton Woods to EMU.**

By Mark Hallerberg. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 258p. \$39.95.

— Hilary Appel, *Claremont McKenna College*

Why did nearly all European Union member states in the late 1990s succeed in reducing their budget deficits below the necessary 3% threshold in time to join the monetary union, after years of varied success at achieving fiscal discipline? Do the explicit criteria set out by the Treaty of Maastricht and the prospect of participating in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) fully explain the fiscal convergence seen in Europe prior to and immediately following monetary union? These are the questions that concern Mark Hallerberg's book. Rather than crediting the incentive of joining the euro zone, Hallerberg focuses on the domestic sources of fiscal reform since 1973. He argues that the Maastricht criteria were important in certain countries, especially in southern Europe. But to understand why virtually all states achieved a sufficiently low budget deficit to participate in monetary union, one must examine the competitiveness of the party system, the functioning of the electoral system, and the ideological coherence of the governing coalitions in individual countries.

Domestic political factors offer a more nuanced, and ultimately more convincing, account of fiscal policy in Europe at the end of the twentieth century.

In addition to introducing Hallerberg's theoretical framework, the first chapter reviews and effectively discounts the standard explanation for fiscal policy convergence in the 1990s. Although the qualification for monetary union frames this chapter and the book as a whole, the argument over the relative importance of the EMU in shaping fiscal policy is not the book's greatest contribution. After all, the author's rejection of European Union-level factors for fiscal policy convergence is only partial. Rather, it is his analysis of the impact of domestic political institutions on fiscal policymaking generally that is the most useful and insightful.

As a result of his empirical analysis in Chapter 2 and his country case studies in Chapters 4 through 8, Hallerberg is able to demonstrate the relationship between particular types of political systems and effective institutional arrangements for maintaining fiscal discipline. Specifically, *Domestic Budgets in a United Europe* argues that in cases where the party system is uncompetitive or so unstable that many forms of government arise in succession (one-party majorities, multiparty coalitions, and minority governments), fiscal discipline is hard to achieve. By contrast, in stable competitive electoral systems, there are two effective strategies for achieving low budget deficits. First, in countries where there is ideological unity within governing coalitions, the delegation of policymaking authority to a finance minister is an effective strategy for keeping spending low. Second, in countries where governments contain ideologically diverse coalition partners, parties can negotiate over and commit to clear rules about formulating policy. According to Hallerberg, these two strategies allow governments to overcome the greatest obstacle to fiscal discipline, the common pool resource problem—namely, the temptation to draw from the common pool of revenue to pay for particularistic goods with little regard for the overall size of the budget. Curbing government spending and keeping deficits low are difficult to achieve when governing parties do not have to pay attention to how their specific expenditures impact the overall pool of revenue. The author convincingly argues that electoral politics determine whether granting greater discretion to a finance minister or formalizing rules for fiscal spending is the better strategy for a specific country to keep domestic budgets balanced.

Each of the empirical chapter examines a small set of EU countries in order to demonstrate the appropriateness and value of one strategy over the other. He groups together the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Greece, since they all benefit from a delegation model of fiscal policymaking given the succession of ideologically unified governments. Among these cases, only Greece needed the Maastricht criteria to achieve fiscal discipline.

In Italy, the delegation approach was only effective after the electoral reforms of 1994, which allowed for party turnover. Previous to the reforms, the dominance by the Christian Democratic Party had led to a “fiefdom” form of fiscal governance in which the common-pool resource problem prevailed. Italy's new electoral system, in addition to the Maastricht criteria, brought about greater fiscal responsibility.

Given the party systems in countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland, a delegation approach is ineffective since the finance minister cannot rely on the multiple parties in government to support spending cuts. Given the ideological disunity of the governing coalitions, formalized rules better limit budgetary spending. In a similar vein, formal rules, or “fiscal contracts” between governing parties and the opposition, were also necessary to rein in spending in countries with consistent minority governments, like Sweden and Denmark. Finally, the lack of stability in the party systems in Austria, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain confounded efforts to reduce spending. In these countries, Hallerberg credits the timing of the Maastricht criteria, along with some changes in the domestic budget process, for fiscal behavior prior to the introduction of the euro.

*Domestic Budgets in a United Europe* is extremely valuable to students of European politics and political economy generally. It is especially well written and accessible to a wide range of readers. There is some repetitiveness between the first and second chapters (and perhaps they should have been combined). However, by repeating the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 and confining the formalization of his framework to this chapter, the author makes his work accessible to a larger readership interested in European politics. One issue that the book anticipates and briefly considers is whether the forms of fiscal governance that worked prior to the introduction of the euro can continue to keep spending in check after monetary union. While the analysis suggests that the domestic institutions should still determine the appropriate strategy for fiscal governance, the higher deficit spending in Europe after monetary union may lead some to question the relative impact of internal and external variables.

**Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization.** Edited by Robert W. Hefner. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 408p. \$19.95.

— As'ad AbuKhalil, *California State University, Stanislaus*

The line between popular culture and scholarship has been obscured by the large volume of books and articles dealing with Islam that came out in the United States after September 11. One can see the features of an Islam Industry dominating production (popular, commercial, media, and sometimes academic) on—or against—Islam. The matter

is quite important as this has become an issue that transcends mere intellectual pursuits and deals with policy matters and, most importantly, with wars. Pundits now casually speak with glee about a war “within Islam” as if to portray U.S. official roles as marginal or secondary. Amid the plethora of books on Islam, one welcomes with great enthusiasm a serious and sober look at Islam in the political and social realms worldwide. *Remaking Muslim Politics* was based on an academic conference, and the papers were later collected in a book form.

While the chapters (case studies) deal with disparate topics and various countries, they are all to be read together because they serve to underline the diversity of the Islamic experience, or the “Islamicate” influences, as Marshall Hodgson had called them. And the editor sets the stage with a useful and general introduction to the volume, although one may disagree with some of his generalizations, especially when he claims that “Islamist issues and parties seemed to have been outflanked by their secular rivals” (p. 18). Robert Hefner was talking about the 1950s and 1960s, but it would be fallacious to extrapolate the slogans coming from above, and the discourse by a segment of the intellectuals, from the whole populations of the countries mentioned. Islam did not go to sleep and then suddenly awaken. It was always “there,” but perhaps it escaped the notice of Western (and Eastern) observers and researchers. Can one really speak about socialist and secular trends in rural Morocco or peasants of Hawran in the 1950s or later or earlier? Yet Hefner is correct in reminding readers that Islamic “resurgence was primarily an affair of civil society, not the state” (p. 20), but as other chapters show, most, if not all, movements of Islamic resurgence benefited from outside support and funding, and the state itself often used the resurgent or weak Islamic groups to strike at the Left and the secular nationalists. In the chapter by Dale Eickelman, we learn that the “imagined” Muslim communities are utilizing not only the traditional print forms but also the new media technology. Satellite TV channels have changed the style and mode of discourse among all political movements in the Middle East, and official speechmaking had to adjust to the new phenomenon. The hours-long speeches by Arab rulers seem to be a thing of the past; rulers know that viewers are now equipped with a powerful tool, that is, the remote control.

Qasim Zaman focuses primarily on the role of *‘ulama’* in Pakistan. He takes a cautious approach toward the (Western) demand for the reform of madrassas. He does not believe that reform in itself can guarantee the construction of “resources for democracy and pluralism” (p. 81). Jenny White introduces the Turkish model of “Muslimhood,” which asserts that “believing Muslims can be secular politicians, that their qualities of personhood not only do not disqualify them from running the secular governmental machinery, but may even benefit the political realm by inserting personal ethics and a moral stance” (p. 88).

But does that imply that religion has a superior claim over morality, in the ethical sense, than secular, non-religious-based ideologies? Scandals within churches, mosques, and synagogues confirm that religious ideologies are not immune from unethical behavior. White also has an interesting discussion of the Alevi presence in Turkey, which receives less attention than Islamism in most treatments. Bahman Baktiari’s chapter deals with developments in the Islamic Republic in Iran but also reveals a range of opinions within the parameters of debate. Augustus Richard Norton’s chapter on Hizb Al-Wasat is an important contribution to this volume, and to the study of Islam-in-the-political-process because such (“centrist”) Islamist trends rarely get any scholarly coverage, and they may represent a potent political force in the future, especially if Arab regimes undergo structural political transformations beyond the cosmetic reforms that George W. Bush expects from his allies in the region. Norton also proposes policy recommendations that tend to encourage and support such Islamist trends, but it is unlikely that in this age of us-versus-them, nuanced arguments can be heard in Washington, DC.

Diane Singerman’s chapter is also important because she studies the genealogy of divorce laws in Egypt. Her study shows that women in Egypt, without Western prodding and inspiration, have been engaged in struggles for gender fairness and equality, and that any achievements made are not due to governmental initiatives, although sometimes alliances are made with segments of the ruling groups. Gwenn Okruhlik studies Islam in the Saudi political context and critically examines the roles of the *‘ulama’* and their relationship to the government. She, however, may have overstated her case when she refers to Crown Prince ‘Abdullah as “a champion of women’s rights in the Saudi context” (p. 206); she perhaps may have wanted to say that he is less vocal in his sexism and misogyny than other members of the royal family. The person in charge of perhaps the most misogynist political order on earth cannot be said to be a “champion of women’s rights” in any context.

Thomas Barfield’s chapter may be the least analytical and most journalistic. It does offer an overview of the topic but seems to lack the research components of the other chapters. Michael Peletz’s chapter on Malaysia situates Islamism and Islamic influences in the special context of a country rich with religious and ethnic diversity. Hefner then offers a detailed examination of the Indonesian experience, while Mandaville provides a general, too general indeed, picture of Islamic movements. His treatment of Hizb At-Tahrir is rather weak and incomplete, perhaps because it is based on the brochures of its British branch. John Bowen’s chapter contains interesting references to debates among French Muslim leaders and intellectuals.

This is a most interesting and serious book on Islam. It is perhaps one of the most scholarly books on the topic



since September 11. The authors for the most part should perhaps be commended for steering away from public pressures to stick to topics and approaches from outside academe. *Remaking Muslim Politics* is highly recommended and should be added to college courses dealing with Islamic issues.

**Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism.** By Yoshiko M. Herrera. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 318p. \$75.00.

— Juliet Johnson, *McGill University*

In her book Yoshiko Herrera crafts an impressive theoretical argument by first noting and then rectifying an important intellectual inconsistency in contemporary studies of nationalism. While these studies typically view identities as multiple and constructed, they nevertheless tend to treat economic interests as unproblematic and objective. Herrera challenges this assumption by arguing that economic understandings are constructed as well, and that these constructed views of economic interests will affect the relative propensity of substate regions to press for greater autonomy or secession. As she succinctly puts it, “The central argument of this book is that variation in regional activism is explained not by differences in structural economic conditions but by differences in understandings of the economy, which, in particular institutional contexts, resulted in differences in the imagination of economic interests” (p. 11).

Herrera supports this claim by examining regional activism in Russia from 1990 through 1993. She points out that the institutional context of *perestroika* opened a window of opportunity for the regions to reconceptualize their positions in the USSR and then in the Russian Federation. This window, she argues, remained open until Russian President Boris Yeltsin forcefully dissolved the Supreme Soviet in October 1993 and the subsequent adoption of the December 1993 constitution resolidified center-regional relations. Herrera finds that during this period, comparing such objective regional economic indicators as income, unemployment levels, tax remittances, and so forth across the 55 “Russian” regions (that is, those territorial regions not explicitly identified with a non-Russian ethnic group) fails to predict which regions would engage in struggles for greater sovereignty. More importantly, she argues persuasively that the uncertain, data-poor environment of the early 1990s meant that the various regions had no way of actually knowing whether or not they were significantly economically disadvantaged in relation to one another. *Imagined Economies* thus places itself in opposition to previous studies of regional activism in Russia by scholars such as Steven Solnick, Henry Hale, and Daniel Treisman, whose arguments focus primarily on Russia’s ethnic regions and turn upon objective understandings of the regions’ relative economic positions vis-à-vis Moscow.

Herrera’s most significant contribution in this book is to bring the insights of constructivist political economy to the study of nationalism. In doing so she goes beyond a mere critique of previous scholarship to offer an intellectual framework for the study of imagined economies. Using schema theory and an adaptation of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus*, she argues that there is no one “real,” correct understanding of economic conditions to be contrasted with misunderstood or manipulated “false” ones. Rather, economic conditions are complex and economic data can be fairly interpreted in multiple and sometimes contradictory ways. Actors take material facts (“bits of data”) and subject them to cognition and interpretations mediated by habitus and institutions. This process leads to the development of intersubjective understandings of the economy, which then crystallize into specific economic and political interests such as sovereignty movements.

Herrera makes her empirical case for the importance of imagined economies in spurring sovereignty movements through a detailed comparison of the Samara and Sverdlovsk oblasts. She argues that although Samara’s economic relationship to the central government was “objectively” worse than Sverdlovsk’s, actors in Sverdlovsk *perceived* its economic situation much more negatively. Consequently, Sverdlovsk embarked upon a sovereignty movement while Samara did not. She demonstrates the differences in perception by means of a content analysis of 579 newspaper articles from the two regions published from 1990 through 1993, finding that those in Sverdlovsk consistently described their region’s economic relationship with Moscow in more negative terms than did those in Samara.

As a resident of Quebec, I am convinced that Herrera is on to something important when she posits a relationship between economic perceptions and sovereignty movements; for example, recent surveys here show that more than half of Quebec sovereignists believe that remaining a part of Canada is economically disadvantageous, while fewer than a fifth of Quebec federalists think so. But does regional activism arise from perceptions of economic exploitation, or do sovereignty movements themselves encourage a reimagining of economic relationships with the center as more exploitative? While Herrera argues for the central, causal role of imagined economies in determining relative regional activism in Russia, the empirical evidence she presents is more ambiguous. For example, one cannot tell from her data how many of the Sverdlovsk articles in the sample predate the active regional autonomy movement and the subsequent decisions of the regional government in early July 1993 to unilaterally raise its administrative status and to declare the creation of a Urals Republic. This makes it difficult to determine causality. The comparison also raises the question of how negative perceived economic relations must be in order to spark

regional activism, because according to the analysis, Samarans also thought that they were getting a bad deal from the central government (in Samara, 63% of the articles discussing Moscow's economic actions toward the region saw those actions as negative for Samara, as compared to 81% in Sverdlovsk [p. 186]). In addition, the discussion in Chapter 6 of the Sverdlovsk sovereignty movement acknowledges that proponents based their case as much on perceptions of constitutional and political inequality as on perceptions of economic injustice. To Herrera's credit, however, these concerns only become evident because she has presented her cases thoroughly and fairly, refusing to omit complicating information.

In short, despite these quibbles about the empirics, *Imagined Economies* clearly represents a significant theoretical contribution and corrective to the current literature on nationalism, and it sets a promising agenda for future research.

**Organized Labor in Postcommunist States: From Solidarity to Infirmity.** By Paul J. Kubicek. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004. 256p. \$29.95.

— Peter Rutland, *Wesleyan University*

What happened to organized labor when capitalism came to postcommunist Europe? Paul Kubicek provides a convincing answer to this question, based on case studies of Poland, Russia, Hungary, and Ukraine. He confirms the core story of labor weakness laid out in Stephen Crowley and David Ost, eds., *Workers After Workers' States* (2001). Kubicek draws on an impressive range of primary and secondary sources and dozens of interviews with union officials, mostly in 2001–2.

The central puzzle is why trade unions were not more influential, given their organizational resources and large pool of members (who now had the right to vote). Why were they not able to better defend their members from the painful economic changes of the early 1990s? The unions had greater potential, it seemed, than the other, weak actors present in the shattered postcommunist social landscape. Many predicted that class conflict would erupt following the introduction of radical market reform. But this did not occur (p. 69).

The answer to the puzzle of labor passivity is that the unions faced a double whammy—a disabling political legacy from their communist past and a host of new economic challenges as their countries introduced market reform and entered the global economy.

Most of the currently active unions in the region originated as official unions under the socialist state. New, independent unions have only recruited a small portion of the labor force and typically focused on playing national politics, rather than defending worker interests. The ex-official unions have a low level of public trust because of their former role as agents of management for the state

(p. 35). In addition, their communist experience left them and their members with a paternalist mentality, an expectation that in return for loyalty, employers or the state would look after their interests (p. 24).

Labor mostly stood by and watched while the region's governments introduced wrenching policies of stabilization, liberalization, and privatization. Even in Hungary, a Socialist Party government that came to power in 1994 launched a tough austerity program in 1995—ignoring union opposition (p. 41). In Poland and Hungary, unions were able to delay privatization, but its inexorable advance accelerated de-unionization (p. 147). Marketization has led to a widening gap between winners and losers, both across and within industries, undermining the solidarity needed for effective collective action (p. 149).

At the same time, these economies were opening up to globalization. International competition to drive down costs and increase labor flexibility had already eroded well-established unions in Western countries (p. 59). Each of Kubicek's country chapters includes a careful analysis of the impact of globalization. Most unionists seem surprisingly open to foreign investment, which they see as bringing jobs and better work conditions (pp. 98, 191). According to the author, "The Marxist mantra of worker solidarity has been replaced by one that argues that what is good for business is good for workers" (p. 204). But the situation varies from firm to firm, reflecting the foreign company's business culture and home country practices (p. 97). German firms like Volkswagen appear to be the most labor-friendly, while American and South Korean firms such as Daewoo are seen as the most hostile.

In the 1990s, union membership was still 25%–35% of the labor force in Eastern Europe—high by contemporary international standards—and was 70%–80% in Russia and Ukraine (p. 34). Membership has been steadily falling, dropping to 14% in Poland by 2001. The unions are now concentrated in the old, state-owned "sunset" industries, and have made few inroads into the "new economy" or small business sector.

The unions were drawn into tripartite, corporatist institutions alongside employers and the state, but these bodies were a facade and lacked a real decision-making function. In postsocialist Europe, corporatism is a sign of labor's weakness, not its strength (p. 40). Strike activity has been modest, and was spontaneous, not organized. But strikes did contribute to the fall of governments in Poland and Bulgaria in 1993 (p. 37).

Chapter 4 explores the Polish case. Solidarity stands out as the only large mass movement in the region, but its achievement was toppling communism rather than defending workers' rights. The Solidarity government of 1989–93 introduced shock therapy, causing part of the union to break away, and the Solidarity-backed government that returned to power from 1997 to 2001 was more concerned with preserving national and Christian values than

with labor issues (p. 84). Meanwhile, at the grassroots level, Solidarity had to compete for members with a union created by the communists in 1984. Kubicek concludes that in Poland, “[y]ears of ‘passive acceptance’ of various reform programs and management strategies have undermined unions’ ability to press forward a pro-labor agenda” (p. 93).

In Russia (Chapter 5), the old official unions managed to cling to their bureaucratic niche, despite backing the losing side in the October 1993 confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the parliament. The unions were punished by losing control of social insurance funds to employers. Since then they have tried to prove their loyalty to the state, even backing the government’s new labor code in 2001, which was condemned by independent unions for weakening collective bargaining rights (p. 110).

In Hungary (Chapter 6), the most successful transition economy, organized labor is divided among a plurality of competing unions. By 1994, the main successor union had fought off challenges from new right- and left-wing unions. But they also faced competition from elected works councils, introduced by the government to decentralize bargaining and weaken unions. In 1998, the new right-wing government dismantled the tripartite institutions and took away union control over health care and pensions.

The situation in Ukraine (Chapter 7) is similar to that of Russia, only more so. The reforms were slower, and the unions even more politically subdued—despite the high level of public discontent. East–West regional rivalries were an added complication deterring political action, although the independent miners’ union did join the “Ukraine without Kuchma” protests in 2000–2001 (p. 171).

Kubicek paints a convincing picture of union disenfranchisement across the region. There is little good news to report, but it would have helped to have more discussion of the specific issues in which unions have engaged, such as layoffs, wage arrears, and minimum wage laws. Given the low level of official unemployment in Russia and Ukraine, one wonders whether unions played any role in limiting layoffs and encouraging public sector hiring.

Kubicek does not find the prevailing Western approaches to the socialist transition very relevant in explaining union passivity. The civil society literature tends to ignore economic interests, while the transitologists, extrapolating from Latin America, look for pacts between the leaders of well-organized social actors. Such strong actors with well-defined interests were largely absent in Eastern Europe.

Perhaps the most important negative consequence of a weak labor movement is that this contributed to the failure of democracy to establish deep roots in postsocialist society. People have the power to turn out governments, but they do not have any confidence in the ones that are elected (p. 198).

**The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela.** Edited by Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 368p. \$49.95.

— Matthew Søberg Shugart, *University of California, San Diego*

The replacement of a “stable” democracy with an elected self-proclaimed “revolutionary” government—especially in a major petroleum-exporting country—demands the attention of comparative politics. Thus, this volume is a welcome addition to the rather thin body of scholarship on Venezuela. Comprised of essays by several leading students of Venezuelan politics, it locates the preconditions for Hugo Chavez’s rise in the vulnerabilities of the previous regime. Some chapters, including the conclusion, also attempt to explain the nature of the new government under Chavez. However, given the origins of the book in conference papers from 2000, the latter task is quite underdeveloped. A fuller analysis of the nature and structure of the Chavez government, now into the final year of its first full constitutional term, would have made the book all the more valuable. Nonetheless, its question about democracy’s “unraveling” is of great importance.

Unfortunately, the book does not provide a convincing explanation for why Venezuelan democracy failed. Analytical precision is hard to locate in characterizations of a political system as “an institutionalized limited democracy located in the gray zone” between liberal democracy and outright dictatorship (Jennifer McCoy, p. 294). Both the “Punto Fijo” regime—as the 1958–98 system is commonly called, after the house where its founding pact was signed—and Chavez’s “Fifth Republic” are characterized by this same vacuous concept of the “gray zone.” It is not anymore helpful that the introductory chapter (in pp. 6–8) orients the volume around three rather opposing “theoretical approaches.” These are, “structural” (i.e., political economy), “institutional” (understood narrowly as being about “political choices”), and “cultural” (political orientations and learning). The editors do not only their readers but also their own contributors a disservice by not synthesizing among these traditions or imposing a preference for one of them. In fact, very few of the chapters explicitly build on what is unveiled as the “Argument of the Book” (p. 6); only in the concluding chapter is there an attempt to recount the applicability of the approaches. (Apparently all three are equally applicable!)

Contained within the volume’s pages is a wealth of information—much of it not readily available elsewhere—about the trajectory of politics in Venezuela. For instance, perhaps the best chapter, by Jose Molina, provides one of the most succinct accounts available of the origins of the Punto Fijo political parties and the dynamics of the party system. At the height of the “institutionalization” of the party system (1973–93), the two main parties expressed almost all the organized interests of society, aside from business, which was represented in a more ad hoc manner.

Yet by 1998, a former lieutenant colonel who had tried to overthrow that party system by force six years earlier would be elected, Molina notes, precisely because he was the candidate who most consistently rejected any role for those parties. This is the essence of the puzzle of institutional decay that must be explained, and while the underlying conditions for that decay may be found in either political economy or culture, the story is fundamentally one of failed institutions.

Indeed, the editors recognize this primacy of institutions when they speak of the question of how variously described forms of “limited” democracy might become institutionalized (p. 2), how the Punto Fijo regime’s institutions remained “exclusionary” (p. 7), and so on. Yet notwithstanding the brief introductory chapter’s repeated references to institutions and their failure, few of the chapters explore these themes explicitly. Aside from Molina’s chapter on party systems and a very informative one by Harold Trinkunas on the military, institutions are largely absent. There is no chapter that explains the role of congress, and subnational governments and the judiciary are mentioned only briefly. Yet to understand democracy’s failure, we must understand why these checks on executive power—institutions that were present all along—were insufficient to secure democratic accountability.

Instead, the bulk of the volume consists of a set of chapters on “actors making political demands,” and a second set entitled “policy-making and its consequences.” Yet how these actors’ demands are aggregated and turned into policy is not explored, thus leaving the reader at a loss to determine whether Punto Fijo’s “representative democracy” was either. The format of narrowly focused topical chapters makes it challenging for the reader to digest what are too often chronological accounts—thus always resetting the clock to 1958 or earlier—into a coherent explanation for why democratic accountability failed so badly that a coup plotter was freely elected.

Of course, the very notion of “limited democracy” being institutionalized is an oxymoron. If democracy is limited, the implication is that there is no effective accountability to the electorate, but if an alternative font of accountability is likewise not institutionalized, then how can the regime itself be, in any meaningful sense? It would seem that authors such as David Myers might need to rethink Venezuela’s former status as “one of Latin America’s oldest and most respected democracies” (p. 24), especially if the regime’s elites considered their hold on power “precarious” (p. 26). Moreover, if the political parties that defined that regime were as discredited as Molina and other authors note, then the claim by both Molina and McCoy that the prior institutionalization of party competition allows a democratic culture to survive Chavez’s personalization and centralization of authority is called into question.

A contrary interpretation of the previous regime is hinted at by McCoy (p. 268), that the parties and their affiliated

organizations were so rigid that they could not incorporate new interests that arose in civil society (especially among the urban poor, as noted by Damarys Canache). This interpretation implies that the parties themselves—if not democracy per se—were *over*institutionalized, in the sense of being too rigid to adapt and maintain accountability to the electorate (as must be the case in a democracy). It is, moreover, possible that the new “Bolivarian” movement backing Chavez, and penetrating civil society, is the basis for a new (and, if it succeeds, potentially quasi-totalitarian) form of accountability—most likely not the “direct” democracy Chavez promises. These are profoundly important questions for understanding the failures of democracy and the rise of alternatives—not only in Venezuela. *The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela* provides ample information and food for thought about such questions, even if it fails to explore them from within any coherent framework.

**European Union Enlargement.** Edited by Neill Nugent. New York: Palgrave, 2004. 328p. \$75.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

—Stefano Bartolini, *Universita di Bologna*

The well-known difficulty of reviewing edited books is in this case enhanced by the high number of relatively short chapters (19) and also by the double ambition of this collective enterprise. On the one hand, the book deals, as the title suggests, with the recent and momentous enlargement of the European Union by the 10 Central and Eastern European countries finalized in 2004. The ambition of the editor is, however, broader. Actually, five to six of the 19 chapters deal with “enlargements,” that is, with the whole set of territorial accretions of the Community/Union, starting from the 1973 opening to the three northern countries (Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark), the 1981/86 broadening to the southern (Greece, Spain, and Portugal), the 1995 inclusion of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, and, finally, the “10+2” enlargement, referring therefore also to the two pending candidates of Romania and Bulgaria.

The first four general chapters, authored by Neill Nugent, are framed in reference to all the enlargements and deliberately try to identify similarities and differences, as distinctive and recurring features, in three main dimensions: 1) the negotiation processes, 2) the policy implications, and 3) the institutional implications of the enlargement itself. The various waves are therefore compared and ranged in terms of how much adaptation they required in the Community/Union.

Similarly, the two concluding chapters bring up again the general issue of enlargements. Lee Miles’s chapter reviews existing theories of integration (neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, multilevel governance, new institutionalism, and constructivism), debating

whether they have something to offer as a way to interpret the enlargements. This is a very important chapter because it clearly and directly addresses the issue of whether theories meant to explain the EU's internal developments can be used to explain the EU's territorial enlargement by new members. The results of this survey are meagre—at least in my view—but the chapter has the merit of raising the crucial question of the “theoretical” relationship between the internal consolidation of the EU and the enlargement of its external boundaries. In the context of a short chapter, the author does not fully develop this point, but he highlights the importance of this linkage and underlines its neglect in the predominant theorizing about the EU. In his concluding chapter, Nugent brings up again the general issue of implications and explanations of enlargements, and stretches the analysis to the further enlargements, foreseen or possible (not only Bulgaria and Romania but Turkey, the Balkan countries, the recalcitrant Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland, and, finally, the western former Soviet states).

In between these six chapters with a broader perspective, however, the book comprises 13 chapters that deal exclusively with specific aspects of the recent 10-country enlargement. The coverage is comprehensive, and no single aspect of the EU structure, processes, and policies is left out. Most of these chapters are very descriptive, and their quality diverges sharply. A special mention for the richness of the information and the lucidity of the analysis is owed to the chapters on the possible types of state alignments within the enlarged Union's Council (by M. Baum), to the implications for the budget and spending (by E. E. Zeff), to the implication of enlargement for the trade policy of the EU (by A. van den Hoven), and for justice and home affairs, with particular reference to crime control (by J. D. Occhipinti). Other mainly descriptive chapters concern the problems and prospects of the EU economy (N. Baltas), the internal market (G. M. Amorusi), and monetary union (M. Chang); of institutions and governance problems (D. Phinnemore); of international politics (C. Archer); and of development policy (M. Carbone).

The chapter by Gable, concerning a discussion about what the new members will “bring” to the Union, is not meant to provide detailed information. It argues the case that the 2004 enlargement, and future enlargements as well, will “encourage the EU to develop new areas of integration” and that all the problems generated by them will be eventually solved. However, this very optimistic view is not adequately sustained or documented. Finally, the two chapters devoted to the implications of enlargement for “identity” (L. Buonanno and A. Deakin) and “legitimacy and democracy” (J. Mather) are highly speculative and generally elusive. But this is probably inevitable, given that these same features characterize the literature on these topics for the old 15 members of the EU and that the

enlargement can only make these issues more complex and their evaluation more difficult in the short term.

In conclusion, the weaknesses of the book are those typical of large collective endeavors: the lack of a shared theoretical perspective; a certain amount of theme overlapping and redundancies, and the inequality in inspiration of single chapters. But the issue coverage and the information offered are impressive (the final detailed chronology and extensive bibliographical appendix are very useful). If we compare with the previous literature on enlargement, this book has the advantage of dealing with the 2004 enlargement at the moment it is completed, rather than with the process itself. It has the important feature of focusing more on the consequences of enlargement for the Union than for the applicant members. It links the issue of the 2004 enlargement to the broader question of the “theory of enlargements.”

Finally, one can mention that the overall book views the current and future enlargements positively and optimistically. Critical and skeptical views are absent. This represents the orientation of the authors, as well as the pre-TCE referendums climate. This optimism sounds less convincing in the current (summer 2005) mood of the EU milieu. Yet we do not know whether the new negative climate will become a more permanent feature of the enlarged EU, eventually affecting future enlargements, or whether it represents one of the many fluctuations in the life of the Union itself.

**Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden.** By Peter A. Swenson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 448p. \$24.95.

— Brian Waddell, *University of Connecticut*

Peter Swenson has written a thought-provoking and edifying work of comparative political economy that examines the causal relationship between national differences in capitalist interests and divergent welfare state development. Given Swenson's ambitious challenge to many existing accounts of welfare developments and his detailed historical analysis, this book should attract some well-deserved attention.

The book seeks to explain how the United States raced ahead of Sweden in developing national welfare state programs in the 1930s, despite the fact that Sweden enjoyed a strong labor movement, a dominant labor-based party, and a highly centralized parliamentary system. This “historical puzzle” is compounded by the fact that Sweden then slowly but surely built an exemplary comprehensive welfare state while the U.S. welfare state never fully followed through on its earlier and more substantive beginnings. Swenson finds lacking the standard explanations by institutionalists (led by Theda Skocpol) and power resource theorists (led by Gosta Esping-Andersen) because they

ignore the key supportive role played by capitalists. To bring capitalists into the explanation means rejecting the “equivalency premise” that class interests are fixed across national boundaries and that all capitalists oppose reform. In fact, Swenson finds that capitalists, as employers, are very interested in social reform as another way to steer and control labor market developments. And they often join with responsible labor leaders in “cross-class alliances” to support reformers developing social legislation.

The author argues that capitalists in different nations organize their labor markets differently, and this helps explain divergent welfare state developments. Using concepts borrowed from labor economics, he traces divergent Swedish and American labor market strategies over the course of the last century. He finds that Sweden, with its chronic labor shortages, developed a system of employer “solidarism” in which leading elements of Swedish capital supported low-wage compression by preventing individual employers from using higher wages and benefits to coax job-hopping by employees. Sweden’s organized labor leaders cooperated with this strategy because of the benefits they gained in return—greater job security for members, greater unity, and more stable leadership. And Swedish Social Democrats were all too willing to help stabilize and support this cross-class alliance with new types of governmental interventions designed to underwrite the stable low-wage compression demands of Swedish capital.

American capitalists, on the other hand, relied upon two completely different labor market strategies. In the excessively competitive sectors of the economy (coal mining, for example), capitalists developed “cartelism,” encouraging unions and later government social policies as devices to control and counter low-wage “chiselers” who exploited low-wage labor to gain market advantage. Monopoly-sector capitalists (automotive firms, for example), by contrast, developed “segmentalism,” utilizing high “efficiency” wages and company-based benefits (“welfare capitalism”) to keep unions at bay, create goodwill, and so increase labor productivity to match their higher investments in cutting-edge technologies. Segmentalists, too, supported social legislation during the 1930s to counter the Great Depression era’s cutthroat competition.

For Swenson, these divergent labor market systems greatly influenced the type of welfare state reforms that were subsequently pursued by reformers in each nation, as reformers listened to capitalists, and as capitalists supported reform efforts that fit their labor markets needs. The role of capitalists also explains the puzzling divergent timing of welfare state developments in each nation. During the 1930s, American employers proved more willing than their Swedish counterparts to support new forms of governmental interventions because of the unruly cutthroat competition unleashed by the Depression. Later, in the 1950s, Swedes and Americans reversed roles as Swed-

ish capitalists supported expanding comprehensive government benefits to undermine the growing use of private company-based social benefits to poach labor from the majority of low-wage employers. Meanwhile, American capitalists resisted expansive new social policies by increasing company-based private benefits.

These conclusions are much more startling with regards to the Swedish case, where scholars have focused on the great strength of organized labor and the labor-based Social Democratic Party. By putting capitalists at the heart of the story about Sweden’s comprehensive welfare state, Swenson turns much conventional thinking on its head. Nonetheless, his account only tweaks the scholarly understanding of the less universalistic U.S. welfare state. While institutionalists have assumed “monolithic capitalist opposition” (p. 222), other scholars from whom Swenson directly draws—including Gabriel Kolko, G. William Domhoff, and Colin Gordon—specifically examine the diverse sentiments among American capitalists and how these interests intersected with reform efforts.

Swenson, though, seeks to steer a course between an institutionalism that ignores capitalists and an instrumentalism that makes too much of capitalist input. He seeks a theory that “neither ignores nor exaggerates capitalist influence” (p. 238), and so opts for an “institutionalism open to the notion that capitalists are a force to be reckoned with in capitalist society” (p. 244). He does this by focusing on the key role of reformers who build on existing cross-class alliances to orchestrate reform legislation that will survive post-crisis rollbacks. Capitalists signal to reformers what measures they will accept, and reformers in turn build these preferences into reform legislation. His evidence for this is much stronger in the Swedish case, but still, to the extent that he shows capitalist preferences dictating the direction and pace of even welfare state development, he reveals a rather powerful version of capitalist input into, and leverage over, politics. In fact, as he notes, his account counters Esping-Andersen’s commonly accepted view that welfare policies are “de-commodifying” by sheltering workers from market forces. Since capitalists often support many successful types of social reform, welfare states do not embody clear victories by workers over capitalists.

Swenson’s analysis, however compelling, leaves some broader issues untheorized and unexamined. He seems to have absorbed the perspective of labor economics so well that he continually blames labor militancy when cross-class alliances fail to form or when they fall apart. Real issues of power and class struggle—certainly of importance when discussing capitalist relations with labor and with government—are simply overlooked or discussed functionally in terms of the technical difficulties of solving labor market disequilibria. And by arguing that the American head start over Sweden in the area of social reform “derived from profound differences in employers’ regulatory interests” (p. 12), Swenson simply overlooks

the far more unruly and disruptive social movement experience in the United States.

Swenson also begins and ends *Capitalists Against Markets* with references to Karl Polanyi. But for Polanyi, welfare and environmental measures do represent a countermovement against commodification and a power loss for capitalists. Hence, however conducive at times to capitalist interests, reform measures do engender a real tension between commodification and de-commodification and a real ambivalence on the part of many American capitalists in particular, a tension and ambivalence that have become all too obvious of late.

**New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European Welfare State.** Edited by Peter Taylor-Gooby. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 264p. \$115.00 cloth, \$35.00 paper.

— Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona*

The comparative welfare state literature has taken some important turns in the past decades, moving first from a focus on the causes of its growth to studies of retrenchment. Lately, scholarship has become more preoccupied with welfare state adaptation to the new risk and needs structure. This book falls squarely in the latter camp and includes European scholars, such as Bruno Palier, Giuliano Bonoli, and Peter Taylor-Gooby, who have been exploring this theme for some years now.

The starting point is that modern societies give rise to a set of new risks that are distinct from the traditional risk menu around which most welfare states were—and most often remain—molded. The new risks emerge primarily from demographic change, such as new household forms and aging; from labor market transformation, such as more unemployment and precariousness; and also from ongoing welfare state adaptation, such as pension reform and privatization. According to Taylor-Gooby et al. the new risks are distinct because they are often of a more transitory nature and because they affect citizens and life's stages that traditionally were not seen as being at risk. Illustrative key examples include the problems of reconciling work and motherhood, the risk of dependency in old age, and social exclusion.

Considering that contemporary welfare states were built around the risk structure of the old industrial era, the book's key question is how governments respond and adapt to the new reality. In sampling European countries that represent the variety of welfare regimes, the meat of the book lies in six chapters that provide country case studies and one that examines the evolving social policy role of the European Union. Much of the book's appeal lies in its rigorous and uniform chapter organization, each one beginning with a synoptic presentation of the intensity and pervasiveness of new risks in the respective country, followed by an examination of how government policy has

responded. Taylor-Gooby's opening and closing chapters wrap it all up very well by highlighting cross-national similarities and diversity.

To begin with, one should congratulate the authors for their effort to present unusually well informed portraits of risk development and welfare state adaptation. With few exceptions, the country case studies are rigorous and comprehensive and yet succinct. For readers who seek a quick but solid panorama of welfare policies in contemporary Europe, this book is the place to start. One clear message that comes across is that all advanced countries face a set of essentially convergent new risk scenarios, in particular as regards employment precariousness, the difficulties of reconciling careers and motherhood, and the specter of severe dependency in old age. On one count, not surprisingly, there is more variation—namely, with regard to risks associated with ongoing welfare reforms and privatization, most notably in pension entitlements. Citizens face far more serious risks of inadequate protection where, as in the UK, governments have pursued radical privatization. It is a great pity that the book excludes the United States where, arguably, social inequalities and insecurity have risen most dramatically.

The greatest value of *New Risks, New Welfare* comes from its country-based examination of government responses. From the assembled case studies it is evident that convergent risk trends provoke highly divergent if not orthogonal policy. Much of the policy variation can be ascribed to path dependencies, adapting the old policy logic to new problems. Thus, Britain continues to favor targeting; Germany built its elderly care policy on top of the social insurance system; and Scandinavia's age-old adherence to universalism is replicated also in its child and old-age services. But there is also an unfolding process of regime "trespassing." The Bismarckian models, like France, are adding an array of general revenue-financed social-assistance programs to address new risks, and this results in a certain welfare state dualism that mirrors evolving "insider-outsider" cleavages in society.

Besides path dependencies, there are other key factors at work. Governmental decentralization and a proliferation of veto points clearly slow down the process of adaptation, as is very evident in Switzerland and Germany. Financial constraints, especially as a consequence of the Maastricht Treaty's stipulations, are clearly also a major impediment to the launching of serious and therefore expensive new social policies. The chapter on EU policies is, in this respect, of special interest. Trine Larsen and Taylor-Gooby provide an excellent bird's-eye synopsis of EU-level policy making and raise the interesting hypothesis that member countries seek to push responsibility for the new risks toward EU institutions. But the EU is, in turn, blocked from intervening directly in social policy and responds therefore with mainly nonbinding targets, using the Open Method of Coordination, or with attempts

to include social objectives in its employment directives. This suggests that EU integration is creating a policy vacuum by, on the one hand, restraining countries from spending their way out of rising social problems and, on the other hand, by refraining from picking up the slack.

All in all, this is a valuable book for those who seek a well-documented, no-nonsense, and up-to-date perspective on welfare state adaptation in Europe. It has its faults and weaknesses. There is virtually no systematic coverage of active labor market policies and their role in combating social exclusion. Considering that Denmark is here the most innovative and ambitious policymaker, it is a pity that the Nordic chapter omitted the Danish case. A second major shortcoming is that immigration is completely ignored, especially when we consider that immigrants must be hugely overrepresented among the new-risk clienteles in areas such as social exclusion and employment precariousness. And since the book explicitly assumes that the new risks tend to be more transitory than the old ones, it would have helped if the focus had been more on life course dynamics and mobility. Finally, there are questions that many readers probably will raise but which the book does not. Financial constraints are surely important, but how come heavy welfare spenders like Denmark and Sweden seem more able to overcome them than lean spenders like Spain or Italy? And why are strong unions in Northern Europe less an obstacle to reform than weak unions in, say, France?

**How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan.** By Kathleen Thelen. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 352p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

— David Finegold, *Keck Graduate Institute of Applied Life Sciences*

The theory of evolution is under attack. In this case, however, the attacker, Kathleen Thelen, comes armed with far more plausible evidence than the proponents of “intelligent design,” and the creatures being analyzed are not plants and animals but key economic institutions, such as vocational training systems, organized labor, and employer organizations.

In political economy, as in the natural sciences, the prevailing current view of evolution is “punctuated equilibrium”—the theory that long periods of relative stability are disrupted by exogenous shocks (e.g., an economic or asteroid crash) that give rise to relatively clean slates when it is possible to make radical changes in existing ecosystems. In *How Institutions Evolve*, Thelen uses a two-pronged historical approach to challenge this view. Combining a cross-case comparison of the origins of skill-development systems in the United States, Britain, Japan, and Germany at the start of the twentieth century with a century-long longitudinal analysis of the evolution of the German training system, she demonstrates that there is a

strong path dependence in the history of how institutions evolve in each country. In her account, the strategies of firms in core skill-intensive sectors such as metalworking interacted with the associations of craftsmen who had traditionally controlled the training of skilled workers to shape each nation’s institutional structures, structures that continue to exert a strong influence in how each of these economies operate today. As she summarizes: “In Germany, metalworking firms at century’s end were concerned to certify skills, in Britain to reassert managerial control, in Japan to dampen labor mobility, and in the United States the goal was above all to rationalize production and *reduce dependence on skilled labor altogether* (author’s italics) through technological change, work reorganization, and product standardization” (pp. 280–281).

Not only did the development of these early institutions have lasting consequences, but Thelen also argues that even radical shocks will not necessarily disrupt these systems. On the contrary, Germany’s experience following the loss of two world wars and later reunification with East Germany demonstrates that “in times of crisis or deep uncertainty, political actors often specifically eschew experimentation and instead fall back on familiar formulas—resulting in institutional reproduction not change” (p. 292).

Although she critiques the punctuated equilibrium view of institutional change, Thelen is careful to avoid the other extreme of overly determined path dependence. In her view of history, institutions once formed do not lock policymakers into certain choices; rather, they are like sharks that must keep moving and adapting to their changing environment if they are to survive. One of the book’s most important contributions is showing how key policy actors—for example, large German employers and labor unions—who originally opposed the creation of a craft-dominated apprenticeship system, were able to transform the system over time to meet their needs, eventually becoming key pillars supporting the German model of training. Although not using the term, Thelen’s account supports Stephen J. Gould’s evolutionary concept of “exaptation,” where an institution (or organism), originally intended for one purpose evolves to perform a very different function.

Thelen’s in-depth historical analysis thus provides key insights on how institutions form and change that are of relevance to scholars well beyond those interested in skills issues. The question she leaves unresolved, however, is what type of change occurs when a closely intertwined set of institutions is no longer well adapted to its environment as, some have argued, is now the case for the German model. Falling back on the traditional apprenticeship approach was not only familiar but also a functional solution to the problem of high youth unemployment following World War II and reunification, but this approach



appears not to be working as well today. In her brief analysis of the contemporary German situation, Thelen reviews a number of forces that threaten the German dual system in ways that may differ from past crises—intensified competition, shifts to more team-based production systems, an imbalance between the costs and benefits of apprenticeships to employers, the challenges posed by reunification, and the availability of a greater supply of university graduates. To her discussion of international competitive pressures she might have added the expansion of the European Union and the rapid emergence of China and India as much lower cost competitors in manufacturing and high-tech services, which have further increased the low-cost labor alternatives open to German employers. As the author notes, a growing number of German companies have been defecting from the apprenticeship system, with a consequent decline in the number of training places and a sharp increase in the level of youth unemployment.

What Thelen avoids is reaching any conclusions on whether the German apprenticeship system can be adapted once again to cope with this new set of demands, and if so, what changes are needed. Rather, as a careful historian, she notes that while the system is under serious stress, it would be premature to declare the death of the German model, and that any solution will mean finding ways to keep “individual firms invested (and investing) in the system” (p. 277). Even here, however, her analysis is equivocal. She notes on the one hand that the “German vocational training system . . . rests on (firms) *voluntarily* taking apprentices.” On the other hand, she says that “no one can force German firms to train,” and then a few sentences later refers to Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s proposed “government-imposed training levy” (p. 276).

The recent experience of the British education and training system suggests that potentially, even radical changes in skill outcomes may be accomplished within Thelen’s exaptation approach of transforming existing institutions. Trapped in a “low-skill equilibrium” and lacking the institutional supports to reinvent its own failing apprenticeship system, Britain opted for a U.S.-style skills solution. In less than a generation, Britain has shifted from an elite higher education (HE) system, with one of the lowest participation rates among the developed countries, to a mass HE system that is now graduating more young people with degrees (33% of the cohort) than the United States, with a target of 50% of young people receiving an HE qualification by 2010. This broadening of participation was accomplished with essentially the same institutions through a set of policy changes that included reform of the examination system, the merging of polytechnics and universities into a unified and much more competitive HE sector, alteration of funding rules to reward further education and HE institutions that attracted students, and a controversial decision to ask individuals to bear a small portion of the costs of their HE for the first time.

The British case does not offer the right solution to Germany’s current economic and skills issues, but rather suggests, like Thelen’s strong comparative and historical analysis, that the most likely answer to Germany’s current malaise will involve key actors adapting existing German institutions to the challenges of the knowledge-driven economy of the twenty-first century.

**Human Rights in Russia.** By Jonathan Weiler. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. 165p. \$49.95.

— Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., *Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies*

This is a revisionist book. Jonathan Weiler breaks with the fundamentally positive vision of post-Soviet “reform and democratization” that prevailed among Western analysts of Russia during *perestroika* and the Yeltsin years, and still dominates American and European governments’ policy.

Weiler asserts that “politically motivated violations are comparatively low in contemporary Russia,” and does not dispute the characterization of Russia as a democracy (pp. 3, 21). He focuses instead on the less examined human rights violations “that arise from the effects of political processes and policies” (p. 4), *indirectly*. In five chapters he examines abuses in prisons, against women (including domestic violence), orphans, ethnic Caucasians, and other “dark-skinned” outsiders, and against military conscripts, as well as the results of the two Chechnya wars. How we should categorize these in relation to other abuses is an issue on which contemporary debate lacks clarity, and Weiler does not really address the issue. But his book has great value in highlighting the magnitude of these side effects of “democracy and reform.”

Weiler sees clearly that one of the primary reasons for infringement of Russians’ rights is the *weakness of the state*. And he is right to see privatization, decline of state share of GNP, and (perhaps) decentralization as factors weakening it. He displays a keen perception of Russian reality in defining “the mantra of contemporary Russian reform” as “anything goes” (p. 76). The result, in a wonderful phrase, is “microtyrannies” (pp. 14 and *passim*) throughout Russian society. I wished that Weiler had followed up this brilliant suggestion: “The violence that accompanies much of this corruption may be . . . an attempt to justify the perverseness of the situation: if the victim of corruption is rendered subhuman, the act becomes easier to justify” (p. 100). This insight might have been explored further. Are the microtyrannies ultimately divorced from politics? Perhaps the narrow elites that seized public resources during privatization encourage, consciously or subconsciously, anarchy and exploitation among ordinary citizens in order to keep the citizens who are nominally masters of the system passive and demoralized. Although it would be difficult to bring systematic evidence to bear for or against

such an interpretation, *dedovshchina* (brutalization of younger conscripts or, as Weiler notes, orphans and prisoners, by the older or fiercer ones), well described by the author, seems to have functioned this way in the Soviet system. In any case, all the conditions he describes exist because of the fundamental powerlessness of Russian citizens.

*Human Rights in Russia* does have significant defects. The important chapter on the Chechnya wars seems less informed than the others. Weiler ends his book by comparing Russian human rights with conditions elsewhere, broadening into a critique of neoliberalism. Such comparisons are important but difficult; neither the author nor this reviewer knows all the relevant comparisons equally well. All Weiler's examples are drawn from Latin America, which is appropriate as an area where the state has often become the instrument of private interests and has also empowered informal armed groups to carry out state agendas. There is, however, a crucial contrast. In Russia, a strong state changed quickly into a weak state. In Latin America, most of the postcolonial states were always weak. Therefore it is far more plausible in Russia that neoliberalism greatly weakened the state to the detriment of human rights.

To understand this change in Russia, which was not anticipated by political scientists, it would also be necessary to explore the elements of weakness in the communist state. In a brief review, I can mention only how the state was penetrated and used by a "private" organization, the apparatus of the Communist Party. In general, the communist past tends to be discounted as a cause of human rights conditions by Weiler (see pp. 117, 127, 127, 130). About Chechnya, for example, he concludes: "These [dire consequences] do not flow ineluctably from the deformities of Soviet communism (though, of course, those play a part) or from defects in the Russian character. Rather there has been a confluence of social, economic and political forces that are not unique to Russia" (pp. 117–18). Of course, Weiler tends to minimize Soviet factors to counter the sometimes shameless extenuation of Russian abuses by its recent past. The trigger for the two Chechnya wars was its secession, something strictly post-Soviet. But is it right to consider post-Soviet causes more important than Soviet? The use of a Russian city the size of Trenton, New Jersey, as a free fire zone for artillery, bombers, and missiles would, I think, be impossible without the Leninist tradition of overcoming morality and, as Nathan Leites showed long ago (*A Study of Bolshevism* [1953]), a mentality they conceived as endemic to Russian culture. Likewise, the general treatment of Chechens and Caucasians is hard to imagine without the Soviet tradition of isolating and stigmatizing groups such as Kulaks, Jews, and "bourgeois nationalists," that is, members of the non-Russian nationalities.

Finally, the footnotes and bibliography give an odd impression. Although Weiler seems to know Russia well,

there are few sources, beyond the many interviews, in Russian—as though a Russian fact or sentiment does not become a datum for scientific collection until it has been registered by the ponderous apparatus of international elite metaexperience. To rely on the international and scientific community accords with the equally current belief that area studies is a rusty survival. But does it not invite the very perversion of understanding that Weiler so well criticizes in the neoliberal approach to Russia during the 1990s? We took for granted the neoliberal "Washington consensus" as a way of reform valid in general, one that spared us the need to weigh carefully the distinctive circumstances of the former Soviet Union. In retrospect, we were postulating an *ideology* that blinded us to experience. We were acting, in fact, just like the Soviet advisors to Ethiopia in the seventies who advised, oblivious of their own experience for 40 years, that collective farms would improve Ethiopian agriculture. At a moment in human history when the apparatus for collecting, weighing, transmuting, testing, and theorizing information is vaster than ever before, we still need to plunge as deeply as we can into the things themselves.

**Educating Citizens: International Perspectives on Civic Values and School Choice.** Edited by Patrick J. Wolf and Stephen Macedo, with David J. Ferrero and Charles Venegoni. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. 397p. \$59.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Eric Gorham, *Loyola University New Orleans*

Not to be confused with the Carnegie Foundation book carrying the same title, *Educating Citizens* is a very good resource for those who want to learn about how Western European societies have considered the issue of school choice. The editors have collected a series of reports on how private, generally religious, schooling has operated in the most developed countries of Europe, and they conclude that a variety of educational choices will benefit primary and secondary schooling in the United States. However, such choices must be well regulated to ensure the development of civic values among youth here. They argue for "a certain sort of publicly funded pluralism in education; pluralism justified by value differences but contained by significant regulation and tamed by systems that ensure accountability" (p. 4).

The editors introduce the volume by reviewing and summarizing the chapters in the book, and so can save some readers the time or trouble to actually read the whole text. Their aforementioned conclusions do not always concur with those of the authors of individual chapters, and so readers may want to examine more closely the country chapters that most interest them. Part I includes case studies that begin with the most pluralist systems and "proceed, roughly, toward systems that provide less scope for school choice" (p. 9): the Netherlands, Britain, Belgium,

Canada, Germany, France, and Italy. Jaap Dronkers concludes the section with a comparative essay on the relative success of private schools in cognitive and civic training.

While all the country studies provide information useful for researchers interested in this particular topic, Denis Meurat's essay on France and, to a lesser degree, Luisa Ribolzi's on Italy will capture the attention of nonspecialists. Meurat, especially, has succeeded in explaining deep historical differences between France and more "pluralist" systems of school choice arising from the relationship of church, state, and the individual. He also dares to include his own experiences in the French school system as a means of helping readers understand school choice phenomenologically. All contributors in this section present information and analyses of their countries in a clear and competent manner; Meurat and Ribolzi demonstrate an understanding of theirs that transcends the research data and helps place issues in a broader cultural and philosophical context.

Part II consists of essays by William Galston, Richard Garnett, Charles Glenn, and John Witte, with Charles Venegoni and David Ferrero linking evidence from these countries to issues of civic education in the United States. Galston recognizes differences between Europe and the United States on issues of civic education and school choice, and he recommends policy instruments least foreign to our system, such as Alberta's exit exam in social studies. Garnett, Glenn, and, to some degree, Witte suggest fewer regulations than do the editors of the volume, and so readers can learn from a variety of viewpoints. For the most part, these four contributors do not advocate policies learned from European systems; so the other essayists failed, ironically, to impress upon some learned contributors "the ways in which the countries we examine here regulate school choice for the sake of promoting the public benefits of choice" (p. 5). Venegoni and Ferrero read the evidence from the Netherlands as a model for a regulated pluralist system of school choice here—and their essay provides a bookend to the volume that tries to keep it "on message."

The editors had other difficulties keeping the contributors on message. On the one hand, all the authors considered civic education as a theme, but the North American contributors understood the editors' charge better than some of their European counterparts. Jan De Groof's analysis of Belgium ignores the topic, for the most part; Ben Vermeulen discusses only legal and constitutional issues relevant to civic education, as do Neville Harris and Stephen Gorard writing on Britain. On the other hand, European contributors emphasize sociological foundations of the issue, while David Campbell or the authors in Part II do not for Canada and the United States. So although participants wrote about political education and choice, many did not choose to learn a common conceptual language about citizenship training—another ironic consequence of the conference out of which this volume arose.

Nonetheless, all the essays in the book are thoughtful, scholarly, and worthy of consideration by those interested in the particular subject matter(s).

Important voices that are not heard here regarding K–12 education and school choice are those of students. Some contributors surveyed parents, politicians, and school officials, but researchers ought to listen to children and discover what they understand about their own schools and citizenship. The strength of this collection is to collate official academic discourse on the topic; its shortcomings present opportunities for future research into what students and citizens actually think about the issue.

The editors pose a central concluding question: "[W]hat combination of choice and regulation, legal limits, requirements, tests, and incentives will allow U.S. society to realize all of its important public educational values?" (p. 25). Yet because no democratic society has ever realized all of its important public educational values, can such a question even be answered? Given the alleged pluralism in this country, can we talk about a coherent set of public educational values, or should we be asking ourselves different questions?

Here are other questions future researchers may want to consider: Does the language of school choice obscure ways in which parents and students understand civic values? Who chooses how citizens discuss school choice? Are there things "about which it is preferable not to talk, hence the absence of research" (Meurat, p. 261) on issues such as the voice of individual citizens most affected by choice? Research in this area would contribute greatly to the civic education of academics and, maybe, other citizens.

**The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior.** Edited by Alan S.

Zuckerman. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005. 368p. \$72.50 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

— Michael Laver, *New York University*

The central premise of this edited collection is set out with admirable clarity on the first page of the opening chapter: "It is both obvious and well-known that the immediate social circumstances of people's lives influence what they believe and do about politics. Even so, relatively few political scientists incorporate these principles into their analysis" (p. 3). Alan Zuckerman tackles this problem with a selection of chapters, written by authors with a range of intellectual pedigrees, that set out to show how what is "both obvious and well-known" can be incorporated into rigorous political science. The individual chapters are too numerous and diverse to review in detail here. What is perhaps more useful is to consider the extent to which, taken together, they map out a potentially fruitful line of future development for the discipline.

Much is made by several authors to the contributions made by the "Columbia School" of political sociology,

and a casual reader might take this book as something of an homage to the past glories of this research tradition. Despite a certain amount of nostalgia in the prose at certain points, however, all of the chapters are essentially forward looking. The interesting question to ask is whether they collectively reflect an ongoing “sociological turn” in political science. This turn may in part be about reopening classic but recently neglected questions, but it may also reflect a recent and vigorous growth of interest in the analysis of social networks in general, and in particular of the impact of social networks on the evolution of individual preferences.

What the chapters highlight very clearly is the gulf—which may now be narrowing rather than widening—between economic and sociological models of politics. Of the many ways of characterizing this gulf, these essays help us see that perhaps the most important has to do with the source and trajectory of individual preferences. “Economic” models (focusing as they typically do on markets rather than marketing) almost invariably take individual preferences and tastes as raw primitives. “Sociological” models almost invariably see preferences and tastes both as endogenous and as one of the most important things to be explained. The distinctive contribution of *The Social Logic of Politics* is to refocus our attention on the source and evolution of preferences, while at the same time demonstrating that this can be done without sacrificing the rigor and discipline of modern political science.

Thus, Robert Huckfeldt, Paul E. Johnson, and John Sprague (Chapter 2), Lavia Stoker and M. Kent Jennings (Chapter 3), Alan S. Zuckerman, Jennifer Fitzgerald, and Josip Dasovic (Chapter 4), Sidney Verba, Kaylehan Schlozman, and Nancy Burns (Chapter 5), and Jeffrey Levine (Chapter 7) all use the sophisticated and rigorous analyses of survey evidence to explore ways in which political choice and attitudes are affected by the other humans with whom survey respondents say they interact—holding constant all of the usual causal suspects. These chapters combine to provide us with a systematic empirical documentation, for the United States at least, of what the opening chapter claimed to be “obvious and well-known.” The evidence is convincing.

There is, of course, always the potential for selection bias—not explored in detail in this book—in survey evidence on the “network contacts” of respondents. It seems at least plausible that those explicitly named by respondents as people with whom they discuss politics may be a biased selection of those with whom politics is actually discussed—contacts who are more similar in views or more persuasive, perhaps. In this context, the distinctive and innovative approach used by the political geographers Ron J. Johnston and Charles J. Pattie (Chapter 10) is of particular interest. Building on British survey evidence, these authors constructed, for every one

of the 2,731 respondents in the British Election Study, “a series of bespoke neighborhoods around their homes, containing the nearest 500, 1000, 2500, 5000 and 10000 residents” (p. 188). They assembled independent socio-economic data for each of these neighborhoods and showed that the individual’s bespoke neighborhood had a strong contextual effect on voting, controlling for all relevant individual-level characteristics. This is an elegant way to show the effect of social context on individual behavior.

While most of the book chapters apply new evidence and techniques to classic questions, the final two chapters, under the section heading “Looking Ahead,” introduce new research paradigms. If our premise is that the preferences of one person are endogenous to the preferences of others, then we self-evidently have a complex system. Techniques of simulation and agent-based modeling have been developed, within what we might think of as the “Santa Fe School,” to handle such problems, which can prove quite intractable using traditional methods.

The contribution by Paul E. Johnson and Robert E. Huckfeldt (Chapter 13) uses agent-based modeling to wrestle with one of the most serious inconsistencies generated by many models of endogenous preferences: that recursive mutual influence of individuals’ preferences on each other tends to lead to an evolution of the system toward total preference homogeneity—which we do not observe empirically. Their solution is neither to erect barriers to interaction between individuals nor to introduce random mutations of tastes, but to model strong local reinforcement effects on the way that individual interactions affect opinion change.

Finally, James H. Fowler offers a “small world” model of turnout (Chapter 14). We might well question the substantive plausibility of the conclusion that cost-benefit calculations associated with turning out to vote are affected by “turnout cascades,” whereby one person turning out affects the turnout probability of others. However, this chapter is very significant in the context of this book in that it is the only one to use what we might think of as the “new network sociology” pioneered by scholars such as Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz—and indeed to refer to this literature. While turnout may be one of the less promising applications, the arguments advanced in many of the empirical chapters in *The Social Logic of Politics* cry out for the type of theoretical microfoundation that could be provided by the rigorous network modeling used by Fowler in the book’s final chapter.

Overall, this is an important collection of essays, since few of us would deny the book’s fundamental assumption about what is obvious and well known, yet few of us really know what to do about implementing rigorous models of complex political interactions with endogenous preferences. This is an essential read for those who worry about such matters.

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## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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### **International Relations Under Risk: Framing State**

**Choice.** By Jeffrey D. Berejikian. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 152p. \$40.00.

— William A. Boettcher, III, *North Carolina State University*

This book challenges the rational choice assumptions that undergird much of the extant international relations literature on deterrence, bargaining, cooperation, economic behavior, and the exercise of power. In an ambitious extension of his previous work, Jeffrey D. Berejikian attempts to construct “a new set of theoretical propositions about international politics securely anchored to empirical research in cognitive psychology” (p. 2). In the tradition of Graham T. Allison’s (1971) *Essence of Decision*, Berejikian meticulously demonstrates the degree to which behavioral expectations regarding strategic interaction are tied to underlying conceptual models of decision making. He substitutes prospect theory’s empirically grounded observations regarding framing effects and loss aversion for rational choice assumptions regarding invariance and net asset valuation. The result is a comprehensive cognitive model of state interaction that is capable of explaining preference reversals, risk acceptance, and non-maximizing choice. The boldness of this enterprise more than compensates for minor flaws in execution.

The publication of *International Relations Under Risk* marks the culmination of more than a decade of work attempting to integrate prospect theory into international relations research. The book includes portions of articles published in the *American Political Science Review* and the *Journal of Peace Research*, as well as a significant amount of new material that molds the chapters into a very coherent whole. The book flows smoothly—from an introduction and defense of prospect theory in Chapters 1 and 2; to the modification of basic expectations regarding strategic interaction in Chapters 3, 4, and 5; to an empirical investigation of the cognitive models in Chapters 6 and 7. The empirical chapters focus on European Community (EC) and United States decision making involving the negotiations that eventually produced the Montreal Protocol restricting chlorofluorocarbon production. The author concludes that observed shifts in negotiating frames and risk-acceptant cooperation can only be explained by cognitive models of choice.

Berejikian’s introduction and defense of prospect theory is relatively brief. The uninitiated reader would find a better review in Chapter 2 of Rose McDermott’s (1998) *Risk-taking in International Politics* (as he readily acknowledges, p. 123, n. 6). The author does, however, introduce the relevant concepts—reference points, aspiration

levels, the s-shaped value function, framing effects, the endowment effect, and loss aversion. The credibility of prospect theory as an alternative to rational choice theory is then carefully established. Berejikian reviews the massive body of literature utilizing prospect theory in a range of disciplines, emphasizing its empirical success and noting the Nobel committee’s recent endorsement of behavioral economics (p. 2). The review of the application of prospect theory to international relations puzzles is less persuasive. Much of the first generation work that he cites has been heavily criticized, and some more recent publications in the area are oddly omitted (most notably, James W. Davis’s *Threats and Promises*, 2000). Berejikian’s responses to critiques regarding differences between the “real world” and laboratory setting, the identification of reference points, the data requirements of the theory, and collective versus individual choice are spirited, but not completely convincing. Too often the default defense is that a “similar critique applies equally to rational choice” (p. 17) or that the explanatory power of prospect theory is “an empirical question” (p. 21).

The strength of the book and the author’s most significant contribution to the literature can be found in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. In each chapter, Berejikian initially “presents the logic and behavioral expectations of a rational model . . . then modifies or extends the analysis by integrating prospect theory” (p. 2). Over the course of a mere 50 pages, he undermines rationalist understandings of military deterrence, economic threats, negotiation, cooperation, collective action problems, and the relative versus absolute gains debate. In several instances, the integration of prospect theory’s descriptive observations produces counterintuitive expectations regarding strategic interaction. Where prospect theory and rational choice models offer similar predictions, Berejikian contends that prospect theory more accurately characterizes the *process* of decision making (see pp. 5–6). He constructs cognitive models that reveal how credible deterrent threats can induce a “losses frame” and produce a risk-acceptant challenge (p. 41); how losses frames can produce both “new cooperative agreements” and “defection within established cooperation” (p. 57); how framing effects illuminate the different aspects of collective action problems that “require governments to make a contribution from existing endowments” versus those that “restrict consumption of an existing resource” (p. 61); and why “states in a gains frame pursue absolute gains and are risk averse, whereas states in a losses frame chase relative gains and are risk acceptant” (p. 76).

Armed with this new set of expectations (derived from prospect theory) regarding strategic behavior, Berejikian embarks on a study of the EC and U.S. negotiating strategies that eventually resulted in their acceptance of the Montreal Protocol. Chapters 6 and 7 reveal the extent to

which shifts in problem frames favored risk-acceptant strategies to secure relative advantage by the EC and the United States. The interaction of these strategies then produced unintended cooperation on a major environmental issue (see pp. 96–97). The author demonstrates a significant depth of knowledge about the cases—identifying the dynamic positions of relevant government, multinational, and domestic political actors. He does fall prey to some of the problems associated with identifying problem frames (too often suggesting that actors are “in” a frame, instead of focusing on how alternatives are framed) and measuring the subjective probabilities and utilities associated with outcomes under consideration (relying on ordinal estimates of utility and verbal representations of probability), but the cases are clearly intended to illustrate and not fully test the comprehensive cognitive model.

In the end, Berejikian clearly succeeds in his effort to demonstrate the value of integrating empirical observations from cognitive psychology into our models of state interaction. Descriptive knowledge of how individuals and groups actually make decisions increases the predictive *and* explanatory value of our conceptual models. For Berejikian and other scholars impressed by contemporary cognitive research, the “as if” defense of the rationalist enterprise is no longer adequate (pp. 5–6).

**The Limits of Transparency: Ambiguity and the History of International Finance.** By Jacqueline Best. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 240p. \$37.50.

— Kathleen R. McNamara, *Georgetown University*

While social constructivism has moved into the mainstream of international relations theory, informing scholarship in the subfields of security studies and international organization, its application and status in international political economy (IPE) has lagged behind. From the articles in the highest-status political science journals to the works on graduate syllabi across the major research universities, the study of IPE has been dominated by a single view of markets, drawn from neoclassical economics, premised on a narrow view of rationality, and rooted in materialist foundations.

Over the past few years, however, a growing body of work in IPE and comparative political economy has emerged to challenge this approach. Jacqueline Best makes an important contribution to this emerging tradition. Her well-written and thoughtful new book offers novel insights on the history of the Bretton Woods system and a template for the governance of the contemporary international monetary system, while convincingly making the case for the merits of a constructivist approach to political economy. But her book also demonstrates the challenges faced by scholars seeking to understand how markets are socially constructed and culturally embedded. Best thus provides a convincing rejoinder to those who might argue

that there is no place for constructivist work in IPE, while her work provides clues as to what this literature still needs to accomplish as it establishes itself as part of the traditional canon.

The central puzzle of *The Limits of Transparency* is rooted in an important real world issue: How can international financial markets, often highly fragile and prone to systemic crisis, be governed so as to promote economic and political stability? Best’s answer is initially counterintuitive but, on consideration, a sensible one. Institutions and political leaders will be successful in part, she argues, because they are able to recognize the constructive role that ambiguity plays in governance, particularly in the realm of international finance. In her view, the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange-rate regime was caused in large part by the increasing rigidity of the system and its corresponding inability to accommodate ambiguity. The lesson she draws is that transparency—the holy grail of policymaking in the post-Asian financial crisis era—can in fact be counterproductive, whereas the correct balance between ambiguity and coherence may produce better systemic outcomes.

While ambiguity is pervasive in political life, Best points out that money is an area where the centrality of ambiguity is perhaps most obvious. Financial value is itself irreducibly dependent on beliefs. A piece of paper with a euro symbol on it has value only as we agree intersubjectively that it does: The value of a bar of gold is equally a matter of faith, socially constructed. The fact that we all act “as if” these monetary phenomena have a material basis does not remove them from the realm of human interpretation, generated through social interaction. Best asserts that “[w]e can only ever manage, never eliminate, ambiguity” (p. 13), and in her account, it is the quest to eradicate ambiguity that gets policymakers into trouble.

But what, exactly, is ambiguity? The author usefully separates out ambiguity into three interacting strands, demonstrating how each was part of Bretton Woods. “Technical” ambiguity arises out of insufficient or incorrect information, keeping actors from determining things like the optimal exchange rate level or inflation rate. “Contested” ambiguity has more inherently political and distributional roots: It is produced “when political differences lead to contending explanations and solutions for a given economic problem” (p. 4), such as central bank independence. Finally, “intersubjective” ambiguity springs from the inherent ambiguity of economic communication and interpretation. Various actors may agree on the value of free markets, for example, but disagree over whether capital mobility is an essential part of that order. Her theoretical discussions are remarkably jargon-free and evidence a sophisticated intellect at work.

Best illustrates these various types of ambiguity by means of a close study of the changing content and practices of the Bretton Woods postwar international monetary

system. The bulk of the empirical material traces the intellectual history and institutional rules of this system, including the negotiations leading up to its founding in 1944, the slow transition to currency convertibility through the 1950s, and its operation and demise in the early 1970s. Her account highlights the regime's shifting ability to manage ambiguity as a central reason for its waxing and waning, parsing out the ways in which the three types of ambiguity shaped its success at governance. She is persuasive, but more attention could usefully have been paid to the specific actors and coalitions that pushed for more or less ambiguity over the years. The nexus between strategic behavior and the construction of norms is critical to an understanding of the path of political action, but it remains an area incompletely addressed by many constructivist works in IR, this one included.

In addition, the Bretton Woods chapters, while useful in illustrating Best's argument, cover ground quite familiar to most political economists, and thus are not as compelling as the more contemporary empirical material in the next-to-last chapter, on the cult of transparency. In this treatment, Best offers a provocative and timely analysis of the ways in which the liberalization of finance, the rise of new classical economic theory, and the prescription of surveillance and transparency as the cure-all for financial instability came together. Drawing on the lessons of Bretton Woods, she offers a convincing critique of the potential for transparency to solve the problems of global finance, and makes the case for the effective and creative use of ambiguity in policymaking instead. A concluding chapter outlines a series of policy prescriptions that flow from her analysis. She evaluates in very practical terms the problems with the "new financial architecture" approach of the post-Asian financial crisis era, and offers a series of alternatives in areas ranging from International Monetary Fund policymaking to macroeconomic adjustment and exchange rate strategies, and to capital control issues.

*The Limits of Transparency* contributes to a much-needed broadening of the range of approaches to IPE. The claim that rationalist and materialist approaches are inadequate to explain outcomes has been well substantiated in the field of security studies. But a similar debate in the area of the economy has been strangely absent, despite the fact that markets do not exist outside of the social actors that create them. Best's book, along with work by Mark Blyth, Rawi Abdelal, Jonathan Kirshner, and others, demonstrates that many of the puzzles confronting us regarding the politics of money and finance can be unlocked if we move from a narrowly rationalist understanding of political economy to one also informed by constructivist insights. This book demonstrates that constructivism, done well, can be a model of theoretical clarity, empirically grounded, and can produce practical policy recommendations. In an area of universal importance such as the inter-

national financial system, how can we afford not to pursue such an approach?

**Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation.** By Roland Bleiker. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 224p. \$27.95.

— Hazel Smith, *University of Warwick*

This slim book combines six chapters and a conclusion in 124 pages. It intends to promote a new way of thinking about Korean security problems that "goes beyond conventional realist and state-centric approaches" (p. 1). The idea is not to offer new empirical insights but instead to focus "on underlying trends and conceptual challenges" (p. xlvii) in order to identify "broad patterns of conflict and possibilities for peace" (p. xlvii). The ethical aim is to promote dialogue based on an understanding that "the other's sense of identity and politics may be inherently incommensurable with one's own" (pp. xlvii–xlviii). In the case of this book, the incommensurable "others" are the two Koreas—North and South. The author's contention is that efforts toward peace have been periodically tried and always failed in the past because there has not been a sufficient acceptance of difference between North and South. Roland Bleiker is keen to stress that such an approach does not lead to political relativism but that it, in fact, makes for improved debates, such as over the ability to make more informed political choices between different political projects. Toward the end of the book he argues, for instance, that "[t]olerating different coexisting narratives does not prevent making judgments about their content or desirability" (p. 114).

The book is commendable in its efforts to support a solution to contemporary Korean conflicts through dialogue and reconciliation. Most policy analysts of whatever political hue—from either North Korea or the United States—have arrived at the conclusion that as difficult and tense as Korean security politics are, war as an instrument of foreign policy would likely involve huge loss of life, social dislocation, and economic devastation throughout the Korean peninsula. The problems in this book are not in its objectives. Rather, they lie in the execution of the research project. These problems are manifested in the undeveloped theoretical, conceptual, and methodological apparatus that underpins the book, as well as the under-researched empirical foundations and the contradictory ethical implications of the thesis.

The dominant state-centric approach to the study of security in the international relations discipline is intimated rather than examined, which has the unfortunate consequence that only readers familiar with the sometimes arcane professional debates might know precisely what is being criticized by the new approach espoused. Perhaps this is not important, given that the book is aimed for a specialized audience who might be expected to be

familiar with some of the core professional debates. Much more important is the failure to provide an exposition and an interrogation of the alternative theoretical foundations in which the book locates itself. The author makes frequent but cursory mention of what can be described loosely as poststructural or critical scholarship in sociology, philosophy, history, and literature, and which clearly animates his thinking. Allan Bloom, William Connolly, Mikhail Bakhtin, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Kearney, Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Ricoeur, and Hayden White are all mentioned, among others, with Ricoeur receiving one of the most extended treatments at four sentences (pp. 112–13).

The effect of not providing a systematic evaluation of the theoretical foundations, in a book that is self-professedly not concerned with providing new empirical insights (“I seek not new facts and data but new perspectives” [p. x]), is to make it difficult to judge the helpfulness of the conceptual discussion that constitutes much of the essay. Concepts such as “difference,” “identity,” “other,” “dialogue,” “dialogical agreement,” and “interactive security” are used, but absent an explicitly drawn analytical framework, they become either reified or left to be interpreted through the “old” analytical framework the book wishes to transcend. Difference, for instance, seems to be analyzed through a conventional positivist “levels of analysis” framework that methodologically separates individual and state (p. 61), although another problem with the way this concept is used is the confusing elision between the two levels of analysis throughout the work. This methodological slippage leads to ethical concerns because it is sometimes difficult to discern whether claims are being made that difference between individuals with their disparate perceptions of history, multifaceted identities, and diverse life chances should on the whole be tolerated (in my view, this is an ethically unproblematic question and the answer is yes) or that different political regimes should be tolerated (in my view, the answer is much less ethically clear).

Bleiker’s intention not to produce “new facts” does not excuse him from the responsibility of ascertaining what the “old facts” might be—both in the theoretical and empirical literature. Roy Richard Grinker’s seminal work on cultural difference between North and South Koreans is cited (*Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War*, 1998)—though not rigorously evaluated—but excluded from the analysis are standard studies of “Koreanness” (see e.g., Hyung-Il Pai and Timothy R. Tangherlini, eds., *Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity*, 1999). Also unmentioned is contemporary work of South Korean scholars attempting to recover more nuanced versions of Korean history, which has hitherto been dominated by nationalist historiography.

More attention to the empirical record would call into question the claim that ideological frames provide two fundamentally antagonistic North and South Korean iden-

ties that somehow define the breadth and content of the security debate on the peninsula. One troubling empirical omission, for instance, is reference to the generational polarization in contemporary South Korean society—which has been endlessly analyzed and widely understood as shaping predispositions to “hard” or “soft” security policy on the peninsula. In North Korea, there is also little evidence that people’s individual identities are shaped primarily by ideological concerns and much evidence (from the resident humanitarian organizations) that their primary goal is personal and family survival.

The underlying assumption of *Divided Korea*, that a core identity antagonism can be a source of both conflict and potential reconciliation, is unpersuasive. It is surely the mutability and diversity of Korean identities, North and South, that provide fruitful grounds for conceptual and empirical research. In policy terms, it is perhaps by accepting mutability that one can also claim the right to reject that which is ethically and politically unacceptable. At the same time, policymakers can search for commonalities across diversity—on which could be built, one hopes, lasting peace and reconciliation among all Koreans.

**Critical Security Studies and World Politics.** Edited by Ken Booth. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. 336p. \$62.00 cloth, \$24.50 paper.

— Franke Wilmer, *Montana State University*

Ken Booth has tasked himself and his contributors (particularly chapters by S. Smith, A. Linklater, H. Alker, and R. Wyn Jones) with sorting out the menagerie of theoretical criticisms often identified as either critical or in some way as alternatives to realism, including not only those that directly engage questions of security—“securitization” theorists and constructivists—but also the various “post” (modern, structural, positivist, colonial) theoretical critiques. Though on the whole the book rejects both realism and poststructuralism, the contributors do find some common ground with and among “critical,” “post,” and “alternative” writers on the question of improving the human condition (as an implicit goal of criticism), and applauds those who engage ethical issues to the extent that criticism is undertaken in order to reveal and confront, if not overcome, oppression.

But this volume is more than a parsing of various strands of critical theoretical and philosophical writing in political, social, and international relations theory. Instead, by means of a careful analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, contributions, and relationships among writings in the critical theory tradition and radical IR theory, Booth (with much support from his contributors) constructs a platform on which to propose “the” (not “a”) critical theory of security in the final chapter. The work thus acknowledges



intellectual debts, while out of them developing a complex theory that also serves as an organizing theme of the text.

Beginning with Cox's insight that theory is always "for some one or for some purpose," and is therefore a political practice, and taking his distinction between "problem-solving" and "critical" theory as a point of departure (p. 4), the authors develop their arguments around the notion that as a practice creating the social world of "facts by agreement," realism serves to replicate the world as it is, with existing power relations intact. Doing so not only fails to provide security for the majority of people but is also making the world as a whole *less* secure. Of all the reasons to reject realism (nine good ones are listed in Booth's introductory chapter), this, they argue, is the most compelling. In contrast, critical theory and practice aim to reform the world by restructuring power relations according to the imperative of emancipation in the spirit of the Frankfurt School.

This theme is taken up by each contributor in ways that both enlighten and provoke our thinking about how it bears on questions of human security. Whereas conventional security theorizing protects the material privileges of elites in elite states at the expense of security for ordinary people, the referent for critical security studies (CSS) is, at the same time, the human as an individual and humanity as a whole. "The only transhistorical and permanent fixture in human society is the individual physical being," says Booth (p. 264), and security as if people mattered, or as we are told, for "real people in real places" (p. 272). These real people include Shidane Arone, a Somali teenager brutally tortured and killed by Canadian "peacekeepers" in 1993, the subject of Sandra Whitworth's contribution on the consequences of "militarized masculinities" (p. 89). They are "Australians" in Petman's chapter, whose racialized identities have been constituted predominantly by white settlers manipulating cleavages between themselves and indigenous Australians, and themselves and their Asian neighbors. The real people in J. Ruane and J. Todd's study are the Protestant-Scottish-English-British settlers and the indigenous-Catholic-Gaelic Irish, and their descendants in Northern Ireland whose best hope for lasting peace/security may lie in the reconfiguration of their relationship in ways that take into account their interlocking oppressions and shared prospects for emancipation. CSS is *for* all of humanity, and for the purpose of human emancipation. Both the orthodoxy serving elite, state-centric conceptions of security and poststructural approaches that "celebrate insecurity" fail to engage the ethical responsibility created by an emerging self-consciousness of our common humanity.

Perhaps Roger Tooze and Graeme Cheeseman tackle the most difficult subjects, from the perspective of critical security. Tooze takes on the globalization of capitalism and its neoliberal ideology, in search of a critical inter-

national political economy that addresses and resists the structural economic violence that follows from the practice of economics masquerading as (a physical/natural) science. No theory of security as emancipation is credible without wrestling with the oppressions and insecurities that are a direct consequence of the practice of neoliberalism. Tooze knows this, and takes it on. Cheeseman attempts to reconcile elements of an "alternative security agenda" that emerged during the Cold War with the necessity of rethinking the role of the military in light of both new sources of insecurity and the changing situation of the state. He looks for ways to move toward an "enlightened and humane" global governance or "transgovernmentalism" (p. 78), but laments a retreat from "alternative and critical thinking about security" since the Bush administration (and its British ally) initiated a global war on terrorism.

I did have two concerns, though addressing them may have required additional chapters, and readers inspired after reading this work may yet pursue them. The first is that this project does not directly address the most difficult question of whether violence might ever be justified as an act against oppression, against an ongoing humanitarian crisis, in order to stop an ongoing injury. I have in mind not only the unparalleled case of the Holocaust but also "real people in real places" more recently in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur. The other is that the referent for CSS is said here to be twofold—the individual and the whole of humanity. But particularly in light of Tooze's search for a critical international political economy, there are instances of violence committed against a group by depriving it of its material/economic base simply because the group wishes to control whether, and if so, how, it interfaces with global capitalism. This is the case of indigenous peoples today in an increasingly energy-desperate capitalist system, from Ecuador to Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (and historically the whole of Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and all of Central and South America). It is my hope that CSS will open spaces for a kind of rethinking and restructuring of power relations that will not only facilitate the emancipation of these people and places but also prevent future humanitarian crises.

This book is an extraordinarily important contribution to the field of critical security studies, as well as international relations and social theory. In addition to adopting Cox's definition of critical theory and Jürgen Habermas's commitment to emancipation, the contributors also share a concern with theorizing CSS in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. This, along with the excellent organization of the book into three parts corresponding to the conceptual foundations of Booth's critical security theory—security, community, and emancipation—give it a coherence uncommon in edited volumes. *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* should be read widely among students of politics (Booth even

argues that political science ought to be a subfield of international relations) regardless of specialization.

**Environmental Peacemaking.** Edited by Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002. 200p. \$35.00 cloth, \$17.50 paper.

— Dimitrios Konstadakopoulos, *University of the West of England, Bristol*

This book explores the proposition that cooperation on environmental issues can be instrumental in resolving local conflicts caused by environmental degradation and scarcity of resources. Such conflicts are not a new phenomenon. However, in the early twenty-first century, continuing degradation of the environment, coupled with ever-increasing pressures on resources due to an expanding population, has substantially increased the incidence of violent conflicts on environmental issues. Moreover, most of the present threats to peace are major intrastate conflicts (e.g., civil war and genocide) or ones that are occurring along ecologically fragile border regions, implying that researchers should concentrate on the regional or local level of analysis. At the same time, as the cause of such conflicts has risen on the political and discourse agenda, a corresponding large body of research has emerged, increasing our understanding of the ways in which environmental destruction can lead to conflict.

The aim of this scholarly work is to clarify some aspects of the current discourse on environmental conflicts and to propose a method of resolving them that is a departure from traditional approaches. The editors and their contributors employ an elegant term for it: *environmental peacemaking*. Ken Conca, one of the volume's editors, argues in the introductory chapter that it is more appropriate to ask whether environmental cooperation can bring about peace than whether degradation of the environment can trigger violent conflict. He views such cooperation as the mechanism by which to reduce tensions, foster demilitarization, and promote peace (p. 9). This can be achieved, Conca asserts, by two means: firstly, by exploiting environmental problems as opportunities for creating trust, transparency, reciprocity, and habits of cooperation among governments, and secondly, by building civil society linkages at the transnational level, transforming state institutions, and fostering environmental responsibility and peaceful resolution of disputes.

The various contributors focus on the regional dimension of environmental peacemaking. Their case studies on the international politics of regional environmental cooperation are very informative, but they almost all concentrate upon the issue of water resources, limiting the breadth of the volume. The case studies cover the following issues: environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea (Stacy D. VanDeveer); the sharing of water supplies from rivers in South Asia (Ashok Swain); promoting water sharing in

the Aral Sea basin in central Asia (Erika Weinthal); land, energy, and water cooperation in southern Africa (Larry A. Swatuk); environmental cooperation around the Caspian Sea (Douglas W. Blum); and water sharing in the U.S.-Mexico border region (Pamela M. Doughman).

As the editors conclude in the final chapter, the case studies alone cannot entirely validate their environmental peacemaking propositions. It appears that crises relating to the environment in different parts of the world have failed to create effective regional governance on its protection (with the exception, I should add, of the European Union, which is largely outside the purpose of this volume). At best, such crises provide some evidence that environmental cooperation can lead to peacemaking. For instance, Weinthal suggests that water sharing in the Aral Sea basin and its extended riparian lands helped to defuse tensions among the nascent central Asian states in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the case studies are important in their own right. They indicate that bringing environmentalists, policymakers, practitioners, and political scientists together in a real-world situation could create a fruitful interaction between the areas of environment and peacemaking. More importantly, Conca and Geoffrey Dabelko argue, in the concluding chapter, that environmental cooperation at the regional level creates positive synergies for peace that could have contrasting consequences. They consider the pattern of interstate dynamics revealed by the case studies, and observe that environmental cooperation draws the attention of state actors at the highest level (i.e., high politics as opposed to low politics). This rather contradicts the commonly held belief—at least among some Europeanists—that in the early days of European unification, environmental cooperation was viewed as low politics that would eventually “spill over” into more politically sensitive areas, such as the economy and foreign and defense policy. They also observe that environmental cooperation could be a double-edged sword. On the negative side, meaningful cooperation in sharing watercourses, protecting regional seas, and abating transboundary pollution may be harder to achieve if it is seen to pose a threat to well-entrenched interests. On the positive side, by contrast, they argue that such cooperative initiatives, once established, could bring more benefits than would cooperation among local stakeholders. Finally, they argue that examination of the strength and robustness of transsocietal linkages reveals that civil society is still weak, at least in the case studies examined.

The editors rightly warn us that the case studies do not make it absolutely clear whether the resolution of environmental conflicts is due to cooperation at the sub-state level. Nevertheless, this is a provocative and invaluable book that makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the link between environment cooperation and peace. There is little doubt that more explicit environmental peacemaking efforts could emerge

in the near future, and this volume will encourage their development.

**South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China.** Edited by Lowell Dittmer. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. 296p. \$69.95 cloth, \$28.95 paper.

**India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status.** By Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 302p. \$70.00 cloth, \$25.99 paper.

— Seema Gahlaut, *University of Georgia*

The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan caught the attention of international relations theorists as never before. While the earlier analyses of South Asia came primarily from those working on nonproliferation issues and regional conflict-prevention perspectives, the advent of overt nuclear weapon status of India and Pakistan presented IR scholars with the opportunity to explore a range of hypotheses about new nuclear powers. Was South Asia going to be able to take advantage of its backwardness/late entry into the deterrence game and learn from the considerable research and experience of the two superpowers during the Cold War? Were India and Pakistan as rational as the United States and the Soviet Union (if not more), and could they manage their rivalry without resorting to nuclear exchange? Will their overt nuclear weapons capabilities make India and Pakistan more careful in their responses to each other's provocative moves? Is a rivalry based in political ideology (like the U.S.-USSR one) more susceptible to rational decision making than a rivalry based in religious ideology (supposedly the primary basis of the India-Pakistan dispute)? A related set of questions raised by the tests focused primarily on the reasons/motivations behind Indian nuclear tests and their impact on the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The Kargil war between India and Pakistan in 1999, just a year after their nuclear tests, elevated international concerns about the risks of escalation to nuclear war in the region. The war also brought into sharp relief the assumptions and hypotheses of nuclear deterrence theorists, as well as those who tended to downplay the differences between the domestic factors in India and Pakistan when offering assumptions about dyadic behavior with and without the presence of nuclear weapons.

The two volumes under review examine South Asia after Kargil, but from different perspectives. Lowell Dittmer's edited volume explores the complexities of the security problem in South Asia. It offers thoughtful analyses on the domestic and external factors that have, and are likely to have, a strong influence on deterrence stability in South Asia. The book by Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, on the other hand, looks primarily at Indian behavior on nuclear and military issues and situates it in the larger realist theme of power transitions.

Dittmer has put together a logically coherent set of topics and authors, which, according to his introduction, uses South Asian nuclearization as a test case to explore "challenges to the international nonproliferation regime in a post-Cold War Unipolar world" and the impact on "development and security among developing countries" (p. viii). Chapters by Rahul Roy-Chaudhary (nuclear and naval capabilities), Hasan-Askari Rizvi (Pakistani tests), and Sumit Ganguly and Kent Biringer (crisis stability) explore economic, political, and technological dynamics in India and in Pakistan that have determined the bilateral relationship of insecurity. Lawrence Saez provides a good overview of the arms race literature and also some evidence to show that "the economic asymmetries that confront India and Pakistan have a significant strategic impact" (p. 28).

The chapter by Dinshaw Mistry on the strategic significance of India's nuclear and missile forces provides a comprehensive picture of the way in which Indian civilian and defense capabilities on the nuclear and missile/space side have been integrated over time, and the likely role of missile defense forces in this mix. The chapter will be especially useful for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, who will find clear expositions of such concepts as counterforce, countervalue, Theater Missile Defense, and crisis stability—particularly as applied to South Asia.

Timothy Hoyt's examination of the Pakistani nuclear doctrine is especially noteworthy. He decisively distinguishes between the existence of rational and efficient structures for making *operational* decisions and the aggressive and poorly conceived *strategic* policies that emanate from the military leadership. In brief, his contention is that although the "Pakistani military has been intimately connected with the military planning and political authorization of Pakistan's offensive failures" (p. 131) it has not helped change Pakistan's war-fighting doctrine: It continues to favor preventive attacks and an aggressive forward defense. The military leadership has a propensity to use a mix of regular, irregular, and insurgent forces to achieve tactical objectives, but displays strategic myopia in assessing Indian and international reaction to such bold moves in a nuclear environment. In such a situation, Hoyt argues, the doctrinal emphasis of Pakistan on first use, its military's continuing efforts to revise the status quo, and its poor strategic judgment will ensure that even perfect command-and-control systems cannot guarantee stability in South Asia. Samina Ahmed's assessment shows that for a variety of reasons, the Pakistani military under General Pervez Musharraf continues to depict the Kargil operation as a military success and holds the civilian government responsible for "capitulating to external pressure and opting for unilateral withdrawal" (p. 147).

While South Asia specialists have long seen China as an important factor in both nuclear/missile proliferation as well as military calculations in South Asia, the Dittmer

volume takes it a step further and correctly expands the regional security canvas to include two interlinked deterrence dyads: India-Pakistan and India-China. Jing-Dong Yuan's conclusion is that Chinese analysts continue to be divided on how Beijing should regard and treat New Delhi. Nevertheless, he expects that their upward economic and military trajectory is bound to lead India and China into each other's perceived sphere of interests. He remains cautiously optimistic about the future, which is currently undergirded by regular, high-level dialogue and growing economic cooperation. T.V. Paul's assessment of Chinese interests and policies regarding Pakistan provides a clear picture as to the limits of India-China bonhomie. According to Paul, China has curtailed some of its nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan due to U.S. pressure and the increasing interaction of Beijing in international institutions and regimes, but the rest will stop only when China perceives the diminishing utility of containing and balancing India through Pakistan. These analyses suggest an interesting hypothesis when the instability of the India-Pakistan dyad is contrasted with the stability of the China-India dyad: that the internal characteristics and doctrines of the weaker side determine the level of deterrence stability.

In sum, the Dittmer volume will be useful for those interested in a comprehensive treatment of the different components that make up nuclear deterrence scenarios in South Asia: military capability, institutional capacities, doctrines, and alliances.

Nayar and Paul's book follows the classical realist tradition, borrows heavily from the power transition theories, and uses the neorealist insights on the importance of nuclear weapons in determining international power distributions. The authors see India's nuclear behavior as a response to the Indian elite's long-held positions that a) India deserves to be treated as a major power and not equated with a minor, risk-acceptant, and unstable state like Pakistan, and b) the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability is the key to obtaining major power status. They also explain the response of the major powers (the nuclear five) to Indian nuclear tests as predictable actions: using nonproliferation as a tool to discourage other actors in the international system from giving India the recognition it seeks, in order to preserve the status quo of power distribution, where they alone have a monopoly on "legitimate" nuclear capability.

The authors argue that India has always faced a status inconsistency between its role aspiration and the actual role assigned to it by the major powers and the international institutions established by them. India has always aspired to the role of a major power, characterized by restrained and responsible behavior. This aspiration was visible in Indian foreign policy between 1945 and 1990 when the country attempted to compensate for its economic weakness by using soft power (leadership of nor-

native groupings like the nonaligned movement). This self-perception has become more overt as India has begun to use its rapidly growing macroeconomic strength to compete with China for spheres of influence in Southeast and Central Asia, and to start a series of strategic interactions with the United States, the European Union, Russia, Israel, and Japan.

To assess whether India's aspirations now have a basis in reality, the authors provide a detailed comparison of Indian capabilities vis-à-vis the recognized major powers, as well as with some of the countries that are often categorized with India (Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc). Although the data are a bit dated by a few years—during which India has seen improvements on some axes—they will allow the readers to come to their own conclusion.

Demographic, economic, and technological changes in India have already highlighted the status inconsistency to some extent: In Pakistan People's Party terms, India is the fifth largest economy in the world, yet it has only recently been invited to join in the Group of 8 discussions. It has the largest, largely indigenous, and most ambitious nuclear energy program in Asia, yet major foreign investors cannot invest in this sector due to nonproliferation sanctions. With the recent successful launch of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle, its space program can be ranked among the top 10 in the world, yet missile proliferation concerns have warned off most potential partners except Russia—and this joint project has produced the supersonic cruise missile Brahmos. With its significant civilian nuclear and space capabilities, India is a major challenge to the international nonproliferation regime: It is outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is not bound by the export restraints of informal regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

This work, therefore, will be especially interesting to those who have attempted to "categorize" and "explain" Indian behavior on nuclear issues and on the nonproliferation regime and have found the traditional theoretical divides (neorealist, institutionalist, constructivist) unsatisfactory.

**Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations.** By Peter D. Feaver. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 400p. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Claude Welch, *University at Buffalo (State University of New York)*

Most scholars work within established paradigms. Few have the temerity to challenge them—and fewer still succeed in causing fundamental reconsideration. Peter Feaver has accomplished the latter task. He has taken on the dominant long-standing theoretical framework for American civil-military relations and, in the process, provided a more accurate view of them in the early twenty-first century.

Samuel Huntington offered a paradigm in his 1957 book *The Soldier and the State*. He asserted that only “autonomous military professionalism” provided the best fit between national security needs and “objective” (as contrasted with “subjective”) civilian control over the armed forces. Other frameworks for analyzing civil–military relations have been advanced since then: bureaucratic politics, convergence theory, the “postmodern” military, shared responsibility between civilians and military, and structural theory. None has as detailed an empirical foundation or (in some cases) as ambitious paradigmatic aims as either Huntington or Feaver.

*The Soldier and the State* was written at the height of the Cold War. The challenge in the mid-1950s was clear, unambiguous, and based on both an internationally recognized state and its allies. It assumed combat against a uniformed enemy, fighting conventional warfare, with a threat of nuclear bombs in the background. This represented (in Feaver’s summary) a fundamentally ideological viewpoint. Huntington argued that America required a shift from liberalism to conservatism to ensure maximum security, since the constitutional framework could not be changed. Feaver developed his arguments, by contrast, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and disappearance of its overt threat. (Writing was completed before the launching of the “war on terror” and the invasion and occupation of Iraq; nonetheless, the challenges posed by them provide additional support for his arguments.)

The theoretical heart of *Armed Servants* lies in agency theory, set forth in Chapters 2 and 3. Developed by economists and management specialists, but infrequently used by political scientists, agency theory is usually presented as the “work or shirk” trade-off. Those responsible for supervision—the “principals”—wish to extract the maximum effort for the minimum cost. Those who carry out the tasks—the “agents”—hope to get away with the greatest reward for the least work. Translating this model from economic to political realms leads to major problems, however. The issues are compounded in applying them to armed forces (at least those willing to accept governmental control, rather than substitute their own preference, as through a coup d’état or other irresistible pressure). Feaver suggests three reasons. First, military agents prefer to be told what policy to pursue. They wish to deal with threats from a “position of advantage, controlling the tempo and the scope of the conflict” (p. 63), resulting in a preference for offensive operations. Second, military agents wish to have their accomplishments given appropriate recognition by others—or, in other terms, they manifest a “general military preference for honor, or a desire for respect” (p. 65). Thirdly, they wish to carry out their tasks with minimal civilian interference and oversight. Feaver adds an important caveat, however: Both civilians and the military are “imperfect judges of what is necessary for national security” (p. 65).

Application of agency theory, like any rational actor approach, presupposes that those involved act in accordance with their interests. Two types of costs are involved: *electoral* costs of time and effort, and *policy* costs of divergence between preferred and actual policy outcomes. Feaver discusses them both as a general issue of costs and as a game in formal terms. His conclusion drawn from his model merits citation: “[T]he costs of monitoring, the expectation of punishment, the strategic calculus of the actors . . . are nonetheless essentially absent in traditional civil–military relations theory” (p. 113).

Shirking exists within the American military, Feaver asserts. Although insubordination is rare and a coup practically unthinkable, three forms exist: 1) inflating costs of military operations (thus predetermining the outcome of policy calculus); 2) carrying out “end runs,” leaks, and various appeals to political actors; and 3) bureaucratic foot dragging so that an undesired policy or policies will never be implemented. However, civilians retain the right to punish; more important, the American armed forces see themselves as agents of civilians, and hence accept sanctions.

The book’s empirical foundation is rich and detailed: 10 tables summarizing points made in the text; 33 tables presenting data. For those more comfortable with case studies, there are summaries of American involvement in the 1990–91 Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Force was employed in all, requiring both a policy *decision* by the principal and its *implementation* by the agent. Looking at 29 different cases, from Berlin in 1948 to the invasion of Panama in 1989, Feaver finds that the American military worked in 23 and shirked in the remainder, a clear indication of civilian dominance: “[T]he empirical record does not support a picture of a renegade military resolutely thumbing its nose at civilian leaders” (p. 151).

This book appears at a propitious time for a reconsideration of American civil–military relations. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has embarked on fundamental transformations (building on changes proposed earlier, but bringing a strong sense of urgency and unwillingness to accept orthodox Pentagon lines of argument). The “war on terrorism” and the ongoing insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq for which the armed forces seemed ill prepared add further impetus to the need for reconsideration. Does agency theory provide a better guide than Huntington’s “objective civilian control” or the plethora of approaches noted earlier?

In *Civilian Control of the Military* (1999), Michael Desch focused on four “clusters” of cases. However, only part of one involves the United States directly, examining the much-studied Cold War period. Breadth and depth, yes; but those interested in the theory and practice of American civil–military relations will find *Armed Servants* more satisfying. Also broad ranging in global terms is Charles Moskos, David Segal, and John Allen Williams, eds., *The Post-Modern Military* (2000). The authors set forth 11

variables (for example, perceived threat, force structure, or major mission), then apply them to a dozen states. Moskos's chapter on American civil–military relations is interesting, albeit just over 16 pages long.

Summing up: Agency theory now counts as a significant theory in civil–military relations. Feaver's book applies it to the United States; others should utilize it in other settings.

**Remapping Global Politics: History's Revenge and Future Shock.** By Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 380p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

— Janice Bially Mattern, *Lehigh University*

This latest book in Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach's decades-long research collaboration is exceptionally ambitious. Starting from the controversial claim that current globalizing processes are decreasing states' capacity, legitimacy, and authority while increasing those of many of the other collectivities that populate global politics (p. 312), the authors argue that it is time to redraw "our mental maps of global politics" (p. xi). They set out to do so, proposing to "explain the forces shaping change" along the way (p. xi). Of course to *either* remap global politics *or* explain the forces that shape change is a formidable task. It is thus impressive that they have managed to argue their case as successfully as they have, especially in such a lively and often delightfully irreverent way.

The authors, following James Rosenau (*Distant Proximities*, 2003), begin by sketching what they see as the "postinternational" organization of the contemporary world. As they argue, the current world is not a tidy state-centric international system but a "messy" (p. 36) "crazy-quilt" (p. 78) of various political spaces. In contrast to the international system, political spaces in the contemporary world are not necessarily territorially based nor are their authorities necessarily sovereign. In fact, most are far from autonomous and independent; they are nested within one another, overlapping in a complex web of identity and authority. Insofar as global politics *are* postinternational—and the authors make a compelling case, especially in Chapters 6 and 7—it becomes impossible to disagree that a remapping of global politics is necessary. Indeed, as Ferguson and Mansbach argue beautifully in Chapter 2, the conventional maps of international relations are too limited by extremist theories to capture the logic of postinternationalism. They are variously imprisoned by the uncompromising constructs of scientism, state-centrism, and relativism.

Yet precisely because of the discipline's ossified assumptions, especially about state-centrism, Ferguson and Mansbach cannot simply proceed to their remapping project. As they implicitly recognize, any postinternational remapping project is unlikely to be accepted by the discipline

unless the authors can first offer some compelling account of how world politics moved from an international to postinternational world in the first place. Thus, in Chapters 3 through 5, the authors sketch a loose model of the processes that drive global change, illustrating their arguments with plenty of anecdotal evidence. They draw on their previous collaborative research to shift the focus of global political analysis from states to polities, understood as institutionalized but not necessarily territorialized or sovereign structures of identity and authority that exist at all levels of political life. They then argue that because IR has mistakenly conflated polities with territory, it has gotten stuck in an international model of politics that misses the ongoing processes of "fission and fusion" that "alter and constitute" the identities, loyalties, and authorities that configure polities (pp. 21–22). In the context of globalization, these processes are augmented in a way that has "tipped" international over into postinternational.

With this account of change in mind, Ferguson and Mansbach turn finally in Chapters 6 through 9 to mapping postinternational global politics. They approach the task by issue area: that is, by developing "case studies" of the postinternational global economy, war, and technology, in which they narrate the complexity of economics, violence, and knowledge flows in the postinternational world. They conclude by considering the practical and normative implications of living in such a complex and uncertain world.

This is an important book, particularly when it comes to the authors' account of the forces shaping global change. For one, it is conceptually innovative in ways that enable it to accommodate both change and continuity. For instance, the notion of polities is so flexible that it can account for history and the future, no matter what they entail. And yet this does not doom the concept to becoming a vacuous category. One can easily imagine a variety of ways to construe the idea of "polities" in a sufficiently rigorous manner for facilitating directed research. Unfortunately, Ferguson and Mansbach themselves do not do the best job of this. They repeat many of the oversights of their earlier work on polities, such as some slippage between their definitions and their illustrative examples (e.g., if identity is the core of polities, can one really unproblematically refer to transnational corporations as polities? [p. 102]), and some notions, like culture, loyalty, and moral communities, whose relationships to polities are undertheorized (pp. 152, 155, 159). But the promise of a fruitful research trajectory on polity formation, persistence, alteration, and decline is undeniable.

The focus on fission and fusion is also promising. Because these forces emerge from dynamics among polities within the larger context of global politics, there is, as the book's subtitle suggests, a connection in the present between the past and the future. Questions that are left unanswered—for instance about the particular microlevel processes that

set fission and fusion in motion—provide fertile ground for further inquiry. Finally, the authors' model allows for (in fact, expects) "more than one story to be true" (p. 338). One benefit of such a model, as they note, is that it demands systematic engagement with the kind of normative questions that IR has otherwise so systematically ignored. Another benefit is that it offers IR a way out of its current obsession with "elegance, parsimony . . . and games for the gamers" (p. 38). It offers a model of the world that actually looks like the world in which we live. For all of these reasons, this book should be read and taken into account by anyone interested in change in the world order.

However, when it comes to the primary goal of the book, *Remapping Global Politics* is, unfortunately, less evocative. That is, Ferguson and Mansbach explicitly promise to redraw the map of global politics but they never do (p. xi). Given all of the diversity, depth, complexity, and tendency toward change in the postinternational world, mapping it would seem to entail a detailed representation of the spatial arrangement or distribution of polities, with special attention to their nesting arrangements. Moreover, since the idea is to remap *global* politics, one should do this globally. But this is not what the authors do, not even within the specific issue areas of economics, war, and technology that they examine. Instead, they offer the reader thick and very interesting but limited and unsystematic stories about the various developments in those issue areas, with only general reference to how identity and authority are being shaped by them. In this sense, Ferguson and Mansbach abandon their effort to map postinternationalism in favor of a discussion of its dynamics. The result is a book that does less to actually remap global politics than it does to persuade readers that it needs to be remapped.

**The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s.** By V. P. Gagnon, Jr. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 217p. \$35.00

— Spyros Economides, *London School of Economics and Political Science*

Publications focusing on Yugoslavia's collapse and the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo abound. One of the key category errors committed in much of this work—and especially in the mountains of journalistic output throughout the 1990s—has been to classify Yugoslavia's wars merely as wars of rival ethnicities and nationalisms, if not ancient hatreds. Conventional wisdom has it that Yugoslavia's wars in the 1990s were typical "Balkan" wars emanating from primordial nationalisms, heavily laden with historical baggage and rich in potent myth and symbols. The easiest way to explain Yugoslavia's violent disintegration in the late twentieth century was to relapse into cliché-ridden accounts of base, primeval ethnic rivalries that hitherto had been contained by a combination of the restraints imposed by Tito's brand of communism and the exigen-

cies of a polarized Cold War international system in which Yugoslavia inhabited a very particular space.

*The Myth of Ethnic War* goes a long way in providing alternative explanations for the violent fall of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. V. P. Gagnon's general position on the debunking of the myth of ethnic war as the root explanation for violence in Yugoslavia is not necessarily novel. Beginning with Susan Woodward's groundbreaking *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (1995), there is a growing body of literature that challenges the superficial assumptions of those who pin Yugoslavia's traumas on base nationalist hatreds. But Gagnon's main target is not the general assumptions made about the role of nationalism and ethnicity in these wars. What he is more interested in analyzing is the complementary assumption that certain Yugoslav leaders, especially Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, played the ethnic card in mobilizing domestic support to fight their respective political battles: In times of weakness, they would stir up nationalist tendencies and rekindle the embers of ethnic rivalries inherent in the makeup of Yugoslavia.

The author does not underplay the role of history and ethnicity in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Nor does he necessarily accept the overexaggerated assumption of harmonious multicultural coexistence between ethnic groups in Yugoslavia up to the 1990s. He argues that in fact, Serbian and Croatian leaders and ruling elites promoted violent conflict as a means of demobilizing opposition movements, as well as vast parts of their domestic constituencies that they could no longer carry with them. At times of threat to the ruling regimes, violent conflict, rather than simply ethnic conflict, was a means by which to thwart, marginalize, and even crush reformist tendencies that posed a political threat.

Indeed, Gagnon provides much evidence for this argument. For example, when electioneering, Milošević would take up moderate positions concentrating on economics, skirting questions of nationalism, and subsequently when faced with mounting opposition, he would unleash violence to demobilize public support for that opposition. The author also makes extensive use of polls and surveys to support his argument that ruling elites created hard, divisive, ethnic identities through the promotion of violent conflict, which is a challenge to the conventional assumption that, in fact, ethnic tension led to violent conflict. In turn, he argues that this was then employed to attack the antiregime reformists and undermine their challenge to the ruling elites.

On one level—that of the general challenge to the assumption of direct causality between ethnic rivalry, war, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia—the argument is fair and convincing. It is widely accepted that in examining the country's collapse, we have to take a serious look at economic disparities within the former Yugoslavia and at external economic pressures, consider demands for

democratization, and place events there in the context of dramatic changes in the international political landscape. On another level—that of the debate between mobilization and demobilization of publics by ruling elites—the argument is much more difficult. The main reason is that it assumes that the leadership both in Belgrade and Zagreb had long-term and subtle strategies mapped out, which were then operationalized in specific instances to achieve specific results. And there is no substantial body of primary evidence to support this. Nor is there yet enough convincing evidence to suggest that the wars in Croatia and Bosnia were simply run from Belgrade, which through the promotion of violence manipulated local placemen to perpetuate the myth of ethnic conflict.

In any event the issues of mobilizing publics by “playing the ethnic card” or demobilizing opposition forces by promoting violence, which solidifies support around a ruling elite—or rather disrupts opposition to the ruling elite—center on the idea that whatever the approach, what was at stake was regime survival. If that is the case, then in fact the argument that then becomes most questionable is yet another conventional assumption that the wars in Yugoslavia were the direct product of a project to create a Greater Serbia. Perhaps the most convincing aspect of this book is the idea that what was being fought out mainly in Belgrade—and to a lesser extent Zagreb—was the survival of outdated regimes and individuals clinging to power in the face of growing demands for reform.

**Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally.”**

By Evelyn Goh. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 316p. \$75.00.

—Yufan Hao, *Colgate University*

The constructivist approach to the study of international relations seems to have become popular today. Evelyn Goh’s book uses the constructivist approach to study one of the most dramatic events in the history of international relations in the twentieth century: Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with China. The traditional orthodox interpretation of Sino-American relations views bilateral relations in the 1960s as an extension of hostility and antagonism that started in the early 1950s; Nixon’s dramatic departure in the early 1970s resulted from his realistic calculation of American strategic interests and the assistance China might provide in counterbalancing the increasing Soviet threat. This book analyzes the Sino-American rapprochement from a different angle. By identifying and tracing, throughout the 1960s within the U.S. government, the changing perception of China and the idea of a new China policy associated with the rapprochement, Goh tries to answer the question of how the rapprochement could have been achieved, rather than why it happened in 1972.

Constructivists believe that states develop interests and social identities, which change over time. At any given moment, state actors inhabit an environment of shared understandings and expectations, and social reality is the product of people constructing that reality. According to constructivists, the international system does not produce an automatic “objective” causal influence on a state’s actions. Rather, the state’s policy choices and responses result from a process of perception and interpretation by its decision makers, through which they come to understand the situation that the state faces.

The focus of this book is the forging of this subjective context in which image, ideas, and perceptions regarding China, mostly in the form of linguistic representation and rhetorical strategy, or a “discourse,” as the author puts it, and how one or more advocacies became dominant, and finally to what effect within the policymaking process. The central argument of the book is about the power of this constructed reality. Goh argues that there were several options, rendered by the Sino-Soviet split in early 1960s, available to U.S. decision makers at the time, and that Nixon chose to improve relations with China due, to a large extent, to the accumulated themes and change in perception resulting from debates about the nature of China and its capabilities. It was the gradual move to alternative policy positions within the governmental decision-making process from 1961 to 1974 that finally paved the way for Nixon’s departure from the traditional post-1949 China policy.

The book is divided into three parts. By exploring the mostly midlevel official debates about China policy during the 1960s, Part I investigates how the rethinking of China policy occurred within official circles. The author reveals in this part that in contrast to the dominant image of China as “Red Menace” and “Revolutionary Rival,” there were proponents of two revisionist discourses of China as “Troubled Modernizer” and “Resurgent Power,” which suggested seeking better relations with China for reasons other than common opposition to the Soviet Union. Part II investigates the period of transition from 1969 to 1971, when the competing discourses funneled down to a more intense policy debate about variations on the agreed theme of improving relations with China in the face of a clear opportunity. It argues that the revisionist view of China gradually gained momentum and had an impact on Nixon’s and Henry Kissinger’s new conceptualization of triangular politics. Part III deals with how the Nixon administration’s new China policy was advocated to the Chinese and justified to the various domestic constituencies in the United States as well as to international allies. Nixon and Kissinger tried to sell the rapprochement to Mao by cultivating an image of China as a noninimical partner, persuading the Chinese leaders that areas of common interest existed. This part also analyzes the implementation of the rapprochement policy from 1971 to 1974.



Constructivism is regarded as a form of “inside” theory, in contrast to “outside” social science theories that make use of the approaches of the natural sciences. While outside theories assume the existence of lawlike connections between different factors, which can be identified and qualified, the inside approach emphasizes the need to explore complex human beings, who are full of meanings, motives, symbols and intentions (see Fred Chernoff, *The Power of International Theory*, 2005). In that sense, Goh’s constructivist perspective offers a unique understanding of events that occurred in Sino-American relations in the 1960s and 1970s and ways to interpret them, rather than to identify a causal chain of events.

Based on some newly declassified documents from the Johnson and Nixon administrations, the book is full of discussion about the ideas underpinning U.S. debates for reconciliation with China. To Goh, actors and their perceptions matter and international relations are historically contingent, because “alternative actors with alternative identities and practices are capable of effecting change” (p. 258). Goh tries to prove that the constructivist approach may help to strengthen historical research by providing conceptual tools for analyzing the connection between ideas and outcomes.

The problem with the constructivist approach is that the important question is left unanswered: Where do human perception and ideas, particularly the change of ideas, come from? Some may well argue that they come from the changing reality of the external environment and that the ideas or the change in ideas may only reflect the changing reality. To some, changing ideas about China within the governmental decision-making process in the 1960s may be argued to have been predetermined by the changing situation in the international system. After all, it is existence that determines ideas, not vice versa, as Marxists would put it. In a sense, the rapprochement between China and the United States may have been structured and thus explained more convincingly by the traditional and rationalist balance-of-power approach.

Nonetheless, the book is overall an interesting and important supplement to the orthodox rationalist explanation of the U.S.-China rapprochement. It definitely contributes to our general understanding of how and why this important event occurred the way it did. It makes us think about the power of ideas, as well as the power of the constructivist approach.

**Freeing God’s Children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights.** By Allen D. Hertzke. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 440p. \$27.95.

— Mark Amstutz, *Wheaton College*

Contemporary international relations scholarship has generally disregarded the role of religion in global politics. The two dominant IR paradigms—neorealism and neo-

liberalism—tend to neglect religion altogether, assuming that religious beliefs and institutions are an impediment to world order. To a significant degree, the skepticism about religion is rooted in the prevailing Western assumption that science and reason will make religion unnecessary in modern life. However, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, the world has not become more secular. Rather, religion has become more prominent in society, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As a result, the leading secular IR paradigms have failed to take into account the religious dimension in international affairs.

Thankfully, a growing number of scholars have begun to address this conceptual and empirical shortcoming. One of the first noteworthy books to call attention to the significant role of religion in global politics was Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson’s *Religion—the Missing Element of Statecraft* (1995). Since then, numerous other studies have been published on the role of the sacred in global politics. *Freeing God’s Children* by Allen Hertzke is a welcome addition to this emerging literature.

In this book, Hertzke explores the growing role of religious actors in the making of U.S. foreign policy, focusing on neglected human rights issues. Since human rights groups have historically focused on governmental abuses, they have given little priority to offenses driven by religious fundamentalism or commercial interests. As a result, such abuses as religious persecution or sex trafficking have not been major concerns of either the foreign policy establishment or the international human rights movement. In the past decade, however, American religious groups, inspired by transcendent ideals, have begun to challenge the prevalent conception of human rights advocacy. As Hertzke demonstrates compellingly, religiously motivated actors—working with political leaders, publicists, and non-religious groups—have helped to develop a more comprehensive human rights agenda, thereby “filling a void in human rights advocacy” (p. 5). More particularly, the rise of evangelical global activism has provided “one of the few significant counterweights to the domination of foreign policy by corporate interests or strategic calculation” (p. 341).

Throughout much of the twentieth century, fundamentalist and evangelical believers, influenced by pietism and the belief that religious service was more important than public affairs, gave little attention to social and political action. This began to change as the Christian Right began to address domestic social issues in the 1970s and as evangelicals began to focus on global human rights in the 1990s. Ironically, the religious activism reinforced a conservative agenda on domestic issues but a progressive agenda on global concerns. Indeed, because of the rising impact of religious actors on global humanitarian issues, Hertzke claims, evangelicals have begun to serve as the foreign policy conscience of conservatism.

The author attributes the growing influence of the human rights faith-based coalition in the United States to several factors. First, because of a global religious revival, religion is more important in the world. While this renewal has been most dramatic in the Third World, religion has also become more salient in the United States, with evangelicals establishing some of the largest, best-organized social networks in the country. Second, since Christianity has been declining in Europe while rising in Asia and Africa, the shift of the Christian population from the North to the South has resulted in a religious “demographic revolution.” Whereas 80% of the Christian population lived in Europe or North America in 1900, by 2000 only 40% were in the North. Third, a growing number of believers have begun to face intense religious persecution. According to Hertzke, more than 600 million believers face non-trivial restrictions on their religious freedom. Finally, the growing intellectual awareness that Christianity has been conducive to human rights, peacekeeping, and democracy has resulted in an intellectual environment that is more hospitable to religion.

Of course, egregious injustices do not assure political reform. If policy change is to occur and advocacy to succeed, grassroots support must be mobilized and political leaders must provide tactical guidance. In earlier books, Hertzke analyzed the role of religious lobbies in Washington and the general role of religion in American politics. Here, he focuses on how religious groups have helped to promote international human rights and how concerned citizens have sought to influence U.S. foreign policy in confronting religious persecution and human trafficking. He provides a persuasive account of how human rights activists (e.g., Michael Horowitz and Nina Shea), heads of religious organizations (e.g., James Dobson of Focus on the Family, Charles Colson of Prison Fellowship, and Franklin Graham of Samaritan’s Purse), congressional leaders (e.g., Representatives Frank Wolf, Chris Smith, and Tony Hall and Senators Joseph Lieberman, Sam Brownback, and Don Nickles), and columnists, such as Abe Rosenthal and Eric Reeves, worked together to bring about major reforms in human rights legislation. The most important achievement was the passage in 1998 of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), a law that established an Office of International Religious Freedom at the Department of State and called for an annual report on the status of religious freedom worldwide. With the passage of this important law, the interfaith coalition (Jewish, Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant, and evangelical) created a faith-based organizational “scaffolding” that greatly facilitated passage of other human rights reforms, including the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (2000) and the Sudan Peace Act (2002).

A major strength of this book is that it illuminates how religiously inspired action can contribute to public policy reform. In particular, it shows how religious actors—

influenced by the conviction that all persons are entitled to dignity because they are “God’s children”—can strengthen global human rights. Second, the book provides an account of the nature and growing political influence of evangelical groups concerned with promoting liberation from human bondage. Finally, the study provides a compelling and often riveting story of how a faith-based movement has helped to establish a new human rights foreign policy architecture.

**International Relations and the Problem of Difference.** By Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney. New York: Routledge, 2004. 276p. \$80.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

— Daniel M. Green, *University of Delaware*

Can scholars of international relations dig themselves out from under the weight of several hundred years of world history and their own analytic baggage and remake themselves? This book asks for precisely this, delivering an important message for the discipline. Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney’s opening premise is that IR, in spite of what one might logically expect, has always in fact been stymied and wrong-footed by the “problem of difference.” Far from being able to understand and deal sensitively with diversity and the other, the practices and discipline of IR have squashed it—internally the state has become an engine of homogenization, while externally international society is a hostile realm of danger and hierarchy, in which forces of an “empire of uniformity” operate to stigmatize difference and tame it. Instead of embracing and theorizing difference, IR is associated from the time of early modern Europe with the crippling dual “legacy of colonialism and religious cleansing” (p. viii). The authors are advocates instead of “heterology,” of the study of IR as a “study of differences” in which dominant Western perspectives and leaders are not afraid to be challenged and changed by encounters with diversity and the other, in which such encounters are open questions.

Inayatullah and Blaney draw inspiration from critical and postcolonial authors such as Tzvetan Todorov and Ashis Nandy and, of course, from fellow members of IR’s critical wing. Four of the six principle chapters in the book have appeared previously as journal articles, but they are fairly extensively revised for this volume, and the book hangs together very well as an ensemble. The two entirely new chapters are excellent and adroitly add to the arc of their overall argument. Most of the chapters follow a common formula of critical excursions through key texts and even the personal careers of select luminaries. For those who enjoy dipping into the early political theory of IR, there are insightful and innovative discussions of some of the usual suspects—Vitoria, Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke—as well as the less well-known Jean de Lery (1534–1613) and Tomasso Campanella (1568–1637), both mined for their writings on native life in the

New World and Christianity's responses. These are supplemented by later, extended treatments of Adam Smith, F. A. Hayek, and Karl Polanyi, to name a few.

The history of IR, examined from roughly 1492 to the present, is revealed by the authors to be one of closing down of the opportunities for constructive, equal engagement with difference. The encounter with the New World did not go well. Subsequently, sovereignty itself crystallizes the problem, and 1648 is more properly seen as the "Westphalian deferral" when, counter to the popular myth, Europe creates a system that allows it to containerize societies and avoid open encounters with difference.

Somewhat surprisingly, the authors' chief targets and source material are not primarily American realists and neorealists, who are perhaps too far beyond help. Instead, there is a sustained critical engagement with the English School in particular, and some of its main contributors (Hedley Bull, Robert Jackson, Andrew Linklater, Adam Watson, Martin Wight), who are constantly drawn on as examples of good-but-still-flawed work. Beyond these, the authors deliver particularly telling attacks on several of today's IR literatures, for example, on three popular "neo-modernizationist" approaches (liberal peace, cosmopolitans, and global civil society; pp. 116–25) and on international political economy (IPE) (Chapter 4). The "neos" repeat the errors of their modernizationist forebears, deploying a "politics of comparison" that makes claims of universal goodness on one side that find concomitant failings among non-European peoples and states. Liberal peace arguments do this most obviously, but even those who might seem to go the furthest to be nonjudgmental and inclusive (Richard Falk, Andrew Linklater) are still found accepting of diversity only in a "truncated form" that cannot delay us on the "inexorable march of humanity toward universalism" (p. 121). Only true dialogue and acceptance of "mixed modes" of being can redeem the situation. These critiques are familiar terrain for some, but they certainly bear repeating as compelling and persuasive indictments of business as usual in IR scholarship.

Opponents of critical approaches will say that tearing down is far easier than building up. So, how do we actually engage with difference, and why would powerful actors really wish to do so? These are tough questions that any reader would have in mind throughout this book. To their credit, the authors themselves raise these and respond beyond the abstract and hortatory, to actually discuss following through on the implications of their positions. This is a risky venture that many who take critical perspectives prefer to avoid, but Inayatullah and Blaney's still might have come off better.

First, the authors rely in part, with a certain wistfulness, on the hope that dealing with the other is inherently necessary, since "the presence of the other within the self makes pure forms illusory" (p. 187)—difference cannot be erased and so its challenge is always there. To go further

and illustrate the potential of new understandings of territory and the permitting of "multiple and overlapping sovereignties," the authors take odd routes, first exploring complex understandings of property in Mughal India and the sharing of revenues, then the shifts in the encounter with British colonialism. An obscure case perhaps, with little said about how it might practically affect development today. The second example is modern Jerusalem, where negotiations about mixed uses and overlapping and contending claims have been inventive, to be sure. This is a good case to deal with (and differs from the more typical example of multiple sovereignties in the European Union), but no one would say that the fate of Jerusalem has yet been resolved, nor that discussions about it have been anything less than tortuous. What can we then say of dialogue and open engagement with difference at larger scales?

The aims of Inayatullah and Blaney are definitely worthy, and *International Relations and the Problem of Difference* contains, in one place, a devastating and thorough indictment of the way mainstream IR and IPE have been historically constructed and are done today. But we may also wonder about their timing. For, arguably, we live in an era in which transnational capital is ever more eager and adept in asserting its property rights to every corner of the world, in which the "war on terror" is enhancing the scrutiny of territory and borders, and deepening the disciplining of the other in international society. Critical voices will hopefully flourish, but in many ways the "empire of uniformity" has probably never had it so good.

### **Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial**

**Past.** By Kimberly Zisk Marten. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 208p. \$27.95.

— Tony Smith, *Tufts University*

This instructive volume aims to sort out the reasons that peacekeeping missions today so frequently fail. Kimberly Zisk Marten throws a wide net in investigating why. While her main case studies are Haiti, the Balkans, East Timor, and Afghanistan, she also makes more passing reference to a number of other recent or current interventions, including Iraq. As the subtitle of her book indicates, she also considers a variety of efforts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by liberal (for the times) colonial powers to ensure order and to restructure local societies and governments in line with what was perceived as beneficial both for the subject populations and the imperial homeland.

Marten's conclusions are mostly pessimistic. Peoples who come under foreign military occupation—whether today or more than a century ago—are inherently difficult to manage, much less reform, in liberalizing ways when deep-set ethnic differences have been long contained by authoritarian rule. Moreover, the intervening powers often lack

the political will to do more than maintain order, finding that greater challenges at the center of world affairs preoccupy them much more than trying to perfect human relations and governing institutions on the periphery. By showing that in many ways the same dilemmas of “enforcing the peace” bedeviled both peacekeeping nations today and their predecessors a century or so ago, the author points to a recurrent set of obstacles that almost always eventually means that an enduring change toward stable democratic rule is not achieved.

Marten is careful to point out differences in time and place as well as similarities. Thus, the colonial powers of a century ago were more interested in consolidating their own hold on power than in preparing their subjects for eventual self-rule, which is the essential task today. Or again, the vicissitudes of 1994–95, first in Rwanda and then in the Balkans, led to critical changes in the way peacekeeping was conceived in our era, as it became understood that the intervening powers had to be prepared to use decisive military force if their ambitions were to have any hope of success. And she is careful to point out the peculiarities of individual cases—the fact that East Timor had never had its own government, for example—that make each situation unique to some extent.

On the basis of her review of a wide range of armed interventions—especially those of the 1990s and in Afghanistan beginning in 2002—Marten comes to pessimistic conclusions. “Nowhere have the liberal democratic military peacekeeping operations of the 1990s created liberal democratic societies,” she writes. “They did not even create much forward momentum in that direction in any of the countries where they were deployed” (p. 13). From this finding, the author does not conclude that armed humanitarian interventions should cease, but she does think that states involved in these actions should be aware of the limits of their abilities to enforce the peace for positive state-building ends and be satisfied instead with achieving what they can accomplish: stopping civil violence, protecting local populations against famine, engaging in limited projects to improve the economy (infrastructure development, for example), and hoping against hope that eventually the locals themselves will come to a positive resolution of their differences.

Calling for “a new model of security building” (p. 158), Marten explicitly warns against the kinds of inflated expectations that hold that stable governing institutions can emerge from peacekeeping occupations. Even the modest mission she describes for outsiders—in effect, the essentials of law and order plus a bit of humanitarian outreach and economic improvement—should be anticipated to take time and incur real costs. While international bodies such as the United Nations have critical roles to play, specific states should have lead authority in managing specific cases. States leading such interventionist missions should have some self-interest involved in the undertak-

ing but not expect dramatic gains from their efforts. As a new government emerges, the foreign influence in place should support it—which may involve the armed control of borders, facing down rioters, or breaking the power of organized criminal operations. Interventions need to be backed up by a clearer commitment to use force and to stay the course, yet at the same time they should be scaled back in terms of thinking that outsiders can build states or nations, for these are tasks that must be left to the locals.

For this reviewer, the main merit of *Enforcing the Peace* lies in its decidedly sober assessment of what progressively minded intervention can hope to achieve in today’s world, combined with a determination not to throw in the towel completely. By calling for what I might label the depoliticization of intervention in favor of more modest goals delivered with a firmer hand, Marten’s approach might be similar to that recently announced by David Rieff, who has in effect repudiated his past calls for ambitious state-building schemes in favor of much more modest humanitarian ends (*A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*, 2003; and *At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention*, 2005). The pessimistic restraint of both Marten and Rieff might be compared profitably to the kind of enthusiasm that reigned only a few years ago with social scientists like Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (*The Power of Human Rights*, 1999). The interventions of the late 1990s were sobering; those of the early twenty-first century are frankly depressing. We are chastened by our times of an earlier optimism born of the end of the Cold War on terms we thought might continue to sweep forward in the world, if only we gave the push.

I would suggest a few amendments to the book’s argument. First, the flashbacks to the imperial past are too brief to be compelling, and in any case, are they really useful? The subtitle of the book is surely misleading in any case. And the effort to make the two periods comparable strikes me as stretching it. Between the taking of the Philippines and the invasion of Iraq, for example, lies something called the twentieth century with its wars, its ideologies that were blueprints for political change, its winners and losers, its nationalism, its rebirth of religion—the list could be extended. Political scientists are at risk when they ride roughshod over history, gaily assuming that they may compare whatever they please when in fact circumstances are so changed.

Second, why can the international community not act more forcibly to bring about border rectifications where they make sense? Marten appears to think that trying to get the various ethnicities of the Balkans together within Bosnia in the Dayton Peace Accords was a mistake (I agree), but why not redraw boundary lines (for example, putting more ethnic Albanians now under other state authorities in Kosovo proper, while ethnic Serbs are permitted to be citizens of Serbia)? Many of these communities live very

close to borders in any case, and some kind of proportional exchanges might be envisioned, such as now are discussed in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, for example. We can thus avoid the terrible ethnic transfers that occurred among Greeks and Turks or Indians and Pakistanis, while at the same time creating an ethnic homogeneity that makes whatever government is in power more likely to be stable.

**Whither Globalization? The Vortex of Knowledge and Ideology.** By James H. Mittelman. New York: Routledge, 2004. 152p. \$105.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Manfred B. Steger, *Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology*

This book contains an accessible blend of previously published articles (revised) and new essays that examine the role of knowledge and ideology as the pivots of globalization's power in the twenty-first century. Expanding the central arguments of his previous study, *The Globalization Syndrome* (2000), James Mittelman defines globalization as "a triangulated structure" comprised of "the global division of labor and power, a new regionalism, and resistance politics" (p. 5). Shifting his analytic focus from issues in international political economy to the cultural production of identities, Mittelman locates his primary concern in this concise collection in the "subjective framework of globalization, namely, knowledge and ideology" (p. 3). Thus viewing globalization as a "cognitive map constituted by clusters of knowledge," the author focuses particularly on the production of alternative forms of knowledge, ideas, and strategies of resistance to globalization—"alterglobalization" (p. 97).

The essays in the first half of the book not only provide a penetrating overview of the various *academic discourses* on globalization but also offer a useful discussion of emerging points of scholarly agreement and disciplinary realignments. Examining the impact of the ascending paradigm of global[ization] studies on the traditional field of international studies, Mittelman contends that neither the "para-keepers"—scholars who deny that globalization offers a fresh way of thinking about the world—nor the "para-makers"—academics who consider globalization studies a distinct theoretical innovation that is rapidly replacing the old paradigm—capture the complex transformation of power knowledge currently underway in international studies. The author ultimately posits a sensible synthesis that acknowledges the tremendous influence of globalization as an academic knowledge-set, while rejecting the radical view of those para-makers who contend that we are finding ourselves at the cusp of an intellectual overthrow that would quickly sweep away the reigning paradigm: "Given that systematic research on globalization is only slightly more than a decade in the making, it is more likely that international studies has entered an interregnum between the old and the new" (p. 33).

Connecting this theoretical middle ground to the practical task of developing new research projects, Mittelman urges globalization researchers to focus their intellectual energies on producing different kinds of knowledge about the ideological linkages and fissures between neoliberal globalization and alterglobalization. Referring to such a genre of knowledge as "critical globalization studies," he envisions interdisciplinary teams of researchers and activists committed to methodological pluralism and anchored in the philosophical tradition of critical theorists like Max Weber, Antonio Gramsci, Karl Polanyi, Michel Foucault, and Sandra Harding (pp. 34–36). Insisting that contemporary critical globalization theorists ought to remain cognizant of the hierarchical power-knowledge relations that provide the structural framework for the ideological maneuvers of contemporary global power elites, Mittelman issues a passionate call for the construction of "grounded utopias"—ethical projects of alterglobalization rooted in real historical tendencies and centered on the embodied voices and practices of those who have been marginalized or excluded by the juggernaut of neoliberal globalization (pp. 36–39).

In the second half of the book, the author turns more concretely to matters of political ideology, by providing both qualitative and quantitative analyses of those perspectives of globalization circulating *in the public sphere* that sustain or undermine the dominant neoliberal worldview. He offers a useful typology that divides different sets of ideas and values about globalization into four contemporary "ideological currents": 1) centrist neoliberal thinking (reflected in the dominant approach of the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization); 2) reformist neoliberalism (expressed by neoliberal dissidents such as Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman, and George Soros); 3) historical-materialist transformism (propagated by such left critics of free-market capitalism as William Tabb); and 4) development transformism (often presented by cosmopolitan intellectuals in the global South such as Walden Bello or Martin Khor). While these four ideological currents represent very different views on the desirability of the dominant neoliberal globalization agenda, Mittelman claims that they are nonetheless united in their common assumption that "the contemporary era is marked by a bundling of neoliberalism and globalization" (p. 54). Defining neoliberalism in terms of its core agenda—deregulation, liberalization, and privatization—the remaining essays of the book discuss the potential of alterglobalization as an ideological-material project of delinking globalization and the dominant neoliberal framework.

No doubt, free-market ideas and values play a vital role in the construction of what I have referred to as the ideology of "globalism" (Manfred Steger, *Globalism: Market Ideology Meets Terrorism*, 2004). However, the conceptual link between neoliberalism and globalization does not capture the full dimensions of the dominant political belief

system—especially in our post-9/11 world. Seemingly sensing that there might be more to globalism than neoliberalism, Mittelman discusses in very general terms the ideological ramifications of the meteoric ascent of neoconservatism and the concomitant “rise of military globalization” (pp. 38–43, 95–97). In the harsh political climate following the attacks of September 11, neoliberals have struggled to maintain the dominance of their economic project. As the author recognizes, one obvious solution was to “toughen up” neoliberal ideological claims in order to fit the neoconservative vision of a unilateralist American empire backed by overwhelming military power. As a result, however, 1990s neoliberal globalism has morphed into the imperial globalism of the new century. The altered conceptual composition of globalism raises the crucial question of ideological continuity: How much of “neoliberalism” still remains in imperial globalism?

Finding an answer to this question requires a fundamental reappraisal of the ideological landscape of our time, one that would go far beyond the confines of *Whither Globalization?* Still, Mittelman’s self-selected focus on ideology and knowledge requires a more detailed discussion of this gigantic ideological transformation in our global age. One obvious task would be to address the serious ideological contradictions arising from the newly forged link between globalization and militarization. After all, the globalists’ reliance on the coercive powers of the state to secure their project undermines the neoliberal idea of the “self-regulating market.” Moreover, the Bush administration’s belligerent vision of enforcing “democracy” and “freedom” at gunpoint in conflict areas around the world conflicts with the neoliberal emphasis of “negative liberty”—the absence of coercion. Finally, the Anglo-American unilateralism contradicts the cosmopolitan, universal spirit associated with the concept “globalization”—hence, the criticism of reformed neoliberals like Joseph Stiglitz. By relying too heavily on the neoliberalism-globalization link, Mittelman undertheorizes powerful neoconservative processes of knowledge production that critically impact ideological formations on the global stage. But this hardly takes away from the conceptual power of the book. Written in elegant prose, this study represents a remarkable intellectual achievement that will appeal to students and globalization researchers alike. Most of all, it fortifies James Mittelman’s stature as one of the most luminous thinkers in the emerging interdisciplinary field of globalization studies.

**Covenants Without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire.** By Jeanne Morefield. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 280p. \$39.50.

— Jennifer Pitts, *Princeton University*

The entanglement of liberal political thought and European imperial expansion has received increasing attention

in recent years, in work by David Armitage, Barbara Arneil, Uday Mehta, Richard Tuck, and James Tully, among others. Yet the phenomenon remains puzzling, for while many European liberals, especially from the mid-nineteenth century through the interwar period, enthusiastically promoted imperial rule, the reasons for their support varied widely: There is no single or consistent liberal imperialism. Jeanne Morefield has enriched this story considerably with her closely argued and elegantly written account of a hitherto largely neglected episode, which she calls “one of the most philosophically interesting moments when liberal thinkers and activists engaged in the politics of hierarchy and paternalism” (p. 2). Although Morefield’s protagonists, Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern, have not received much attention in previous scholarship, her narrative impressively complements the account in Martti Koskenniemi’s recent book *The Gentle Civiliser of Nations* (2002). Both chronicle the activities and ideas of visionary internationalists who aspired to end the barbarities of war and erect a humane international system, but who also keenly supported European imperial expansion during its heyday.

*Covenants Without Swords* offers a compelling rereading of British interwar internationalism that in important respects improves upon E. H. Carr’s influential account in *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (1939) by providing a more nuanced and differentiated portrait of some key thinkers of the period. The central figures of the book, Murray and Zimmern, were both Oxford classicists trained during the 1880s and 1890s when the liberal idealism of T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet was ascendant. Both men were outsiders to the British establishment, Murray as the Australian descendant of a line of Irish radicals, and Zimmern as the son of Jewish German parents who had emigrated to England after the Prussian annexation of Frankfurt. Zimmern went on to hold the world’s first chair of international relations (at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth), while Murray remained a lifelong professor of classics at Oxford even as he lectured and wrote widely on international politics. Both had extravagant hopes for a moral global society but were at the same time unwilling to argue for the institutions and politics that might foster such a society. Their individualist suspicion of state power, Morefield shows, led them to resist any global organization with real power and to rest content with the hope that liberal nations would voluntarily come to renounce war. Their complacent paternalism toward “backward races,” as well as their anxiety for the European imperial order in the face of anticolonial resistance, resulted in a vision of “world spirit” that acquiesced in, indeed embraced, imperial rule.

Murray and Zimmern exercised considerable influence over the development of the League of Nations, in part because their vision of a toothless League was more palatable to key British delegates than the aspirations for a

more potent international body entertained by contemporaries such as Harold Laski and John Hobson. The League's weaknesses, Morefield argues, can thus be traced in part to the distinctive political preoccupations and theoretical approaches of this fascinating and problematic moment of British idealist liberalism. Murray and Zimmern's thought is worth dwelling on, she suggests, not because they offered a particularly compelling vision of international politics but because the theoretical "muddle" that characterized their thought exemplifies deeper, persisting tensions in liberalism.

One of the great strengths of Morefield's argument is that it shows that Murray and Zimmern's seemingly paradoxical international commitments were firmly rooted in their political thought more broadly. Far from being an anomalous departure from an otherwise seamless egalitarianism, their combination of idealistic internationalism and deference to the imperial status quo reflects deeper tensions that run through their views on domestic politics as well. As Morefield puts it, Murray and Zimmern held that "selfishness caused conflict; in both cases [domestic and international], a return to a spiritualized form of liberal morality would lead to renewed order" (p. 97). The author situates Murray and Zimmern in a reformist tradition that saw classical liberalism as excessively individualist and as complicit in the economic injustices endemic in industrial society. In their effort to supply British liberalism with a stronger notion of moral responsibility, and to reconcile liberal freedom with a sense of the common good, these thinkers, following Green and Bosanquet, turned to Hegelian idealism. Their engagement with Hegelianism was always ambivalent, however, for they were too wary of government power to accept Hegel's seeming apotheosis of the state. Moreover, as British opinion turned against "Prussianism" in reaction to Bismarck's aggressive foreign policy, and then even more emphatically with the onset of the First World War, it became impolitic to acknowledge a debt to Hegel, who was seen as having inspired the Prussian state. Morefield argues persuasively that these thinkers' reluctance to adopt a thoroughgoing Hegelianism, in which the conflict embodied by the market and civil society is transcended in an ethical state, led them to adopt solutions to market failings that were in important and problematic ways both "preliberal" and "pre-Hegelian."

Instead of turning to the political realm to resolve the pathologies of market individualism, British idealists, including Murray and Zimmern, relied on what they saw as organic structures, especially the family and the nation, as sources of moral authority. Their rather uncritical confidence in "nature" as an "engine of progress" (p. 43) led such thinkers to worry, for instance, that sexual equality would have catastrophic social consequences and to devote philanthropic efforts toward keeping working-class women at home. In the international sphere, Morefield shows,

they blithely regarded nations as organic units and adopted a notion of the family of nations that presumed a hierarchy of mature and infantile peoples. For all the similarity in their concerns, Murray and Zimmern had distinctive approaches, which the author effectively details. Zimmern's thought appears, on the whole, more nuanced and his vision of international spirit less static and less hierarchical than the notion of "cosmos" that Murray modeled on his beloved Periclean Athens, with its values of community and self-sacrifice.

Morefield has provided a sure-handed and tightly argued account of a body of liberal thought whose failings had unfortunate effects on world politics and whose paradoxes continue to be instructive. In the book's final chapter, she explores analogous tensions in the work of such contemporary liberal hawks as Fareed Zakaria and Michael Ignatieff. Her discussion of many liberals' continuing temptation to overlook or embrace hierarchies of power both within and among states (as in Ignatieff's proposed "empire lite" [p. 227]) is tough-minded and acute. The book's references to the theoretical alternatives of the interwar period are tantalizing, for she suggests that some of Murray and Zimmern's liberal contemporaries, such as J. A. Hobson and Harold Laski, managed to avoid the paths and pitfalls that led so many others to support the imperial order and to shy away from imagining more effective global institutions. Those strands of interwar liberalism that escaped the most hierarchical and exclusionary tendencies of their day would be well worth further study, perhaps by Morefield herself, and indeed might aid current efforts to theorize more egalitarian global institutions than those offered by today's liberal imperialists.

**Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.** Edited by T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 400p. \$70.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

— Patricia A. Weitsman, *Ohio University*

The end of the Cold War and the advent of the post-9/11 era altered the strategic context of international relations irrevocably. In the wake of these changes, it is useful to reexamine our traditional theoretical understandings of the system in order to determine the direction international relations scholarship should take. While theory should evolve independently from the empirical realities of world politics, periodically taking stock of where we are and where we should go is extremely helpful. This book is a welcome collection that takes on that task.

The book is divided into three segments. An introduction by T. V. Paul establishes the need to reevaluate balance of power theory, given contemporary challenges in the international system. He describes the different strategies of balancing behavior and outlines the research questions for the volume. The first segment of the book, devoted to

theories of balance of power and major powers, opens with a chapter by Jack S. Levy that summarizes balance of power theory, its predictions, and scope. Levy astutely argues that balance of power theory is Eurocentric and that it focuses too much on great power politics. The second chapter, by Douglas Lemke, persuasively argues that power transition theory provides a better explanation for contemporary politics than does balance of power theory, in the form of offensive realism. The final chapter in the first segment of the book, by Mark R. Brawley, addresses the political economy of balance of power theory. Brawley innovatively identifies the international economic policies associated with the strategies of external balancing, internal balancing, bandwagoning, buck passing, and appeasement. This chapter also calls the utility of balance of power theory into question. Brawley finds that, by and large, major powers in the system are not responding to American superiority and do not fear American dominance (p. 97), although this could change in time.

The second segment of the book addresses new security challenges and the balance of power. It begins with Christopher Layne's chapter about the war on terrorism and its meaning regarding the balance of power. Layne argues that the 9/11 attacks "changed virtually nothing" (p. 103). This chapter is more what one might expect from a book entitled *Balance of Power*. It is a forceful and cogently argued defense of offensive realism in the contemporary context. The chapter could not be more at odds with most of the other chapters in the book, especially with the one by Edward Rhodes, which comes later in the same segment. Rhodes argues very nearly the opposite of Layne, that in the contemporary era, "states do not face a logical imperative to balance each other's military forces" (p. 150). This is true, according to Rhodes, in light of the changing nature and construction of warfare, as witnessed by the 9/11 attacks, and the American campaign against terrorism (p. 151). James J. Wirtz's contribution to this segment of the book addresses the "the tendency of war to erupt during confrontations between weak and strong states—wars that strong states should strive to avoid and weak states cannot realistically expect to win" (p. 128). Wirtz appropriately notes that these conflicts offer "significant anomalies" to balance of power theory (p. 146).

The third segment addresses "regional subsystems and balance of power." Robert J. Art writes about Europe, William C. Wohlforth about Central Eurasia, Benjamin Miller about the Middle East, Robert S. Ross about East Asia, and Raju G. C. Thomas about South Asia, and Michael Barletta and Harold Trinkunas address Latin America. Most of these authors seek departure from balance of power ideas—Art describes Europe mixing its strategy via hedging; Wohlforth finds that "the conclusion most charitable to balance of power theory is that it does not apply to this group of states at this time" (p. 235); Barletta and Trinkunas suggest a theory of "balance of identity," in

which regime type replaces power as the most important driving force of state strategy; while the Ross and Thomas contributions are more ambivalent about the balance of power applications to their respective regions. Only the Miller piece in this segment is an unapologetic application of balance of power theory. A concluding chapter to the volume by the three editors succinctly summarizes the contributors' arguments and draws them back to the theme of whether balance of power theory in the contemporary context.

The most significant weaknesses of the book are the inconsistencies in the application of balance of power theory and in the contradictory interpretation of events past and present (e.g., China's current status and behavior are represented in five different and conflicting ways). Since most of the contributors find balance of power theory to be problematic in the first place, the title and topic of the book is misleading. Most of the authors critiqued balance of power theory in order to promote their own competing views of international politics. This arrangement would have worked better had there been a consistent theme or theory that was advanced in balance of power theory's place, or had the book been entitled *Future Directions for International Relations Research*. The book is disappointing in regard to its lack of gender diversity as well.

Despite these shortcomings, most of the chapters are thoughtful, insightful, and interesting. The book offers a wealth of analytical gems and fruitful avenues for future international relations scholarship. The pairing of the theoretical enterprise with the subsystem regional applications is innovative, and the concluding chapter to the volume does an admirable job of tying together some of the disparate themes. The book is a valuable addition to the literature and worth examining for advanced international relations courses, provided the reader understands that most of the contributions are contra-realism.

**Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America.** By Kathryn Sikkink. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 288p. \$29.95.

— David Cingranelli, *Binghamton University, State University of New York*

Kathryn Sikkink argues that the United States government has sent mixed signals to the governments of Latin American countries about the importance of respect for human rights. The book provides detailed descriptions of U.S. policies that promoted better and worse human rights practices in particular countries over the past 30 years. She notes several cases where the U.S. government sent mixed signals by being strong on general human rights rhetoric, but by not pressing human rights concerns when dealing with Latin American governments facing domestic rebellions. The willingness of the U.S. government to support anticommunist, counterrevolutionary and antiterrorist policies has been much stronger than any desire to



promote good human rights practices in the region. In the author's view, these were the wrong priorities.

Besides this contradiction between words and deeds, the United States also has sent mixed signals because it has adopted strong bilateral policies on the promotion of human rights but has no multilateral human rights policies. States have a bilateral human rights policy when their governments take human rights into account when making policies toward other states. They have a multilateral policy on human rights if they are willing to submit their own internal human rights practices to international review. During the 1970s and 1980s, the United States adopted several policies designed to promote better human rights practices by other governments of the world. The origins and contents of these policies are described in Part I of the book. Since that time, the U.S. government has included human rights considerations in its bilateral policies toward Latin America, at least to some extent. However, as the author notes, "The United States has been unwilling to ratify any international human rights treaty with teeth" (p. 10). The government has not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights or accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or even joined the International Criminal Court. These, she argues, would be minimal first steps toward a multilateral human rights policy. She notes that unlike the United States, every country in Europe has both a bilateral and multilateral human rights policy.

The central theoretical question of the book concerns this puzzle: What factors lead any state to adopt human rights policies in the first place? After all, bilateral human rights policies can make it harder to achieve other economic and military foreign policy objectives, and multilateral human rights policies require that a nation cede some of its sovereignty. Beyond this general question, the author wonders why the United States, in particular, is the only economically developed country to have a bilateral human rights policy but no multilateral one. She discusses five alternative theories: realism, critical theory, liberalism, ideational theory, and institutionalism.

Sikkink argues that ideational theory and institutionalism are the most useful in explaining the support for a bilateral human rights policy and lack of a multilateral human rights policy in the United States. Ideational theory emphasizes the role of ideas and norms in effecting political change. It provides the best explanation for the development of a strong bilateral human rights policy by the U.S. government. She explains that ideational theories are often called "constructivist" theories because they are concerned with how human consciousness constructs the social world (p. 15). At the risk of oversimplification, the basic idea here is that the United States has a strong bilateral human rights policy mainly because the American people strongly support the idea of universal, individual human rights. By "institutionalism," Sikkink refers to theories that

stress the importance of institutions and institutional rules. According to the author, difficult treaty ratification rules under the U.S. Constitution have been the main reason for the absence of a multilateral human rights policy. The creation of the Bureau of Human Rights within the Department of State, on the other hand, has helped to prevent some administrations from backsliding on the U.S. commitment to promote better human rights practices through its foreign policy.

Sikkink points to the importance of nongovernmental human rights organizations in supporting the development of bilateral and multilateral human rights policies in the United States, introducing human rights ideas into international political discourse, and transforming human rights ideas into international norms. This emphasis on the role of transnational nongovernmental forces in advancing human rights ideas also was a central theme of her 1999 book with Margaret E. Keck entitled *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. That book won the 1999 Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order.

Despite the mixed signals sent by U.S. foreign policy, Sikkink believes that strong public support within the United States for human rights ideas, external pressure from activist groups, and certain institutions and institutional rules have produced improvements in human rights practices in Latin America. As examples, she points to the long-term expansion of the right to participate in the selection of government leaders, the right to freedom of speech and press, and the right to freedom of association. She believes that U.S. foreign policy has been at least partly responsible for the democratization of most governments in Latin America over the past 30 years. In the late 1970s, she notes, almost all governments in the region were authoritarian. Now, almost all are democratic.

However, the author does worry that the war against terrorism will lead the United States to repeat the mistakes of the past. Indeed, the most important policy implication of the book is that in the past, the U.S. government encouraged many Latin American governments to wage wars on terrorism without regard to the rule of law, leading to massive violations of human rights. Some Latin American governments, with U.S. approval and sometimes with the active assistance of the U.S. government, wrongly imprisoned, tortured, killed, and caused to disappear thousands, even tens of thousands, of their own citizens. This was a mistaken path for them and for the U.S. government, she argues, because the only effective, long-term solution to the problem of terrorism is one that promotes democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

As evidence of the beginning of a regression to the policies of the past, the author points to the U.S. government-backed coup in Venezuela against the elected populist president, Hugo Chavez, in 2002. After the coup, the White House spokesperson did not condemn it. Instead,

he suggested that the U.S. government was happy that President Chavez was gone. In contrast, the Organization of American States quickly and strongly condemned the coup. Congressional, NGO, and media critics demanded that the administration explain its actions. Partly as a result, Hugo Chavez was restored to office. So here we have another mixed signal. The regional institutions and norms protecting human rights and democracy were strong partly because of the influence of the United States. They were so strong that they trumped U.S. short-term interests that would have led to a violation of those same norms.

*Mixed Signals* is an excellent account of the development of U.S. human rights policy, with a special emphasis on Latin America. It is impressive in its empirical scope, careful documentation, and analytic subtlety. It will prove useful to scholars and students.

**The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness.** By

Timothy J. Sinclair. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 208p. \$29.95.

— Adam Harmes, *University of Western Ontario*

In his book, Timothy J. Sinclair makes a strong theoretical and empirical contribution to the growing political economy literature on the increasing influence of non-state actors. More specifically, he draws upon a cogent interweaving of rationalist and constructivist approaches to reveal the various forms of power exercised by American bond raters, such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's. Moreover, by means of detailed case studies on the rating of corporations, municipalities, and national governments, he demonstrates the broad political implications of rating agency power in terms of both geopolitical and distributive questions. In both cases, Sinclair's central argument is that "rating agencies help to construct the context in which corporations, municipalities, and governments make decisions. Rating agencies are not, as often supposed, 'neutral' institutions. Their impact on policy is political first, in terms of the processes involved, and second, in terms of the consequences of competing social interests" (p. 149).

To demonstrate these points, Sinclair makes three supporting arguments related to his analytical categories of investment, knowledge, and governance. In terms of investment, he seeks to challenge neoliberal views on the decentralized and "automatic" nature of capital allocation, which have been reinforced by the trend towards disintermediation. Disintermediation occurs when corporations and governments raise capital directly from individual investors through the selling of stocks and bonds, rather than indirectly from depositors through bank loans (where banks act as intermediaries between depositors and borrowers). By reducing the influence of the banking intermediaries,

disintermediation is said to remove the "gatekeeper" role from financial markets in a way that leads to more decentralized investment judgments and, in turn, to a more efficient form of capital allocation. The author challenges this view by examining how disintermediation has created an information gap related to the creditworthiness of bond issuers that has been filled by the very small number of rating agencies. The result, he argues, is a type of recentralization of investment judgments in which American bond raters have emerged as one of the new gatekeepers. In making this argument, he adds much to our understanding of capital mobility and the structural power of capital by highlighting the role that ideas, and the "embedded knowledge networks" that promote them, play in coordinating the decisions of millions of unconnected investors.

Turning to the ideas themselves in his analytic category of knowledge, Sinclair challenges the notion that rating agency judgments are simply the product of a neutral and technocratic process. Instead, he argues that "[r]ating agencies produce knowledge that is socially and politically partial, and then objectify this knowledge, making it authoritative" (p. 59). From his critical and constructivist perspective, he views the creation and assessment of knowledge as the product of conflicts between competing social forces; ideas are thus connected to interests, and interests and power thus help to determine which ideas are assessed as valuable. At the same time, ideas that become widely or intersubjectively held can help to construct and reproduce specific policy ideas and broader ways of knowing. While careful to avoid any suggestions of direct or deliberate prejudice, the author persuasively demonstrates the bias of raters toward neoliberal policy ideas and synchronic, instrumental forms of knowledge, which take existing structures of world order as unquestioned givens.

Having established the bond raters as powerful gatekeepers who employ "biased" forms of knowledge, Sinclair goes on to examine the political implications of rating agency power through his analytic category of governance. While far more nuanced than can be detailed here, his key argument is that "the logic of rating is linked to a particular form of social organization and set of interests. It does not represent a universally beneficial system" (p. 62). The form of social organization he is referring to is one that is broadly neoliberal in character. The set of interests who benefit most from it are investors in distributive terms and the United States in geopolitical terms.

Taken together, Sinclair's supporting arguments related to investment, knowledge, and governance add up to a convincing and highly accessible account of American bond raters as a significant form of nonstate governance in the emerging world order. They also add up to a strong theoretical contribution to the constructivist and critical international relations literatures. As such, this book will be of interest well beyond the cadre of "usual suspects" who

work on the political economy of global finance. Particularly good for this wider readership is Sinclair's theoretical chapter on "Unconscious Power," his empirical case study on the "Global Growth of the Rating Business," and his chapter "Good, Bad or Indifferent: The Emergence of Rating," which provides a first-rate historical account of the emergence and growth of the rating industry. For finance specialists in economics, political economy, and history, the more empirical chapters on corporate, municipal, and sovereign ratings and on "blown calls" related to Orange County, the Asian crisis, and Enron are the further additions that make the book as a whole a must have.

Notwithstanding its many strengths, *The New Masters of Capital* does have a few small sins of commission and omission. In the former case, some of the statistical information (such as on the extent of disintermediation, p. 55) could have used more updating. The theoretical chapter, particularly when discussing the political implications of rating agency power, could have used more specific empirical examples. Though provided in later chapters, such examples would make this aspect of the argument that much clearer at the start. In terms of omissions, a bit more discussion of the rating agencies as sites of struggle might have been interesting. While Sinclair does deal with the emergence of non-American raters, he might have examined some of the proposals for including environmental and social criteria in the rating process, what the implications of this might be, and how, if at all, the agencies have responded to such proposals. These very minor points aside, this is an extremely well-written, carefully researched, and theoretically nuanced book that will be of interest to scholars from a wide range of disciplines and perspectives.

**Bridging the European Divide: Middle Power Politics and Regional Security Dilemmas.** By Joshua B. Spero. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 360p. \$75.00.

— Michael G. Roskin, *Lycoming College*

The focus of this work is narrower than the title implies. It is actually a close study of the policies of Poland's first noncommunist foreign minister, Krystof Skubiszewski, who served all four Solidarnosc-based governments, 1989–93, and thus set Poland on its present course. Joshua Spero abundantly praises Skubiszewski for pursuing policies that not only safeguarded Poland's interests but kept Central Europe out of the traps of the interwar period.

As Spero sees it, Skubiszewski made pragmatic and rational choices for a "bridging" strategy, "a new form of alignment" of cooperative behavior with all neighbors,

deliberately making Poland into "a pivotal middle power" (p. 24). Bridging, according to the author, is distinct from such traditional strategies as 1) forming alliances to balance the power of threatening states, 2) joining or bandwagoning with stronger states, or 3) trying to stay neutral between two dangerous neighbors. Instead, a middle power could build a series of bridges to all neighboring states, calming their fears and drawing them into stable regional arrangements.

Skubiszewski, who was 62 when he took office, had a Harvard Ph.D. and was a world-respected professor of international law at the University of Poznan. Earlier Polish thinkers had pointed to a bridging strategy. Emigré journalist Juliusz Mieroszewski proposed that a post-Communist Poland renounce any claims to neighboring countries—and Poland had once possessed much of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine—as part of Polish independence from the Soviet Union. Poland's 1957–58 Rapacki Plan (named after Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki), by calling for the denuclearization of Central Europe, also showed a middle power seeking room to maneuver by calming regional tensions.

Spero massively details Skubiszewski's bridging policies in several areas:

1. He supported German unification in return for Bonn's settlement of the Oder-Neisse line as their common border. This led to German support for Poland's admission to NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004.

2. He helped set up the Visegrad Triangle of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, building a sense of Central European solidarity and shared aims.

3. He renounced any claims to Poland's old territories in Lithuania, Belarus, or Ukraine, thereby easing the transition with the weakening Soviet Union.

4. He negotiated the departure of Soviet troops stationed in Poland, along with the demise of the Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

Spero makes a good case that Skubiszewski was a clever and meticulous statesman in getting Poland out of the Soviet grasp, and in a nice way. The author, however, does not develop "bridging" as a foreign policy category, except for Poland in 1989–93. Comparative cases could be interesting. Have other states—such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary during the same time period—practiced it? Was France under de Gaulle engaged in a bridging strategy? Is Japan—which attempts to maintain good relations with China, Taiwan, Vietnam, both Koreas, and the United States—a bridge? Does bridging describe Polish foreign policy since Skubiszewski? He always aimed for Poland to join NATO and the EU. If this was a bridge, it tilted sharply westward.