

this, along with his dedication to philosophy, puts him at odds with the democratic city. The author puts great emphasis on a point in his defence speech when Socrates notes that in other cities a defendant has more time to present his case: ‘when Socrates says to his judges, “if you had a law . . .,” at the close of the *Apology*, he is very subtly introducing the work that Plato undertakes in his hypothetical legislations – the *Republic* and *Laws*’ (54). That enterprise begins with Plato’s critical discussions of both the ‘impure law of violence’ represented by Kallikles in the *Gorgias* and the ‘impure force of law’ represented by Athenian democracy (71). The project of the *Republic* aims for the ‘pure force of law’, but as a theoretical, not a political ideal (75). The ‘flux of law’ itself is stated most directly in the famous discussion of the limits of the rule of law in *Statesman* 294b–c, and from this Dusenbury concludes that ‘any legal ontology is *eo ipso* a spurious ontology’ that ‘penalizes the singular’ (84–85). The second legislation of the *Laws* does represent a political ideal that also recognizes the problems of the flux and attempts to remediate them through a mechanism that supplements and even changes the law code (91). But the solution in the *Laws* seems to Dusenbury inadequate – considerably worse than inadequate – in that lack of free speech and lack of clarity about the process of legal reform, combined with a statute that punishes travellers to foreign lands who return to the city corrupted, would condemn Socrates all over again (34, 93, 96). So the *Laws* represents a ‘vicious circle’ (33, 95) in Plato’s consideration of the flux of law. But Dusenbury hesitates to condemn Plato for this result, which really reflects the continued flux and thus the endlessness of philosophy (96).

While this book dilates on an important topic and proposes a number of interesting ideas, it is also frustrating to read. This is largely a result of its brevity: a number of times, after suggesting a very important point or a novel line of interpretation, the author then says that there is no time to consider the point and moves on (for example, 34, 36). This is most frustrating in the book’s last pages, where he discusses ‘the second death of Socrates’, but simply does not offer anything like a sufficiently detailed interpretation of the text to establish his reading. This is all the more strange given that the second chapter is devoted to a discussion of the Platonic corpus and the dialogue form that does not contain anything original. Why not spend more time on what is new or contro-

versial? Moreover, while Dusenbury chides scholars for not having sufficiently noticed the implications of aspects of the *Laws* for the figure of Socrates (34–35, 96), the point has been raised by many, although not necessarily in a manner that is convincing. The conclusion that Socrates would end up executed in the Magnesian city seems to me, at any rate, at odds with a number of details in the text, but the speed with which the book moves – the writing is mystifyingly epigrammatic at times – precludes engagement with such data. The very emphasis that Dusenbury puts on Socrates’ observation at trial about the different laws that exist in other cities might suggest a consideration of the quite important differences in the Athenian stranger’s proposal for laws specifically concerning impiety, laws that have seemed to other interpreters likely to effect precisely the reverse of the Athenian verdict.

V. BRADLEY LEWIS

The Catholic University of America
lewisb@cua.edu

LUNA (C.) and SEGONDS (A.-P.) (eds)
Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, Livre VI*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2017. Pp. cxv + 472. €55. 9782251006130.
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This enormous tome, added to the six previous such volumes (that on book 4 was so vast that it had to be divided into two), is still not the end of the Budé edition of Proclus’ *Commentary on the Parmenides*. There will still need to be one for book 7 (partly preserved in the Greek and partly in the Latin translation of William of Moerbeke). Book 6 commences the exegesis of the first hypothesis, continuing up to 138a1, and contains a good deal of fascinating material, including the preliminary questions of the preferred number of hypotheses – eight, nine or even ten? – and the proper subject of the first hypothesis – the One alone (Porphyry) or the whole henadic realm (Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus) or even no real subject (Origen the Platonist)? – but also detailed discussion of the sequence of negations proposed by Parmenides.

The introduction amounts to 125 pages, and comprises (1) a most useful and detailed analysis of the argument of book 6 (56 pages) and (2) an elaborate series of critical notes, covering: (a) variations in the totality of the manuscripts (AFRGP); (b) readings particular to ms. A

(Parisinus graecus 1810, the text worked over by George Pachymeres); (c) aberrant readings in the Latin translation of William of Moerbeke; and (d) – last but not least – a list of the divergences, 365 in all, between the present Budé edition and the Oxford edition of Carlos Steel. I cannot help feeling that these are all rather superfluous, and could have been adequately taken care of in the *apparatus criticus* (in which, of course, they do appear), but if Les Belles Lettres don't mind, then why should we?

All one can do, in face of this profusion, is to take some samples of the translation and commentary, and these I find, I am glad to say, most impressive. For a start, let us take the opening section of book 6 (1039–64 in Victor Cousin's edition), in which Proclus discusses the number and subject matters of the hypotheses – prefaced by a short discussion of the nature of henads (1043–51). To these 25 pages of text, Luna devotes 83 pages of commentary, all most useful. Issues here that interest me in particular are the origin of the doctrine of henads and Iamblichus' identification of the subject matter of the first and second hypotheses, a passage of text marred by an annoying lacuna.

On the matter of henads, Luna agrees with me (J. Dillon, 'Iamblichus and the origin of the doctrine of henads', *Phronesis* 17, 1972, 102–06; 'Iamblichus and henads again', in H.J. Blumenthal and E.G. Clark (eds), *The Divine Iamblichus: Philosopher and Man of Gods*, London 1993, 48–54), as against H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink in their Budé edition of the *Platonic Theology* (*Théologie Platonicienne*, Paris 1968), that the doctrine of henads, in at least some form, does go back to Iamblichus and was only elaborated by Syrianus; while on the question of the subject matter of the first two hypotheses, she presents a comprehensive account of the various stabs at filling the lacuna in the text of 1055.2. The most troublesome question is whether or not Proclus is saying that Iamblichus includes 'the intelligibles' (*ta noēta*) in the subject matter of the first hypothesis. Luna concludes, against Saffrey and Westerink, and I agree with her, that he does, leaving 'the Intellectual entities' (*ta noera*) as the subject matter of the second – but this does presuppose a rather idiosyncratic use of *noētos*, referring to 'archetypes' of the Forms, which are objects of Intellection, while themselves being superior to the realm of Intellect.

Then there is the question of the identity of the 'Philosopher from Rhodes' (1157.7), who comes

after Iamblichus and before Plutarch of Athens in Proclus' sequence of authorities, and who can really only be Iamblichus' dissident pupil Theodorus of Asine – the problem being that we know nothing of any connection of his with Rhodes. Once again, Luna provides a very thorough and judicious discussion of the problem, dismissing the rather desperate proposal of Harold Tarrant (*Thrasyllan Platonism*, Ithaca NY, 1993, 152–53) that the figure in question might be Thrasyllus or even Posidonius and casting doubt on the efforts of Saffrey to postulate corruption in the text, taking *ho ek Rhodou* as a garbled version of *Theodoros*. But Saffrey must be nearer to the truth – unless Theodorus had a holiday home on Rhodes that we are not aware of! There is really no other candidate that we know of, after all, between Iamblichus and Syrianus who commented on the dialogue.

The great virtue of this edition, after all, despite my earlier carping, is its comprehensive discussion of every aspect of the commentary, from textual details to larger issues of interpretation, which allow the reader to judge a given issue against a full spectrum of evidence. A nice example from later in the text is a remarkable passage, 1106.2–08.18, where Proclus presents, in his commentary on *Parmenides* 137c–d, (with disapproval) the efforts of some commentators after Plotinus who are concerned to bridge the divide between the ineffable transcendence and simplicity of the One and the salient characteristics of the realm of Intellect, such as Intellection, Being and various primary Forms, such as Goodness, Beauty or Sameness, by postulating antecedents of these at the level of the One, and indeed more than one level of these, for example above *nous*, *nootēs* and then *noēma* or above *kallos*, *kallotēs* and then *kallōma*. Since some reflection of this thoroughly bizarre theory turns up in Marius Victorinus, it has been suggested by various authorities, such as Emile Bréhier ('L'idée de néant et le problème de l'origine radicale dans le néoplatonisme grec', *RMM*, 1919, 443–75) and Pierre Hadot (*Porphyre et Victorinus* 1, Paris 1968, 355–75), that the author of this theory must be Porphyry.

The problem is, though, that there are two other views listed by Proclus, following on this, the second criticizing the first, and the third the second, but all concerned to attribute some form of transcendental characteristics to the One, with the purpose of explaining how it can be the cause of lower levels of reality, beginning with Intellect, if

it is totally devoid of characteristics itself. Oddly, all these three positions find reflections in Victorinus, and this has led Hadot to attribute them all to Porphyry. I am on record as demurring at this (J. Dillon. 'Porphyry and Iamblichus in Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides*', in J. Duffy and J. Peradotto (eds), *Gonimos: Neoplatonic and Byzantine Studies presented to L.G. Westerink*, Buffalo 1988, 21–48) and postulating instead a sequence of Amelius, Porphyry and Iamblichus as authors of the three views and proposing that Victorinus must have had some acquaintance with, perhaps, the *Parmenides Commentary* of Iamblichus (who would have provided criticisms of his predecessors).

Luna devotes fully 18 pages of commentary (330–48) to this passage, and contributes much of value, but she is not acquainted with my article (though she is, of course, with the Morrow-Dillon translation (Princeton 1987)). So, while accepting Iamblichus as the third authority, she does not consider the claim of Amelius to be the first, though the elaborate metaphysical structure proposed here is rather characteristic of him.

This, however, is a relatively minor detail. Overall, this is a superbly comprehensive piece of work, and blessedly free of the polemics which marred volume 4 of the same series. We may look forward to volume 7.

JOHN DILLON
Trinity College Dublin
DILLONJ@tcd.ie

SEAFORD (R.), WILKINS (J.) and WRIGHT (M.) (eds) **Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill**. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xi + 331. £70. 978198777250.

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With an impressive series of books, conference volumes and articles, Christopher Gill has been at the forefront of research on ancient notions of mind, person and self for several decades. His work is especially notable for its ability to move effectively across genres and disciplines, encompassing epic poetry, tragedy, philosophy and medicine. Gill has written about Latin as well as Greek authors, and his philosophical interests extend to modern ethics and philosophy of mind. He has also made notable contributions to specialist studies of Plato and Stoicism.

This volume originated in a conference at the University of Exeter that was organized in order to celebrate Gill's accomplishments on his retirement in 2013. Comprising a collection of 13 substantial papers, edited by three of his Exeter colleagues, the work is an appropriate reflection of Gill's multifarious interests, authored by senior and younger scholars from both sides of the Atlantic. It concludes with a ten-page bibliography of his publications during the 40 years from 1974 to 2014.

Seaford begins the volume with a 'historical sketch' of 'the *psuchē* from Homer to Plato' (chapter 1). Endorsing Bruno Snell's contentious claim that Homer lacked a unitary notion of the inner self (*The Discovery of the Mind*, New York 1982, chapter 1), Seaford proposes that this 'abstract' conception was eventually facilitated by the emergence of coined money. His main argument, to my mind, is more intricate than convincing, but he makes interesting points concerning the analogy between the invisible power of coinage and the invisible essence of the individual.

Three further papers deal directly with notions of soul and self: contributions by Nicholas Banner on 'the indeterminate self and its cultivation in Plotinus' (chapter 8), on 'survival and the self' by R.J. Hankinson (chapter 4), which explores difficult questions of personal identity, and by Emma Gee on 'The self and the underworld' (chapter 12). The latter, starting with Freud's notion of psychic topography, moves skillfully into the Vergilian underworld and concludes with an application of Lacanian topology to thoughts about how to make sense of 'afterlife topography'. This is a brilliant study, foreshadowing the author's forthcoming book, *Mapping the Afterlife in Greece and Rome*.

Hellenistic philosophy of mind is represented by two outstanding papers. In 'Epicurean versus Cyrenaic happiness' (chapter 5), David Sedley convincingly challenges the widespread view that Epicurus thought that duration makes no difference to the quantification of a pleasure. Whereas a Cyrenaic life is enjoyed only episodically during each pleasurable experience, Epicurus envisioned 'a complete lifetime of pleasures', to be enjoyed neither 'unitemporally' (the Cyrenaic notion) nor only in the present, but also in retrospect and prospect. The primary hallmark of Epicurean happiness, on this reading, is the capacity to contemplate the world without fear, especially the fear of death.