

144–81). But states were not alone in building this global polity. Nongovernmental actors of all sorts helped reinforce different values and goals that have become part of a complex world culture (see John Boli and George Thomas, eds, *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875*, 1999). The interstate system has helped spread and reinforce liberal values, but the inconsistencies between liberal ideas of equality and democracy and illiberal practices of inequality and exclusion are reproduced. It is these hypocrisies that provide opportunities for many civil society groups to mobilize people across national borders in an effort to advance human interests over national ones. Groups like Amnesty International, the International Olympics Committee, and the International Sociological Association are among a growing population of transnational associations that unite people around values and interests that cannot be fully realized within the boundaries of national polities. Such associations have expanded dramatically in recent decades, in part because of the greater ease of international transport and communication. But while many readily acknowledge this trend, few have seriously considered how it influences the citizenship regime.

When we consider the work of many transnational associations, it is clear that nationality is not the only identity that generates altruism and self-sacrifice. In fact, globalization has meant that contemporary states are less and less capable of motivating sacrifice on the part of citizens. Mary Kaldor addresses this problem in greater detail, providing an interesting complement to Spiro's discussion ("Nationalism and Globalization," *Nations and Nationalism* 2004; 10: 161–77). Activists who are passionate about protecting human rights or the environment are likely to feel more loyalty to others—regardless of nationality—who share their values than to compatriots who are indifferent or hostile to these core values. This is especially true when the policies of national governments directly contradict broader, human interests and values.

This is not to say that the national state and the institution of citizenship will be going away anytime soon. But it does mean that both institutions are changing, and Spiro's aim is to encourage new thinking about the future bases for community and solidarity. The expansion of transnational civil society plays a key role in facilitating the articulation and dissemination of new identities that extend beyond state boundaries and that provide a foundation for community that better addresses today's global reality. Scholars of global justice activism, such as Donatella della Porta, have demonstrated that transnational civil society projects have indeed helped generate new types of "flexible identities and multiple belongings" in response to the challenges posed by globalization ("Making the Polis: Social Forums and Democracy in the Global Justice Movement," *Mobilization* 2005; 10: 73–94). Such

reconceptualizations of community are essential for moving beyond citizenship to create new forms of social solidarity that can address the major global crises now unfolding.

**Response to Jackie Smith's review of *Beyond Citizenship American Identity After Globalization***

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— Peter Spiro

My thanks to Jackie Smith for her thoughtful observations on *Beyond Citizenship*. My only point of disagreement goes to the nature of a world that, if not truly postnational, has witnessed the dramatic rise of nonstate forms of association. On the one hand, the ability of individuals to more fully actuate identities not anchored in the state advances autonomy values. On the other hand, these nonstate forms of association should not be romanticized. They, too, will implicate exclusion and conflict.

I agree that various nonstate communities "unite people around values and interests that cannot be fully realized within the boundaries of national politics," and that "nationality is not the only identity that generates altruism and self-sacrifice." The core proposition of *Beyond Citizenship* is that the state (and the American state in particular) is waning as a location of community and redistribution, and that other forms of association are taking up the slack.

But I do not mean to elevate nonstate forms of community. Nonstate communities are no more or less "human" than national ones. In institutional form, nongovernmental organizations are political entities representing distinct political interests. Even groups that purport to advance universalist values work for nonuniversalist constituencies (consider, for instance, how slow Amnesty International has been to press economic, social, and cultural rights), never mind groups that by definition represent bounded communities (on the basis, for instance, of race, gender, sexual orientation, and disability). Nonstate communities are just as capable of reproducing "illiberal practices of inequality and exclusion" as are states.

Indeed, nonstate communities may have a greater tendency to such behavior to the extent that liberalism brackets private governance. That explains why liberal theorists are retreating to the relative safety of the state as a sanctuary for democracy and a site for redistribution; the alternative looks risky, perhaps even a little scary, as a matter of both practice and theory. But wishing for the retrenchment of the liberal state will not make it so, and nonstate governance (detached from the state) will have to be engaged. Smith and I appear to agree that the state is not what it used to be and that other forms of community are now consequential. But nonstate communities should not be given a pass on the scrutiny that theorists have applied to state-based predecessors. On the contrary, precisely

because nonstate communities (including transnational ones) are increasingly salient in the regulation of everyday life, they should be policed for injustice.

Citizenship has been a foundational vehicle for protecting against such injustice in the nation-state. Today's pressing question is whether the institution of citizenship can be put to work beyond the state. As globalization knocks the state off its pedestal, that challenge can no longer be evaded.

### **Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West.** By Daniel P. Aldrich. Ithaca and London:

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— Alexander Cooley, *Barnard College, Columbia University*

The popular slogan NIMBY—Not in My Back Yard—captures a classic dilemma that confronts policymakers: Although society as a whole requires certain basic public goods, such as energy supplies, improved infrastructure, and transportation hubs, individual communities are often unwilling to bear the localized costs and externalities of hosting these installations. In this fresh, insightful, and creative study, Daniel Aldrich explores the ways in which states decide to site controversial facilities and the types of instruments that public agencies employ to respond to societal opposition against these siting decisions.

Aldrich uses the term “public bads” to refer to the publicly necessary, but locally unpopular, need to establish installations to accommodate the growing demand for “energy, national defense, waste removal, transportation and correctional facilities” (p. 6). He notes that over the last few decades, the time required to build politically controversial facilities, such as nuclear power plants or liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, has increased markedly in the United States, Japan, and other advanced industrialized countries. Facility siting has become a highly charged political issue.

How, then, do states strategize about where to place these necessary public bads? The book's basic argument is that from a list of potentially technically feasible options, state agencies target locations that exhibit weaker civil society and community networks, while they avoid areas where stronger local community organizations might generate more vocal and sustained political opposition. Further, Aldrich argues that states have a distinct set of preferences about which policy instruments to use when placing divisive sites: When civil society is weak, states rely simply on coercive methods such as land expropriation and police action, whereas when civil society is stronger, states must formulate “soft control mechanisms” to co-opt or persuade anti-project associations and civil society networks by means of educational campaigns, selective incentives, or side payments. In-between cases of “moderate levels of civil society” necessitate instruments of “hard social con-

trol” designed to block citizen access, information, and mobilization. Thus, the process by which states employ one set of instruments over another is dynamic and remains contingent on the changing nature of civil society and its oppositional campaigns. States that previously relied on coercion when civil society was weak will adopt a new set of soft power strategies when confronted with reinvigorated community opposition.

To support his arguments, Aldrich draws upon a bundle of evidence gathered from extensive fieldwork in Japan and supplementary research in France. Japan is a particularly compelling case given its high population density, land scarcity, powerful state bureaucracies, and variety of citizens' associations and movements. The author skillfully blends insights from media accounts, interviews with state agencies and civil society members, and primary sources such as facilities listings. He constructs an original data set of more than five hundred siting decisions in Japan from 1955 to 1995 and finds strong support for the civil society hypothesis in the case of siting decisions that involved nuclear power plants and airports, though not dams. Instructively, he carefully outlines and rejects a number of competing explanations, showing that the strength of civil society is a better predictor for siting decisions than explanations that privilege purely technical criteria, partisan discrimination, environmental racism, economic conditions, and pork-barrel politics.

Though straightforward in its logic, the argument yields interesting and even counterintuitive findings and extensions. For example, areas experiencing rapid population growth, thereby breaking down their traditional community associations, make inviting targets for hosting controversial facilities. States routinely impose hidden utility or airport taxes in order to retain a funding pool from which to distribute incentives for future site fights. Even strong states routinely conduct citizens' surveys to determine levels of potential opposition prior to making siting decisions. And the exercise of holding public meetings and consultations with community organizations is more often than not an attempt by states to assess future targets for soft power strategies, not a genuine attempt at fostering open and transparent state–society dialogue. Viewed through the prism of state bureaucracies, the Machiavellian strategic logic of a broad range of state interactions with community representatives is revealed.

Chapters that compare and contrast the evolution of siting decisions about airports, dams, and nuclear power plants in Japan and France supplement Aldrich's statistical study of siting decisions in Japan. The chapter on airports recounts the now-famous case of the construction of Narita Airport outside of Tokyo and the intense and even violent opposition that it engendered among local activists and their political allies, though the author goes to some lengths to point out that this was an exceptional case. In