apparently of an hysterical nature. Discussing the nervous symptoms he says that he does not consider them to be hysterical, but due rather to constriction of the vessels in the heart, the brain, and the medulla. "L'affaissement général, l'obnubilation de la vue, les vertiges, l'impossibilité de parler, etc., s'expliquent par un trouble cérébral" (*Gazette des Hôpitaux*, 1884, vol. lvii, pp. 65–66). Paget noted a case where, following cold bathing, there were local syncope and subsequently flushing and heat. Commenting on the probable condition of parts which are the seat of pain or other morbid sensations, in cases of spinal irritation or so-called hysteria, he remarks: "When such parts are out of sight, we are apt to think of them as changed in nothing but their nerve-relations. They are spoken of as only functionally disturbed, this implying that if we could see them they would appear in a perfectly normal state. It is more probable that their vasomotor, as well as their cerebro-spinal, nervous systems are, as in this case, affected; and that through the vasomotor influence they are in some cases anæmic and in some hyperæmic, or in both of these conditions at different times" (Sir J. Paget, *St. Bartholomew's Hospital Reports*, vol. vii, pp. 67–69).—(4) Targowla hazards the opinion that the melancholia and the local asphyxia in the case described by him may be due to the same cause—vasomotor disorder. "Lorsque ce trouble survient dans la circulation encéphalique, il se manifeste par un accès de lypémanie; le même trouble, localisé au extrémités, produit l'asphyxie locale intermittente dont souffre le malade" (*Annales Médico-Psychologiques*, 1892, vol. xv, p. 403).

On Shame. By JAMES RAE, M.A., M.D.

HERE we shall consider the effect of shame; then try to discover why we feel it at certain times, and whether it can be represented as the development of any other emotion.

I.

In the first place we must establish the physical signs and accompaniments of shame: The attitude changes slightly; there is a movement of withdrawal, a shrinking from notice. The eyes are averted or downcast, and the head droops. The face flushes, and the dilatation of the vessels may extend over the chest or even further; the pulse-rate is quickened. A tingling of the skin is next perceived as the vessels contract and the face pales. At the same time there is—though perhaps only momentarily—a confusion of thought.

Here is a physiological state. The vasomotor centre is actuated by the emotion, and the fibres must therefore have a connection with the frontal lobe. We know that the vasomotor centre lies in the grey matter of the floor of the fourth ventricle, and the fibres are believed to pass down the lateral tracts. The vasomotor fibres to the face are mixed up with the fibres of the seventh and ninth cranial nerves. It is, however,

the depressor fibres that are concerned with flushing, and their exact course is uncertain.

There is evidently a disturbance of the higher control, and it is interesting to recall the homologous phenomenon of the total absence of shame in dreams, though its presence might be expected as an accompaniment of social progress. However abruptly a person wakes out of a dream of crime or indecency no shame is felt, even if the course of the dream be deliberately retraced.

Shame may arise from personal modesty, from fear, from appearing at a disadvantage, from hearing of or seeing some untoward behaviour in others, without there being any association with the shamed person.

II.

The shame from infringement of personal modesty is frequently seen in the operating theatre in women, but the discussion of this may be postponed for the present. The same variety is sometimes seen in highly-strung boys, who will refuse to learn swimming because of the necessary exposure of their bodies. A most remarkable instance of regard for personal modesty is the historical one of Philip II of Spain. This King gave stringent orders that after his death the persons who tended his corpse were to cover his private parts with a linen cloth, having their faces veiled the while, under penalty of execution. In both instances the feeling appears to be due to a fear of ridicule of personal appearance or detraction. There are a few cases—not to be too readily believed—of men inordinately vain of their beauty having recourse to a thick veil after receiving facial injuries. Was the Man in the Iron Mask the victim of disfigurement? To exhibit the extreme of grief the Greek artist painted a curtain to conceal the face as if from shame at revealing emotion. Again, we have the sixteenth century ruff and the wide skirt introduced to hide deformities of King's favourites, while the yellow ruff went out of fashion because a woman poisoner in the first years of the seventeenth century wore one at her execution. This, however, belongs more properly to shame at untoward behaviour in others.

To return now to the shame felt by women about to be operated upon: this is noticeably the case with the hospital patient. If her chest is uncovered for the anæsthetist her arms

are at once crossed over it; again, on coming round from the anæsthetic, if her dress is not adjusted she will invariably repeat the gesture. With women not of the hospital class this does not hold true, and the explanation is undoubtedly to be found in their custom of exposing shoulders and arms in evening dress. Apparently the shame that a young girl might be expected to feel at appearing at her first "grown-up" dance in a costume so different from what she has previously worn is entirely overcome by her readily understood excitment.

Some may recollect the two-century old story of the young Spanish princess who was escorted to France to be married. On her way the mayor of a small town through which she passed prayed that the community might present her with the silk stockings the town produced. He received the shocked reply: "Fellow, the Princesses of Spain have *no legs!*" A curious survival of this delicacy about women's possession of lower extremities is the feminine trick of pushing the skirt down a trifle when a woman is sitting, and this is still practised even in these days of skirts which just cover the knee. Women show no shame in bathing before a crowded beach, and indeed I am told by a friend that during the hot summer of 1913, women walked about the piers of south-coast towns with a "university" swimming suit and slippers as their sole covering. It is in fact noticeable that the persons who most quickly cover themselves with a wrap after leaving the water are males.

It is significent that for four hundred years women have been in the habit of exposing in the most liberal way the upper part of the thorax. The only exceptions to this are the period of about thirty years in the seventeeeth century ended by the Restoration excesses, and that of less than a decade towards the end of the eighteenth century which was followed (in France) by the scandalous caricatures of classical attire, and the Empire and early Victorian fashions.

As this is not an essay on costume we had better leave this part of the subject. What has been said is intended to show that the most outrageous lack of peripheral covering is placidly accepted by a woman if the fashions of dress so decree, and that in women personal modesty is but a matter of convention. Anyone who wishes for further details has only to refer to "Studies in Psychology of Sex" by Havelock Ellis, Part II, pp. 7–13.

III.

The preceding section has been simple, but in considering fear as a cause of shame we come to a matter of great complexity. Fear is produced by

(*a*) Physical danger.
(*b*) Personal loss or inconvenience.
(*c*) Possible punishment.
(*d*) Wrong conduct (moral fear).
(*e*) Anxiety for others.

These causes of fear are, if not faultlessly arranged, at least comprehensive. Which of them can we delete with reference to shame? The last is cancelled at once, since anxiety for the welfare of others is a virture. It is true that shame may be due to virtue, but this we shall consider at a later stage of our analysis. As for the others, it is not they but the fear of them that causes shame: yet even this statement has to be further modified.

Fear may be so intense as to abolish all shame (in the person afraid) at the display of it. If the individual's higher centres are sufficiently developed, he will be enabled to confront the danger though still afraid, and even though his fear be such as to leave no room for shame, he may nevertheless remain fully alert and capable. Cowardice is nothing but physiological weakness of control, and if a man is incapacitated from performing his task by sole reason of his fear of physical danger he does not feel shame until the fear and its cause have passed away.

Fear of personal loss or inconvenience is not strong enough to produce shame unless the fear has to do with some unworthy object, in which case the consciousness of the unworthiness may give rise to shame. One may be "afraid" of missing a train, for example, if the feeling be genuine fear and not merely discomfort, but the actual missing it does not cause shame unless it is due to laziness or to carelessness. In the latter case it is placed more correctly in the group of fear of wrong action and possible punishment.

The mere contemplation of a wrong action, although the intent of committing it be entirely absent, is a cause of shame. It by no means requires such an action to be carried out before repentance is experienced. An unexpressed distrust of some-

one which is later found to be baseless, an entirely mental elaboration of a scheme of revenge, a "sight of means to do ill deeds," are all capable of bringing about a rush of self-contempt ending in shame, though it, no more than the origin of it, may be disclosed. (The true origin is the realisation that the particular thought is a wrong one; which implies, first, the evil thought; second, a criticism of it; third, a comparison between it and an abstract moral standard; and fourth, the condemnation. Some would add that there must be a thinker before there can be a thought, but the problem of whether this should not rather be expressed as "the *consciousness* of thought implies a thinker" would lead us far into the realms of philosophy.) The shame of possible punishment powerfully reinforces the influence of the moral standard. "Because right is right to follow right" is a motive less potent now than it was in the days of the Greek sophists, and the modern man is more often deterred from wrong-doing by fear of its consequences than urged to virtue for its own sake.

When a wrong action is committed, it is condemned by an abstract moral standard, which depends on tradition both religious and family, modified by personal habits. The common practice of swearing is not acquired until the early sense of shame at using profanity is lost. Leigh Hunt's essay describing his childish self-torture at being "the boy who said 'damn'" is a good illustration of this. There are many people who swear almost without realising they do so, and yet avoid the use of certain expressions, while the Oriental references to the probable ancestry of the hearer are repugnant to the European mind. Similarly, a man who after leading a normal life transgresses the law of the land, may "feel his position acutely," to use the routine phrase of sensational journalism, either in the dock or when released from prison, but if several times convicted loses all sense of degradation.

IV.

This leads us directly to the next cause of shame, namely, appearing at a disadvantage. As civilisation advances certain conventions are established, and any infringement of these causes shame. A man tells us of his father's death, and we condole with him on the loss; if truthful we might feel bound to declare that "such a disreputable and drunken old scoundrel

is better off the earth," but we should be ashamed to do so. We offer amiable congratulations on a badly executed song or sketch, and feel no shame at our lying praise of it. These minor hypocrisies seem quite inadequate to arouse a sense of shame. The person whom the action most nearly concerns feels no shame at it, and it is the truthful critic who would be shamed.

Let us return again to the example of the exposed law-breaker—be he embezzler, forger, cheat, or liar. It is true that he may feel shame at the planning of his crime, but it is a self-contempt not identical with his emotion when he is publicly stigmatised as dishonest. In this case he thinks of the loss of trust, of position, of friends, and of money, and when his misdeeds come to light his first impulse is to save himself. The disgrace to his business partners and to his family is beyond his thoughts, which are entirely devoted to his own loss of public repute.

But we are not driven to such crass examples to illustrate the shame felt on appearing at a disadvantage; there are many minor ones we may cite. Tripping on a rug at the entrance to a crowded room, upsetting a glass, a thoughtless remark which at the time or later one finds has deeply hurt the feelings of one's hearer, all produce shame, and the mere recollection of them revives the feeling for some time afterwards. Of a similar nature is the shame experienced at appearing in inappropriate dress at some public function, or wearing at an unusual time some costume quite suitable in itself for another occasion.

In an earlier paragraph the statement was made that virtue may be a cause of shame. It is quite possible to know one is in the right and yet feel shame. One may be disgusted by an obscene jest, by an account of astute commercial dishonesty, and be shamed because one is the only member of the company who does not admire it. This may be due to one's own wish that one had more worldly-wisdom; there is no surer way to flatter the boy of nineteen than by treating him as one acquainted with all forms of evil. The feeling of shame in such circumstances may be a genuine disgust at whatever has called it forth, but there is more often that perception of appearing at a disadvantage. The blush of conscious innocence may in truth be due to an apprehension of ridicule at ingenuousness which is discordant. Again, one may do a generous action or take some trouble to help another, and at the same time be

most anxious that one's kindness should not be known. Why shame should be felt for this reason is difficult to explain except on the ground that bringing oneself into prominence is in a way appearing at a disadvantage.

V.

Next we have to consider shame caused by untoward behaviour in others. We have already mentioned an example in the yellow ruff. Another instance is the avoidance of the name Stephen by the English Royal Family. The horrible wickedness of the one King of that name has banished it from the families of his successors save as a subsidiary. (It must be stated, however, that the significance of this avoidance is largely diminished by the many changes in dynasty.) As other instances of what may be termed national shame are the effects produced by the news of the fall of Khartoum, and the "Black Week" of the South African War.

Members of a class may be shamed by an opportunist abandonment of principle by a large body of the class. Then, too, there is the family shame of owning a disreputable member, or facing the scandal which is attached to suicide or to marital infidelity. Of a similar nature is the shame felt at hearing a relative make a tactless or brutal remark, just as though the hearer himself were guilty of it. "Visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children" might be interpreted as fixing the period required for the shame of a family disgrace to pass away. To this we must add the shame felt by onlookers at the display of fear by another. All this appears once more to be due to a sense of depreciation in value of a part which must affect the whole, and so cause the whole to appear at a disadvantage.

VI.

Such an analysis of shame requires for completion a distinction between shame and certain other emotions. We have already mentioned the physical signs of shame: blushing and shrinking may be due also to diffidence or to shyness; blushing to anger, but in this case there is no shrinking, and the blush is less extensive. Shame, as we have attempted to show, depends on the opinion of others. Both diffidence and shyness are produced by a sense of unworthiness or inferiority in the individual, quite irrespective of the estimate of others.

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This statement that shame depends on the opinion of others is by no means contradicted by the possibility of the individual feeling shame while alone, for there is always the reference to a standard other than his own. But the shy or diffident person notoriously feels sure of himself in solitude. In imaginary rehearsals of scenes through which he has passed—actually to his own confusion—he always carries himself with easy self-possession, and *l'esprit d'escalier* is famed for its brilliancy. He can make plans for his confident behaviour, but the presence of others disconcerts him totally. Shame, it may be repeated, is experienced quite irrelevantly to the presence of other people.

Where all were afraid, or immodest, or brutal, or obscene, or dishonest, or disgraced, none would feel shame. From what has been expressed in the foregoing paragraphs it will be seen that shame is invariably set up by an *incongruity* between the shamed person and his associates. If the particular circumstances involved no loss of position—moral or material—it is doubtful whether shame would ever be felt. And as this dependence on the opinion of others is the important factor, it does not seem too far-fetched to define shame as "the social expression of self-interest."

Unfitness to Plead in Criminal Trials.

By M. HAMBLIN SMITH, M.A., M.D., Medical Officer, H.M. Prison, Portland.

THE subject of this paper is the criteria of an accused person's fitness to plead to an indictment charging him with some criminal offence. It is a consideration of the questions which are involved in the special verdict of "insane on arraignment." We shall see, however, that in this connection the word "insane" is used in an extended sense.

There are four stages in the process of any criminal case, tried on indictment, at which the question of the accused person's mental condition may have to be reviewed: (1) Before the trial. (2) Before he pleads to the indictment at the trial. (3) During the progress of the trial. (4) After the trial. The questions raised at the second of these stages are those

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