

Communist Party distort “the workings of free markets” (p. 32), yet an appreciation of Polanyi’s and other economic sociologists’ arguments would imply that there is no such thing as the natural “free market.”

Further, as noted earlier, Sharma distinguishes between global market forces and politics (p. 33). Yet global market forces are not bereft of politics, at least if we take seriously Polanyi (and other economic sociologists, like Greta Krippner, whom the author quotes). Again, in the chapter on India, Sharma bemoans that decisions regarding the allocation of resources are “heavily influenced by political considerations rather than sound technical and economic criteria” (p. 149), as if “technical and economic criteria” are not or cannot be political. A realization that “markets and states are intrinsically interwoven” (p. 154)—or, as some might put it, mutually constitutive—is not quite consistent with statements about how “state intervention” distorts the market and is a “second-best” solution (pp. 155, 162). Some degree of contradiction is perhaps inevitable in a work that seeks to represent all sides of a debate without taking any specific position—beyond the very broad one that both market forces and politics matter—because some theoretical positions are difficult to reconcile, as is the case with the sociological and neoclassical views of the market.

Finally, let me offer a few minor—mainly production-related—observations; the “high earner” referred to on p. 155 is presumably Mark Zuckerberg (the CEO of Facebook), and not Mark Zuckerman. Some direct quotes on pp. 89 and 90 are missing page number citations. Illegal immigration, and the resultant labor market competition, is mentioned as one of the causes of growing inequality in the United States, but no evidence is cited for this assertion (p. 50).

Overall, the book’s broad coverage is valuable, even if it lacks a precise and cohesive argument and its claims about the relationship between politics and economics with respect to the market are problematic. As such, it would be useful in an undergraduate or beginning graduate course on inequality and economic development.

Mines, Communities, and States: The Local Politics of Natural Resource Extraction in Africa. By Jessica Steinberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 282p. \$99.99 cloth. doi:10.1017/S1537592719004201

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Jessica Steinberg’s new book aims to explain the logic and outcomes of the “three-actor strategic contexts” (p. 21) in which firms, communities, and states interact. She does so with an innovative mixed-methodology approach that combines formal (game-theoretic) modeling, fieldwork-based case studies, and statistical analysis. The ambition of this book is staggering. Steinberg purports to unify three distinct literatures on social conflict within a single frame-

work to explain why firms provide goods to communities, when communities choose to mobilize, and how states respond to mobilization. The book delivers on this promise. Indeed, I think it may be the most important intellectual contribution to scholarship on resource conflicts in a decade. It certainly joins a small club of analyses that have opened new intellectual vistas and methodologies for the study of local resource conflicts. Consequently, this book is a must-read for anyone working in the highly dynamic subfield of subnational resource conflicts, regardless of geographical expertise.

The innovative core of the book—that is to say the formal (game-theoretical) model of the three-actor strategic context—is found in chapter 3, pp. 66–82. Readers who are short on time or commitment should focus their effort on these pages. It is hard reading for those from intellectual and disciplinary traditions that do not embrace formal modeling (such as this reviewer), but it’s worth it. Steinberg provides the required equations and proofs, but her qualitative explanation is accessible and not overrun by modeler’s jargon. Chapters 5 and 6 test the internal validity of the model with case studies from Mozambique, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Chapters 9 and 10 test the external validity of the model with statistical analyses of when communities mobilize and when governments choose to repress protest. Chapter 11 draws together the main conclusions of the book and provides an interesting sketch of avenues for future research.

As Steinberg puts it, she develops a single theoretical frame that explains “incentives for goods provision by firms, mobilization by communities in extractive regions, and the use of government repression” (p. 23). She starts from the observation that local resource conflicts are territorialized by definition, and therefore they compel the interaction of the three actors examined in the book: the mining firm, local populations, and the government. In this context, actor beliefs about each other’s behavior, as well as contextual characteristics (such as the interruptibility of the mine, the cost of mitigating environmental externalities, the costs of engaging in protest), shape the incentives for actor behavior. The complexity of the model makes the argument difficult to summarize briefly in written format, but the figure on p. 74 provides a useful summary of the sequence of play and key decision points.

Her model begins with the firm figuring out the value of a “transfer” to local populations that is necessary to compensate for the externalities associated with the mine and that constitutes the bundle of contractual and voluntary undertakings promised as a result of the environmental impact assessment, relocation plan processes, and corporate social responsibility. At the first decision point, the firm decides whether to honor that promise or to renege on it. If it honors the promise,

communities do not protest and all is good. But firms, weighing the cost of the transfer to them against the cost and likelihood of protest, are more likely to renege on the promise if the costs of providing it are high or if they believe that communities are unlikely to protest. If the firm reneges on its promise, at the second decision point local populations must decide whether to protest or acquiesce (do nothing and suffer the externalities of mineral production). Local populations are more likely to protest when the cost of doing so is low, which depends on the vulnerability of the mine to protest (how easily production can be interrupted) and on beliefs about the likelihood and severity of government repression. Frequently, communities will not protest due to fears of government reprisals. But when communities protest, they impose economic costs on the firm and government, compelling the government to intervene. At the third decision point, governments decide whether to support the protestors by regulating the firm to honor its promises to the local population (incurring economic costs, but political gain) or repressing the protestors (incurring political costs, but economic gain). When the economic value of the mine increases for the government (higher taxation rates, larger mines) and local populations are politically marginal, it is more likely to repress protest.

The formal model is elegant, parsimonious, and insightful. We must, of course, accept that the real world is messier, but the simplified interactions of the model give a lot of leverage over understanding the problem of local resource conflicts. My reading of resource conflicts in Latin America, however, leads me to ask how the theory advanced in this book may accommodate certain empirical anomalies to the pattern examined in Africa.

For example, Steinberg sees the distinction between environmental conflicts (defend livelihoods) and distributive conflicts (get a better deal), which is a cornerstone of the Latin American literature, as an “artificial division” (p. 62), allowing her to compensate for both sets of concerns within the single concept of a transfer to communities. Certainly, that makes sense for distributive conflicts. But in the Latin American literature, a certain class of resource conflicts is characterized as “all-or-nothing” conflicts, in which activists reject all compensation and indeed the ideology of capitalist resource development in favor of alternative imaginaries. In these cases, local populations protest before the firm faces its first decision point on whether to honor the promised transfer. Also, in Latin America, states tend not be drawn into militarized repression of protest in ways that Steinberg describes in the African context, but it is true that activists, through protest, often try to pull the state into the conflict as an ally against the firm. Can these regional variations be accommodated within Steinberg’s theory?

The case studies are compelling validations of the internal logic of the model, although the game in the

Democratic Republic of Congo seems to be overdetermined by activist beliefs that protest will be repressed by the state. The statistical analyses provide convincing evidence for the external validity of the theory, and especially given the data constraints for this type of work, Steinberg comes up with some creative proxy indicators to test key ideas. Some of Steinberg’s findings that conflict with the existing quantitative literature from Latin America (for example, that richer areas are more prone to conflict, that foreign firms are not more associated with conflict than local firms) will require further investigation to explain the discrepancy.

Gender and Representation in Latin America. Edited by Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 352p. \$105.00 cloth, \$36.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592719003992

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Over the last two decades, Latin American countries have seen a dramatic increase in the presence of women in national legislatures. In 1997 the regional average was just over 10% compared to today’s average of 30.6%, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The region has also seen the largest number of women elected as presidents. Six countries have elected women as *presidentas*, and 18 have had viable women presidential candidates since 1990.

It is thus unsurprising that gender and politics scholars have looked at Latin America to answer questions about the causes and consequences of women’s inclusion, the role of political parties and electoral institutions, and the obstacles women face once formal barriers are lifted and their participation is actively promoted. The wide adoption of gender quotas has been regarded as the most obvious explanation for women’s political presence in the region. However, as *Gender and Representation in Latin America* shows, there is great variation in women’s presence across the region, even when countries have gender quotas.

The increase in women’s presence, which undoubtedly strengthens democracy, occurred concurrently with the rise in populist, antidemocracy leaders in various countries. The “left turn” put an end to democracy in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, and party systems broke down or collapsed in several other countries. Political scientists have studied these phenomena at length, but seldom have they paid sufficient attention to the role of gender in these institutional transformations or to the effect these changes have on women. Schwindt-Bayer’s edited volume masterfully fills this gap. The book presents some of the most relevant findings on women and representation in Latin America shows, arguing that women’s presence cannot be disconnected from the context of democratic challenges and political crises marring the region in the last 20 years (p. 4).