

individuals or carefully choreographed by leaders of groups with an eye to national strategies and political agendas, these acts are consistent with our ordinary understanding of the term.

Setting aside the question of the psychological effects of particular kinds of harassment—a question that Doan's study is not set up to evaluate in spite of the inclusion of brief passages of personal testimony—it is not clear that our current political vocabulary is unable to account for, and help us understand, the evolving tactics of the anti-abortion movement, as well as their wider social context. These theoretical and empirical distinctions do not require a new vocabulary of political action. Instead, they require the kind of careful detective work and analysis in which the author engages in the most fruitful section of her book.

In chapters 4 and 5, Doan's quantitative analyses of the effects of anti-abortion activism demonstrate definitively what other scholars of the abortion wars have long known: that "harassment pays off." Using survey data from the Alan Guttmacher Institute, Doan shows that pro-life picketing outside clinics "exert[s] a consistently negative influence on the abortion rate" (p. 148). A somewhat wider variety of tactics influences the provision of abortion services. For clinic employees, whose contacts with anti-abortion activists are likely to be more frequent and varied, Doan shows that, of the many tactics in the pro-life repertoire, picketing of clinics and residences has the greatest effect on discouraging their participation in the provision of abortion services (p. 146–47). These important findings will no doubt be of interest to scholars as well as to those on both sides of the conflict over abortion rights.

The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality: Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety. By Gregory A. Huber. New York:

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— Graham K. Wilson, *Boston University*

Occupational safety and health has been a major focus of academic analyses of regulation and governance. In part, this reflects the troubling but intellectually fascinating trade-offs involved between important economic goals such as employment and growth, on the one hand, and the health and lives of workers, on the other. These important considerations aside, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been "ground zero" for arguments about the problems of securing effective and efficient regulation in the United States.

Some of the controversies about OSHA were purely political and related to the acute anxiety that many American business executives, such as Bryce Harlow, felt about the growth in the regulatory power of federal government. Reflecting the creation not only of OSHA but also the Environmental Protection Agency, Harlow warned that

American business was being "rolled up and thrown in the toilet" by this expansion of federal regulatory power. The field also attracted much academic attention. Starting with Lennart Lundqvist, a series of studies (not all cited by Gregory Huber) compared the development of occupational safety and health policy in the United States with its counterparts in other countries such as Sweden and the United Kingdom (*The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden*, 1980). These concluded that OSHA produced more conflict and fewer results, prompting attempts to explain why regulation was particularly problematic. Later Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan used OSHA to develop a more general explanation of regulatory unreasonableness (*Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness*, 1982). In short, rather like agricultural policy, occupational safety and health has prompted work that attempts to explain much more than how OSHA works—or fails.

Huber continues this tradition of using OSHA to make a more general theoretical argument. He argues that OSHA coped with the political problems it endured—and inflicted on itself—in its early years by adopting a strategy of "strategic neutrality." By this, he means that OSHA moved to implement the Occupational Safety and Health Act as impartially as possible, allocating inspections without regard to local political pressures or circumstances and, instead, relying on analyses of risk, the incidence of violations, and other obviously defensible criteria. This was not a merely a Weberian bureaucracy dutifully following the rules, however. OSHA adopted this approach deliberately because it allowed the agency to maintain its mission in the face of adverse political pressures. Huber supports his argument with careful and thorough quantitative analysis of data on the frequency and nature of OSHA inspections and risk factors. These analyses enable him to establish, for example, that inspections are more common in the Midwest than in the Sun Belt, not because of political considerations but because Midwestern industries are riskier.

The thoroughness of the authors' empirical analyses commands respect. Huber mines a mountain of data to evaluate systematically each and every argument that has been advanced that OSHA is biased in its allocation of its resources for inspections. The book is thus a model of the systematic and careful use of data to evaluate the conduct of an agency. It is most valuable, therefore, for those interested in the detailed analysis of lower-level officials than in the topic of occupational safety and health policy. This comment accords with Huber's own explanation of what drove his research—an interest in discretion in the use of the coercive power of the state. He does not address what we might call the overt policymaking role of OSHA—the development and promulgation of the standards that its inspectors enforce. This gap means that he is necessarily silent on the role of recent Republican administrations in reining in the adoption of new regulations either because

of ideology or pressure from business interests. Leaving the political creation of standards out of the study necessarily limits how much he can say about the judgments and decisions made by OSHA's leaders and those to whom they report. One of the critiques of OSHA is that perhaps because of the intensity of the attacks upon it, the development of new standards has lagged far behind the introduction of new hazards into the workplace. If this is true, contrary to his argument, OSHA has overall failed to develop strategies that would combine political survival and policy effectiveness.

Huber also seems to eschew many opportunities to engage with theoretical arguments about the nature of regulation. These arguments might have led him to say more about the motivation and behavior of street-level bureaucrats, or to engage with Ronald Brickman and colleagues, David Vogel, Lundqvist, Steven Kelman, and Graham Wilson on whether achieving effective but sensible regulation in areas like occupational safety has been more difficult for the United States than for other advanced democracies (respectively, *Controlling Chemicals: the Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States*, 1985; *National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States*, 1986; *The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden*, 1980; *Regulating America, Regulating Sweden*, 1981; and *The Politics of Safety and Health: Occupational Safety and Health in Britain and the United States*, 1985).

Huber himself notes that in the mid-1990s, almost a quarter of a century after its creation, OSHA was still struggling to overcome a legacy of mindless enforcement of unimportant rules. It would have been interesting to hear his explanation for the difficulty that OSHA had in establishing a defensible regulatory strategy. The quality of his empirical analysis of OSHA's implementation strategies is truly impressive. Perhaps in the future, he can be tempted to address some of the wider questions that previous studies of the agency have raised.

Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment. By Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Joseph N. Cappella. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 320p. \$24.95.

We Interrupt This Newscast: How to Improve Local News and Win Ratings, Too. By Tom Rosenstiel, Marion Just, Todd Belt, Atiba Pertilla, Walter Dean, and Dante Chinni. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 244p. \$82.00 cloth, \$22.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592709091166

— Marjorie Randon Hershey, *Indiana University*

A major aim of the burgeoning research on media and politics is to specify the empirical relationships between media content and individuals' political responses. For a variety of reasons, including the difficulty of learning which individuals have been exposed to which specific media

content and the ever-present challenge of demonstrating causality, the answers have been elusive. These two well-written volumes take us several steps in the right direction.

In *Echo Chamber*, Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Joseph N. Cappella provide a rich textual analysis of what they regard as the Republican Party's vital allies in the media: conservative talk radio (Rush Limbaugh in particular); Fox News programs with Sean Hannity, Carl Cameron, and Brit Hume; and the *Wall Street Journal's* editorial page. Using content analysis, they argue that these media share similar lines of argument, which contrast sharply with those of the mainstream media, and that they define the mainstream media as being liberal, biased against conservatives, and therefore untrustworthy as information sources. The intent of these right-wing media, Jamieson and Cappella posit, is to insulate their audiences from contrary viewpoints, inoculate them against any mainstream sources they happen upon, and teach them how to argue with these sources—in short, to marginalize the mainstream media as well as Democrats and liberals for their conservative audience.

Jamieson and Cappella's discussion of cases is among the most interesting parts of their analysis. They suggest, for example, that in the controversy over former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott's praise of Strom Thurmond, these conservative media sources worked actively to present frames that Republicans could use to defuse the crisis—such as the contention that the mainstream media used a double standard in criticizing Lott but not Democrats with a segregationist past—and to guide the crisis to an acceptable solution (in this case, Limbaugh's claim that Lott had gone too far in apologizing for his misjudgment and should therefore step down from his leadership position). Thus, they contend that the conservative media have been an essential part of the Republican Party's promotional structure since the 1990s, disseminating the Republican National Committee's framing of particular stories and “help[ing] vet candidates in Republican primaries for their loyalty to Reagan conservatism” (p. 239).

Jamieson and Cappella's causal argument—that exposure to conservative media produces attitude change consistent with the media content, rather than that people self-select into the conservative media audience because they already hold these attitudes—is perhaps the weakest part of their analysis (not surprisingly, given the difficulty of establishing causation). The results they present from a 1996 experimental study are not as clear-cut as one would hope, a point the authors acknowledge. They are on stronger empirical ground when they refer to these processes as being “mutually reinforcing spirals of effect and exposure” (p. 83). Their claim would be even more persuasive with greater attention to the falsifiability of their hypotheses: what evidence would be needed to show that conservatives and the Republican Party had *not* been guided by Limbaugh, Fox, and the *Wall Street Journal* in the Lott controversy, and is such evidence possible to obtain?