furnish us with a direct negation of any parallelism whatsoever. The inadequacy probably exists in our own defective conception of the actual nature of the relations existing between mind and matter. In any case, our partial knowledge of that relationship does not warrant a direct negation of the possibilities and probabilities, nor does it form a satisfactory ground for any positive assumption as to psychological monism. Professor Ladd's acceptation of the latter doctrine appears to be based in great part upon the inability to imagine even a moderate dualism, which we hold to be susceptible of further definition and elaboration. The wiser course would appear to be to accept a moderate dualism until we know more about the body and the mind, and not to entirely negative possibilities by theories which cannot be verified.

The remaining discussions on the "Origin and Permanence of Mind" and the "Place of Man's Mind in Nature" are of considerable interest as bearing upon ethical and religious questions.

We may say of this book that it is written in the author's best style. The destructive criticism is in places markedly effective, and the book ought to be widely read as one of the most able and suggestive contributions of recent years to the literature of the philosophy of mind.

Thoughts on Religion. By the late George John Romanes, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S. Edited by Charles Gore, M.A., Canon of Westminster (Fifth Edition). Longmans, Green & Co. London: 1895, pp. 184. Price 4s. 6d.

This is a story of transition from a carefully reasoned scepticism anent religious things, and a life of conscientious abstinence from prayer, to "(1) 'pure agnosticism' in the region of the scientific 'reason,' coupled with (2) a vivid recognition of the spiritual necessity of faith and of the legitimacy and value of its intuitions; (3) a perception of the positive strength of the historical and spiritual evidences of Christianity." But "pure agnosticism," as understood by Dr. Romanes, in his later years, is a phrase which should be explained to the general reader. It is, in fact, the agnosticism of Darwin and Huxley, as to whatever may lie beyond our sense-perceptions, and must not be confounded with the doctrine of the unknowable, the implied impossibility of revelation, the form of agnosticism attributed to Herbert

Spencer. It is by virtue of this particular meaning only that the phrase clearly marks the first stage in the interesting conversion of belief. The distinction is one which should be thoroughly grasped at the outset by all readers of the "thoughts," otherwise the true bearing of the author's

later views will be somewhat difficult to apprehend. In 1873, we are told by Canon Gore in the admirable and lucid preface which he has written to these papers, an essay of George Romanes gained the Burney Prize at Cambridge, the subject being "Christian Prayer considered in relation to the belief that the Almighty governs the world by general laws." At this time the essayist was only 25 years of age, but few philosophical conclusions are so confirmed at the age of 25 as to remain stable through life. Before 1878 Romanes had published, under the pseudonym of "Physicus," a "candid examination of theism," in which he repudiated the theistic hypothesis proffered in his academical essay. In the last chapter of this anonymous work the writer summarised his arguments into the conclusion that the hypothesis of "Mind in Nature" is superfluous to account for the phenomena of Nature; and as the latter writings of Romanes consist very largely of a criticism of this position, and of his own presentation of it, we think Canon Gore has done well to reproduce the entire chapter in the preface. As possibly furnishing some forecast of what was likely to follow, it is worthy of observation that Romanes does not at this period appear to have been particularly happy in his conclusions in favour of the "persistence of force" and the "indestructibility of matter," supplanting belief in the existence and virtue of a sustaining mind. "It is with the utmost sorrow," he says, "that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions here worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them save the strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of society to give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they may be worth. . . . And so far as the ruination of individual happiness is concerned, no one can have a more lively perception than myself of the possibly disastrous tendency of my work!" And again: "I am not ashamed to confess that with virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul of loveliness." . . . From all of which it becomes clearly evident that whatever the transition of intellectual belief may have been in Dr. Romanes' case, the transition of will, a different matter altogether, and often without doubt a stupendously important one, was not of a very wide character

—a fact which is, of course, capable of more than one interpretation.

Some time before 1889 Romanes wrote three articles, which, for reasons unknown, did not appear in the "Nineteenth Century," The first two of these are now given to us in the present volume. They contain a critical examination of his own previous publications, and although sceptical in their main conclusions, they afford some indications of a return to, at least, theism. The illustrations employed, and especially the one of a marine bay, as affording, on the one hand, apparent evidences of design, or, on the other, the effects of previous operations of Nature, without the intrusion of any independent external influence, are admirable, and a passing presentation of the pessimistic philosophy for examination also strikes one as being in the author's best style. These papers are succeeded by a collection of notes for a work on a candid examination of religion, which, as we are told by Canon Gore, form the chief raison d'être of the volume before us. Here we find traces of a careful study of the "Christian evidences," evidently designed by Romanes during the last few years of his life as preparation for the production of that larger work which unfortunately he did not live to complete. The "thoughts" are of a fragmentary character; "pure agnosticism" is apparently the leading idea, Christian agnosticism the ideal, as yet but imperfectly realised. They touch on causality, faith, dogma, the position of woman in Christianity and Christian demonology, thus including a wide field of observation.

There can be little question, however, that it is in regard to natural, rather than revealed religion, that this work will be found to possess its greatest value. Whereas, in the controversial arena of natural religion there is ample room for the scientist to bring the results of his researches into action, and to utilise his own particular modes of investigation, the examination of the fundamental dogma of the incarnation and the historical evidences of Christianity would seem to require a special training and a procedure of a different, or even an exclusive order. This fact must be stated notwithstanding that it is in the former sphere that the force of Romanes' scepticism lies. While Canon Gore is anxious that Christianity should profit by the return of a clear thinker and attractive writer to the orthodox faith, there will be others who, whatever their creed or no creed, search for observations and arguments based upon the ultimate possibilities of teleology in Nature. These will do well to possess themselves of this little volume; in fact, no one who wishes to be thoroughly abreast with modern controversy can afford to do without mastering its contents. And so admirably have these posthumous papers been arranged by that subtle controversialist and master of style, Canon Gore, that nothing weak has been allowed to find a place. If the "notes" appear a little inconsequential at times the fault is simply the failure of a considerable purpose which remained unfulfilled.

It remains to ask what may be the true meaning of this important episode in the distinguished career of a wellknown and highly appreciated man of science. And the reply must be that the conversion, or reconversion of the late Dr. Romanes to Christianity does not, judging from the intellectual point of view and from the evidences before us, figure forth as a ratiocinative conquest of the orthodoxy of the age. There can be little doubt that his return to the "Communion of the Church of Jesus Christ" (sic) was rather a fulfilment of the unrecognised influences of his own inmost personality and soul experience than a yielding to the force of argument or persuasion. We cannot discern such points of contact between his earlier and his later meditations within the realm of pure reason as would enable us to conclude that he had successfully solved even the least among those particular problems which at one time appeared to him to be essential, and to offer no insuperable difficulties of solution. But the fact of his return is deeply interesting. It would perhaps have been more interesting still had it been possible to add more about the man himself and his later life. We must, however, rest satisfied with Canon Gore's decision, and certainly nothing more beautiful, nothing more entirely appropriate, could have been chosen than the well-known quotation from St. Augustine with which he brings a work which contains not the faintest suspicion of any literary flaw, to an eminently touching close.

Mind and Motion and Monism. By the late George John Romanes, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S. (Crown 8vo., pp. 170). Messrs. Longmans, Green and Co., London. 1895.

This small volume is mainly a reprint of certain of the author's published essays. To readers who are acquainted with the metaphysical or controversial problems of the