Difficult Difference

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Modern feminism has been preoccupied with difference.[1] An early and continuing struggle has been to acknowledge differences between men and women[2] without having those differences used against women.[3] That struggle has been extended to recognizing differences among women.[4] By the end of the 1980s, women were calling for a "politics of difference" in which "redefining our differences, learning from them, becomes the central task."[5] Although cautioning words were raised by some,[6] feminists in general moved to trying not only to recognize but to celebrate difference.

But feminists have not been clear on just what differences count. Feminists tend to assume that certain differences—notably race, class, gender, and possibly age and sexual orientation—are relevant differences. These are the categories that Audre Lorde enunciated in her early call to take differences and make them into strengths.[7] They reappear in most feminist writings of the late 1980s and early 1990s, leading Susan Bordo to charge that attending to them has become a "coercive, mechanical requirement."[8] I call them the litany of difference. Little justification has been provided for seeing these—and not others—as crucial differences.

Suppose my friend Bill and I stand side by side. He is tall, black, handsome, male. I am shorter, white, plain, female. Are all of these relevant differences? These differences are obvious, but there are others, less obvious, that may be more important in determining who we are: one grew up on the West coast, one on the East; one loves jazz, the other hates it; one was raped as a child, the other as an adult; one is "gay," the other "straight." Do these differences count as well, or do only the more visible differences count? Among the myriad differences between us, which ones make a difference? Why are race, sex, class, and sexual orientation singled out?

In addition to her racial/ethnic identification, for instance, Rosario Morales adds her specific location in the United States—"I am New York Manhattan and the Bronx"—as though geography might count.[9] Nellie Wong[10] and Cherrie Moraga[11] note that education was key for them. Lorde argues that there is a difference between the dehumanization of marital slavery and that of prostitution, implying that the circumstances of sexual exchange might be morally relevant.[12] Is geography relevant? Is education? Is the patterning of sexual activity? When women of color find differences other than color morally relevant, the reiteration of the tired litany (race, sex, class, sexual orientation)

becomes questionable. The litany of difference is meant to honor important differences, but it may in fact render invisible differences that are just as important. How do we choose those differences that 'make a difference'?

In this essay, I will argue (1) that even those differences that appear most obvious, such as race and sex, are socially constructed and not necessarily obvious, (2) that there are boundary problems in every effort to establish difference, (3) that the litany of difference makes sense only politically, but (4) that to focus on difference is to use analytic rationality in ways that may be fundamentally threatening to feminist politics, (5) that the litany of difference may nonetheless be justifiable, but (6) that the grounds for its justification require an extended analysis of the demands of justice.

The Social Construction of Difference

Difference is difficult. Even those differences that seem most obvious and visible—the fact that Bill's skin is dark and mine pale or that he is male and I female—are at one and the same time subtle and socially constructed. The very categories that appear in the litany of difference are problematic.

Take "race" or "ethnicity" for example. Skin colors vary. But to identify someone as "black" is not simply a matter of noting the obvious. It is a learned behavior. Such identification does not exist in some cultures, even where black skin exists: "Of course Jamaica is a black society, they say. In reality it is a society of black and brown people who lived for three or four hundred years without ever being able to speak of themselves as 'black.'"[13] In some societal contexts, even where skin is very dark, the designation 'black' does not exist. In other contexts, where the designation does exist, it means different things: in the United States it generally refers to those of African descent, in England, to those of Indian descent; Brazilians use the category "black" but only as one of eight categories on a spectrum from "preto" to "branco."[14] So it is true that Bill's skin is black and mine is white. But it is also true that this "difference" is socially constructed. Only in some contexts would it make any sense to say this, and in other contexts it would make sense but would mean something different than it does here. Race is a socially constructed category, constructed differently in different contexts.

The same could be said for sex, class, sexual orientation, and other categories that generally make up the litany of difference. All are socially constructed. This does not make them meaningless, but it does make them problematic. For example, there are at least three differing theories as to when "homosexual" became an identifiable social category.[15] While some people have always had sex with others of the same sex, the notion that they have a specific sexual "orientation" is a very modern notion. Same-sex sexual contact may be a cultural constant, but "homosexuality" is a cultural construction.

Even "sex"—the difference between male and female—can be shown to be socially constructed. Since Robert Stoller distinguished sex and gender some 25 years ago, sex has held sway as a "biological" phenomenon, a "given" determined by chromosomes, hormones, and the shape of one's genitals. Sex stands in contrast to "gender," which is now clearly understood to be culturally formed. But in fact evidence suggests that it is precisely because we assume two genders that we also assume two sexes: "our notion of the biological or sexual dichotomy is more a product of our gender ideology than the reverse."[16] Sex is

already a cultural norm that governs the materialization of bodies.[17] Children are not born with only two types of genitals, but those whose genitals appear different than the norms are quickly "assigned" to a sex in this culture.[18] There are cultures that make room for more than two sexes.[19] So it may be true that Bill is male and I am female, but even this "difference," based on the assumption that there are only two sexes, is culturally constructed.[20]

The Problem of Boundaries

Precisely because differences are socially constructed and not essential or inherent traits, there are always boundary problems. Booker T. Washington tells the story of a train conductor who found a light-skinned man riding in the "Negro" car. Uncertain as to whether the man belonged there or whether he should be moved to the "white" car, the train conductor solved his dilemma, finally, by examining the man's feet! Washington ponders, "how difficult it sometimes is to know where the black begins and the white ends."[21]

What does it take to be "white" or "black" or "gay" or "female" or to fit any of the groups in the litany of difference? Iris Marion Young argues that a social process of interaction and differentiation creates affinity groups that are (1) partly self-chosen, (2) partly based on acceptance by the group, and (3) partly based on identification by others.[22] We claim identity within those groups, and sometimes we are placed there by others, whether or not we like it. As Barbara Cameron puts it, "we are named by others and we are named by ourselves."[23]

What Young does not address is what happens when there are conflicts among the three mechanisms that sort us into affinity groups. What about the married pastor who lives as a straight person in the community and is perceived as straight by his spouse and everyone else, even though he "knows" that he is gay?[24] Is he gay because he self-identifies as gay? Does his own affinity as gay count if he never acts on it publicly and it is never supported by the group in question? Is he straight because both the straight and gay communities think he is straight? Does he belong to both groups at the same time, one because of *his* choice and the other because of *group* choice?

Members of gay culture tend to assume that self-identification is what makes one gay. But self-identification is not always the trump card. Barbara Cameron notes the hostility that exists among Indians toward those who are not Indian but attempt to pass as such.[25] This hostility suggests that group acceptance rather than self-identification is central. Cherrie Moraga writes eloquently about her struggle over whether to claim an identity as Chicana. Because she is "la guera," light-skinned, she is not taken as Chicana by others. Thus she writes, "I have had to look critically at my claim to color. . . . I have had to acknowledge the fact that, physically, I have had a choice about making that claim, in contrast to women who have not had such a choice. . . ."[26] Is she Chicana even when she is not identified as such by others? Is the fact that she has a choice morally relevant?

Is anyone who feels gay, gay? Is a light-skinned person who was always thought of as Caucasian really Chicana? Part of the difficulty is that we think of groups in terms of binary opposition: one is either black or white, either male or female, etc. But in fact the experience of many people is that human experience does not lend neat boundaries.

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The Politics of Difference

If the fuzziness of group boundaries presents one problem, the choice of *relevant* groups presents another. Race and sex emerge as groups because we do in fact use them as categories in social interaction, treating people differently on the basis of race and sex. While race may be meaningless biologically, and sex is not an essence that inheres in anyone but a social designation based already on gender assumptions, nonetheless, race and sex are *used* as classificatory schemes. We sort ourselves and we are sorted by others according to race and sex. They therefore become axes along which affinity groups form.

But are they the relevant groups? When Judit Moschkovich writes of being "Latina, Jewish, and an immigrant (all at once),"[27] we see the difficulty: is the relevant group Jews? Latinas? immigrants? or is the relevant group "Jewish Latina immigrants"? As Young Mi Pak puts it, "My identities have been numerous: Korean, American, woman, Asian, Korean American . . . Asian American, Asian American woman. . . ."[28] Which of these is the relevant group? How is it to be identified?

It is important to identify differences that truly make a difference. Womanist and Mujerista feminists rightly reminded Caucasian feminists that we did not represent the experiences of all women. Similarly, however, lesbian Latinas might remind Mujerista theologians that they do not necessarily speak for all Latinas. Within any identifiable group there will be subgroups, each of whose experiences differs from others'. Any of these differences might be morally relevant.

Moreover, differences can be morally relevant in some circumstances but not in others. Differences become morally relevant depending on the purposes we have in mind. Not by accident does Iris Marion Young speak of a "politics" of difference. Once we understand that differences are not qualities inherent within people, but are social constructions formed by the way we perceive each other and the world, then it becomes clear that differences have a political edge.

Young Mi Pak makes clear the political nature of difference when she writes that being Asian American "is not just a biological or cultural process, but a political one."[29] Indeed, Pak proposes that given the diversity of Asian peoples, "our 'Asianness' in the eyes of the dominant American culture" is a "hegemonic illusion."[30] Difference, then, is partly a matter of power—of who has the power to define difference. Dominant groups often define *others* as different, neglecting the fact that they themselves are just as different to the other. For instance, Doris Davenport writes of the aversion that black wimmin[31] have to white wimmin, finding their hair stringy, their music unpleasant, their politics naive at best. Barbara Cameron would concur: "I couldn't stand the idea of a white person touching me."[32] Difference is a "politics," as Young puts it, because it always involves questions of power—of who defines the difference.

So it is that Gagnier proposes that the differences that give us worry "derive from politics."[33] Indeed, Minow suggests that issues of difference be recast precisely into questions of domination and subordination, in order to disclose the social relationships of power within which difference is named and reinforced.[34] The connection between difference and politics works both ways. Differences are lifted up because of political agendas—agendas largely of the dominant group, but sometimes of subordinate groups. On the one hand, since difference is usually named by those in power, the naming of difference is

generally associated with the use of that power to oppress others. Ruth Hubbard declares that "differences . . . become scientifically interesting only when they parallel differences in power."[35] That is, we study those differences that correspond to political agendas of domination and subordination. As Minow suggests, the attribution of difference can be a way of hiding the power of those who do the classifying and choose the relevant categories. Difference, therefore, can be very dangerous. Minow is skeptical precisely of the damage that lifting up difference can do:

> When professionals use such categories as gender, race, ethnicity, and class to presume real differences in pain and [in] entitlement to help, I worry. I worry that a difference assigned by someone with power over another will become endowed with an apparent reality, despite competing versions of that reality.[36]

The dangers of hegemonic definition or of discrimination are precisely what led the early feminist movement to eschew difference and speak in terms of equality and similarity.

On the other hand, claiming a difference can mean claiming a special status, an entitlement to something. Surely it is this that leads Cherrie Moraga to agonize over whether she could legitimately claim status as Chicana. While claiming such a status might lead to her being stigmatized and discriminated against, it can also lead to a sense of specialness, of group inclusion, and possibly to entitlement to special rights or programs such as affirmative action/ preferential treatment. The later feminist movement upholds difference precisely because differences are understood to bring gifts. Difference would not be of interest to feminist thought if it were not associated both with burdens to be overcome and also with possible benefits to be gained. These burdens and benefits are always associated with political agendas.

Feminism and Difference

Is the movement from eschewing to embracing difference a helpful movement for feminists? Or is it time to move on and "dislodge" difference?[37]

There is an internal logic to the politics of difference. Once it is understood that categories of difference are formed with a political agenda, then it is logical for subordinate groups to claim the power to redefine the meaning and the boundaries of those categories. But this very logic then pushes toward ever-increasing differentiation. If differences are to be affirmed, then there will be an inexorable push toward the proliferation of difference. It is not logical to affirm differences between men and women without then affirming differences among groups of women. But then it is not logical to ignore differences within each of these groups as well.

Then, are we in danger of counting so many differences that we end up diluting our ability to say anything meaningful? Within the "gay" community, for example, we have what one commentator has called "a heady spiral of ever-increasing self-categorization" (into SMs, effeminates, and so on).[38] If we add to the litany of difference other differences such as geography, education, sexual experience, and so on, we run the danger of fracturing experience and ending up with groups so small that meaningful analysis is difficult. To quote

Bordo, "just how many axes can one include and still preserve analytical focus or argument?"[39]

What is important, then, is to realize that we are dealing with politics. Once we begin to take account of the fluidity and complexity of identity in the postmodern world, suggests Regenia Gagnier, categories such as race and sex are too reductive to describe the complexity of social identities.[40] Once we move away from simple dualisms and assumed essentialism to a recognition of the complexity of categories and their socially constructed quality, then we move away from "identity" toward an understanding of affinity and politics. We then have to ask whether preserving differences is politically useful.

The logic of the politics of difference can threaten the basic unity without which feminism itself becomes questionable. We are in danger of losing an understanding of similarity, without which feminism cannot function. Feminism means at a minimum an affirmation that women of all groups are oppressed and that this oppression is wrong. It therefore assumes some similarity across groups. The politics of difference may threaten this affirmation, as we spiral down into ever-increasing differentiations and a postmodern fear of saying anything across boundaries.[41]

Justifiable Differences

There is, however, a way to approach the question of morally relevant differences while not forgetting the common struggle in which feminists are engaged. I propose a modification to Young's approach, one that I believe is amenable to her overall argument on justice.

Many years ago, in a background paper written for the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Tom Beauchamp proposed that "relevant" differences "are correctly fixed when supported by moral principles."[42] For example, since respect for persons requires respect for the autonomy of subjects, then autonomy or the lack of it becomes morally relevant. Children may justly be treated differently than adults precisely because they differ in autonomy. Because the relevance of differences is controlled by moral principles, the choice of such differences is not merely arbitrary or simply a matter of subjective preference, nor will differences multiply endlessly.

Linking morally relevant differences to ethical principles in this way would therefore potentially solve some problems: it would eliminate the proliferation of differences and, most important, indicate which differences are truly relevant.

However, linking relevant differences to ethical principles would also be problematic in modern feminism for several reasons. First, such an approach might imply that differences (such as autonomy) are qualities or characteristics that inhere in individuals. This would be flatly rejected by difference theorists, who have tried to move away from essentialism. Martha Minow urges that we see difference not as something that inheres *in* people but as a statement of the relationships within which we notice differences.[43] She points out that difference is a comparative term that is socially constructed in the determination of which traits stand out. I concur.

However, I would note that every attempt to speak of difference tends toward a kind of essentialism. Jeffrey Weeks asserts, for example, that modern studies claiming to review "gay" history are problematic precisely because they use a

modern self-labeling term ("gay") to define "an ever-changing concept over a period of 400 years" as though there is a homosexual essence.[44] To use the term "gay" is to assume that there is something that unites people who are labeled in this way. Similarly, those who think that "Latina" women form a relevant category do assume that there are some shared characteristics among Latina women that make them an affinity group. Minimally, most difference theorists tend to assume that "white feminists" can be lumped together.[45] As Diana Fuss points out, even under the best of circumstances, difference theory often operates as a more sophisticated form of essentialism: "man" and "woman," "black" and "white" and other divisions continue to operate as categories even when we discuss how those categories have changed historically.[46]

If we seriously believe that all differences are socially constructed and are continuously under construction, then we would be hampered in using labels such as "black," "hispanic," "gay," and so on. If we reject the notion of essence, then the identification of affinity groups and the use of the litany of differences become problematic. So it is not clear that we can avoid essentialism altogether. The presumed dichotomy between essentialism and social constructionism may be a false dichotomy that should be eschewed.[47]

On the other hand, it may be possible to highlight relevant characteristics such as autonomy or the lack of it without falling into the essentialist trap. The approach proposed by Beauchamp need not imply that 'autonomy,' for example, is a quality that inheres in someone. Of all the myriad possible differences between adults and children, or between Bill and me, how do we pick those that 'make a difference'? According to Beauchamp, we pick them because ethical requirements make them relevant. Since there is an ethical requirement to respect autonomy, autonomy is what we look for, and we perceive relevant differences between adults and children. What we look for determines what we see, but what we look for does not have to be an "essence" that inheres in someone; it can be a socially constructed category that emerges only in comparison between people. An adult is more autonomous than a child, just as Bill is taller than I am. Both categories are socially constructed and emerge only in comparison, but they may still be morally relevant. Whether they are depends on whether they impact basic ethical principles.

Precisely here, however, we encounter a second problem: many feminists reject a "principles" approach to ethics.[48] If there are no ethical principles, then morally relevant differences—differences that make a difference—cannot be defined as those characteristics that impinge on the operation of ethical principles. Beauchamp adopted a common philosophical assumption of modernism: that there are basic ethical principles that are not arbitrary and not changeable merely by individual human fiat.[49] But in a postmodern world, feminists are skeptical about modernist claims to fundamental and unchangeable moral principles.

However, I think that feminism—even postmodern feminism—operates on the basis of at least one such basic ethical principle. Susan Sherwin suggests that almost all feminists share the principle of nonoppression.[50] Regenia Gagnier concurs: "the bottom line of feminism is that the oppression of women exists, and its normative project is to make the world better for women."[51] The categories that form the litany of feminist differences—race, sex, class, age, sexual orientation—are there because it is assumed not simply that people are in fact *categorized* in social interaction in accord with these criteria or affinity

groups but also because it is assumed that people have been *oppressed* on the basis of such categorizations.

If power and oppression, domination and subordination, are the organizing mechanism behind the litany of difference, then the choice of these categories is based on an understanding that they are morally relevant because they impinge on the operation of an ethical principle of nonoppression. Oppression is, I believe, a specific language for speaking of injustice.[52] Thus, in developing the litany of relevant affinity groups, feminists do assume that these categories are morally relevant because they impact on the fulfillment or violation of the principle of justice. Even though the underlying understanding of ethics may seem at first glance rather distant from the modernism that Beauchamp assumed, in fact feminists may be operating on the same implicit understanding of what makes differences relevant.

Relevant affinity groups or categories, then, are not simply those into which we sort ourselves or others. They are those with a history of injustice or oppression. The designation of such groups would change over time as their status and history changes. Whether a particular individual belongs to one group or another would still be a question, and we might have to find a way to honor the fact that one can move in and out of relevant groups. For some purposes, Cherrie Moraga might count as "Latina," for other purposes, not. Differences would not be morally relevant because of some "essence" that inheres in the person, but would be understood to be constructed by a history of injustice and oppressive treatment of one group by another.

Thus, one can be a social constructionist and still have morally relevant groups. As Franz Fanon put it, "The Negro is not. Any more than the white man."[53] Similarly we might say, "The gay man is not. Any more than the straight man." Race is not a biologically meaningful category, any more than gay is an inherent quality of some persons. However, race and sexual orientation are socially meaningful categories because of our history of injustices and oppressions toward those who are classified into presumed racial groups or taken to be gay.

Analyzing the Demands of Justice

However, this means that we cannot simply take for granted that the litany of difference names the correct differences. If justice or nonoppression is the underlying moral principle, then judgments about morally relevant categories will depend upon more analysis of justice and oppression. Sweeping judgments (e.g., that women have "always" been oppressed by "patriarchy") would have to be eschewed in favor of more modest and time-limited approaches. As Deborah Rhode urges, "in place of metanarratives that claim universal application, [we need] contextual, situated analysis."[54] Oppressions differ, as Cherrie Moraga notes. The *reason* that it is important to take account of the specificity of oppressions is in order to assess the nature of the concomitant injustices and therefore to assess what justice requires.[55] Feminist theory must now provide a theory of justice in order to explicate which differences are exploitive and why.[56] We will have to be attentive to the possibility that the focus on difference itself only reinforces oppression,[57] and that the task for the future may be to "dislodge" difference rather than to strive for a politics of difference.[58] We have explored difference; now it is time to explore justice.

Notes

1. Sawicki J. Feminism and the power of Foucaldian discourse. In: Arac J, ed. *After Foucault.* New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press; 1988:161–178: "The question of difference is at the forefront of discussions among feminists today."

2. Gilligan C. *In a Different Voice*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.

3. This is what Martha Minow calls "the dilemma of difference." Minow, M. *Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990:20.

4. Williams DS. The color of feminism: or speaking the black woman's tongue. In: Daly LK, ed. *Feminist Theological Ethics*. Louisville: Westminster, 1994:49: "The failure of white feminists to emphasize the substantial difference between their patriarchally-derived-privileged-oppression and black women's demonically-derived-annihilistic-oppression renders black women invisible in feminist thought and action."

5. See note 1, Sawicki 1988:226.

6. Plaskow J. Appropriation, reciprocity, and issues of power. In: Daly LK, ed. *Feminist Theological Ethics.* Louisville: Westminster; 1994:102, "to see me simply in terms of difference—especially to see me primarily in terms of my oppression—continues to turn me into an Other."

7. Lorde A. The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. In: Moraga C, Anzaldua G, eds. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1983:98.

8. Bordo S. *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993:222.

9. Morales R. I am what I am. In: Moraga C, Anzaldua G, eds. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1983:14–15.

10. Wong N. When I was growing up. In: Moraga C, Anzaldua G, eds. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1983:7–8.

11. Moraga C. La guera. In: Moraga C, Anzaldua G, eds. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1983:27–34.

12. See note 7, Lorde 1983:99.

13. Hall S. Minimal selves. In: Appignanesi L, ed. *Identity: The Real Me*. London: Institute of Contemporary Arts, 1987:45.

14. Hutchinson HW. Race relations in the Bahian reconcavo. In: Wagley C, ed. *Race and Class in Rural Brazil*. Paris: Unesco, 1952:30.

15. See Plummer K, ed. *The Making of the Modern Homosexual*. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble; 1981.

16. Cucchiari S. The gender revolution and the transition from bisexual horde to patrilocal band: the origins of gender hierarchy. Quoted in Graham E. *Making the Difference: Gender, Personhood, and Theology*. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1996:60.

17. Butler J. *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex.'* New York: Routledge, 1993:3.

18. See, e.g., Meyers-Seifer CH, Charest NJ. Diagnosis and management of patients with ambiguous genitalia. *Seminars in Perinatology* 1992;16(5):332–39. The fact that such children are not always "assigned" to the sex that matches their chromosomes and biological features shows how socially constructed sex is.

19. Jacobs SE. Visions and revisions of reality: reflections on sex, sexuality, gender, and gender variance. *Journal of Homosexuality* 1992;23(4):43–69.

20. This does not mean that sex is simply a product of discourse, but it does mean that every reference to a male or female body is simultaneously a formation of that body. See note 17, Butler 1993:10.

21. Washington BT. *Up From Slavery*. Quoted in Fuss D. *Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference*. New York: Routledge, 1989:73.

22. Young IM. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990:172.

23. Cameron B. 'Gee, you don't seem like an Indian from the reservation'. In: Moraga C, Andalzua G, eds. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1983:52.

24. Lebacqz K, Barton RG. *Sex in the Parish*. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox; 1991:192.

25. See note 23, Cameron 1983:49.

26. See note 11, Moraga 1983:27–34.

27. Moschkovich J. '—But I know you, American woman.' In: Moraga C, Anzaldua G, eds. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1983:79.

28. Pak YM. Pan-Pacific identity: a skeptical Asian American response. *Journal of Women and Religion* 1995;13:15–24.

29. See note 28, Pak 1995:17.

30. See note 28, Pak 1995:21.

31. The use of the alternative spelling is deliberate and points to the power of groups to define each other. Davenport D. The pathology of racism: a conversation with third world wimmin. In: Moraga C, Anzaldua G, eds. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1983:87.

32. See note 23, Cameron 1983:46.

33. Gagnier, R. Feminist postmodernism: the end of feminism or the ends of theory? In: Rhode DL, ed. *Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990:28.

34. See note 3, Minow 1990:217.

35. Hubbard R. *The Politics of Women's Biology*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1990:129.

36. See note 3, Minow 1990:374.

37. Rhode D. Theoretical perspectives on sexual difference. In: Rhode D, ed. *Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference*, 1990:3.

38. Plummer K. Homosexual categories: some research problems in the labelling perspective of homosexuality. In: Plummer K, ed. *The Making of the Modern Homosexual*. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1981:56.

39. See note 8, Bordo 1993:222.

40. See note 33, Gagnier 1990:24.

41. Moreover, I would contend that the logic of the politics of difference ironically tends toward reductionistic divisions generally identified with masculine modes of reasoning rather than toward the synthetic and concrete reasoning generally identified with feminist thought.

42. Beauchamp T. Distributive justice and morally relevant differences. In: The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. *The Belmont Report*, Appendix I. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, DHEW publication #(OS) 78-0013, 1978:6–10.

43. See note 3, Minow 1990:15.

44. Weeks J. Discourse, desire and sexual deviance: some problems in a history of homosexuality. In: Plummer K, ed. *The Making of the Modern Homosexual*. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1981:76–111.

45. See note 8, Bordo 1993:229.

46. See note 15, Fuss 1989:4.

47. See note 17, Butler 1993:8.

48. Holmes HB. A call to heal medicine. In: Holmes HB, Purdy L, eds. *Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992:4.

49. See note 42, Beauchamp 1978:6–12.

50. Sherwin S. *No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992:13–49.

51. See note 33, Gagnier 1990:24.

52. Lebacqz K. *Justice in an Unjust World*. Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg, 1987:ch. 5+6. See also note 22, Young 1990, ch. 2.

53. Fanon F. *Black Skin, White Masks*. New York: Grove Press, 1967:231.

54. See note 37, Rhode 1990:8.

55. See note 52, Lebacqz 1987.

56. See note 33, Gagnier 1990:29. Gagnier queries whether a theory of justice is insufficiently postmodern, but suggests that we cannot know this until we have done a lot more thinking about theory. I would add that we also need a lot more thinking about justice!

57. Plummer K. Building a sociology of homosexuality. In: Plummer K, ed. *The Making of the Modern Homosexual*. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1981:27: "It may well be that to study homosexuality is to reinforce its separate existence in the world and to remain blind to the connections between homosexuality and other forms of oppression . . ."

58. See note 37, Rhode 1990:6.